

FILENAME: EUAN.001

SBAUV HIM alias EUAN

"Response of Sbauv Him alias Euan, Division 310"

[eight-page handwritten document dated 20 February 1977 on front]

[from p.1]

....

I. General Section

A. A major virtue is that a considerable number of enemy infiltrators within the army were attacked and eliminated, particularly in 1976. So far the troops have been steeped in their national defence duty, and that it is important that the army is clean.

B. Shortcoming. The army is not yet clean and pure. Undercover enemies remain.

Reason: The stance of class struggle is not yet one of absolute determination.

[p.2]

For example, sometimes when their activities were observed, the courage to present reports to the Organization was there, but when the Organization made its decision delays were requested. This resulted in the enemy taking advantage of such opportunities to continue with further activities, even when their desire was to commit suicide, to attack and seize arms depots and to attack and take Propaganda.

This was a deficiency in the sphere of leadership and responsibility.

Reason: Shortcomings with regard to grasping and resolving contradictions correctly and in a timely manner.

For example: so far there hasn't been much unity in the division committee, particularly as regards Veuang and Chh^an of the regiments.

1. Veuang is the kind of person who is into prestige and rank, stubborn and argumentative, takes only either victory or defeat, which adversely affected solidarity generally. The Party was already aware of this problem, that there was a state of competition in work to achieve prestige and feats.

A recent noteworthy activity that I have not yet reported to the Organization and which I was hoping the Party would help with in the Party life-outlook session of February 1977, in which the Party was going to participate, was that Veuan had orally attacked the leadership, in particular Brother 89 personally and Chh'i'n, the Secretary of Division 920.

[p.3]

I don't remember the date, but this was the previous time when a

General Staff session was convened. According to what Veuang told me - I don't remember it all - Brother 89 was still partial to certain divisions. This was a problem that he had been scrutinizing since the fall of Phnum Penh up through the present, and this state of affairs had persisted.

For example, Reuan's unit, which was a unit which Brother 89 had controlled personally ever since the old days, it was the most intimate with him and the one which he invited most to visit and horsed around with the most.

The North units, by contrast, were the only ones not to have any cadres in the General Staff, and the situation was just getting worse and worse. If things remained this way, there was no knowing what would become of the units of the North in the future. According to Veuang, Chh`i'n wanted to resign as Division 920 Secretary because he had lost hope about refashioning himself. According to what Veuang put forward, in one sense he felt the same as Chh`i'n because Veuang was resentful of the Party when it had helped him in the revolutionary life outlook session at the General Staff School

[p.4]

2. Chh^an, the Secretary of Regiment 11, Division 310, is a hothead who reacts meanly to the brothers and sisters. He also used to be a womanizer. The Party is also already aware of this problem. He previously reported surreptitiously about Veuang, and Veuang also reportedly surreptitiously about Chh^an. Both of them came to me saying they were in the right. I have been in the process of trying to comprehend whether these are enemy activities or what. I haven't yet dared to come to a conclusion. I therefore haven't dared to report yet, but was planning to bring it up in the February life-outlook session in front of the Party so that the Party could consider it and make constructive comments.

I have not yet been able to grasp any other traitorous activities. It was my shortcoming that I had not yet reported things to the Party on time so that the Party could make constructive comments.

II. Personal Section

A. Ideologically

I still have proprietary sentiments with regard to family and relatives. Back during the war I assembled my relatives so they were concentrated near me. However, since after 17 April I have not yet been absolutely determined about foregoing this. I still continue to fear that my relatives and family may be undergoing hardship, and I have not yet [??] for them. After having studied again and again I have reformed my ideology, but in terms of concrete deployment I haven't had them going any where. [p.5] Concretely, they are still there.

My ideology of unit of organizationism is still impervious. I still think more about my own unit of organization than the units of organization in general.

This was manifest in wandering around ceaselessly making contacts looking for items from the outside.

The matters of oxen and buffalo, chickens and ducks, hogs, etc.

Separate contact was made with Launh to ask for ten drums of kerosene a month. It was possible to siphon off this fuel for many months, but I don't remember which months, but it was used in particular during the 1976 rainy season in the paddy fields.

