



អង្គជំនុំជម្រះវិសាមញ្ញក្នុងតុលាការកម្ពុជា  
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia  
Chambres Extraordinaires au sein des Tribunaux Cambodgiens

ព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា  
ជាតិ សាសនា ព្រះមហាក្សត្រ

Kingdom of Cambodia  
Nation Religion King  
Royaume du Cambodge  
Nation Religion Roi

អង្គជំនុំជម្រះសាលាដំបូង  
Trial Chamber  
Chambre de première instance

**ឯកសារដើម**  
**ORIGINAL/ORIGINAL**  
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TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

PUBLIC

Case File N° 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC

23 April 2015  
Trial Day 272

Before the Judges: NIL Nonn, Presiding  
Claudia FENZ  
Jean-Marc LAVERGNE  
YA Sokhan  
YOU Ottara  
Martin KAROPKIN (Reserve)  
THOU Mony (Reserve)

The Accused: NUON Chea  
KHIEU Samphan

Lawyers for the Accused:  
Victor KOPPE  
KONG Sam Onn  
Arthur VERCKEN

Trial Chamber Greffiers/Legal Officers:  
CHEA Sivhoang  
Robynne CROFT  
Russell HOPKINS  
EM Hoy

Lawyers for the Civil Parties:  
Marie GUIRAUD  
HONG Kimsuon  
SIN Soworn  
VEN Pov

For the Office of the Co-Prosecutors:  
Dale LYSAK  
SONG Chorvoin

For Court Management Section:  
UCH Arun  
SOUR Sotheavy

I N D E X

Mr. PECH Chim alias Ta Chim (2-TCW-809)

Questioning by Ms. SIN Soworn ..... page 3

Questioning by Ms. GUIRAUD..... page 12

Questioning by Judge LAVERGNE..... page 28

Questioning by The President (NIL Nonn) ..... page 51

Questioning by Mr. KOPPE ..... page 60

**List of Speakers:**

Language used unless specified otherwise in the transcript

Speaker	Language
The GREFFIER	Khmer
Ms. GUIRAUD	French
Mr. KOPPE	English
Judge LAVERGNE	French
Mr. LYSAK	English
Mr. PECH CHIM (2-TCW-809)	Khmer
The President (NIL Nonn)	Khmer
Ms. SIN SOWORN	Khmer

1

1 PROCEEDINGS

2 (Court opens at 0902H)

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 Please be seated. The Court is now in session.

5 In today's hearing, the Chamber will hear the testimony of Mr.

6 Pech Chim.

7 Ms. Chea Sivhoang, please report to the Chamber the attendance of

8 the parties to the proceedings.

9 THE GREFFIER:

10 Mr. President, for today's hearing, I note that all Parties to

11 the proceeding are present, except Mr. Son Arun, National Defence

12 Counsel for Mr. Nuon Chea is absent due to his health reason. And

13 Mr. Nuon Chea is present in the holding cell downstairs, and he

14 has waived his right to attend directly in this courtroom. And

15 the waiver of Mr. Nuon Chea has already been sent to the

16 Greffier. The witness who is brought before the Chamber today is

17 Mr. Pech Chim. Mr. Moeurn Sovann, the duty counsel, is also

18 present in this courtroom. Thank you, Mr. President.

19 MR. PRESIDENT:

20 Thank you, Ms. Sivhoang. Now the Chamber rules on the request by

21 Mr. Nuon Chea. The Chamber <has received a> request on waiver of

22 Mr. Nuon Chea, dated the 23rd of April 2015, certifying that due

23 to his health<, headache, back pain, he cannot <sit or>

24 concentrate <for long. And in order to effectively participate

25 in> future hearings, <> he <requests to waive> his right to

2

1 <participate in and> be present in the courtroom on the 23rd of  
2 April 2015 <hearing. He confirms that his counsel> has <> advised  
3 him <about the consequences> of this waiver, <> that <it cannot  
4 on any account be construed as a waiver of his rights to be tried  
5 fairly or to challenge evidence presented to or admitted by this  
6 Court at any time during this> trial.

7 [09.05.04]

8 <Having seen the medical report of Nuon Chea by the duty doctor  
9 for the Accused at the ECCC dated the 23rd of April 2015, <which>  
10 notes that <> Nuon Chea <> has chronic back pain and he has <a  
11 lot of> pain when he sits for a long time, <and recommends that  
12 the Chamber grants his request so that he can> follow the  
13 proceedings <remotely from> in the holding cell downstairs.  
14 <Based on the above information and pursuant to> Rule 81.5 of the  
15 ECCC <Internal Rules>, the Chamber grants <> Nuon Chea <his  
16 request> to follow <today's> proceedings <remotely> from the  
17 holding cell downstairs, <via> audio-visual <means>.

18 [08.07.54]

19 <The Chamber instructs the AV Unit personnel to link the  
20 proceedings to the room downstairs so that Nuon Chea <can follow.  
21 This applies to the whole day>.

22 <And I'd like to> hand <> the floor to the Lead Co-Lawyer for the  
23 Civil Parties to put <> questions to the witness<>. You may  
24 proceed.

25 MS. GUIRAUD:

3

1 Thank you, Mr. President. I'll give the floor to my colleague,  
2 and then afterwards I will ask a few questions.

3 QUESTIONING BY MS. SIN SOWORN:

4 Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning, Mr. President, Your  
5 Honours, and everyone in and around the courtroom.

6 Q. Good morning, Mr. Witness. My name is Sin Soworn. I'm a Lawyer  
7 <at Cambodian Defenders Project and a lawyer> for Civil Parties  
8 in Case 002. You have so far answered questions by the  
9 Co-Prosecutors in relation to Tram Kak cooperative and Krang Ta  
10 Chan. You are one of the most important witnesses in order to  
11 find <truth and> justice for the victims as well as the suspects,  
12 and for that, I seek your further cooperation on this matter.  
13 My first topic that I would like to get clarification from you is  
14 in relation to forced marriage during the regime. In your  
15 capacity as the secretary of District 105, were you aware of the  
16 marriage regulations?

17 [09.08.10]

18 MR. PECH CHIM:

19 A. I'd like to respond to your question in relation to the  
20 marriage regulations. Yes, indeed I knew about the regulations.  
21 Although it did not exist in the form of <any provision or  
22 articles>, it existed in the form of a common practice  
23 <disseminated> from the upper to the lower level, and we simply  
24 followed the practice. And I mentioned that at length yesterday.

25 Q. Thank you. Who or at what level such marriage principles were

4

1 created and disseminated to the lower level for implementation?

2 MR. PRESIDENT:

3 Mr. Pich Chim, please wait until the microphone is operational so  
4 that your voice will go through the interpretation system, and  
5 please only respond when you see the red light on the tip of the  
6 microphone.

7 [09.09.40]

8 MR. PECH CHIM:

9 A. In fact, on the practice or on the regulations of the  
10 marriage, we discussed amongst ourselves at the districts, <in  
11 accordance with> the <main> guidelines from the zone. And from my  
12 observation, <> there were some gaps in the practice. <Initially  
13 we planned to orally inquire as to whether all couples to be wed  
14 were satisfied, but> we were so busy at the district level <> we  
15 gave such <obligation to communes to do that job, however the  
16 communes authorised> unit chiefs. And as a result, for those  
17 couples who consented to the marriage they were happily living  
18 together, but for the <ones who did not consent, they  
19 consequently broke up in a short period of time.>

20 BY MS. SIN SOWORN:

21 Q. Thank you. Could you further tell the Chamber about the  
22 marriage principles that were practiced; <was> it commonly  
23 practiced throughout the country?

24 A. I do not know whether it was practiced nationwide. I only knew  
25 about the practice in the Southwest Zone. Even within the zone, I

5

1 did not know whether <> other sectors, for example 33 or 35,  
2 <applied this> common practice <> or not.

3 Q. Thank you. You just mentioned that some couples consented to  
4 the marriage, while others did not, and eventually they got  
5 <divorced>. Can you tell the Chamber clearly as to the consensual  
6 marriage between the couples? Did such events take place <in 75  
7 or in 71 or in 72>? Which year did it happen exactly?

8 [09.12.17]

9 A. In fact, it mostly happened in 1975. Wars raged on in 1971, 72  
10 <and 73>, and there was only a handful of marriages during those  
11 years. <And the wedding <must be> held <silently, for> the  
12 <joyful> music <> played <> could mentally affect those who were  
13 busy themselves in the front battlefield, <as a result the  
14 movement could not convince people to go to battlefields.  
15 Usually> the marriage ceremony at that time was done secretly. I  
16 refer to the period of '71 through '73. However, it became more  
17 widespread and open after the country was liberated nationwide in  
18 1975. By that time, both the female and the male <youth grew  
19 older>, so the regulations seemed to <be flexible to accommodate  
20 the mass wedding. The weddings then> were <organised in one or  
21 two big groups. The practice became loose, and people proceeded>  
22 more quickly.

23 [09.13.50]

24 That happened in a rather large scale at that time, although  
25 there was no clear or precise instructions from the upper level.



6

1 <Management at that time was like a family>. And we also <> tried  
2 to follow the tradition that the couples <had to> get married  
3 first before <consummating, and the public witnessed their  
4 marriages then they became legitimate husband and wife.>

5 Q. Thank you. You said that in 1975 such wedding <practice became  
6 loose,> and it was held <in> a large <number of couples>. Can you  
7 further expand on that point?

8 A. When I said it was <loose;> it means that usually <all  
9 marriage> proposals <were> approved <without rejection. The>  
10 relaxed <situation> in that sense <was not a state of anarchy>.  
11 So, usually we would approve any proposals, so that the unit and  
12 the commune chiefs could further <organise the events>.

13 Q. Thank you. And you just said that those couples, they  
14 consented to their marriage. Were all of them consented, or were  
15 some of them forced to marry?

16 A. I did not have a full understanding on this matter, but I  
17 believe both sides were asked about the marriage before they were  
18 actually married. <With the approval response letter to the  
19 marriage proposal, we informed the chief of units or chief of  
20 communes to review it. It took 6 or 7 days before the wedding was  
21 held, I am not quite sure if the commune chiefs had thoroughly  
22 reviewed the intentions and inquired with all proposed couples.  
23 At the events, on behalf of the district and the Angka, we asked  
24 each couple. Some couples eloquently responded whereas fewer  
25 couples were reluctant to respond. So it was obvious they did not

1 consent> to the marriage.

2 [09.17.07]

3 <Apparently, it could be inferred that they were forced to get  
4 married. <That was the first point.>

5 Secondly, the wedding ceremony <held at> commune level <was  
6 normally done with several couples. But when a number of communes  
7 organised marriages at the same time, Bong Khom was invited to  
8 preside over the ceremony. Bong, I refer to Bong Khom. She was  
9 considered as "mae" or mother of all single women. She was in  
10 charge of thousands of single women in the population. If the  
11 events were organised at individual communes the number of  
12 couples to be married was pretty small.>

13 [09.18.06]

14 <For example, if there were 12 communes and in each commune there  
15 were 100 people getting married at the same time and same place,  
16 therefore, there would be more than one thousand people getting  
17 married. Or there were 12 communes and in each commune there were  
18 10 people getting married, then there would be more than one  
19 hundred people getting married. That's why> the wedding  
20 ceremonies were held <on> a large scale.

21 Q. Thank you. So every marriage, through your personal  
22 observation, was that you instructed the unit chief to enquire  
23 from the -- from the youth whether they consented to the  
24 marriage. And what about <> parents of those people? Were you  
25 aware <of> the parents also consented to the proposed marriage?

8

1 A. I also took part in the enquiry. I made a further enquiry with  
2 those people. <And> when I asked them, they replied that they  
3 consented to the proposed marriage. And none of them ever said  
4 that he or she disagreed or <did> not consent to the marriage. <I  
5 could observe the couples who were reluctant to respond,> in my  
6 mind, I would say <they> were afraid. <So,> I would postpone that  
7 couple's marriage. <That happened at the events that Bong Khom  
8 and I attended. I did not know> marriage ceremonies took place in  
9 other offices, <which was far away in> the forests <>. So, I  
10 could not have a full understanding about that because they were  
11 not close to where I could observe. And there was a chief there,  
12 <> the chief <may force people to get married; I don't know>.  
13 [09.21.09]

14 Q. Thank you. And let me ask you whether the wedding ceremony was  
15 organized according to the Cambodian tradition? For example,  
16 there was a sermon by a monk and then there was a traditional  
17 hair-cutting ceremony, for instance?

18 A. No. At that time there was no band, so no music. <Instead, the  
19 event> was <organised as follows. First of all the Master of  
20 Ceremony of the wedding announced the event. All attendees were  
21 required to salute the souls of those who died in the struggle>.  
22 And then <each> couple would be requested to present themselves.  
23 <They sat on chairs and informed whether they consented to the  
24 marriage. Once> they did so, then they would be allowed to sit  
25 <side by side>.

1 [09.22.39]

2 <Then> the same process would follow until the last couple. And  
3 when the wedding ceremony concluded, then the <Chairman> would  
4 wish the newlywed couples and the attendants all the best. And  
5 finally there would be a dining reception, depending on what we  
6 could afford. There could be cooked rice with dessert.

7 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Court at -- when such ceremonies  
8 were organized? I mean, whether they were organized during the  
9 day time or during the night time?

10 A. The ceremonies were <organised> during the day time,  
11 <apparently, in the morning> and <it> usually <concluded around 1  
12 o'clock in the afternoon, and the reception started afterward>.

13 Q. Thank you. So, after the conclusion of the ceremony, where did  
14 the couple go? Was there a house for each couple to go to?

15 A. If they had their relatives or parents living nearby, then  
16 they would be allowed to go there to stay <and greet their  
17 parents or relatives>, and they would be allowed to <be on leave>  
18 for a while. <> And the period <of time would be decided by their  
19 respective unit chiefs. They were on leave at least> seven days  
20 to a fortnight <to reunite with their parents>.

21 [09.25.02]

22 Q. Thank you. Did you observe, or did you know from hearing other  
23 people, that militia would eavesdrop at night time on those  
24 newlywed couples?

25 A. I did not know for sure about that, only later on I <> heard

10

1 <> that militia did eavesdrop on those people. But to my  
2 understanding, it did not happen. And the fact is that the female  
3 unit chief was considered as the mother of those women, <she  
4 supervised 50 or 100 women> and she would want to know whether  
5 the unit members -- that is, those married women, consented to  
6 consummate their wedding. So, usually the female unit's chief  
7 would do that with their unit members, as usually the married  
8 women were assigned rooms or houses to stay, <whereas the others  
9 were working faraway in the fields>.

10 [09.26.58]

11 Q. Thank you. And through your observation, if some couples, some  
12 newly-married couples, did not agree to consummate their  
13 marriage, <was torture inflicted on them, do you know>?

14 A. No, I was not aware of that.

15 Q. Thank you. You just told the Chamber that after their  
16 marriage, they could live together as a husband and wife for a  
17 period between seven days to a fortnight then they would go  
18 separately to their respective unit. And how long after were they  
19 allowed to reunite? And how long would they be <> allowed to stay  
20 together <>?

21 A. After they got married, they would be allowed to rest, to stay  
22 together for between a week to two weeks, and their next reunion  
23 would be varied. For example, if the husbands were soldiers, they  
24 would return to their base, <or> to the battlefield at the  
25 border. And only when they could, they would seek <permission> to

11

1 return to meet with their <> wives, maybe for <20 days or for  
2 half a month, or even between two to three months. If they were  
3 allowed for a week, they would stay for a week and if they were  
4 allowed for a ten day leave, they would stay for ten days.> And  
5 besides that, they <asked after one another> through letters <by  
6 ammunition transporters>.

7 [09.29.22]

8 Q. Thank you. So, what you said is something that happened within  
9 your region, and it's not nationwide. Am I correct in saying so?

