

18 October 1976 (N0001505)

Minutes of the Meeting of Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Divisions and Regiments

18 October 1976, 14.15 hours

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Brother 89's Presentation

1. Since the treasonous events in the army and the grassroots, we conducted discussions and I would like to present some principles for adherence to measures.

i. The CIA plan is to attack the Kampuchean revolution through French, American and Japanese imperialism and the traitors, to attack and seize our maritime islands. In assessing this plan, our Party perceives that we have basically smashed the undercover traitorous links, both this undercover on the inside and those coming from Thailand as well as those who came legally from abroad. This plan to attack our islands was only the earlier plan, and it has been basically smashed and dissipated. However, we must pay attention to conducting an internal purge to make ourselves clean, so as not to allow the undercover enemy in any way to bore from within and attack our revolution, because he still continues to attack us.

ii. Part two is the revisionists, the Soviets and the Vietnamese, who have plans to attack us ever more forcefully, and, concretely, to do so through generating traitorous forces from within and utilizing covering forces from without. This contradiction is a sharply acute and profound one that has attacked our Party through their creation of a new Party way back in 1962. Previously, when the Vietnamese army entered our country, it conducted activities, activities to fashion traitorous forces one after the other. Later, we attacked the traitorous links in the Southwest, Kah Kong, Kampung Seila and Sector 33, and even expelled the Vietnamese from our territory.

Although we have basically smashed the traitors, Viet Nam is continuing to lead the remnants to keep on with more activities. The Vietnamese have exfiltrated those whose covers were blown abroad. Our Party surmises that there will continue to be an ongoing struggle with them, but they will have to fashion forces, and this will take a long time, which gives us an opportunity to strengthen and expand ourselves even more powerfully and valiantly. The successful elimination of the traitors that has taken place is further extraordinary great victory following upon the great victory of 17 April. We not only seized a victory in the open war with American imperialism, but have also seized a victory over espionage, and especially over the secret war of revisionism. The reason for this is that our Party's line is correct; it is not derived from technical expertise. They generated these traitorous forces and put them undercover long ago, and theirs was a major historical betrayal of our Party.

The plan laid down by the enemy was to attack us in a deep, longterm undercover way, by going deep into the army and deep into the grassroots and even of taking hold of important posts. This has been a major lesson, a major experience, for us. It is imperative further to evaluate our cadre in terms of biographies and of implementation of the line. Another lesson we have been taught is that they want to attack us from the outside [using the Angola form¹] by concocting internal turmoil, and only then attacking us from the outside, utilizing the Angola-Czechoslovakia model. We have been taught that if our Party is exacting about details, is on the move in conducting secret work, meticulous about stop-and-search, then it is very difficult to attack us. However, the enemy perceives that our weakpoint is our forces are not set up for combat, but are totally preoccupied with production. If he were to attack immediately, we would have difficulties and would not be quick enough to concentrate forces to fend him off in time. This is if he were to utilize traitorous forces for an immediate attack, although this does not mean his attacks would defeat us.

2. Measures

i. A perspective and stance of lofty revolutionary vigilance is to be substantively manifest as meaningful implementation, and to become the circulation system of revolutionary vigilance. There is to be internalization of the perspective on class contradictions, of serious and tenacious class struggle between us and the enemy. This contradiction is acute, and acute in the sense that we have the advantage over the enemy.

ii. Another measure is that it is imperative to purge the army by getting a clear grasp of biographies and by keeping track of the implementation of the line: is that a liberal state of affairs or a state of affairs in which there are deviations from any aspects of the Party line?

iii. Military measures

In terms of the country as a whole, wait until the General Staff has had discussions with the Zones about the locations in which only measures should be put forward within the army of the Centre, especially in terms of the defence of Phnom Penh. One division must arrange for one battalion always to be in possession of arms and ammunition and duty vehicles. Concretely, make sure that initially this one-battalion force sets up one company to meet the requirement of defending the state radio, the location of the Organization and the location of the General Staff. Select persons to make sure that they are clean politically, ideologically and organizationally. Arm them with light weapons: AKs, light machine guns, M-79s, B-40s, B-41s. These forces are to be encamped at the important targets in the city and be in radio contact with the General Staff. The headquarters of this company must have fast-moving

¹ This phrase is marked out by a line through the text.

vehicles so that there will be no obstacles to maintaining the initiative to attack whenever there is an uprising to make a coup d'etat and to protect against any attack from the outside through bombardment and then landing of forces. ...

The plan suggested is to formulate a combat plan and to please set up a Joint Committee comprising Comrades Nat, Teanh-Ran, Saom and the Division Secretary. ...