Subsequently Launh came frequently to visit me at home, sometimes staying overnight. He noticed elephant tusks which the Organization had had us collect. He said that if it could be taken and traded on the Thai border it would be possible to get fuel and good wristwatches from the Thai. Because of my ideology of acquisitiveness I had the nerve to decide to load the ivory tusks onto Launh's car. Later on a date which I don't remember Launh came to get more.

In 1975 on a date I don't remember I went surreptitiously to Kampung Saom and spent the night there without informing the Organization. On that occasion Nhaem and Launh feted me at Nhaem's house. We all spent the night at Nhaem's house.

That night we began talking about the Supreme General Staff's army. Nhaem and Launh asked me, and I replied that everything was normal. Launh asked me whether there had been anything out of the ordinary, I and replied that it seemed like there wasn't. Launh started to say that when Khiev met him, Khiev didn't shake his hand, and that in the old days it hadn't been like this. (The current Khiev isn't like the Khiev of the old days.)

Nhaem 's rejoinder was that give that his status was now that of a Deputy Premier, it was about time that he forgot who Launh was.

I said because he had so many guests maybe he simply couldn't take notice of everybody.

As for my attitude at that time, it was supportive as in 1975 I was sympathetic to Brother. Things had not yet gone very far because the General Staff unit of organization had just recently been put together.

Nhaem and Launh were very close to each other at that time, but I don't know how deep things were between them.

III. On the Matters About Which I Was Questioned by 21

1. I am supposed to report about my plans for a coup d'etat against the Party which I respect as much as I respect my own life. In my 19 years of revolutionary life [p.6] I have fulfilled assignments as a communist in which I was ready to sacrifice without retreat my body and soul and even my life for the cause of the liberation of my entire class and nation. Under the Party's leadership I have repeatedly refashioned myself, especially my stance of absolute determination vis-a-vis the enemy and my stance of loyalty to the Party. I have nothing to hide from the Party. I have therefore had no thoughts of carrying out a coup d'etat against the Party. I find this question preposterous because the thought had never even occurred to me.

Another thing is that in his response the traitor Khuon said in his report to the Party that he had ordered me to set up radio contact with the CIA. I know nothing about this matter. The Party may please go ahead and find out further facts.

As the Party is already aware, when the radio was set up was already with the General Staff. The set up of this radio was authorized by Brother 89. When the (Ni) CIA group was arrested, I was routinely making daily reports to the Party, until I was asked to cease contacts and hand over the radio to Nat instead, when he was at S^a-21.

I therefore do not concur with this response from Khuon. Even if I must die, I don't want my name marked as that of a traitor to my Party or country. [p.8] These words of Khuon's are therefore a sheer invention.

Another thing is that the questions of S^a-21 say that I gathered recently with Veuang and Chh^an and all the battalions about coup plans. In fact the meeting laid down a plan for a project to expand new people and communist youth and a project gradually to put together leading committees at all levels to test how the work would go in actual fact, so that a table could be presented to the Organization for its assessment and decision. To see the concrete evidence, the Organization can look at my book.

I regret very much that had no advance knowledge that I was going to be arrested, in which case could have proven my loyalty to the Party.

However, it is now too late. I'm shackled in S^a-21.

In sum, with regard to the above shortcomings, I recognize that they still exist, as I have repeatedly to the Party during revolutionary life-outlook sessions.

As distinct with regard to the accusations of betrayal of the Party and the revolution, I do not concur. Even if I am going to die, I will die as someone who was loyal to the Party and the revolution.

If I am nevertheless to die, I ask the Party to seek justice for me. Only the Party knows my biography.

FILENAME: EUAN.002

SBAUV HIM alias EUAN

"Responses of Sbauv Him alias Euan"

[17-page handwritten document dated 20 February 1977 at beginning and 21 February 1977 at end]

[from p.1]

I would like to report honestly to the Party:

1. About the case in which I joined in Party-betraying activities with Khuon.

Initially Khuon utilized the method of sentimentality to win me over by ceaselessly giving me this or that. This caused me to have powerful sentiments of fondness for Khuon. He gave me wristwatches for myself and my spouse and gave medicines for use by my own unit of organization.

In 1974 ...

[from p.7]

In 1975, after the liberation of Phnum Penh, Khuon decided to detach three to four thousand of the troops, including men and women, in the three divisions to go into Commerce, saying there was no longer any assignment for the army because there were no more enemies, and shortly they would all be going into the factories anyway.