10 A. Yes. I can only say about <> the families in my area.

11 Q. Thank you. Did you ever observe through those mass or  
12 multi-couple marriages, about the impressions of their parents?  
13 <For the wedding were simply done and vowed for the Angkar, and  
14 there was no participation from the parents.> Were the parents,  
15 or the people, satisfied with such wedding organization by  
16 Angkar?

17 [09.30.30]

18 A. I'd like to give you two points. First, it's my personal view  
19 as a human being. Of course, <the parent> would be upset. < I  
20 myself would be upset, for my child was being taken to marry  
21 without my participation>. Second point, <> some of them <were  
22 not> upset <> because they trusted and acknowledged the wedding.  
23 Yeay Khom, who was in charge of female units, made fun of me that  
24 I had taken a lot of her daughters to marry. I replied that she  
25 was the one who had a lot of daughters; I merely follow her.>

1 <Q. Thank you.>

2 <A. I would like to add another point. The public expressed their  
3 satisfaction that Angkar organised the wedding and as the result,  
4 the couple would be prosperous.>

5 Q. What about the personal view of the <parents, relatives, or  
6 individuals, would> they be able to express their personal  
7 opinions against the will of Angkar at the time?

8 A. Nobody protested, but sometimes they <informed the chief of>  
9 units, <to Khom or to the person who was close to her. One> would  
10 say he or she did not like <his or her> partner. However, there  
11 were only a few cases of that<. We consulted with them and the  
12 couple agreed to get divorced, so we followed their will; that>  
13 happened.

14 [09.33.11]

15 MS. SIN SOWORN:

16 Mr. President, I have no further questions, and I would like to  
17 ask to cede the floor to my colleague.

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 Thank you. You may proceed.

20 QUESTIONING BY MS. GUIRAUD:

21 Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, everyone. Good morning,

22 <Mr.> Witness. My name is Marie Guiraud. I am Lawyer for the  
23 consolidated group of civil parties participating in this trial.

24 I have a few questions to put to you today regarding life in the  
25 cooperatives, living conditions in <the> cooperatives in Tram Kak

13

1 district.

2 [09.33.54]

3 Q. Over the past two days you've explained to us what your duties  
4 and responsibilities in Tram Kak were, and the manner in which  
5 you supervised <the> arrival of 17 April People and <> issues  
6 regarding food and housing. <Hence, I'd like to> put a few  
7 questions to you in relation to your duties and responsibilities  
8 at the time.

9 The first question I would like to put to you is as follows: can  
10 you explain to us how and who decided in Tram Kak district, to  
11 establish work units in the cooperatives? As a matter of fact,  
12 we've heard several testimonies since the beginning of this  
13 trial, which have <allowed> us to understand that there were  
14 <women's units, children's units,>, mobile units, and specialized  
15 units. I would like to know how those units were established at  
16 Tram Kak?

17 [09.35.01]

18 A. Mr. President, for the cooperative work in Tram Kak, Ta Mok  
19 <directly instructed village chiefs and commune chiefs to  
20 implement it.> But as for the commune or the district, for  
21 instance <I myself> did not know what a cooperative was all  
22 about. We only understood <> that <people would eat communally at  
23 communal dining halls. In each village there would be a dining  
24 hall, so in a commune of 10 villages, there would be 10 communal  
25 dining halls>.



14

1 Q. Thank you.

2 A. Later, Ta Mok <told us> that we should have only one dining  
3 hall for one commune. In other words, we would have only one  
4 kitchen in the commune. But it was not possible at that time, so  
5 <> they <had those communes compete. Any> commune <who> could  
6 <manage to> have one common dining hall, then that would become a  
7 model <cooperative>. And other <communes that had three or fours  
8 dinning halls would be considered as the second and so on>. So we  
9 had to endeavour to achieve that. People would argue with this,  
10 but it was the order from Angkar. That's why people had to  
11 follow. So, the order came from the upper authority, and we had  
12 no choice but to do it. So, we had to prepare <> one common  
13 <kitchen. Of course,> it saved <> time and <labour forces i.e. we  
14 kept some people to prepare cooking whereas, others went to build  
15 dams, to dig canals and to cultivate rice paddy>.

16 [09.38.08]

17 And as for the <organising> of the <units>, at that time there  
18 were <boys>, so <a male youth was designated to be in charge of  
19 leading boy's> groups <to work and to learn to be well-behaved.  
20 Girls were under a female youth; all adult females were under  
21 supervision of the district chief. Unit chiefs at district level  
22 led them to work. Male mobile units and adults, who were building  
23 dykes and dams, rice paddy cultivating, were under my  
24 supervision>.

25 [09.39.10]

15

1 <All workforces were assigned to cultivate rice paddy and to  
2 construct dams. We also grew cassava. For rice paddy production,  
3 we managed to produce two times per year which yielded 3 tons per  
4 each hectare. I repeatedly informed about that; I am not a  
5 boastful person, however I could do it. I could produce 3 tons of  
6 rice paddy per hectare, and in total we had 25,000> hectares <of  
7 paddy fields. Besides arable land for rice paddy, we managed to  
8 grow cassava in a total area of over 1,000 hectares, or likely  
9 1,500 hectares. We supplied to all cooperatives throughout the  
10 district.> In Sector 25, for example, they could not do any  
11 farming; <they went to ask for supplies> we <gave> them <rice  
12 seeds and two trucks of cassava. Sector 15 also went to ask for  
13 supplies; we gave them one or two trucks of cassava, rice seeds  
14 and rice grains for eating>.

15 [09.40.33]

16 In the district I governed, <people ate cooked> rice, and <of  
17 course we> sometimes <had> gruel as well. But, as we could  
18 harvest more crops, then all of them ate rice, not gruel.  
19 So, <> we had to divide them into children, <male, and female  
20 youth units for> production <. Commune chiefs had to arrange the  
21 work.> At that time, wherever there was water, we could <see rice  
22 seedlings were grown. I monitored all communes every day, and  
23 they had to implement the plan. It looked> rather stringent, but  
24 in terms of torturing other people or so, there was no such thing  
25 in the district I governed. <If people had enough food to eat,

1 they would not get angry with me.>

2 [09.41.41]

3 Q. Thank you. When you say that discipline was very strict, what  
4 do you mean?

5 A. Strict, by being strict, I meant that they had to <do it.

6 There was no regulation proclaimed in any article; it was merely  
7 verbal instruction that they had to implement. In simple terms,  
8 it was tough wording>.

9 Q. Thank you. A while ago, you made mention of the presence of  
10 youth units and <children's> units <> in the district. The  
11 establishment of <these units>, was it ordered by Ta Mok? <If so,  
12 what explanation> did you receive in order that such units be  
13 established?

14 A. The reason for the establishment of the various units was to  
15 take firm control of the forces. <They had full grasp of forces  
16 in their respective units; for example, how many male youths,  
17 female youths and children? How was their health condition? The  
18 number of members who went to work and the number of forces who  
19 remained at their shelter and so on.>

20 [09.43.44]

21 <> For example, there were 200 people <supposed to work, but>  
22 only 50 people <were working. There was no one who could tell,  
23 but only the unit chiefs could confirm what had happened.  
24 Without> the unit chiefs, we would not be able to grasp>  
25 information, <therefore, they were established to monitor and

1 organise forces, and work in timely manner>.

2 Q. Thank you. You stated that it was important for you to know  
3 who was lazy. Can you explain to us what happened to people who  
4 were considered as being lazy?

5 A. Those who were lazy, we would <educate and instruct> them. We  
6 did not take hard measures against them. Some of them were  
7 <apparently> sick<, and could not work. If the chief of the unit  
8 was wise and thorough in monitoring, we then trusted him. But in  
9 the case that the chief was not smart enough and he also had  
10 conflict with his deputy <who tried to show off in order to gain  
11 a reputation, we then had to monitor them ourselves. In such  
12 cases>, we had to go and find out directly <from the unit after  
13 receiving a report. If it was in line with what the unit chief  
14 reported, it would be good, but otherwise we would have to  
15 convene them for discipline, and we gave them advice to diffuse  
16 conflicts if there were. <It was educational not frightening.  
17 That's all>

18 [09.46.29]

19 Q. <Thank you.> Regarding disciplinary measures applicable to  
20 lazy persons, can you give us examples of disciplinary measures  
21 that were applied? And <could some people be arrested for being  
22 "lazy", to use that term?>

23 A. I am talking about the overall management within the district  
24 level. There was no arrest <made so far. If the case was very  
25 serious, I had the individual called to meet in person. We were

18

1 in> upper level; we had more experience , we understand the plan,  
2 and we could see from the top. And then we would find out the  
3 shortcoming at the lower level. So we would guide them and advise  
4 them directly <on> what <> the mistake <was> and what should be  
5 done in order to improve the performance. That was it. And then  
6 we would let them go back. And if we found that there was  
7 conflict within each unit, then we would advise them. Or  
8 sometimes, we designated that person to a different unit. <If  
9 they were good, we would promote them.> And <if> we <did not go>  
10 to observe <each unit> directly <and the conflict had occurred  
11 one, two or three times; we would agree to arrest the people>.  
12 Sometimes, we heard the report, <but> we did not believe it. And  
13 then we <> had to go and find out what happened on the ground.<  
14 That was the experience of the leadership.>

15 [09.48.49]

16 Q. Thank you. You have stated that sometimes you went <straight>  
17 to the units to see for yourself what <> the situation <was among  
18 the units>. Were working conditions in those units, to your mind,  
19 appropriate? Or <did you have> the impression that the workload  
20 was <> very significant for various units<, or for all the  
21 units>? Can you describe to us what these working conditions in  
22 the units were as you saw them?

23 A<In my experience, if there was such case, I went to ask four or  
24 five members of the unit at the base while their chief >was not  
25 there. <After getting the information from them, I verified their

19

1 answers> with the report. And then if it was consistent, I would  
2 not put the blame on the unit chief. But if not, then I would  
3 convene the unit chief to advise. <For example, if the unit chief  
4 <said he/she> was sick<, we had to compromise.>

5 [09.50.34]

6 Q. Thank you, Witness. Regarding working conditions, for  
7 instance, the working hours assigned to different members of the  
8 unit with a view to achieving the objectives that you were tasked  
9 with guaranteeing, did you have the impression <at the time> that  
10 people worked <a lot,> too much <>? <Or were> the working  
11 conditions, <in your opinion,> appropriate?

12 A. I was about to answer that question concerning the working  
13 condition. Actually the work output was quite similar. Of course,  
14 there were certain shortcomings in certain units; that was  
15 natural, that was not unusual. Certain unit were very active,  
16 productive but others were not. And when we went there, we would  
17 observe that certain people could carry a bag of rice, <or some  
18 others> could not even carry <a> half <bag> of the rice <>, for  
19 example. <> And then when I witnessed that, I only advised <>  
20 them that we had to help one another, <and do not argue over  
21 petty matters>.

22 [09.52.06]

23 That was my approach. At that time, generally people would  
24 <agree, including comrade Khom who addressed me as an uncle.  
25 Actually, I am older than her. We observed the workforce against

20

1 the output, for they had to stick to their work, they had to  
2 receive food supplies, medicines, shelters. I would spare some  
3 forces to collect thatch for making roof, to cut trees to make  
4 floor. They were> newcomers; they did not have any hammocks. <We  
5 were busy in addressing the shelter, so the yield was not that  
6 good. That is it.>

7 [09.53.23]

8 Q. Thank you, <Mr.> Witness. We have heard several witnesses and  
9 civil parties, particularly two civil parties who worked in  
10 children's units in Tram Kak district. And they explained to us  
11 that the working conditions were particularly difficult <for  
12 them> because they were aged only eight or nine at the time.  
13 While you were at Tram Kak, did you have the opportunity to visit  
14 children's units? And can you tell us whether working conditions  
15 in those units appeared to be acceptable to you?

16 [09.54.04]

17 A. There were many places and I did not recall whether I had  
18 visited <them. For instance, I went to Kus to visit the childrens  
19 and the girls units there.. I mostly met with chiefs of the  
20 children's units at communal meetings. I instructed and set out  
21 the plan. Concerning working conditions, children <> did not have  
22 to do hard work<. They helped making fertilizer, in which they  
23 cut and gathered the Siam weed and place in a dug hole for  
24 decomposing. And they studied in their free time. The children  
25 were fine; the problem was from their chiefs. Because I did not

1 pay much attention because, they were not knowledgeable>.  
2 Q. Thank you, <Mr.> Witness. I would like you to react to the  
3 testimony of a civil party, who testified shortly before the  
4 Khmer New Year. That person had been a children's work unit in  
5 Leay Bour commune, in Tram Kak district. That person is called  
6 Oum Vannak. And that person stated during <her> testimony before  
7 the Chamber in E1/288.1 at about 13.44; and I'll read out to you  
8 what that person stated, Witness, <to have you react. This person  
9 was about 9 years old at the time of the event.>

10 "We were asked to transport <soil> from 6 a.m. to 11.30 a.m. at  
11 midday. If we did not succeed to achieve the objectives assigned  
12 to us, we were deprived of food. A group of 10 children had to  
13 transport 10 cubic metres. At times we achieved that objective  
14 and at times, we didn't. If the <soil> was loose, we would work  
15 from morning to evening and in that case, <we> would succeed <at  
16 meeting> the quotas. And if the <soil> was hard, we didn't  
17 succeed and we were deprived of gruel".

18 I'd like you to react, Mr. Witness, to this statement, because  
19 we've heard many civil parties and witnesses explain that working  
20 conditions were sometimes very difficult. Is it something that  
21 you were able to observe yourself when you were in Tram Kak?

22 [09.56.59]

23 A. I never encountered <such a matter. They> had their breakfast  
24 <in the morning; and they had lunch at 11 a.m.> I <> admit that  
25 there were <loopholes> in the management. <Generally speaking,



1 the children's unit chiefs also experimented in their approaches.  
2 When they did not succeed in implementation, they should inform  
3 the upper level. They should not coerce; and it was wrong to do  
4 so. We at the upper level thought that it went on well and did  
5 not monitor properly, for we were very busy. There were two main  
6 tasks that children had to do: making fertilizer and studying. We  
7 were short of materials, so they had to use clay to write on a  
8 piece of board, We did not have black board for them. For the  
9 earth work, they were not obliged to do it. Chief of the unit  
10 really curried favour with their supervisors. I would address it  
11 if I had seen this matter. There was a loophole in fact>.

12 [09.59.05]

13 Q. Did the food seem adequate to you in order to feed the workers  
14 in Tram Kak district?

15 A. The food ration was there although it may not be for them to  
16 eat to their own content. <If one wanted to be full, they had to  
17 find supplements. We had cassava and it was distributed to the  
18 cooperative to cook for children. On behalf of the district, I  
19 suggested to communes to distribute to cooperatives. They might  
20 forget children. Cassava was grown on more than a thousand  
21 hectares of land which was used to supplement with rice. We  
22 donated to elsewhere, but we may forget our own fellows. We were  
23 very busy and even sometimes we forgot our own meal. And we paid  
24 attention to the guests who came to request supplies>.

25 Q. Thank you. You said on the first day when you testified here,

1 and I quote: "we wanted to do too much and we erred and we  
2 <sowed> distrust <among> the population". As of which moment,  
3 <Mr.> Witness, did you get the impression that you <had  
4 collectively made a mistake>? When you were at Tram Kak, did you  
5 already have the impression that you were going down the wrong  
6 <path> and that finally, you had generated distrust <among> the  
7 population?

8 [10.01.35]

9 A. <I am sharing my personal experience> and allow me to expand  
10 on that. After the coup d'état, <late> king father went into the  
11 <Maquis> forest <. One hundred to 105 teachers in rural areas  
12 fled to Tram Kak district to join the fight> to get <> King  
13 Father back into the government. And they were in <the Front  
14 Movement. Generally speaking, there was a secret movement in  
15 Cambodia, namely Khmer Rouge, in Tram Kak in Takeo, Kampot,  
16 Samlout in Battambang, Brasaut district (sic) in Svay Rieng and  
17 Prey Veng. Khmer Rouge came down from the mountains to rural  
18 areas proclaimed the Front organisational structure. The King  
19 Father was the Chairman, Khieu Samphan, Hou Nim and Hou Yuon were  
20 members.>

21 [10.03.15]

22 <I joined> the movement in order to demand the return of <the  
23 King Father>. So, after the front had been organised, the people  
24 returned from the forest. <They were very vigilant, and they did  
25 not trust the internal revolutionary forces. They had the motto

24

1 "Be vigilante and protect the revolution". At that time> people  
2 <were cooperative and> worked <together. They designated who  
3 worked with who and at what level, before the conference to  
4 announce the membership of district and commune committees>. And  
5 of course, people <came> to seek <> assistance or  
6 intervention<-->

7 [10.05.53]

8 Q. I understand of course that you want to put everything back in  
9 context but unfortunately my time is very limited. I simply  
10 wanted to know if back then, when you were at Tram Kak, and when  
11 you were supervising the work units, <if> the issues of food and  
12 of lodging gave you the impression that you <had gone> down the  
13 wrong path. That is to say, that <in general,> the principles  
14 that you <were implementing> were not working; <is that something  
15 you thought> about <> back then or did I <misinterpret> what you  
16 said at the beginning of the hearing?

17 A. In fact, I probably made a rather lengthy response and maybe  
18 not to the point that you want me to answer. I -- actually I  
19 cannot recall the main point that you asked in your question.  
20 Could you please repeat the points that you want me to respond?

21 [10.07.06]

22 MR. PRESIDENT:

23 Counsel, could you please repeat your question as the witness  
24 cannot recall it.

25 BY MS. GUIRAUD:

1 Certainly, Mr. President. My question, <Mr.> Witness, was <as  
2 follows:> you said during the first day you testified here and I  
3 quote, "we wanted to do too much and we went down the wrong path.  
4 We <sowed> distrust <among> the population." So I wanted to know  
5 <> if in 1975 and 1976, and at the beginning of 1977, when you  
6 were at Tram Kak, if you already had the impression that you had  
7 gone down the wrong path. Did you have the impression that the  
8 policies that you were implementing and that you explained to us  
9 this morning -- division of labour in <the> units,  
10 collectivization -- did you already have the impression back then  
11 that these principles would not work?

12 [10.08.12]

13 MR. PECH CHIM:

14 A. At that time, <> people were <content> with the <Front's>  
15 lines. And they <were enthusiastic about the implementation>. Of  
16 course, there were a few <people who expressed discontent, and  
17 we had to resolve <and explain> the matters through mass  
18 meetings. <That was> how we <resolved> the issues. <Ninety> per  
19 cent of <population agreed> to our lines, <but> only <four to 5>  
20 per cent <disagreed, hence we needed to resolve it. I obviously  
21 explained in> the mass meetings <that 90 per cent of population  
22 satisfied with revolutionary movement; it was useless for a few  
23 people opposed it. It would be better for > them to re-freshen  
24 themselves <. I frankly told them. Other cadres admired what I  
25 talked to them and they would take my words as lessons learned in

1 future meetings>.

2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Witness. I have two last questions for you.

3 Earlier on, you said to us in your testimony, when you were

4 speaking about the working conditions and about the organisation

5 of the units, that you would report to the leaders <to> try to

6 understand, <alongside> them, where the problems <and weaknesses>

7 lay. And I wanted to know what kind of reports you would <submit

8 to> the leaders. And if <> at times <> you would mention <>

9 erroneous information, <in these reports>, in order not to alert

10 them about the situation in the units?

11 [10.10.24]

12 A. The report was about the <> situation<, i.e. what the

13 management was like, what the hostile conflict was like and how

14 to solve the issues and what the future plans were. The economic

15 section would report> on the <harvesting of rice. The rubber

16 plant section reported on the <collecting> of <resin. Be aware

17 that rubber made up to 70% of country's economy. We reported> to

18 the upper level. Usually, at the <end of the> report <we> would

19 express our comments and suggestions and seek advice> and the

20 measures <to be> taken. <We needed to include the future plan,

21 for instance further education, increasing of rice and cassava

22 production, reconciliation of conflicts and so on. In case that a

23 serious> conflict could not be resolved, <> the matter would be

24 referred to the upper <level>.

25 [10.12.02]

1 <But it was very rare that I referred any case to upper level,  
2 for I knew they were very busy. Moreover, we were the ones, who  
3 had been through thick and thin in the base, knew much more than  
4 them>. <I avoid referring the petty matters to upper level,  
5 otherwise they would be overwhelmed.> And that is all.

6 Q. Thank you. My last question. You were speaking about the  
7 difficult situations. Can you give us an example of a situation  
8 that warranted <being reported> to the <upper> echelon?

9 [10.13.08]

10 A. It is rather difficult to <precisely clarify> that. Usually,  
11 the report could not contain everything. <The situation report>  
12 would encompass <internal> and <external matters>, the situation  
13 of <the population> whether the people followed <the> movement  
14 <entirely> or <any percentage>, <for> example<, there was 70 per  
15 cent of the population who followed the revolutionary's line,  
16 whereas> 30 per cent of the population did not want to follow us  
17 <etc.> This is just an example. <We also included what issues had  
18 been solved and as well as on economic matters. We had to  
19 precisely report to the upper level, otherwise, the upper echelon  
20 would not have a full grasp of the situation. That was the way to  
21 work in Khmer Rouge time. Moreover, we needed to suggest how  
22 things could be done better and request for their approval>.

23 [10.14.42]

24 MS. GUIRAUD:

25 Thank you, Mr. Witness. I believe that my time is up, Mr.

1 President, thank you very much. Thank you very much, <Mr.>

2 Witness, for having answered my questions.

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 Thank you. The time is convenient for a short break. We take a  
5 break now and return at twenty-five to 11.00.

6 And court officer, please assist the witness in the room for the  
7 witnesses and <the expert> during this break, and invite him  
8 along with the duty counsel into the courtroom at twenty-five to  
9 11.00.

10 The Court is now in recess.

11 (Court recesses from 1015H to 1036H)

12 MR. PRESIDENT:

13 Please be seated. The Court is now back in session.

14 Before handing over the floor to the Defence team, I wish to turn  
15 to my colleague on the Bench. If you have any questions to put to  
16 the Party, you may proceed.

17 Judge Lavergne, you may proceed now.

18 [10.37.18]

19 QUESTIONING BY JUDGE LAVERGNE:

20 Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, Mr. Witness. I have a few  
21 follow-up questions for you.

22 Q. First of all, questions regarding your family. Can you tell  
23 us, for starters, whether you have any family ties with Ta Mok?

24 MR. PECH CHIM:

25 A. I <am related to> Ta Mok. <Apparently, we were distance

1 relatives>. We <are> not biological brothers> or <cousins>.

2 [10.38.09]

3 Q. And since when had you known Ta Mok?

4 A. When I was young, I met him once. <After leaving his monkhood,  
5 he came to visit my mother, and he addressed my mother as "Aunt".

6 He was called Choeun (phonetic), not Ta Mok at that time. My  
7 mother introduced me and suggested I address him <as> brother<.

8 Although we are distance relatives, we were always in touch for  
9 any ceremonies organised in the two families. I did not receive>

10 political <education from him though>,I studied <at a> French

11 school <located in Wat Phchoek Chrum which is far away from

12 Trapeang Thum. After being educated at the French school, Angkar

13 transferred me to study in> Phnom Penh. <He was ordained and

14 studied at a Buddhist school.>

15 [10.39.32]

16 Q. Thank you. If I understand what you're saying, therefore Ta  
17 Mok was your mother's nephew; is that correct?

18 A. <You are correct, but> he was not my mother's biological  
19 nephew; <> he was <a distance nephew>.

20 Q. Very well. Let us now talk about your <> siblings. You said

21 <you> were <one of six> children and <that> you had two brothers

22 -- Pech Nau and Pech Kit, who <held responsibilities> during

23 <the> Democratic Kampuchea <regime>. Another witness said you

24 <may have> had another brother called Ta Kou, whose name may have

25 also been Ta Sramaum. Did you have an elder brother by that name?



1 A. I had a brother <whose> name <was> Kou. He was the twin of  
2 Kit. And <after the twins, I> had another elder sister, and then  
3 <> it was me. <I am now 79 years-old. My mother must have been  
4 over one hundred years of age if she were alive. My older sisters  
5 died in their eighty's. The last sibling died last year. It's  
6 only me who is alive and organise their funeral ceremonies>.

7 [10.41.47]

8 Q. Is Kou still alive? And if he is deceased, can you tell us  
9 under what circumstances he died?

10 A. Brother Kou passed away long time ago. <In Sangkum Reastr  
11 Niyum era> I was studying in Phnom Penh. It was in 1968 <when  
12 the government cracked down on the> Khmer Rouge <movement, so the  
13 situation was intensified>. He <was accused of being a Khmer  
14 Rouge, and the government hunted him down. He fled home. All  
15 family members were not aware of where he had gone to>. And  
16 <about a> year later, <we> learned from others that he <had> left  
17 with his wife <to make their living in> Kampong Seila <near a>  
18 military barrack. And he passed away. I heard from others that he  
19 <and another man, who had> joined the Khmer Rouge <and had a  
20 carbine, went into an old abandoned village. They wanted to pick  
21 some coconuts. The guy told him that he was not well, so my  
22 brother climbed the tree to pick the fruit. The guy shot him  
23 thrice, and he fell off onto the ground. His dead body was  
24 brought to display on a road side, and labelled him as "Sramaum  
25 (phonetic), the Khmer Rouge". Before he died; he> had four

31

1 children: two <boys> and two <girls. The boys were transferred to  
2 Battambang along with> Ta Mok <during Khmer Rouge period; I have  
3 never heard from them> since <>.

4 [10.45.32]

5 JUDGE LAVERGNE:

6 Very well. Mr. Witness, I think we should stop here because we  
7 <don't have much time>. Mr. President, may I request that the  
8 witness be shown the sheet of paper on which <a> witness's name  
9 and pseudonym are written? May I therefore request that the sheet  
10 of paper be shown to the witness?

11 MR. PRESIDENT:

12 Yes, please.

13 [10.46.07]

14 BY JUDGE LAVERGNE:

15 Let me point out in the interest of the Parties that the person  
16 in question is a witness that we are going to hear soon. The  
17 pseudonym is 2-TCW-822. <Mr.> Witness, do you know the person  
18 whose name is written on this sheet of paper?

19 Let me caution you not to mention that name aloud. Do you know  
20 that person? <Can you please> repeat your answer? I believe it  
21 has not come through the microphone.

22 MR. PECH CHIM:

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Is that a person with whom you have family ties, and if yes,  
25 what are those family ties and are you still in contact with that

1 person?

2 [10.47.37]

3 A. <We are not in touch>. Of course, we <are relatives. He is my  
4 in-law>, but <he is not friendly person, so I never invite him to  
5 attend any children's wedding ceremonies and neither does he. We  
6 speak to one another when we meet though>.

7 \*\*\*\*\*Q. Very well, so Witness <2-TCW-822> says the following  
8 regarding your brother, Ta Kou, <he says that:>

9 "He was shot dead and <then> beheaded while he was climbing a  
10 coconut tree to harvest coconuts. And then, the head was given to  
11 Samdech during an inauguration ceremony <in Prey Nob.">

12 It is in document <E319.1.31, at answer 32>. Does this reflect  
13 what you remember? Was your brother beheaded and was his head  
14 given to Samdech during an inauguration ceremony?

15 [10.49.37]

16 A. Well, yes, <although I cannot recall it fully,> that was the  
17 story.

18 Q. Very well, we'll move on to another subject, <Mr.> Witness.  
19 Please tell me, do you also know a person called Riel Son <or  
20 Riel San (phonetic)>? <A> person <who> was <the> deputy director  
21 of the Tram Kak district hospital.

22 A. Yes, I do, but <we have> never worked with him. <I normally  
23 saw him with Bong Khom because he had worked for her, and <>  
24 later on he ended up working <at> the hospital. <Bong Khom  
25 assigned him to work there>.

1 Q. Can you tell us who was responsible for the appointment of  
2 cadres, including village chiefs and commune chiefs, <unit chiefs  
3 or hospital chiefs? Who had that responsibility?> Was it the  
4 district, was it the sector, or <other> officials?>

5 A. <It was normally assigned at> the district level<. We  
6 nominated and reported the list to sector level for approval>.  
7 And <in the case of Son, he had worked with Khom for a long time;  
8 I did not know whether she sought approval from the sector or  
9 not. I did not discuss the matter with members of the district  
10 committee in the meeting, and I did not contradict with her  
11 decision>.

12 [10.52.46]

13 Q. Were there any particular directives regarding the appointment  
14 of cadres? And to be more specific, were the cadres who were  
15 appointed people who needed to have <what they called a "good  
16 biography">? That is, did they belong to a particular <social>  
17 class? <> And if yes, which class?

18 A. <According to the Party's line, the> appointment had to <be  
19 done in a> strict <manner>. It had to be based on the poor,  
20 <worker, and> peasant <class. The> peasant class <>, to my  
21 understanding, <meant the person was> not extravagant, <and was  
22 not a greedy person>. And they had to belong to the <pedigree>  
23 peasant <which was> honest, <friendly, respectful, polite,  
24 responsible, and -->.

25 [10.54.47]

1 Q. Mr. Witness, may I request you to keep your answers short. <I  
2 have an additional question for you on this matter. I would like  
3 to know if, when they appointed hospital officials>, they were  
4 interested in finding out whether they had any medical <>  
5 training <or if they were primarily> interested in their  
6 biography <>?

7 A. In the appointment, through my observation, they did not  
8 review the biography that much, so the most important thing was  
9 the experience in the medical field: <> that did not comply with  
10 the <Party's> line.

11 [10.55.56]

12 \*\*\*\*\*Q. Very well. I'll read out to you some statements by  
13 Mr. Riel Son. He was heard on <the 17th> and <18th> of March this  
14 year, <here before this Chamber,> and he referred to meetings he  
15 attended. First of all, may I <ask> whether you remember  
16 attending or chairing meetings at the level of the district  
17 during which Mr. Riel Son participated with other <commune  
18 chiefs, other leaders,> district <unit> officials, and if yes,  
19 what was the purpose of such meetings?

20 A. I do not recall. <There was no a meeting organised to  
21 designate the district> medical personnel. <He might have  
22 attended a meeting when I was at the lower level areas or when I  
23 was away to visit the canal construction sites. I delegated works  
24 to other members. It was rare to stay and work together at the  
25 office>.

1 [10.57.38]

2 Q. Very well. Mr. Riel Son referred to meetings during which  
3 instructions were given regarding purges. He specifically  
4 referred to a first meeting that was held shortly before 17th of  
5 April 1975. He stated at the hearing of the 18th of March 2015,  
6 <around> 15.08, in document E1/279.1, and this is what he stated,  
7 and I quote: "Ta Chim gave us <the> instructions I referred to,  
8 he announced that that only had to do with Tram Kak district.  
9 People (evacuees) had to be assembled in pagodas and villages and  
10 communes of Tram Kak district, and that is why all the village  
11 chiefs and commune chiefs were invited to attend that meeting. It  
12 was important for them to monitor the evacuees and to ascertain  
13 whether they were former civil servants or soldiers." End of  
14 quote.