After he had bestowed the troops on the Party, Khuon then surreptitiously took them back again and again. He checked off the names Nhaem, Mach and M'o'l, and proposed detaching all the special forces to go with them with a view to grasping something special: the plan to attack the Party, with Mach as the one directly grasping things.

In around May or June 1975 Khuon summoned Euan, Chh'i'n and Suong to a banquet with food and drink at his house east of Propaganda.

After the food and drink, Khuon spoke nostalgically about how we had worked with each other during the war. Khuon spoke a lot in a very sentimental vein, as if he cared more strongly about us than the Party.

[p.9]

After promoting his own influence, Khuon spoke disparagingly about Brother 89 saying his leadership didn't show much comprehension of the problems of the troops, that he didn't know very much about the weal and woe of the brothers and sisters. This was one thing. Another thing was that when we were fighting on the battlefield everybody was aware that we were going all out to fight the enemy, almost without a break, with everybody contributing, but he nevertheless didn't notice this. If therefore his leadership in the future was going to be like this, there was no way of knowing what would become of us and of who we could bank on. He wanted to know how we all felt. Chh'i'n, Hean, Suong and I replied that that was also the way we saw things, but we didn't know how we could resolve this, given that the war was over now. If there was still a war on, then we could go all out in fighting and eventually the higher ups in the Party would notice us.

Khuon said we had no choice but to approach things differently if we were ever to make a future for ourselves. We all asked him how we should approach things. Khuon said that now while we still had three very powerful divisions worth of troops at hand we could do anything we wanted. [p.10] If we could liberate the country, we could do anything.

All of us had to understand that from what he knew nobody wanted to be with the revolution, especially the major leadership figure. They simply weren't talking. They were awaiting circumstances. Having said this much, Khuon stopped. All of us looked at each other dumbfounded[?]. Khuon continued saying that nevertheless we all had to keep quiet. Someday we would find out. We would continue the struggle for justice and happiness for our troops and our country until we achieved them. Someday we would be charged with even greater functions, commensurate with our strenuous efforts. All of us concurred with his views, whatever he said. We would do whatever he asked, because he had been our leader and had a sympathetic understanding of all of us.

After Khuon had given us all education, we said goodbye to him and

went to our respective positions.

[p.11]

That same May or June 1975 Khuom summoned Chh`i'n, Suong and me to another banquet. After the banquet, he invited us to talk with him in secret, and he indoctrinated us with the following traitorous plan.

1. The three divisions must go all out to make every effort to fashion traitorous cores, particularly in the regiments and battalions, so as to grasp all the troops. However, this must be done over a long period and painstakingly.

2. Ready arms and ammunition so as to have mastery in advance, which would facilitate things once there was a plan.

3. Ready food supplies so as to have mastery, it being imperative to be adept at skimping on the rice ration so as to repeatedly lay some aside.

All of this was to do done through utilization of revolutionary forms. Anything out of the ordinary was not to be done. It was imperative to use a long period of time and to maintain the utmost secrecy. For all of us who had come the major plan was to build up strength.

[p.12]

After having taken on board the plan the three divisions all began to proceed actively to build up strength according to plan.

On the one hand I strained to fulfil my revolutionary assignments in form, while on the other hand I was also strenuous about the plan to betray the Party.

Something that simplified the task was obviously that the core forces were in our respective hands. What made things difficult was the narrowness of the Party line. There were therefore delays in putting the traitorous plan into motion.

Khuon received regular reports about such hardships from each division. As for the results achieved:

K`e'um, the former Deputy Secretary of Division 310, currently in the Division of the North

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In 1975, when the Party still had not detached Khuon, I always noted that Khuon made an effort to liaise with the Propaganda Ministry and particularly with Ph`a'oh by sending him food almost every day. Ph`o'ah was infatuated and became devoted to Khuon, but what sort of contact they had, I was unable to grasp, but it's possible that Khuon intended to build up strength in Propaganda to be utilized in the plan to betray the Party.

[p.14]

In addition to this I always observed the North Zone coming to get in touch. This included Pok, the Zone Secretary, Sreng and the Zone Deputy Secretary. Contact was frequent, but I was unable to grasp it.

Generally speaking, I had clear knowledge of things only with the confines of the army

All I did see nevertheless was that Khuon held frequent banquets, sometimes secretly, sometimes overtly, in order to win over forces through legal forms at the Commerce Ministry.

2. On the Plan to Betray the Party

1. The strategic plan desired the carrying out of a coup d'etat to overthrow the Party, in particular after the military forces were put together in 310, 450 and 920.

However, no detailed plan was made because after Khuon was detached none of the three divisions had anything to fall back on. They were left floating and so each started lying low.

[p.15]

Another thing was that the Party was repeatedly taking measures against traitors, and we were afraid that Khuon would confess in his responses. We therefore all went all out to strain to fulfil our respective revolutionary assignments.

3. On the Plan to Contact Those in the CIA

Khuon instructed me to make contact via (Kau L'a'ng). I made contact by designating Sau, the former chairman of the P^o-41 Hospital of Division 310, who is now in S^a-21. Whatever contact was made, Sau reported directly to Khuon. Back then the radio was put up near the Propaganda Ministry. Veuang and S'o'ng made the arrangements and were in direct command. They then reported to Khuon.

4. The Ocean Plan

I didn't know about it. In 1975 I went there secretly. On the one hand my purpose was to familiarize myself with Kampung Saom and the ocean. On the other hand I also wanted to make contacts to find fuel and watches. I got in touch with Launh of the ocean.

[p.16]

One thing that struck me was that Launh and Nhaem were terribly close, as if they were one. They ate and drank, banqueted, walked around and had fun as equals. [??] Moreover these two were always talking again and again in a critical vein about the Party. From the way they talked it seemed that they weren't satisfied with anybody.

From this it might be possible that Nhaem had won Launh over. Moreover, Launh surreptitiously siphoned off many drums of kerosene, hiding this from the Party, and then distributed it monthly to 310 and 502, particularly from 1975 through the middle of 1976.

Moreover there was a plan to collect ivory from Divisions 310 and 502 and take it to trade in Thailand for wrist watches.

Separately from this, I received five wristwatches ... from Launh.

I don't know what sort of contact Launh had with Siam.

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FILENAME: EUAN.003

SBAUV HIM alias EUAN

"Response of Sbauv Him alias Euan: The History of His Own Treason"

[78-page handwritten document dated 22 February 1977 at the beginning and 28 February 1977 at the end]

[from p.57]

A while after the fall of Phnum Penh Khuon called in the committees of all three divisions to a special banquet at his home. After the banquet he invited me, Chh`i'n, Hean, K`e'um, S^ay and Suong to see him. He said that maybe all three of our divisions would now be taken by the Organization, that we might all be separated from each other. However, even if we were separated, our plan remained the same, although it was imperative to make every effort to maintain absolute secrecy by going all out to conform with the Party by using nothing by revolutionary formats, not doing anything that was out of the ordinary.

[p.58]

The major thing was to make every effort to build up strength, particularly core forces, most importantly in the regiments, battalions and companies, so as to be sure to be able to grasp all of the troops.

Another important matter was to make every effort to assemble arms and ammunition. We had a lot of potential as regards arms because there were still weapons everywhere in Phnum Penh.

He would also make every effort to collect them himself, but his weapons were to be for supplying the bases.

Another matter was to make every effort to collect two-way radios from the largest to the smallest size to store them away for use in subsequent plans.

After the meeting was over Khuon had has trade in our wristwatches. Each of us selected a good one

....

Later ... Khuon [p.59] invited me, Chh`i'n, Hean, S^ay and Suong to come work with him. He stated his view that now that all our troops had to be turned over to the Organization, we would be cut off from him. He was to leave the military and go to State Commerce instead. He therefore was asking to detach a number of military, maybe in excess of three thousand, to go help him in Commerce. A number of cadres were also to be detached. Those detached wouldn't be going anywhere far away. We would still all be in Phnum Penh. Therefore our liaison on covert work would remain the same.

He said he wanted now to make introductions of our forces in the rear bases, in order to facilitate our work liaison with them in the days to come. However, he would like this to be kept quiet, and we would only know these few names. We were to do whatever needed to be done to prevent our subordinates from knowing about this, because these bases were very secret. [p.60] He was nevertheless taking this opportunity to go ahead and inform us that they comprised Deuan, Sreng, S`o't, Chh^an, T`o'l, Ngin, Seng (Saor), Choeng Prey, (Chhean), (Saom), (`U'n), (Saen), (Poul), (Sim), (Suor), Knaut and a number of others in the district committees, not all of whom I can remember. Sreng was in direct charge of all of these forces, that is those in the North.