15 Later on <in the same hearing>, Riel Son referred to another  
16 meeting and he said the following at 15.16.26.

17 "During the second meeting, he," -- that is, Ta Chim, "reiterated  
18 the same instructions. At that time, the evacuees were present in  
19 all the communes and villages, and he asked the village chiefs  
20 and the commune chiefs to carry out research among the evacuees  
21 to ascertain whether the persons present were former soldiers or  
22 officials of the Lon Nol army, or whether they were high-ranking  
23 civil servants, beginning with the first deputy mayor, and if  
24 that was the case, they had to be purged. It was the village  
25 chiefs, the commune chiefs, the militia chiefs, who had <to>

1 implement that policy." <>

2 <Very well,> I have just read out to you the statement of Riel  
3 Son. Please tell me what you think of that statement.

4 [11.00.37]

5 A. I'd like to clarify. <The> plan <was> set out by the upper  
6 <level. We had to disseminate it, otherwise, we would be wrong.  
7 It was upper level's plan to review the number of people, and we  
8 had to report to them. The arrests made were not from me>.

9 Q. From whom did you receive these directions? And when was this  
10 plan disseminated? And what did this plan consist of?

11 A. Let me explain to you. On that day, Khom convened a meeting.  
12 <What> Son said was not correct. I only participated in that  
13 meeting which was held by the chief of the Party in the area. And  
14 I added a little bit further to that circular as I was instructed  
15 by Khom, so I gave a little bit of a speech in addition to what  
16 was said by Khom. So as I said the plan was announced, but there  
17 was no gathering, although it was said in the plan.

18 [11.02.29]

19 Q. When did you become aware of these instructions? Was it before  
20 17 April 1975, as Mr. Riel Son stated or was it after; a long  
21 time after, or just afterwards?

22 A. It happened about three or four months after 17th April 1975  
23 and I learnt it through Khom, as Khom raised the plan during the  
24 meeting that she convened.

25 Q. Mr. Witness, I can read to you again what Riel Son said. Riel

1 Son indicated that this happened at a moment when the people were  
2 going to be evacuated or were in the process of being evacuated,  
3 so you are telling us that he is mistaken, or do you remember  
4 having received orders that had been sent before 17 April <>?

5 [11.03.52]

6 A. I do not catch your question, Your Honour. Please repeat it so  
7 that I can respond to the point of the question.

8 Q. Yes, I was telling you that the witness, Riel Son, told us  
9 that during the first meeting that occurred before 17 April, it  
10 was indicated that the evacuees were going to be gathered in  
11 pagodas in the villages and in the communes of the district and  
12 therefore that it was necessary to plan to watch over these  
13 evacuees, and in particular to detect whether these evacuees were  
14 former officials or soldiers. And he stated then, that a second  
15 meeting took place later where the same orders were given  
16 <again>. So, therefore can you tell us, as far as you remember,  
17 if there was one or if there were two meetings, and if there was  
18 only one meeting, did this meeting happen before 17th of April or  
19 after?

20 [11:05:16]

21 A. I can remember that there was only one meeting and it happened  
22 after 17th April 1975.

23 Q. What were exactly the instructions given? Were they, as Mr.  
24 Riel Son said, were the instructions to purge, that is to say, to  
25 eliminate these people, <these categories of people,> that is to



1 say, <high level> officials or <military> officers from the Lon  
2 Nol regime?

3 A. At that time, Khom made the announcement about the plan <that>  
4 she <had> received <> from the sector level, and I participated  
5 in that meeting. However, I did not see any purge being conducted  
6 after the meeting was held, as the people, those people subject  
7 to the plan had already been gathered on the 17 April 1975, or  
8 while they were en route to various provinces. <Khom, however,  
9 suggested to look further for them; they might have remained.>

10 [11.06.56]

11 Q. Therefore, <Mr.> Witness, these people who were gathered, what  
12 was <supposed> to happen to them? What was their fate <supposed  
13 to be>?

14 A. If those people indeed were gathered, it meant they had no  
15 future. It meant their fate was in <danger>. However, this is  
16 just my personal opinion.

17 Q. Fine. Now I'm going to share with you what another witness  
18 said -- that is to say, witness 2-TCW-822, and this is in his  
19 written record of interview at E319.1.2 <(sic)>, at answer 27.  
20 And he says the following <about you>, "Ta Chim set up the bodies  
21 <of power> in June or July 1970 and I did not stop seeing massive  
22 arrests since that day. One day, I saw people being escorted and  
23 I ended up asking the <following> question to the people who were  
24 escorting <them,> 'Where are you going?' And they answered me,  
25 'We are going to see Angkar.'" In the following days, I learnt

1 that the people I had seen had been arrested, therefore I no  
2 longer asked any questions and the people who were arrested were  
3 former teachers and officials." So, do you have any observations  
4 to make in relation to what I just read out to you?

5 [11.09.41]

6 A. The situation was very strict at the time, <I intended to  
7 resign and so did San (phonetic).> Khom <> kept me to <work> with  
8 her. <I,> personally, did not involve in <bringing people here  
9 and there>. Of course, there were people <> sent to us from <>  
10 commune chiefs and we further sent them on. If there were a gap  
11 in there that we could help them then we would do so, but as for  
12 the 105 <former teachers were> under the control of San  
13 (phonetic) and I. <All of them <disappeared> except one, <Oeun  
14 who worked with me. They went back and stayed at their houses.  
15 Not all former teachers were arrested, some of them remain living  
16 today, while some others escaped for Phnom Penh>.

17 [11.11.11]

18 Q. When you tell us that they disappeared, what do you mean  
19 exactly by that? What happened to them?

20 A. <All>105 <former teachers> who disappeared, as I meant that  
21 they were not <assigned to work>, <and> those teachers were  
22 allowed to <return> home, and that's what Khom said. <I told her  
23 that I wanted to go home too, but she denied my request. I asked  
24 her where> San (phonetic) was <and she said that he went to work  
25 elsewhere. That means in> 1972, the stance of class struggle

1 <were led by peasant and labour class people. The middle class  
2 people, who> could not conform <themselves> to that social class,  
3 would be taken out. So, those people requested to <return> home  
4 as they were afraid that if they were working with them, they  
5 would make a mistake and then they would be <punished>. But allow  
6 me to say that there was no arrest or execution of those people  
7 at all. Some of them left, they could return to Phnom Penh. As I  
8 believe, four or five of them returned to work in their previous  
9 position in the former Lon Nol regime, and there was no arrest of  
10 those former teachers.

11 Q. So, during the Democratic Kampuchea regime, people could  
12 travel freely and go to Phnom Penh, and occupy positions they had  
13 <before> during the time of the Lon Nol regime. Is that what  
14 you're telling us, Mr. Witness?

15 [11.13.42]

16 A. Maybe you misunderstand my statement. Those people were  
17 allowed to return home, so then they could go wherever they  
18 wished to. They could go secretly, maybe through the forest <>  
19 then they <emerged> at Tram Khnar <to catch a taxi to Phnom Penh.  
20 If> they were <> arrested, then they would be dead. So if they  
21 could go and engage in the job, then they would earn <> salary  
22 and feed their family. Here I refer to the year of 1972.

23 Q. <Mr.> Witness -- Witness, 1972 is a very interesting year, but  
24 it's completely out of the scope of our discussion. I would like  
25 you to focus on what happened as of 17th April 1975. So my

41

1 question is; on April 17, <1975,> were there instructions and  
2 were there purges, and who was purged? Am I clear?

3 (Short pause)

4 [11.15.33]

5 BY JUDGE LAVERGNE:

6 Can you please answer this question, Witness, or do you wish not  
7 to answer <> this question?

8 MR. PECH CHIM:

9 A. I am unsure as I did not see it. If you say there were  
10 arrests, I didn't see any arrests. And I myself did not involve  
11 in any arrest. In 1975, people died. <There was a militia unit  
12 for the district and 12 militia units for 12 communes. They>  
13 provided <> protection at Angk Ta Saom, <Takeo and Srae Ronoung.  
14 If> people were arrested at the front battlefield, they could  
15 hardly survive.

16 Q. <Mr.> Witness, earlier you told us that people had been  
17 gathered and that their fate was a disastrous one, and these  
18 people were gathered pursuant to a plan, yes or no? And did this  
19 plan consist <of> eliminating these people who were gathered? Can  
20 you please answer by yes or by no?

21 A. No.

22 Q. So therefore why was their situation so disastrous, Mr.  
23 Witness?

24 A. I think I need to provide a lengthy response to that so that  
25 you can understand. I refer to the group of those teachers who

1 were allowed to rest--

2 Q. Witness, please, please <let me stop you right there>, I'm not  
3 at all interested in the group of 105 teachers who experienced  
4 what you talked about in 1972. I'm only interested in what  
5 happened to the people who were gathered after 17 April 1975. Am  
6 I clear enough? But if you don't wish to answer, please say so.

7 [11.19.01]

8 A. I cannot respond to that question since I am not sure of the  
9 nature of that question.

10 Q. Well, fine, I thought I was clear. I don't know how I could be  
11 any clearer. Now we're going to pass on to another question,  
12 Witness. Witness, Riel Son, stated that during the district  
13 committee meetings, he had been questioned on the reasons <behind  
14 why so> many people who were sick in the hospital he was in  
15 charge of, were suffering from oedema or from diarrhoea, and he  
16 indicated that he had <> explained that the situation was due to  
17 lack of food. And when he presented this problem, the head of the  
18 district told him that what he was saying <was> an offence to the  
19 cooperative, an attack against the cooperative, and he said then  
20 that he did not dare make any requests for the hospital to be  
21 better supplied in food. And therefore he would often send  
22 requests but he would never receive anything in return. These  
23 statements were made during the hearing, with transcript  
24 E1/278.1, from 10.47.39 to 10.53.24. So does this ring a bell? Do  
25 you remember having been concerned about <why> there were people

1 who were sick in the hospital, about what <> their <illnesses  
2 were>, and about whether they had enough to eat?

3 [11.21.23]

4 A. Yes. I was concerned about that.

5 Q. And what do you think about what Mr. Riel Son said -- that is  
6 to say, that when he <> explained the situation, he was told that  
7 what he was saying was <> an offence <on his part> against the  
8 cooperative?

9 A. At that time I heard about that, but I did not go there  
10 directly. We <resolved the issue by ordering the communes nearby  
11 to supply rice and vegetables to the hospital> , but I did not  
12 know the result of that matter because at that time <I did not  
13 monitor it. There> were many sick people in all hospitals and we  
14 provided them with supplementary food. Of course, the situation  
15 was difficult, <for our brothers were closed minded, complicated,  
16 difficult and terrifying. In the capacity of management, we had  
17 to resolve the issues>.

18 Q. Well, unfortunately I don't have much time left, so I will  
19 <try to> move on now to another topic. <Mr.> Witness, I would  
20 like you to tell me if there was, back then, a policy regarding  
21 the creation of dams, of reservoirs; a policy governing the  
22 building of canals. That is to say, a policy geared <towards  
23 equipping> the country <with a better irrigation system>. Did you  
24 receive any instructions <in> that regard and who provided those  
25 instructions to you?

1 [11.23.45]

2 A. We received those instructions as part of the Party lines  
3 through our study session, so we had to implement the Party  
4 lines. Wherever we could build dams or dig canals, then we would  
5 make a proposal to the upper level <for approval. Whenever we  
6 received the green light from upper level, we would proceed  
7 accordingly. We did not have an issue with land because> it was  
8 for the collective use.

9 Q. What was your specific role in the implementation of these  
10 policies? The first day you came to testify you said that you  
11 could not attend all of the district committee meetings because  
12 you had to travel, go to the work sites. So was your role to  
13 supervise all of the work sites in Tram Kak district?

14 [11.25.12]

15 A. Allow me to clarify that sometimes I missed attending the  
16 meetings at the district and I was authorised <to be absent from  
17 the meeting. The Chairman assigned taskforces to work in  
18 different fields for there was a lot of work to do as I  
19 repeatedly mentioned in> the last few days <> in great detail.  
20 And on the work plan, we consulted among the district members,  
21 and <sought approval from> the sector and by the zone. <Once> the  
22 sector approved,<> we would implement the plan. <We drew the plan  
23 <and its contents on a piece of paper>. So it was a joint effort  
24 by the district committee. Although we did not have any advanced  
25 technology, we resorted to our traditional measure in measuring

1 <terrain> for the construction of those irrigational systems and  
2 we could do it. <It was based on the elevation and draining  
3 method on the map . When we completed it, we were asked which  
4 engineers helped survey the terrain for the Pok Veng (phonetic)  
5 canal to Tram Kak. I responded that we had injured soldiers who  
6 were capable of reading the terrain on the map had come to help  
7 us. We only needed to monitor while the work was in progress and  
8 correct if something went wrong>. And that is all.

9 [11.27.07]

10 Q. Can you tell us if the implementation of this plan involved  
11 many sites? Can you give us the names of the main work sites in  
12 Tram Kak district and, for example, the dam that was built at  
13 Khpob Trabek, was it one of the main work sites in your district?

14 A. <The> Khpob Trabek dam <> was a <former> forest <and there was  
15 a small stream with a deep bed and high ground on the east and  
16 the west sides which is called> "Khpob" <in Khmer. We consulted  
17 with sector and> subsequently <it was> approved by Ta Mok <>. As  
18 for <a canal it was built by using a method in which we  
19 depended on elevation of terrain on the map. The dam construction  
20 affected a village; I do not remember how many households> had to  
21 be relocated to the west side of the dam. And as for the canal<,  
22 it ran from Samraong to Kus communes and affected only one house,  
23 therefore, we had it removed and rebuilt. Then we> modified <the  
24 plan a little bit>.

25 [11.29.21]



1 Q. Witness, the number of people who worked on these work sites,  
2 do you believe it represents a few hundred or a few thousand, or  
3 a few tens of thousands of people? We have a witness, Mr. Saut  
4 Saing, who said that he worked on Khpob Trabek work site and he  
5 said that there were about tens of thousands of people who were  
6 working there. What can you say about this?

7 A. Allow me to clarify. <A strong> mobile unit <had one overall  
8 chief to be in charge. I was not the chief. There were> 8,000  
9 male and female workers. <There was a female and a male unit  
10 chief. I <went there only to convene meetings to encourage them  
11 to be independent based on the> work plan <in their respective  
12 communes. There> were 14 communes <in Tram Kak district>  
13 respectively at the time. And each commune had also to provide a  
14 workforce in the form of a mobile unit. So, yes, if you talk  
15 about the total number of people engaging in site projects, there  
16 were many, many workers. And as I said, the main <district>  
17 mobile workforce consisted of two units: male and female units<>,  
18 and each commune would provide its own mobile unit to supplement  
19 the main workforce. <Meetings and> education <took place> at the  
20 work site <>. And then the main unit would be subdivided into  
21 smaller units and, of course, the district chief of committee did  
22 not have to control those smaller units. We dealt with the main  
23 unit <chiefs, and we> resolved the logistical issues. We provided  
24 rice and <clothes. We took the clothes from garment unit to  
25 distribute to the one whose clothes were torn. We also supplied>

1 medicine to the workers at the work site. And the medicines at  
2 that time <were scarce> as we did not know how to produce them.

3 [11.32.21]

4 Q. Witness, I'll read part of the statement of witness 2-TCW-822.  
5 It is in the statement, E319.1.32. In answer 63, this is what he  
6 states, "In 1972, the population of Kaoh Andaet district sought  
7 refuge in Vietnam. Later on, Ta Mok <swapped> the Vietnamese from  
8 Cambodia <for> those refugees. On one occasion, he retrieved 90  
9 Khmers and handed them to Ta Chim so that <he could use them to>  
10 transport <soil> using a shoulder pole for the construction of a  
11 canal at Khpob Trabek. Ta Chim stated that the Khmer in question  
12 <were> stealing and he executed them. A month later, Ta Mok  
13 intended to go and see the 90 Khmers and he questioned Ta Chim  
14 <because he> did not see them, and Ta Chim answered by saying, "I  
15 executed them because they were stealing too much." Ta Mok  
16 started reprimanding Ta Chim violently, saying, "Do you think I  
17 can find manpower easily? I have bent over backwards in order <to  
18 get them> so that they could give us a hand. Why did you kill  
19 them? Do you think I am capable of finding staff members?" Do you  
20 recall an incident regarding 90 Khmers from Vietnam who were  
21 allegedly executed whereas they had been assigned to work at  
22 Khpob Trabek?

23 [11.34.43]

24 A. I had never encountered such a story. I categorically reject  
25 it -- this story. And as for the Khmer Krom coming to live in the

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1 region, it was the issue of the sector. The sector took them  
2 there. The sector would resolve it. <I, in Tram Kak, did not have  
3 authority over Treang, Kiri Vong and Kaoh Andaet district.> And I  
4 don't know, probably it was only a rumour people talk from one  
5 person to another and I did not agree with the line of story you  
6 just mentioned. No, never ever Ta Mok would send a group of  
7 people to me.

8 [11.35.51]

9 Q. Very well. I have a last question for you as we are running  
10 out of time. Can you tell us whether you recall seeing leaders  
11 come and visit Tram Kak district, particularly cooperatives or  
12 work sites? Do you also recall a ceremony during which an  
13 honorary <> flag was <awarded> to someone?

14 A. <In brief, the honorary flag,> I <> received it on behalf of  
15 Tram Kak committee. They presented it to me, and of course, it  
16 was meant to give to all of us, not specifically to me. <> I do  
17 not recall the exact date when it was presented to me. <Whether  
18 it> was <in> 1976 <or 75> following the liberation. <There were  
19 only three flags presented. It was> Tram Kak,< Brasaut> Thmei  
20 (phonetic), <and> Samlout districts <> in the entire Cambodia.  
21 <We were awarded a gold medal, <because we produced more rice,>we  
22 could self-sustain <ourselves and we also supplied rice to the  
23 soldiers. However, Battambang, the soil rich province, did not  
24 receive this award.>

25 [11.38.00]

1 Q. Please clarify something. Who were the leaders who came? Who  
2 were those who came when that <flag was awarded>? Were there any  
3 visits outside of that particular ceremony, and in particular  
4 were there visits to work sites in Tram Kak district?

5 A. At that time, only Ta Mok came to award that medal. Nobody  
6 else came. And at that time it coincided when the dam was  
7 <damaged. I managed to repair the damage and I attended the  
8 convention. And> following the <convention> we were awarded this  
9 medal. <The> dam was broken, but there were 8,000 men and women  
10 who could stop it. We <repaired> the dam <quickly>. We used the  
11 wood <poles, palm leaves and soil> in order to stop the water  
12 from destroying the dam. All of us actually went to help stop the  
13 dam from breaking.

14 Q. Two civil parties testified before this Chamber specifying  
15 that leaders, particularly Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, visited  
16 work sites while they were building canals. Do you recall any  
17 visits by Khieu Samphan or Nuon Chea in Tram Kak district?

18 A. I know that he came at that time, but I did not know the exact  
19 place where he visited and where I met him. He visited there and  
20 there was a guy at that time by the name of Sen (phonetic) <who  
21 brought him there>. He visited the cooperatives, but as for  
22 accompanying him, I, to my recollection, I never accompanied him  
23 because I had other tasks at the front and people might have  
24 arranged his visit. So I am not sure, but of course he did go to  
25 visit the cooperatives.

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1 [11.41.20]

2 Q. Who do you mean by 'he'? Who are you referring to? Nuon Chea,  
3 Khieu Samphan, or someone else?

4 A. Both of them, Mr. Nuon Chea and Mr. Khieu Samphan. They both  
5 did visit there, but I do not recall whether I had accompanied  
6 them during their visit, but I can only confirm that they did  
7 visit Tram Kak <district>.

8 Q. Very well. I thank you, Mr. Witness. I <believe I> have gone  
9 well beyond the time allotted to me. I have no further questions  
10 for the witness, Mr. President.

11 [11.42.14]

12 MR. PRESIDENT:

13 Thank you. The time is now appropriate for lunch break. The  
14 Chamber shall adjourn now until 1.30 this afternoon.

15 Court officer, please arrange the holding room for the witness  
16 during the break and have him back and his duty counsel back to  
17 this courtroom before 1.30 this afternoon.

18 Security guards are instructed to bring Mr. Khieu Samphan to the  
19 holding cell downstairs and have him back in this courtroom this  
20 afternoon before 1.30.

21 The Court is now adjourned.

22 (Court recesses from 1143H to 1331H)

23 MR. PRESIDENT:

24 Please be seated. The Court is now back in session and for this  
25 afternoon, as the duty counsel Sovann is busy, he will be

1 replaced by another duty counsel, Mr. Morm Rithea.

2 QUESTIONING BY THE PRESIDENT:

3 Q. Mr. Pich Chim, the Chamber thanks you for answering the  
4 questions put to you by the Parties and the Bench. You have tried  
5 to respond to the questions so far and I have some questions that  
6 I'd like to get clarification from you. This morning before the  
7 break time, you said Tram Kak district <received honorary red  
8 flag, and> was <one of the three> model <districts in> the  
9 Democratic Kampuchea <>. Can you tell the Court <the> criteria  
10 <that> Tram Kak district <was awarded the honorary red flag and  
11 considered> as a model district during the Democratic Kampuchea  
12 regime?

13 [13.33.30]

14 MR. PECH CHIM:

15 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President and Your Honours. I'd like to  
16 give you the reasons that led to Tram Kak district being awarded  
17 as a model district in that particular sector. There are several  
18 reasons however I would like to mention the three main reasons,  
19 as follows. <First of all, it had good forces both military and  
20 civilian which had contributed to the revolutionary movement. The  
21 second reason <was> that the majority of the population in the  
22 district <was> the middle-class <> or <> lower <one,> and they  
23 were loyal to the revolution. <The> third reason <was> the  
24 <economy> factor. <Tram Kak district> was <> poor <and stretched  
25 out on low quality soil,> but the production was better than

1 districts <that had fertile soil. Thanks> to the effort of the  
2 people <and cadres> living in the district,< we produced two  
3 yields per year, and we also grew cassava as secondary crop. Soon  
4 we were able to supply for our own consumption, we shared the  
5 surplus to the rest for the country in the regime>.

6 [13.36.23]

7 Q. Thank you Mr. Pich Chim. <Did> Tram Kak district <have a>  
8 principle <of distributing food rations equally> to all the  
9 cooperatives <>, or <> was <it> based on the rice yield in each  
10 cooperative or commune?

11 A. The principle of rice distribution was the same -- that <was>  
12 three cans of rice and each can was meant for three people. And  
13 after the entire country was liberated, each can was for six  
14 people and that applies to both the people who had lived in the  
15 liberated zone, as well as those who <lived in the> Lon Nol side.  
16 <And the food ration was doubling up. I already testified  
17 yesterday.>

18 Q. After the establishment of the cooperative and <earlier you  
19 also testified that your> district received <honorary flag as an  
20 advanced district for> three main reasons. <One of them> was  
21 <the> district <produced high a yield on a less quality soil. Was  
22 rice distribution for daily consumption equal in> all  
23 cooperatives and communes within <> Tram Kak district?

24 [13.38.46]

25 A. The food ration was the same. <For example, commune "A"

1 consumed a certain amount of rice; we would> review their rice  
2 <stock. We would provide them more supply in case their stock was  
3 not enough. And we did the same in all communes. The district did  
4 not have supply, apparently, we took the supply from the communes  
5 that had surplus supply and we shared that supply with communes  
6 that needed it. We, the district committee, had the figures of  
7 the communes that had surplus supply, so we levied and  
8 distributed it to the communes which were in need of> rice.

9 Q. <Thank you.> You just mentioned that the food ration was equal  
10 across Tram Kak district. My question to you is the following:  
11 who or which body had the authority to make that decision -- that  
12 is, to provide equal food ration to everyone within the communes  
13 <or cooperatives> across the Tram Kak district?

14 [13.40.22]

15 A. In fact the decision <arose> from the discussion by the  
16 district committee and then we sought approval from the sector  
17 level. <We explained to the sector that people should eat  
18 equally, and we had to share with the communes which were short  
19 of food. The sector approved,> so we discussed among the district  
20 committee based on the practical needs and with the advice from  
21 the sector, we proceeded <accordingly>.

22 Q. Thank you. In your response to the questions put to you by the  
23 Lead Co-Lawyer, you mentioned that there were 25,000 hectares of  
24 <cultivated land> and that each hectare produced three tonnes <>,  
25 and that in some areas you could harvest twice. Am I correct in



1 summing up this statement -- that is, your response to the Lead  
2 Co-Lawyer question this morning?

3 A. Yes, that is correct.

4 Q. And based on that response, in the early phase of the harvest  
5 season, people were given cooked rice and later on they were  
6 supplemented with <cassava> and further on it was -- people were  
7 given gruel and you said it was a thick gruel but some other  
8 witness said the gruel was rather watery at the time <and it was  
9 not enough>. And my question to you:<> you had 25,000 hectares of  
10 <cultivated land> and that you produced <at least> three tonnes  
11 of rice per hectare <. You produced rice two times a year. It  
12 meant that a hectare could provide 6 tonnes per hectare in a  
13 year. Moreover, your> district was awarded as a model district,  
14 <and had received honorary flag. Why> the food ration change <>  
15 from cooked rice, to cooked rice with <cassava> and later to  
16 gruel? What is the reason for this degradation?

17 [13.43.00]

18 A. The rice produced and the land that I mentioned was for what  
19 we reported in 1976. <Prior to 1976 the food was not sufficient.  
20 However, from 1976 onwards, people ate on the ration. That is all  
21 Mr. President.

22 Q. Does it mean that in 1976 all the people in Tram Kak district  
23 were given cooked rice for the whole year?

24 A. People were given cooked rice starting from 1976, then '77 and  
25 so on. And if some communes did not have enough rice, then the

1 commune itself had to find supplementary food for the people but  
2 in general, people were given cooked rice to eat to their fill.

3 Q. Based on your experience as you were at one point an <acting  
4 secretary of the> district as well as a member of the district  
5 committee, was there any surplus of rice produced at any year  
6 during the regime and that it was sent to the <Centre>?

7 [13.44.44]

8 A. Yes, there was but I cannot recall as to the <amount> of the  
9 rice produce that was sent to the Centre. Usually, we sent them  
10 <husked> rice. In fact, we provided not only to the Centre but to  
11 other sectors who sought help from us and usually we would send  
12 them a truckload or two truckloads of the <surplus rice and  
13 cassava> to them. So we would distribute and share with them  
14 whatever we had in the surplus.

15 Q. I put that question to you because several witnesses and civil  
16 parties alleged that the food was not sufficient and for that  
17 reason, they resorted to stealing food and not only the adults  
18 who stole food but the children also <>. Subsequently they were  
19 arrested and tortured and we want to have a clarification on this  
20 issue. What reason do you have to show to the Chamber that from  
21 1976, people in your district <were> given cooked rice to eat  
22 <all years all over Tram Kak district?>

23 A. When I talked about cooked rice, I refer to <> thick gruel and  
24 they could eat to their fill. And before that, yes, sometimes the  
25 rice was not sufficient. However, since the harvest in 1976 <-

1 77> then the food <given> was <> enough<. Despite the yield being  
2 high, we did not use it extravagantly, for other locations were  
3 in short of food.> And I would say the food ration given to the  
4 people there was reasonable enough. <Once a month, there was a  
5 special feast which was called "Meeting of the great feast". All  
6 cooperatives managed to prepare> all kinds of cakes, cooked rice,  
7 <Khmer> noodles, etc. <It looked like a big celebration.> And  
8 usually it was New People who <were hungry and overate; they  
9 became sick and> collapsed when they returned to their <place>.  
10 Then the person was helped <with coining and massaging to  
11 retrieve consciousness>.

12 [13.48.16]

13 Q. Thank you and I have two more questions to you. One question  
14 is related to document E3/401, and another is E319.1.18, and the  
15 section that I wish to bring to your attention has been  
16 highlighted on the hard copy and you will be given this document  
17 by the court officer.

18 I'd like now to ask you a question in relation to document  
19 E3/401. That is a statement of interview, in Khmer it's,  
20 00373478; in English it's, 0038128 and I don't have the document  
21 in the French language. And Mr. Pich Chim, please refer to the  
22 highlighted section of that document and a stick note is also  
23 stuck on that paper and it should be the last page of that  
24 document. In that interview, you state that Ta Mok gave  
25 instructions in a meeting that people should not be killed

1 <illegally>. Can you find that highlighted part of the document  
2 -- that is, your previous interview?

3 [13.50.32]

4 A. Yes, I see it.

5 Q. Thank you. I will ask some questions to you in relation to  
6 this. Can you recall as to when Ta Mok gave that instruction?

7 A. I cannot recall it.

8 Q. <Was> it <> the time that you were a member of the Tram Kak  
9 committee or <was it> the time that you were an <acting>  
10 secretary of that district?

11 A. I cannot recall the year that he gave that instruction,  
12 however it was at the time that I was a member of the district  
13 committee. And sometimes he told his daughter about that matter  
14 so at one time he gathered us and gave the instructions on the  
15 various topics, including this very topic on not to kill. <Then  
16 he went away.>

17 Q. Thank you. And can you tell the Chamber what had happened in  
18 Tram Kak district that led Ta Mok to give such instruction to the  
19 district committee?

20 [13.52.36]

21 A. Allow me to give you an example. Immediately after 1970, and  
22 here I refer to 1972, whoever joined <or defected> the enemy  
23 would later on disappear. <There was a person who was overall in  
24 charge of new> recruits within the district. But the subordinates  
25 did not--

1 Q. The Chamber does not wish to hear about the events that  
2 happened prior to <17 April>1975. Can you state <> as to what  
3 happened after 17 April 1975?

4 [13.53.40]

5 A. Yes, after 1975 he came and he convened a meeting and he gave  
6 similar instructions <>.

7 Q. And what did you observe as to what had happened that led to  
8 Ta Mok giving such instructions?

9 A. Through my observation, yes, it happened. <Some people were  
10 killed.> In fact>, it was <a> conflict between soldiers and  
11 soldiers. <Actually when they were young, they knew one another.  
12 Some of them were cousins. After the conflict, those soldiers  
13 were arrested. The district committee was not able to intervene  
14 because the soldiers were armed with guns. After realizing the  
15 incident, Ta Mok made such instructions>. And in fact, those  
16 <soldiers> were the relatives of Ta Mok.

17 Q. What did he mean <"illegal killing">?

18 A. It could mean he referred to the revenge <which occurred to a  
19 soldier just returned from the battlefield. He was arrested and  
20 taken away. The district was not able to intervene, neither did  
21 Nhev (phonetic), Khom (phonetic) and I>.

22 [13.55.51]

23 Q. Thank you. As the time is running out I now move on to another  
24 document -- that is, your -- another interview, document  
25 E319.1.18, in the Khmer language the <ERN 00997048> and the

1 English language <ERN 01000689, A188>. In that document, you  
2 <stated> that you received a letter of instruction from <Pol Pot  
3 in> Phnom Penh in August 1978 to stop the killing and that letter  
4 was issued to all zones and it was a general instruction <>. Can  
5 you find that highlighted portion on the document?

6 A. Yes, I locate it.

7 Q. Thank you. Is that statement correct -- that is, when you  
8 provided your statement to the investigator of the Office of the  
9 Co-Investigating Judges?

10 [13.57.40]

11 A. Yes, that statement is correct.

12 Q. Then this is my last question. How did you receive that  
13 instruction? When and where did you receive it?

14 A. I received that order <> from <> Ke Pauk at the Central Zone.

15 Q. And when did you receive that instruction?

16 Mr. Pich Chim, please respond to my last question as to when you  
17 received that instruction.

18 A. It happened in August 1978, but I cannot recall the day that I  
19 received it.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Witness. I do not have any further questions  
21 for you.