In Siem Reap-Utday Meanchey there were Sean, S`u'n), (Beng), (Chiem), (Khuean), (Da) and in all the district committees, but I don't remember their names.

In general, it had been possible to build up grassroots strength very quickly, and we had the full potential to expand and advance further, as we already had cores.

He was therefore now requesting to detach Hean from the division with a view to putting him in control with the Utdar Meanchey division in order to expand our strength along the border, so it would be steadfast and a reliable hinterland, as this was also in conformity with the Organization's plans.

[p.61]

Another project he was preparing was to have S`o't go and grasp Siem Reap as Siem Reap Secretary. Our forces would then all abut on each other.

Sreng would grasp the new North Zone which had just been put together.

It was not yet certain what would be happening with Deuan and Seng. We could expect to be informed later.

It seemed that the Organization might be taking Deuan and putting him in the Organization's own bureau.

Seng was still ill and on a period of sickleave. Once he was well arrangements would then be made for his work.

After Khuon finished speaking Hean asked him when he wanted him to go. Khuon said that was not yet certain, but that he would inform him later. Nevertheless he should put together his things now.

....

[p.64]

Later Khuon had me make arrangements for two ... radios for Hean, and to send two to S`o't and two to Sreng. At the same time he had P`o'ek set up another ... and hand it over to S`o't for liaison when there was a plan, so they would not be any hitches. In addition to these there were a number of C-46, C-25 double and ordinary C-25 radios with S`o't for distribution

to use within the sector.

Later Khuon had me put up a [?] for contact with the CIA. I handed this over to Veuang and Sau to make the arrangements for the contact. Whatever the results were, Veuang was to report them regularly to Khuon

Later Khuon repeatedly invited the divisions to frequent banquets. [p.63] He was always talking provocatively about Brother 89, saying that in his control of the army he would be devoted to one and hate another. Crucially, he only had eyes for Reuan's division. He didn't give much thought to the divisions of the North. At the same time Khuon was making every effort to promote his own influence. He was always holding one banquet after another and taking advantage of these opportunities to arrange marriages for a large number of cadres while coming out with spreads of food and beer and giving watches as wedding presents in all three divisions. This made cadres blindly devoted to him and forget about the Party line.

Subsequently Khuon regular invited all three divisions, inviting them one at a time to see him to fortify their stance of treason to the Party.

Later the Party required Division 2 to go defend the border in Ratanakiri. Before it went Khuon summoned Chh`i'n and S^ay to come see him for work, but I don't know what plan he laid down. [p.64] However from what I subsequently learned there was a plan to liaise with Khuon along the border.

After they met I noticed he handed over a large quantity of medicines and equipment to Chh`i'n and S^ay.

Later I regularly noticed that Khuon was sending thousands of guns to the rear. There were pistols of every calibre, but I don't know to which sectors they were handed over. Mostly they were AR-15s mixed with other things.

Later Khuon sommoned me, Suong and Nhaem to see him and he announced a set of provisional appointments with a view to facilitating my and Suong's upcoming liaison,

Khuon, Chairman;

Deaun, Deputy;

Sreng, Member;

S`o't, Member;

Euan, Member;

Chh`i'n, Member;

Suong, Member;

Hean, Member;

Nhaem, Member.

[p.65]

The Standing Committee, however, comprised the top three. The assignment of the Standing Committee therefore was to maintain an overall grip both of the bases and the military. Therefore if Khuon was not around, then I was asked to liaise with Deuan, and if there were further hitches, then it would also be possible to get in touch with Sreng. If, however, there was nothing essential and it was liaison about the military, then I should liaise directly with him.

Nhaem had to spread out the Special Forces so they would be in many locations and such that they would be able to grasp the situation everywhere in Phnum Penh city and outside it, so when the fighting broke out the Special Forces would be able to act as guides quickly taking the major units to attack. In principle if these Special Forces had been able to gather clear intelligence they were to return to their unit so that could come back under the supervision of their division.

The plan remained the same. There were not yet any changes. [p.66] The important thing was to maintain absolute secrecy. In other words, utilize revolutionary forms in every case, and never do anything the least bit out of the ordinary.