22 And the Chamber now will hand the floor to the defence teams and  
23 first to Nuon Chea's defence to put questions to this witness.

24 You have the floor.

25 [13.59.32]

1 QUESTIONING BY MR. KOPPE:

2 Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours, Counsel. Good afternoon,

3 Mr. Pich Chim. My name is Victor Koppe. I am the International

4 Co-Lawyer for Nuon Chea and I have some questions to ask to you.

5 Let me start with following up some questions asked by the

6 President just now and that is a question in relation to the food

7 situation in Tram Kak. Do you know whether there was any policy

8 or any implementation of a policy in the communes to make a

9 distinction in terms of food rations between 17 April People and

10 Base People?

11 MR. PECH CHIM:

12 A. On the issues of food distribution, the food ration was the

13 same for everyone. The district would set the instruction to the

14 commune and the commune would implement that instruction and in

15 principle it means that one can of rice was for three people.

16 However, in reality, <we heard that it was not enough, so the

17 sector suggested to organise "the great feast" once every one or

18 two months. I personally went to visit the commune I observed

19 that there was distinction in the distribution of rice. For

20 instance, the Base People secretly received a can of rice for two

21 people whereas a can of rice severed for three people for the New

22 People. We did not blame or punish them; instead, we gently

23 informed them that we were just one blood in one nation.> I admit

24 that we did not control everything and learn about that as that

25 happened in certain cooperatives within the district. Base

61

1 <People received two cans of rice for one person, then they  
2 received one can of rice for two people and later on they  
3 received one can of rice for three people. At first they ate  
4 rice, later on they had to eat gruel. It could happen, frankly  
5 speaking. When I had observed that, I personally gave them direct  
6 political instruction so that they could improve the situation.>

7 [14.03.25]

8 Q. But what you're describing -- are these incidents, things that  
9 happened sometimes and were in principle against the policy, the  
10 policy being that everybody should have the same food ration?

11 A. Yes, it was against the policy. It was not in line with the  
12 policy. <However, we had tried to follow it>.

13 Q. You lived in Tram Kak district, I believe, or Takeo province  
14 also, before 1970, before you joined the revolution. Are you able  
15 to make a comparison with the food situation of people before the  
16 establishment of cooperatives and after the establishment of  
17 cooperatives? In other words, did the food situation get better  
18 because of the cooperatives?

19 A. <Generally speaking, in regards to the> food situation before  
20 the establishment of cooperatives, <people> had their private  
21 <eating>, so there was enough food. And that was it. And after  
22 <establishing> cooperatives, <the food was not sufficient. We  
23 deliberated and resolved the problem. We finally came up with the  
24 principle and we proceeded accordingly>.

25 Q. Would you be able to mark a point in time between 1975 and



1 '79, that you and others thought that the food situation was  
2 adequately solved?

3 [14.06.10]

4 A. Before 1975 the food issue was resolved by individual family  
5 <and we did not levy the surplus, so they had more than enough.  
6 When we ate communally in cooperatives, food became short>. We  
7 actually <shared> rice <with other places, where they did not  
8 have enough food. In total, we did not have enough food for our  
9 population. They had to work harder to gain more yield and they  
10 had to eat less for three to six months before harvest time>.

11 [14.07.24]

12 Q. If somebody, let's say in 1975, 1976, was caught stealing  
13 cassava or other fruits which belonged to the collective, what  
14 would happen to this person? Was it considered a light offence or  
15 was it considered a serious offence?

16 A. <They> were considered <to have committed a petty crime>.

17 Q. And if somebody had committed such a light offence, what would  
18 usually happen to this person?

19 A. <In> that case, we only <educated, instructed, refashioned and  
20 verbally explained to them. There was no school or documents for  
21 educating them, we conducted it under the tree. We went to meet  
22 them or we asked them to come to see us. We> asked them not to be  
23 <worried>. We only advised them <> that it was not good <>  
24 behaviour and they had to correct themselves. That was it and we  
25 had to advise them <in honest and soft manner. If we intimidated

1 them, they would run a way.> That was it.

2 [14.09.29]

3 Q. Would you be able to tell after how many times stealing and  
4 then being caught stealing, somebody would finally be sent  
5 somewhere for re-education? After how many times somebody had to  
6 steal something in order to be able -- in order to be  
7 re-educated?

8 A. To my recollection, <the stealing offense was not> sent <to>  
9 re-education <office. Individuals were only educated in their  
10 base, i.e. village or commune>.

11 Q. Do you know any instances in which somebody was executed,  
12 killed, for stealing things like cassava or other fruits?

13 A. No, I never knew of such an instance. I had never encountered  
14 such an instance of execution of those who were found stealing  
15 <>.

16 Q. In terms of comparising -- comparing, did this ever happen for  
17 instance in the Central Zone at the rubber plantation? When  
18 somebody was caught stealing, did this person get executed for  
19 this?

20 [14.11.42]

21 A. I never saw it.

22 Q. Do you know whether the policy that you described in relation  
23 to minor offences, would be or was the same in other districts of  
24 Sector 13 and in other sectors in the Southwest zone?

25 A. In my understanding it would be different because <> our <>

1 approach <more likely coordinated and resolved the matters.

2 Implementation might differ from one location to another>.

3 [14.12.44]

4 <Principally speaking,> the minor offences, for example, stealing

5 or drinking, <were> not <to be executed>. But <the practice may

6 have varied from place to place, regardless of zone>.

7 Q. My last question in relation to food. Would you be able to

8 tell us something about whether the goal of three tonnes per

9 hectare -- rice per hectare whether that was a realistic goal?

10 Whether that was in fact a goal that could be realistically

11 achieved?

12 A. At the time the decision did not come from me. It came from

13 the sector, Ta Mok <,and> all <> participants in the meeting. <I

14 raised my concern that we would not meet the target. I suggested

15 that 2.5 tons would be realistic, but they said let's try to

16 achieve 3 tons per hectare and it would include cassava>.

17 [14.14.36]

18 Q. And what would be the consequences if, within a district, this

19 goal wasn't achieved? Would there be serious consequences for the

20 people responsible for this, or not at all?

21 A. No consequence whatsoever for the responsible person or for

22 the district. <We> tried our best, and we increased <as much as

23 twice our production. We harvested two yields of rice per year,

24 and we grew more cassava, in addition. Of course, there was

25 shortages in the transition, for rice,> generally it took three

65

1 to five months to <be ready to> harvest <>.

2 Q. Would it then be fair to say that in your district and maybe  
3 in other districts the people were not forced to work extra hard  
4 just only to achieve this three tonnes per hectare. Is that  
5 correct?

6 A. That was not correct.

7 Q. Maybe something went wrong in the translations. You agree with  
8 me. Is that -- is that how I understand your answer?

9 MR. PRESIDENT:

10 Counsel, please put your question again to the witness because it  
11 appears that the witness does not catch your question very well.

12 [14.16.55]

13 BY MR. KOPPE:

14 Q. Yes, it's because of the double negative. Mr Pech Chim, do you  
15 agree with me that in your district it didn't happen that people  
16 were forced to work extra hard just to achieve this three tonnes  
17 per hectare?

18 MR. PECH CHIM:

19 A. Yes, I do agree with you.

20 Q. Now, I would like to move to another topic, and that is  
21 education. I understand that you yourself, before you joined the  
22 maquis, had been a teacher in Takeo province, is that correct?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. Would you be able to tell us how long you have worked as a  
25 teacher?

1 A. From '59 to '70, it was during this period around 11 years.

2 Q. What can you tell us about the goals of the CPK and the goals  
3 of Democratic Kampuchea in terms of education? What was  
4 Democratic Kampuchea set to achieve in terms of education? Could  
5 you tell us in general terms what the goals were?

6 [14.18.35]

7 A. It was very long but the ultimate goal was to be developed, to  
8 turn Cambodia to become a developed country like other countries  
9 around the world.

10 Q. I'll be more concrete. Was it the intention within your  
11 district to -- after the liberation, to have schools, to educate  
12 children, to have primary schools, secondary schools, etc.?

13 A. Yes, that was. The purpose was to organise in respective  
14 district, not only within the district but in the province. And  
15 the overall idea <was> that across the country there were primary  
16 schools, secondary schools and even tertiary education in order  
17 to develop our country to become a developed, prosperous, <and  
18 strong> country. That was the ultimate purpose that we all  
19 desired.

20 Q. And could you make a comparison as to how the education system  
21 worked in 1975, 1976 and 1977 in Tram Kak district as opposed to  
22 how the education system was before the civil war?

23 [14.20.54]

24 A. The education system in Tram Kak district in 1971, 1972 all  
25 the way to 1975, <> there were a lot of schools <built> in the

1 country, but later on there were no schools because it was <> war  
2 time. We could not construct a school so we only <assigned>  
3 teachers to teach children <in all villages. We hoped to build  
4 more schools in later days based on the circumstances and time>.

5 Q. And after 17 April '75, what did the district, or did District  
6 105 do in terms of building schools?

7 [14.22.01]

8 A. At that time they constructed small huts. There was no formal  
9 school structure. <It was merely sizeable to accommodate tables  
10 for children>. And <in some> villages there were no such  
11 <facilities, therefore, children were obliged to study at the  
12 nearest school>.

13 Q. Was it a priority in your district to build schools?

14 A. I do not understand the word "priority". You say school was  
15 the priority and I do not understand <that word>.

16 Q. Was it an ambition of your district to build as many schools  
17 as possible?

18 A. It was not an ambition, but it was our priority. <It> was our  
19 good intention <for youths, our parents, our brothers and our  
20 nation>. That was the only way that our country could develop.  
21 Without school everything would be dark.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pech Chim. Now another subject, that is, the  
23 subject of health care. What can you tell us about the policy  
24 within your district in relation to access to medicine, access to  
25 hospital? Concretely, was there any difference in treatment

1 between Base People and New People when it would come to being  
2 admitted to a hospital or being able to have access to medicine?  
3 Was there any difference?

4 A. <In the concept, people would receive> equally. But in my  
5 personal <view it was not> exactly equal <it was somehow  
6 different. Medicine was very scarce. We were neither able to  
7 produce it nor> accept the medical supplies from international  
8 aid. <We> did not <seek> foreign aid. <It was a great leap  
9 forward movement. But in fact, it brought us a great  
10 destruction>.

11 [14.25.48]

12 Q. I might have a question, a follow up question on that. But my  
13 first question was do you know if a New Person would get sick,  
14 seriously sick, he would be admitted to the hospital, and it  
15 didn't matter if he was a New Person or a Base Person, is that  
16 correct?

17 A. <No, there> wasn't <a distinction. They> were <hospitalised as  
18 long as they> were sick. <I visited> the hospital, <I saw some old  
19 beds in the hospital and I greeted all patients, regardless of  
20 whether they were New People. Medicine was very scarce, so I  
21 instructed the staff at the hospital> to provide them with enough  
22 food to eat. <I communicated with the nearby communes to supply  
23 food> to the hospital. Because the district has already issued  
24 that decision, so we had to <> provide that service to the  
25 people. But shortcomings <were> inevitable.

1 [14.27.10]

2 Q. Would you agree with me that in your district in terms of  
3 food, medicine, education, there was no discrimination against  
4 17th April People?

5 A. I do agree with you.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pech Chim. I would like to turn to another  
7 topic if that's all right with you. Do you know or do you  
8 remember whether there was a big meeting in May 1975 in Phnom  
9 Penh where all cadres, both military and civilian were invited to  
10 discuss the way forward? A big meeting between, I believe, 20 and  
11 24 May 1975, in Phnom Penh?

12 A. No, I did not attend that meeting.

13 Q. It was a big meeting where apparently hundreds, maybe even  
14 almost thousand cadres were collected together, convened  
15 together, to discuss the way forward. Do you know maybe whether  
16 your fellow district committee member Khom had gone to that  
17 meeting in May 1975?

18 A. I <knew> that the cadres at the district level came to attend  
19 the meeting.

20 Q. And do you remember whether Khom, whether she went to that  
21 meeting, and if yes, do you remember when she came back, what she  
22 reported to you and the other members of the district committee?

23 [14.30.07]

24 A. Yes, she reported to us about that. She actually organised  
25 <one morning> session <to explain to> us about what she learned



1 <>.

2 Q. I realise that it's a long time ago Mr. Pech Chim, but do you  
3 remember which news or which reports she brought with her after  
4 this meeting in May 1975? What did she tell you and the others?

5 A. I cannot recall it; it has been a long time.

6 Q. Maybe I can help you a little bit. Do you remember whether she  
7 said to you and the other members that there had been discussion  
8 and instructions on, for instance, the abolition of money and the  
9 abolition of markets?

10 [14.31.36]

11 A. Yes, I recall that, I recall about the abolition of money and  
12 markets.

13 Q. What do you remember she reporting on this?

14 A. She talked about the closure of markets and that the money was  
15 no longer used. That's the only two main things that I can  
16 recall.

17 Q. Do you recall whether she said anything about disrobing or  
18 defrocking of the monks?

19 A. Yes, she actually spoke about that subject, but I cannot  
20 recall as to whether she was telling us at that time or whether  
21 it was on another occasion <before that. She talked about that  
22 and she led the communes to implement according to their  
23 respective sections>.

24 Q. Do you remember whether she came back and said anything about  
25 what should happen to people who had been former Lon Nol

71

1 government officials or former Lon Nol soldiers or military?

2 A. No, I cannot recall it.

3 Q. Mr. Pech Chim, do you know somebody who used to be a high  
4 ranking Eastern Zone cadre called Heng Samrin?

5 A. No, I don't. <> I was not familiar with the situation in that  
6 zone.

7 Q. If I just ask you do you know who Heng Samrin is, would you be  
8 able to tell us?

9 [14.34.47]

10 A. No, I don't. I don't know anything about that and if you were  
11 to ask me about Ke Pauk, I did not know for sure what exact  
12 position he held or that he led a division, or what, I am not  
13 sure.

14 Q. Do you remember, maybe if I can try to refresh your memory,  
15 whether Khom, when she came back, said something to the effect  
16 that people who had belonged to the former Lon Nol regime, should  
17 be put out of the framework, should be scattered, rather than  
18 killed?

19 MR. PRESIDENT:

20 Witness, please wait. And Deputy Co-Prosecutor, you have the  
21 floor.

22 MR. LYSAK:

23 Yes, Counsel at this time is leading the witness. I'd have no  
24 objection if he wants to use Ben Keernan's research and ask the  
25 witness if that refreshes his recollection. That would involve as

1 he did yesterday both the three or four people who said that the  
2 policy, the instruction was to smash the two and then the  
3 contrary view that he was mentioning. But -- if he wants to use  
4 that evidence, that's fine, but I don't think he should be  
5 leading the witness with one interpretation.

6 (Judges deliberate)

7 [14.37.39]

8 MR. PRESIDENT:

9 The Chamber agrees to the observation made by the Deputy  
10 Co-Prosecutor, that that question was a leading question. And  
11 Witness, please do not respond to that question. And Counsel  
12 Koppe, please rephrase your question and try to avoid any leading  
13 questions, which are prohibited in the proceedings before this  
14 Chamber.

15 BY MR. KOPPE:

16 Q. Yes, Mr. President. Mr. Pech Chim does the word "komchat" mean  
17 anything to you?

18 MR. PECH CHIM:

19 A. The word "komchat" means to take out or to remove. That word  
20 was used in the party lines and it stands to get rid of personal  
21 feeling, to get rid of personal ambition, and to build a good  
22 positive stance in place of the negative ones. And that also  
23 referred to the feeling of being capitalist or being officials of  
24 the previous regimes. So we need to get rid of these kinds of  
25 classes and build our own stance. And we had to strive <> hard <>

1 in order to conform with the labourer and the peasant class.  
2 <And> indeed we <partly> succeeded in the reform. <That is it  
3 "komchat">.

4 [14.40.11]

5 Q. The explanation that you just gave about the word "komchat"  
6 was that something, was that a policy to be implemented to people  
7 who had worked for the former Lon Nol regime? To re-educate them,  
8 to take them first out of the framework but then re-educate them  
9 and the re-integrate them back into the society?

10 A. Yes, that is also correct. They had to refashion themselves in  
11 order to conform themselves to the society and to get rid of  
12 their <negatives elements. It could not be done in a short time,  
13 but it changed its course gradually, from one year to another  
14 one>. That was another meaning of <it>.

15 Q. And Mr. Pech Chim, was that the policy of District 105 when it  
16 comes to the treatment of former Lon Nol officials and former Lon  
17 Nol military? To "komchat" them?

18 A. Yes, that statement you made is also correct. It's the word  
19 that was used.

20 [14.42.07]

21 Q. And very concretely do you remember Khom or Saom using the  
22 word "komchat" when it comes to the treatment of former Lon Nol  
23 officials?

24 A. I rarely <heard> them use that word, that is the word  
25 "komchat" for this or for that, or to use the word "komchat" for

1 the former Lon Nol soldiers. And as I said the word was mentioned  
2 and used during the study sessions -- that is, to "komchat" the  
3 <dangerous> people, or the things that <were> not <beneficial>.  
4 And when it comes to the former Lon Nol officials or Lon Nol  
5 soldiers, <we were told that> only the elements "that" are not  
6 good would be "komchat", <however,> the good elements <that did  
7 not cause any harm would not be "komchat". Without precise  
8 explanation, lower cadres, especially, female ones  
9 overgeneralised to "komchat" all> people. <So, we the upper level  
10 who had broader knowledge would explain to them. They were too  
11 rigid; they arrested and paraded the one who stole a stalk of  
12 lemongrass or a chicken. It was hardly done by male cadres. I am  
13 not discriminating the female cadres, for they had less  
14 education;> they blindly followed the Party without making any  
15 consideration. <They were honest and caring. They would cook and  
16 kill chicken and prepare food for the Party, but they did not  
17 have strategic idea to maintain the party to be prosperous. It's  
18 similar to a story that the master was having a nap after lunch  
19 and told his servant to get rid of the insect that came to  
20 disturb him. The servant was very caring and always kept his eyes  
21 on the master. Once a fly landed on the nose of his master, the  
22 servant got a big rock and crushed the fly, eventually, he did  
23 not only kill the fly, but he also killed his master. Likewise,  
24 loving and caring with no wisdom caused a great destruction to  
25 the Party. But <> maybe because <people had> too

75

1 <much>confidence <in the Party, > without considering the facts,  
2 that led to the demise of the Party and people, they simply  
3 followed the lines, and only the few people at the top of the  
4 Party were intellectuals.

5 [14.45.51]

6 MR. PRESIDENT:

7 Thank you the Counsel and the Witness. We take a break now and  
8 resume at 3 o'clock.

9 And court officer, please assist the witness in the waiting room  
10 for witnesses and civil parties and have him return together with  
11 the duty counsel at 3 o'clock.

12 The Court is now in recess.

13 (Court recesses from 1446H to 1502H)

14 MR. PRESIDENT:

15 Please be seated. The Court is now back in session.

16 I hand over the floor to Counsel Victor Koppe to resume his line  
17 of questioning.

18 BY MR. KOPPE:

19 Hello again, Mr. Pech Chim. Just one or two follow up questions  
20 in relation to my questions before the break.

21 You might not remember, but I asked you some questions in June  
22 (sic) 2013, during the first trial. So I think I know already the  
23 answers to the questions that I want to ask, but I just want to  
24 ask them again.

25 Q. Have you yourself, while in District 105, witnessed any

76

1 executions, any killings of former Lon Nol officials or military?

2 MR. PECH CHIM:

3 A. No. I never witnessed the execution of the Lon Nol soldiers.

4 Q. The following question I asked you also already in June (sic)

5 2013. Have you yourself ever ordered the execution of former Lon

6 Nol officials or military?

7 (Short pause)

8 [15.04.13]

9 BY MR. KOPPE:

10 I heard you say, "ort teh" (phonetic).

11 MR. PECH CHIM:

12 A. No, I have never ordered any execution of Lon Nol soldiers.

13 Q. Are you aware of any executions of former Lon Nol officials or

14 military in your district between 1975 and 1979?

15 A. I have never witnessed the execution, I have never ordered

16 myself, but I am aware that there were executions.

17 Q. Let me turn to the sector chief, chief of Sector 13, Ta Saom.

18 You have given testimony to the Investigators about Ta Saom, you

19 spoke briefly about him in your earlier testimony. What can you

20 tell us about Ta Saom, what kind of person in terms of political

21 line, political stands, was he?

22 [15.06.00]

23 A. <I would like to clarify this point,> I did not know Saom

24 before. <However, after the> coup d'état I saw him. <Nhev

25 whispered to me that the person was in charge of the sector. Muth

77

1 was not promoted to be the chairman; even though he had been the  
2 deputy chief of the sector. I knew him since. He stayed at Nhev's  
3 house; I stayed at a different place. We normally secretly  
4 informed our fellows, so that they were aware of his presence.  
5 There was not an official announcement about his assignment, but  
6 we worked under his management. Muth and Khom were, for sure,  
7 aware of his tasks and received works from him constantly.  
8 Despite no official announcement being made, at all meetings, he  
9 sat in the chairmans seat>. Then long afterwards there was the  
10 official <announcement of> the sector committee. <I learned from  
11 other people that he was an intellectual from Phnom Penh. And no  
12 one knew where he was at the time of the riot in 1968. He> got  
13 married <in> Kampong Chhnang province <while he was a fugitive  
14 there. Comrad Phors (phonetic) also> came <along> with him.  
15 <And> one year later Ta Mok appointed him <to work in Kampong  
16 Chhnang. He was a capable and brave person, but he lived with  
17 tuberculosis. He> was well educated <person; he never made  
18 mistakes or misused words in his writing>.  
19 Q. Was he seen or considered by the Party as someone who was a  
20 leftist, somebody who was radical, somebody who was in favour of  
21 the cultural revolution as it was implemented in China?  
22 A. From the Party I did not know, but <from the district and  
23 commune's perspective, he was known to be very serious,  
24 inconsistent with the front movement, which was gathering forces,  
25 and too absolute>.



1 Q. Would you be able to tell us what connection he had with Chou  
2 Chet alias Sy?

3 A. He did not have any relation or connection with Chou Chet.  
4 Actually, Chou Chet <and Ta Mok were> his superior, <> and he  
5 <was a respectful person>. He was <effective, serious and an  
6 obvious person. After studying with him everyone understood and  
7 was able to analyse and comment>.

8 [15.11.33]

9 <I did not know how he worked with Chou Chet.> I actually saw  
10 Chou Chet once. <> Chou Chet <and his wife went to visit and  
11 stayed at my district office. Khom and> Saom <were> there <at> my  
12 office,<> and Ta Mok was also there with them. That happened  
13 after the liberation. <And I believed that there was no conflict  
14 or pressure in their relationship>.

15 [15.12.20]

16 Q. What happened to Saom, was he at one point arrested?

17 A. No, he was not <> arrested. He became sick towards the end and  
18 then he was <hospitalised> in Phnom Penh. Actually his wife, <who  
19 worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the visitor liaison  
20 office, had> delivered <a> baby <at a hospital in Phnom Penh.  
21 Soam was later very sick, and he was brought to the same hospital  
22 for treatment. Once> the Vietnamese troops came in, we evacuated  
23 <them to> Sisophon. <After arriving in Sisophon, he refused to go  
24 further. It looked like he had a mental problem. He blamed  
25 himself for the "Yuon" invading the country and he said it would

1 be better if he died there. His wife failed in insisting he>  
2 move <on, so she left with the children. After a while, we  
3 returned and looked for him, but> we did not see him <since>.

4 Q. Did he at one point in time also started working for the  
5 ministry of foreign affairs?

6 A. His name was actually <in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs> but  
7 he himself was being hospitalised at that time. <There was  
8 someone who took his place>. But in terms of <> ranking, he held  
9 a higher ranking position than the one who <came to replace him>.

10 Q. When was the last time you saw him?

11 A. Before <leaving Takeo>, I said goodbye to him and he wept,  
12 <and he reminded me that I was the one who always fed him. He  
13 wept while he was blessing me. When he was at> the hospital,  
14 Preah Sang (phonetic) hospital, <my wife, my small child and I  
15 visited him;> I brought <him> a bunch of coconuts. <He again  
16 cried. He also warned me not to bring small children to a  
17 hospital. It was just a brief visit>.

18 [15.16.15]

19 MR. PRESIDENT:

20 Mr. Pech Chim, I have reminded you so far that you need <> to  
21 listen to the question put to you and you try to answer to what  
22 is being asked. You do not need to go further than what is asked  
23 because <it will be difficult. You are the one who faces this  
24 difficulty in answering further questions again. Secondly, the  
25 Chamber does not have much time to listen to your testimony.

1 Counsel, please go on.>

2 [15.16.58]

3 BY MR. KOPPE:

4 Q. Very brief question, Mr. Pech Chim. Did you see Saom after  
5 1979, after the Vietnamese had invaded?

6 MR. PECH CHIM:

7 A. No, the last time I saw him was when he was in <the> hospital.

8 Q. What about the under-secretary of Sector 13, Phen. What do you  
9 know about him?

10 A. Phen was appointed <the Committee Chief of> Sector 43. <He  
11 normally stopped> by my house <on his trip to meet with Ke Pauk  
12 in Kampong Cham>. Later he was removed. <At first, he> was  
13 transferred <to the Central Zone and then he was transferred to>  
14 the Southwest Zone. So from that time onward I did not know  
15 anything about him <>.

16 Q. What was the relation between Phen and Chou Chet alias Sy?

17 [15.18.45]

18 A. No, there was no relation. <Phen> asked the reason <of  
19 removal; the reason was> his brother had been arrested. <I heard  
20 that he survived the regime. When> the Vietnamese came, he was  
21 <in Damrei Romiel jungle. He was killed in action> there. I  
22 actually heard from others. <My son was also killed along with  
23 him there. That is it>.

24 Q. Finally, do you know what the relation was, if any, between Ta  
25 Keav and Chou Chet?

1 A. No, I don't.

2 Q. Chou Chet was the leader was the Western Zone at one point but  
3 at one point also together with Ta Mok, the leadership of the  
4 Southwest Zone. Do you remember when exactly the zones were  
5 divided into two zones, when was that, that the Southwest Zone  
6 split up into two zones?

7 [15.20.21]

8 A. <> I cannot recall it clearly. But I recall that it was after  
9 17th April 1975, and it was split into two, one was the West Zone  
10 under Chou Chet and the Southwest <Zone was> under Ta Mok.

11 [15.21.02]

12 Q. Do you know why Chou Chet was arrested in March 1978?

13 A. No. I don't.

14 Q. Do you know what the relation was between Chou Chet and So  
15 Phim the leader of the East Zone?

16 A. No, I don't

17 Q. You were asked this question by the investigators as well but  
18 I'm asking you again, do you know who Ros Nhim was?

19 A. I only heard his name, <and> I have never met him <in person>.

20 I only heard his name and <he was at> zone <level. I am not sure  
21 whether it was Northwest or East Zone>. I only actually <heard>  
22 his name <>.

23 Q. Do you know about a coup d'état led by So Phim in 1978?

24 A. No, I don't.

25 Q. What can you tell us about any rebellion? You spoke earlier in

1 your interviews to the investigators about a rebellion. Yesterday  
2 you also spoke about internal struggle, who was fighting whom,  
3 can you be a bit more specific as to what you meant with groups  
4 of cadres within the CPK fighting each other? Can you explain us  
5 a little bit what you meant?

6 A. I'll try to clarify it briefly. I learnt of that situation,  
7 then I thought to myself, <why was there a conflict among those  
8 people. Because the one who had been interrogated was the one  
9 from the Party's network. For example if "A" had been arrested,  
10 in his confession would implicate to people in the Party,  
11 including the chief of group, chief of the unit. So they arrested  
12 their own people. I could not stop my mouth from speaking it out.  
13 It was completely wrong to do so. Frankly speaking, as what you  
14 asked me earlier concerning conflict between> Ta Mok and Chou  
15 Chet, <as the result,> the zone was split into two so that one  
16 could control one zone exclusively. <Another> example Sae <who  
17 was in charge of> Kampot province, <he was accused of being a  
18 "Yuon" servant or in the "Yuon" network. He was removed to Siem  
19 Reap. He was arrested there>.

20 [15.25.13]

21 <We> did not know whether or not he was the <in the network> of  
22 the Vietnamese, at that time nobody knew. <We, in the Party,  
23 fought each other to gain the power. It was obvious that they  
24 accused and imprisoned the people. Following to what I was asked  
25 in relation to the East Zone, Northwest Zone Phim and Nhim, it

83

1 was the same scenario. Vorn Veth was also in high ranking  
2 position. I would like to add, for I didn't think I would have a  
3 chance to express it, finally, Ta Mok and Pol Pot had a conflict.  
4 It became a giant fight. Brother Nuon and Brother Khieu stood  
5 aside. After a brief armed clash, Pol Pot decided to hand over  
6 both the Party and military power to Ta Mok>. I actually did <not  
7 witness> but I learnt from <others who were at the event>. Ta  
8 Mok <controlled> everything <but he was not satisfied.>

9 [15.27. 24]

10 Q. It's a little bit -- it's a bit of out of the scope of my  
11 question but just to follow up, are you talking about a clash  
12 between Ta Mok and Pol Pot in the periods '75 or '79 or back in  
13 the '80s or '90s?

14 A. It was in 1979, <sooner after the fall of the regime>. Well  
15 actually, it was towards the end of that period when the Khmer  
16 Rouge was dismantled and Anlong Veaeng was taken over. The Khmer  
17 Rouge last strong hold was dismantled.

18 Q. Right, right, let me go back, Mr. Pech Chim, to the word  
19 "implications". You were saying people were implicating other  
20 people. Did you know Chou Chet had implicated Saom, Phen and Keav  
21 as his collaborators or did you not know that?

22 MR. PRESIDENT:

23 Mr. Pech Chim, please be mindful of the microphone before you  
24 speak. You have to wait until the microphone is activated.

25 MR. PECH CHIM:

1 A. No, I do not know anything about it.

2 [15.29.25]

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 The Chamber observes that you are becoming very tired that's why  
5 the Chamber gently reminds you to try your best to only answer to  
6 the question being asked. You should try to avoid very long  
7 winding answers because you will be fatigue at the end of the  
8 day. So you should try to answer to only the question asked.

9 MR. KOPPE:

10 Would it be an idea to, if that's correct what you're observing  
11 that the witness is indeed fatigued, we will stop now, because we  
12 will continue tomorrow anyway and maybe a half hour tomorrow  
13 would be more fruitful than a half hour now. It's just a  
14 suggestion; it's of course to your wisdom.

15 (Judges deliberate)

16 [15.30.47]

17 MR. PRESIDENT:

18 Mr. Pech Chim, the Chamber would like to know whether you can  
19 continue for another half an hour and if you restrain yourself to  
20 only responding to the points asked of you then the Chamber is  
21 certain that you will only be required for tomorrow morning and  
22 then you can return home.

23 So please tell the Chamber whether you would like to stop now or  
24 whether you can continue for another half an hour.