Then for a long period there was no mutual contact as we were preoccupied with our respective other works due to the fact that we were making every effort to go all out to obey the Organization.

Later Suong came to see me and asked me how things were going with me. I said I had mastery now in general terms I asked him how things were with him, and he replied he also now had mastery

[p.67]

A while later Khuon invited me, Suong and Nhaem to his house east of Propaganda, near Voat Phnum. ... He said we hadn't seen each other for a long time because we had been too busy. He had me, Suong and Nhaem each report on the situation in our respective units He summed up, saying that the situation was that we had a certain extent of mastery in each of our units He said he would like to transmit our projected overall plan, which was to be implemented both by the bases and the military. [p.68] He said he had already gone down to the bases with this plan. Only the military was left.

The overall plan was that we would hijack power from the revolution in the form of a coup d'etat.

In Phnum Penh our primary objective was to attack the Bureau of the Higher Organization from its summit on down utilizing the military strength of 310's Special Forces. It was therefore imperative to begin gathering intelligence starting now. Another important objective was to take the Ministry of Propaganda in our to transmit our new voice to the outside. We would utilize the strength of 310's Regiment 13 ... which was already on the spot defending that location.

Another objective was to grasp the arms and ammunition depots to have mastery when there was combat, as well as food supplies. The forces of 450 were for intervention, especially in case other troop strengths either in Phnum Penh or outside it came in to help.

[p.69]

He had readied vehicles and food supplies already. In general we had no worries about food supplies or means for transporting the troops. This was the Phnum Penh plan.

He had already made the arrangements for the plan in the bases. Our primary principle was to seize power legally by grasping all the core forces down to the bottom. There would therefore be no outbreak of fighting. In case, however, an outbreak of fighting was necessary, that could also be done utilizing grassroots military strength, which already had mastery.

We were therefore asked to maintain a firm grasp on this plan, and if there were any changes he would inform as later

[p.70]

Later Deuan drove over in a car to see me and Suong Deuan asked how our work was getting along and whether Khuon had been to see us yet or not. I told him Khuon had already seen Suong and me, but now we weren't seeing him at all. Deuan replied that he was now extremely busy and wouldn't be able to come to see us. However, our work remained the same. There was nothing out of the ordinary. ...

[p.71]

He asked me whether I had ever been to the North. I replied that I hadn't been there for a long time. He asked what the situation was like in the North. I said I didn't know either because I was so busy I hadn't made any contacts at all. ...

Later Khuon had an immoral affair with Ms Kheng at Propagana, and as her husband found out he surreptitiously killed Ms Kheng's husband. Then the Organization detained Khuon, and I didn't know where he had been taken to. This incident caused something of a panic due to the lose of our support structure. Moreover, there was fear that our secrets would be revealed. For a period after Khuon's detention things were quiet everywhere because everybody was waiting to see what the situation was going to be. [p.72] The situation after the Party detained Khuon was that things very pretty inactive everywhere. This was due to the fear of covers being blown. Everybody was keeping quiet.

Later Suong came to see me. Suong asked me what was happening with Khuon. I said I didn't know what was going on as I still hadn't learnt anything. It looked like things were quiet everywhere, but I just didn't know what was happening. Suong said the only way was to see Deuan. I said I hadn't seen him ever. I hadn't yet seen anyone. Suong said that maybe things were going to go awry. I said I just didn't know, that if Khuon had been taken to Security, all of us would certainly be in trouble. Sooner or later he would respond. However, from some of the things I had heard maybe things would be alright.

[p.73]

Later Deuan wrote me a letter via Saem of the Organization's bodyguards. There were letters to Sreng, S`o't, Hean, Suong and Chh`i'n. The substance of the letter said that it had been many months since we had had contact with each other due to the fact that we had had hitches in connection with our leadership, especially in that Khuon had had to be disciplined for his immorality. However, he would like to inform all of us that the Higher Organization had been forgiving about this matter. These days he was residing in a bureau and indeed was near Deuan. Therefore normal contact had been resumed.

There had been no changes in our plan. We were still continuing to prepare condtions to hijack power as before. He had written letters to all locations now. ...

[p.74]

.... Later the Party discovered traitorous links again and again, including the links in Commerce, and important links were arrested, even in Division 310. Seeing this situation, I convened a meeting of the division committe and decided that it was necessary to set up a security unit with a view to pulling the wool over the Organization's eyes, as it looked like the situation had gone awry.