25 MR. PECH CHIM:

1 I would like to continue for another half an hour and I'll try my  
2 best to answer the questions.

3 MR. PRESIDENT:

4 If that is case, Counsel, you may continue.

5 [15.31.52]

6 BY MR. KOPPE:

7 Thank you, Mr. President.

8 Q. Mr. Pech Chim, in answers to investigators of Co-Investigating  
9 Judge, you made some observations in relation of Pol Pot, Ta Mok,  
10 Son Sen and Nuon Chea. I would like to read an answer that you  
11 gave, to you -- that is, E319. 1.18, that is your answer 58 and  
12 the question is as follows.

13 Let me rephrase, Mr. President, let me start with answer 56, that  
14 might be easier.

15 Question: "To your knowledge did Ta Mok have authorities over the  
16 other zones apart from the Southwest Zone?"

17 Your answer: "During the time internal problem occurred, Ta Mok  
18 had authorities to take control over the Northwest Zone. Later  
19 on, when there were problems in the Central Zone and the East  
20 Zone, Ta Mok also had authorities to control the Central Zone and  
21 the East Zone. As far as I knew, Pol Pot authorised Ta Mok and it  
22 was Ta Mok's basic tasks."

23 Question: "To your knowledge, did Ta Mok receive orders directly  
24 from Pol Pot or Son Sen, alias Brother 89, the chief of the  
25 general staff?"



1 [15.33.32]

2 "Ta Mok received direct orders from Pol Pot."

3 Question: "What convinced you to believe that Ta Mok received  
4 direct orders from Pol Pot?"

5 Answer: "Because Ta Mok was the second person to Pol Pot.

6 Organisationally the first person was Pol Pot, the second one was  
7 Nuon Chea and Ta Mok was the third person but when receiving  
8 orders, Ta Mok received direct orders from Pol Pot, not Nuon  
9 Chea. As for Son Sen he was in the Central Committee of the Party  
10 but not under Ta Mok."

11 My question to you, Mr. Pech Chim, this seems to be high level  
12 knowledge of the command structure. Can you tell us how you know  
13 this?

14 MR. LYSAK:

15 Mr. President, just--

16 MR. PRESIDENT:

17 Witness, please wait. And the <International> Deputy  
18 Co-Prosecutor, you have the floor.

19 [15.34.41]

20 MR. LYSAK:

21 Just to correct the record, I think Counsel may have  
22 inadvertently misread the last part of it. The transcript or the  
23 interview actually says, "As for Son Sen he was on the Central  
24 Committee of the Party but under Ta Mok." Counsel read, "not  
25 under Ta Mok."

1 BY MR. KOPPE:

2 I apologise, "but under Ta Mok."

3 Q. My question, Mr. Witness, this seems to be -- your answer  
4 seems to be quite detail knowledge of the organisational  
5 structure within the standing committee, would you be able to  
6 tell us how you know, how you knew this, that Ta Mok was in fact  
7 the number 2, factually?

8 [15.35.35]

9 MR. PECH CHIM:

10 A. Allow me to clarify <that point, in fact> he was the third  
11 person, not the second person. <The second person was Uncle  
12 Nuon.> And that was based on my enquiry with the people who were  
13 familiar with the <organisational> structure. And people in Phnom  
14 Penh actually told me about that, that who was the first, the  
15 second or the third person. Previously it was not organised in  
16 that way.

17 Q. Thank you for that clarification. It was very helpful. But my  
18 question was how do you know this, did you just hear it from  
19 people or did you have any other way of knowing such detailed  
20 aspects of the command structure?

21 [15.36.40]

22 A. I asked the questions to the people that I knew. I did not  
23 dare <to> ask Ta Mok. And in fact, I asked Ke Pauk who involved  
24 at the centre and he was also the head of the zone. <He told me  
25 so>. Ta Mok was at the zone <level at the beginning, and later

1 on> he came to the centre he became the <2nd> deputy. <There> was  
2 also an announcement about the central permanent committee  
3 members. <Uncle Ieng Sary, the Standing Committee, Uncle Son Sen>  
4 was <the> candidate <of the Standing Committee, amongst the eight  
5 important people> and <in fact> he was the last person amongst  
6 the five. <Those five people were> Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok,  
7 Ieng Sary and Son Sen. As the rest, they were in charge of the  
8 zones.

9 Q. Let me try another example from your statement to the OCIJ  
10 investigators, again E319.1.18. In your answer to question 95,  
11 you said the following. The question is: "You said that Son Sen  
12 was under Ta Mok. To your knowledge was it possible that Ta Mok  
13 was the one who assigned Meas Muth as the Division 2 secretary?"  
14 Answer: "I do not think so because the central committee in  
15 charge of the military made the decision. The people in charge of  
16 the military included Son Sen, Ta Mok and Pol Pot. Not a single  
17 person decided this matter, it was decided by all of them. I  
18 would like to answer that I do not know the answer to this  
19 question because I am not sure."

20 And the following question: "Did you know if it was possible that  
21 Meas Muth was an assistant member of the military committee of  
22 the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea?" Answer: "At first I did not  
23 know. I knew it later. I saw Meas Muth in a film, then I secretly  
24 asked a high ranking person in the army, then I was told that  
25 Meas Muth was an alternate member of the military committee of

1 the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea."

2 [15.39.26]

3 Again, Mr. Pech Chim, this seems to be detailed knowledge about  
4 the structures in the highest positions of the CPK. Can you tell  
5 us a bit more about how you came to know this?

6 A. I asked questions and I discussed with the people who were  
7 familiar with the structure <and knew the important people>. I  
8 spoke to Boeun and mostly I learnt from Ke Pauk and that is all;  
9 that is how I obtained that information.

10 Q. I understand, but can you explain to us why it is that you do  
11 not really know So Phim or Ros Nhim or Heng Samrin, is there any  
12 reason you don't know anything about them or is it that you do  
13 not wish to speak about them?

14 [15.40.44]

15 A. We were living far away from one another. Here I refer to So  
16 Phim and Heng Samrin. <I was there after the liberation. I do not  
17 know them; therefore,> I cannot say that I know them.

18 Q. I understand that you might not know them or might not have  
19 know them personally, but if I ask you to think a bit more, what  
20 can you tell us about So Phim, Ros Nhim, Chou Chet, Vorn Vet,  
21 what can you tell us about them?

22 A. No, I cannot tell you anything else as I was at the other side  
23 of the country and they were at the opposite side<. In the> East  
24 Zone there was Ros Nhim and So Phim and sometimes I confuse these  
25 two individuals and upon my arrival I did not meet them as they

1 had passed away. So, I don't know what else I can tell you about  
2 this.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Pech Chim. I'll move on to another topic and  
4 that is your knowledge as to what happened in terms of food  
5 supply, health care, education, etc., in the other districts in  
6 Sector 13. Are you able to tell us anything about what happened  
7 there between '75 and '79, for instance you might have had  
8 discussions with other district secretaries of these districts?  
9 Can you tell us a bit more about the situation in these other  
10 districts, in Sector 13?

11 [15.43.44]

12 A. <I can tell you briefly about it. In fact, 105 had rice and  
13 cassava. Kiri Vong and Angkor Chey also had cassava but Treang  
14 and Kaoh Andaet were in a critical situation. We helped Kaoh  
15 Andaet and Treang>. At that time <for sure,> we <shared> rice <as  
16 per requested from> Saom. If I recall well, we gave them several  
17 batches of rice, sometimes it was 10 sacks, the other time it was  
18 15 sacks. And in fact <I always discussed with Khom, and> we  
19 decided to <share with> them the rice. <even though we had to eat  
20 gruel. All> the communes under our district also agreed to that  
21 because they were in short supply as at that time both the Base  
22 People and the New People had gruel <> -- we follow the principle  
23 of our old saying that we should help those who were in need and  
24 that was with us in our spirit as well.

25 [15.45.16]

1 Q. But in terms of implementation of Party policy, here in this  
2 Court we are focusing on the events in District 105 but I believe  
3 it would be helpful if we are able to somehow compare the  
4 achievements or non-achievements in District 105 with the other  
5 districts in Sector 13. Based on conversations with other leading  
6 members of these districts, can you tell us bit more about how  
7 Party policies were implemented in these districts?

8 A. From <my> observation and later on through our discussion, the  
9 yield or the achievement was moderate. That would be the level  
10 that we estimated.

11 Q. Do you know whether people were hungry in District 106, 107,  
12 108 or 109?

13 A. We were all in the same situation in terms of food shortage  
14 for instance.

15 Q. What about, for instance, the decision -- the apparent  
16 decision to disrobe or defrock monks, do you know if this  
17 happened in District 106, 107, 108 and 109, as well?

18 A. I cannot recall that because by that time all monks had come  
19 to stay at District 105 and none of them returned to other  
20 districts. However, there were a few of them in Angkor Chey  
21 district. So in terms of measures for the monks it applied all  
22 across the districts.

23 [15.48.01]

24 Q. Talking about the policy toward monks, do you remember whether  
25 there was any directive or order within the Revolutionary Flag

1 when it comes to Buddhism, when it comes to the treatment of  
2 monks, do you remember any central guideline written down in any  
3 of the "Revolutionary Flags"?

4 A. At that time I read it once but I did not read it fully  
5 <because I was too busy>. I cannot recall whether there was such  
6 a policy mentioned in that magazine.

7 Q. Turning to the Revolutionary Flag. You've given testimony that  
8 you read the Revolutionary Flag between 1975 and 1979. Was the  
9 Revolutionary Flag also meant to announce Party policy to the  
10 sectors and the district?

11 [15.49.34]

12 A. There was an announcement in the Revolutionary Flag magazine  
13 and some policy lines were also repeated in the magazine as a  
14 reminder to the cadres. However, sometimes, because we were  
15 engaging in our daily affairs, we tended to forget about the  
16 policies and it did not mean that we did not want to adhere to  
17 the policies, and that is all.

18 Q. Have you seen -- have you ever seen any policy announcement in  
19 the Revolutionary Flag about marriages in Democratic Kampuchea  
20 and about what should be done in relation to marriage policy?

21 A. I cannot remember <everything>. I only know in general terms  
22 but not the specifics of that principle. And of course, <there  
23 was policy on marriage in the "Flag" magazine. < We simplified  
24 it. As I told you earlier, there was a limitation in implementing  
25 it>.

1 Q. I'm returning again to the question of Buddhism; what do you  
2 remember having read about policy toward Buddhism in Democratic  
3 Kampuchea, in the Revolutionary Flag?

4 [15.52.00]

5 A. I read it and I consider it personally although I did not  
6 discuss the issues with my colleagues. I tried to consider myself  
7 and to analyse the issues whether Buddhism had any impact on the  
8 revolution and I concluded that Buddhism did not have any impact  
9 on the revolution. <The reason that> Buddhism was <eliminated  
10 because it was too> gentle as it had been practiced for <more  
11 than> 2000 years but we did not gain anything, on the contrary,  
12 we had lost our territory. However, let me state again that was  
13 my personal analysis. So, I believed at that time, based on my  
14 conclusion, that Buddhism did not have any impact on the  
15 revolution.

16 Q. Did you ever order people within your district not to practice  
17 Buddhism?

18 A. No, I did not. Whoever wished to practice Buddhism, they were  
19 freely allowed to do so.

20 Q. Do you know of any instances where people were punished for  
21 having practiced Buddhism in your district?

22 A. There was none.

23 [15.54.20]

24 Q. Mr. Pech Chim, we have had, I believe, two witnesses  
25 testifying to the Trial Chamber that I believe, in 1975, had



1 witnessed the demolition of Buddhist statues in pagodas. Have you  
2 heard about this?

3 A. Yes, I did. I actually gave my answer on this point that in  
4 general it had to be demolished.<Khom had announced this. I  
5 remained silent and gentle; however, I disagreed with that  
6 practice in my mind.>

7 Q. I'm not sure if I understood you correctly, who was  
8 responsible for the demolition of Buddhist statues, do you know  
9 that? I think I heard your answer in Khmer, could you repeat it  
10 please with the light on?

11 A. No, I don't. I don't know who demolished the Buddhist  
12 <statues> in District 105.

13 Q. Do you know who had ordered -- who had ordered that, the  
14 demolition, who was responsible for this, I mean in terms of  
15 instructing people?

16 [15.56.50]

17 A. I already said about that. It was the chairperson of the Party  
18 who gave that instruction. Although I did not like it, I kept  
19 quiet. And as for those people who actually did the demolition, I  
20 did not know them. And actually the meeting was held for the  
21 district committee, including Khom, <Keav> and Nhev.

22 Q. And who was the chair person responsible and was this person  
23 punished for his act or for her act?

24 A. It was <> Khom <who> was the chairperson of the Party. Keav  
25 was the deputy and <Nhev> was a member.

1 Q. But do you know whether they had -- that they had acted under  
2 the instructions of upper echelon or only by them without any  
3 authorisation from the upper echelon?

4 A. I knew that they did not initiate the instructions, but they  
5 obtained the instructions from the upper echelon.

6 [15.58.43]

7 Q. And who precisely, do you know?

8 A. During the meeting, Khom, who was the chairperson of the  
9 Party, gave the instructions on the demolition <of Buddhist  
10 statues,> and <communes> implemented it <accordingly>. So, I did  
11 not know who else were assigned at the commune level. As for the  
12 district level, it was Khom, <the Chairperson of the Party, Ta  
13 Keav and Nhev who agreed and gave> that instruction <to the lower  
14 level.>.

15 [15.59.40]

16 Q. Do you know why in Phnom Penh, there are no reports of  
17 demolition of Buddhist statues and pagodas?

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 Witness, please wait. And the Deputy Co-Prosecutor, you have the  
20 floor.

21 MR. LYSAK:

22 The objection is that Counsel is leading and testifying himself.  
23 I don't know the basis of this -- this assertion on his part but  
24 he shouldn't be leading the witness and testifying.

25 BY MR. KOPPE:

1 I will rephrase.

2 Q. Mr. Pech Chim, do you know anything about the fate of Buddhist  
3 statues and pagodas in Phnom Penh between 1975 and 1979?

4 MR. PECH CHIM:

5 A. I cannot answer your question. I actually don't get your  
6 question. What do you mean about the impact of Buddhist statues  
7 in Phnom Penh and I would like to seek clarification from the  
8 President of Chamber on this issue.

9 MR. PRESIDENT:

10 The Counsel wants to know whether you know what happened to  
11 Buddhism and in particular to Buddhist statues and to pagodas in  
12 Phnom Penh during the period of Democratic Kampuchea?

13 MR. PECH CHIM:

14 A. Yes, indeed it happened nationwide. I talked about the impact  
15 so it not only had an impact on Buddhism in Cambodia but it had  
16 an impact on Buddhism elsewhere including the Buddhism in China,  
17 <India> and throughout the world.

18 MR. PRESIDENT:

19 Thank you, Counsel Koppe and thank you, Mr. Pech Chim. We adjourn  
20 today's proceedings now and we will resume tomorrow -- that is,  
21 Friday the 24th April 2015, commencing at 9 o'clock in the  
22 morning. The Chamber will continue to hear the remaining  
23 testimony of the witness, Pech Chim.

24 [16.02.58]

25 Mr. Pech Chim, the Chamber is grateful of your presence. However,

1 your testimony is not yet concluded and you are invited once  
2 again to come to testify in this courtroom tomorrow morning at 9  
3 o'clock. You may now return to your place of residence.  
4 Duty counsel, the Chamber would also like to thank you for your  
5 assistance and again you are invited tomorrow to provide your  
6 assistance to the witness. It will commence at 9 o'clock.  
7 Court officer, in collaboration with the WESU, please make  
8 necessary transportation for Mr. Pech Chim to his place of  
9 residence and have him return to this courtroom before 9 o'clock.  
10 Security personnel, you are instructed to take the two Accused,  
11 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan back to the detention <> facility <of  
12 the ECCC> and have them return to attend the proceedings  
13 <tomorrow morning> before 9 o'clock.  
14 The Court is now adjourned.  
15 (Court adjourns at 1604H)

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