S`o'ng was responsible for this security unit.

The situation then became that Nhaem and M`o'l disappeared.

Nobody dared to engage in any more activities. Everybody was waiting to hear what everybody else was doing. As for liaison with Deuan, [p.75] there was no more correspondence to be seen.

Then Suong came to see me again. He asked me what the situation was. I said I had yet to learn anything at all because since receipt of Deuan's letter I hadn't gotten in touch with anyone as I was too busy. Suong asked me whether I had learnt what had happened to Khuon. I said it looked like to me that there were no assurances because the Party was in the process of tracking things down in great detail, and those who had been around him had all been detained by the Organization now. It looked like it wouldn't be long before the Organization detained Khuon again.

Suong asked further what would be happening with us. I said if things remained docile like this it looked like we were defeated.

A few days before Siem Reap-Utdar Meanchey had also written me a letter asking me in particular about the situation. [p.76] However, I had also said I still didn't know anything. It looked like every location was cut off from liaison like us.

Suong asked further if the Organization detained Khuon what would happen to us. I said it was not possible to guess because the Organization hadn't noticed us, and even in the case where there were replied the Organization wouldn't believe it because in form we hadn't let anything leak out.

A few days before The Brother Higher Up called me in to ask me about the Khuon affair. I reported on his immoral affairs. I didn't report

anything about any plans. Suong said a few days ago he had brought up the question in a Party life-outlook session, about Khuon's influence over me and the troops. [p.77] However, he had said there was no such influence. It seemed as if he was really pursuing the matter.

I said it looked to me like everything was alright. We should continue working as usual and keep our eyes and ears on the situation. If there was anything unusual, he should tell me.

The situation subsequently was quiet. There was no contact from the others. Everybody was lying low and listening.

This was how it was right up through 18 February 1977 when the Party detained Suong and me.

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FILENAME: EUAN.004

SBAUV HIM alias EUAN

"On the Traitorous Forces in Division 310"

[12-page handwritten document dated 26 February 1977]

[from p.1]

1. Euan, me myself;
2. Veuang, Division Deputy;
3. Chh^an, Secretary of Regiment 11;
4. Cheng, Secretary of Regiment 12;
5. S`o'ng, Secretary of Regiment 13;

...

EUAN.005

SBAUV HIM alias EUAN

"I Would Like to Report On One Problem to the Party"

[three-page handwritten document dated 7 March 1977]

[from p.1]

On contact with the CIA.

In 1975 I was designated by Khuon to make contact with the CIA. I designated Veuang, S`o'ng and Sau to arrange the contact. The person who was to make the direct contact was Sau. The contact place was the Khmer Athletics Centre, next door to Propaganda.

During the period of contact I went there once to listen to the contacts. All I heard was American. I asked Sau whether contact had been established yet, and he told me it had

[p.2]

The result of the contact was that liaison was established with Th`a'ch Ph`o'ng, the CIA chief for Kampuchea after the liberation of Phnum Penh.

Later S`o'ng and Sau, who were always at the contact place, made contact with Veuang, who presented all the news to Khuon, because at that time I was busy both with the work in the city and the urgent matter of the paddy fields, so I wasn't in contact with them. Later the liaison was cut off as that frequencies got mixed up [p.3] because the Th`a'ch Ph`o'ng group changed their location when they moved from Khmeria to Siam.

....

FILENAME: EUAN.006

SBAUV HIM alias EUAN

[untitled six-page handwritten document dated 9 March 1977]

[from p.1]

I would like to report to the Party about the preparation of food supplies in Division 310 for the plan. More than a thousand tonnes of food supplies are stored at Anglung Krangan. Veuang is directly in charge of this. However, this food has repeatedly been used for eating, and I don't know how much is left now.

In addition to this there is the fermented fish for which Veuang has the complete manifest. There isn't any more anywhere else because it hadn't yet been possible to find any. It was projected that we would go all out to find more by accelerating the farming of dry season paddy and finding contacts in the grassroots. However, everywhere in the grassroots records were kept, so nothing could be found.

On Arms and Ammunition

So far the plan had been to make arrangements by regiments, battalions and independent battalions, and they had put together a sufficient amount. Arrangements were made to keep what was left over in the depots legally. Therefore was not yet any policy to take it out and conceal it anywhere.

I turned over these depots to Veuang for him to grasp personally

[p.3]

On Two-Way Radios

Two were allocated to Hean in Utdar Meanchey, two to S`o't in Siem Reap, and two to Sreng in the North

These days there are four (kau l`a'ng) in the depot

[p.4]

On the Problem of Medicines

Back in 1975 there was a plan to make a large ready reserve by collecting it on the spearhead. Later, however, the hospitals were divided into two parts. One part was presented to the Organization, and so the medicines were also divided up into two part. Moreover, most of the medicines were old, beyond their expiration date, and they have been used one after the other.

Most of what's left is primary ingredients for medicines, which are nowadays in the laboratory

[p.5]

On the Young Woman Who Had Immoral Encounters with Khuon

[names 20 and says there are more whose names he can't remember, saying that before liberation there were 30, and that after liberation he didn't have much of a grasp], but that the rumour was that altogethyer in Phnum Penh, Kampung Saom and Chrang Chamreh there had been more than 50
....

....

FILENAME: EUAN.007

SBAUV HIM

"On Liaison with Brother Deuan"

[16-page handwritten document dated 12 March 1977 at end with one-page handwritten appendix dated 13 March 1977]

[from p.1]

In 1976 ... Deuan drove over in a car ... to see Suong, Veuang and me behind House No. 2 (Hotel Le Phnom). ...

[p.2]

.... I [said] that I had also been busy because now all the divisions were launching storming attacks to put up paddy field dikes and feeder canals for the farming of rainy season paddy. Deuan asked me whether I had ever been to the North or even seen Sreng. I said I hadn't ever been there, nor had I ever seen Sreng.

....

[p.4]

.... Another plan was for the preparation of foodsupplies. Here we had difficulties because we didn't know where to go looking for it, [p.5]

but from what Khuon had said we need not worry because he was on the spot at Commerce.

[p.5]

In addition there was a plan for the preparation of medicines. However, there were some shortages of medicines, because on the one hand most of what we had was old and it had been divided into two parts. Nevertheless Khuon could ensure this as well.

....

As for the intelligence gathering plan, we had been able to gather quite a lot now through the Special Forces

[p.11]

Later I received five letters from Deuan, including those to go to Sreng, S`o't, Hean and Suong and to me personally.

The content ...: I would like to inform you with regard to the Khuon problem that these days the Organization had not imposed any punishment on him, but had simply removed him from his work. [p.12] These days he was confined to one place, a separate bureau near me. We therefore have normal contact. ...

[p.13]

In late 1976 the Party kept discovering traitorous links, particularly in Commerce and even in Division 310, especially among those who had been attached to Khuon before. They were detained by the Party one after another.

Seeing that this was the situation, I wrote a letter to Deuan asking for his views, in which I reported on the situation in the division. He wrote back saying it was imperative to set up a division security unit to cover our tracks and pull the wool over the Organization's eyes in form so as to prevent the Party's attention from being drawn.

[p.14]

After having received Deuan's letter I convened a meeting of the division committee to set up a security unit, which S`o'ng was assigned to take charge of.

[appendix]

I would like to report to the Party honestly on the Problem of the Major Enemy Soldier Chiefs in Phnum Penh

I don't know about the generals after the fall of Phnum Penh. I don't know how many died and how many were alive. I don't know about their concealment either.

This is because Khuon turned them over to Nhaem and Sean, who were to be their guides. At that time I was busily preoccupied with arranging the city, sweeping out and removing the people that were in the way of the

overall work of the Higher Party. Therefore I didn't know about these big soldier chiefs. ...

FILENAME: EUAN.008

SBAUV HIM alias EUAN

"On Liaison with Comrade Suong"

[7-page handwritten document dated 14 March 1977]

[from p.2]

....

After the fall of Phnum Penh, because Hean was transferred to Utdar Meanchey, there was constant contact between Suong and me. While Khuon was still around I met with Suong three times at Khuon's house, before Khuon was detained by the Party on account of his morals affairs. I participated in another gathering about the plan to betray the Party, which was held at my hosue behind House No. 2 and which was led by Deuan.

After Khuon was detained by the Party in connection with his morals affairs, Suong made a series of visits to me. ...