

**KEY TEXT HIGHLIGHTED**  
**05 SEPTEMBER 2006**

**THE CHAN NOTEBOOK**

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16 JANUARY 78

Slogans

1. Celebrate the X year anniversary of the creation of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea.

Celebrate the great victory of 6 January over the Yuon aggressors and expansionist land grabbers.

1) In order to celebrate 17 January 68, the birth of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, this is the reason for this meeting.

Program

I. Respect the Party flag, the national flag, and the souls

II. Brother Number One's speech:

- The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea was an important factor in realizing our revolution's victory.

- The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea defends the integrity of the border, defends the national nation's soul, the spirit of documents, the spirit of mastery, etc.

Brother Number One's Speech

Respects and praise to the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, because it is the strong main pillar, the instrument to

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build our Organization.

- Join together in building socialism - three tons + six tons.

Meaning do not lose anything at all from the targets of each one of us.

III. The meeting representative states his impressions:

- The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea = the absolute instrument of the Party - the proletariat.

2) We have a glorious mission.

- Liberate the nation, liberate the people - defend the territory - eliminate the land-grabbing E3/833 Yuon.

3) Develop the feeling of implementing the Party line of people's war.

4) Fulfill your tasking strongly by studying the military battlefield front + the cooperatives in the battlefield front.

(IV. Summary of the Organization Committee)

V. Respect the Party flag - the national flag. The end.

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Resolutions of our Party. We have achieved successive victories and have extolled the honor of the nation of Kampuchea, the revolution of Kampuchea, and the Communist Party of Kampuchea as outstanding on the international stage.

We have pride in our army, because the army has fought and suffered in every way for the people, for the state power, for the glory of Kampuchea, to defend our Kampuchean territory land and sea.

Seeing this, we have faith + express our satisfaction with our army.

Let me raise some new matters:

1) On the creation of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. In this matter, I raise the question, When was the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea created? What was its source? On what occasions did it overcome? When?

- It was not born from two, three, or four circulars which established the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. It was not this organization

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or that organization which ordered the combatants, male and female, to wear the uniform of the Army.

- It was born of:

- The resistance: The Communist Party of Kampuchea raised the line of attacking imperialists and feudalists. The Party said to build weaponry. The Party created an army from its bare hands. Two to three people, four to ten people, attacked the enemy with ancient weapons and eventually modern weapons. attacked with three men, a squad, a platoon, a company, then a division, then many divisions.

Seeing the history of our Army like this shows that our Army was not created by circulars, but by the fire of combat. It became bigger and stronger by attacking and defeating imperialist America. It became very bigger and stronger attacking and embarrassing the land swallowing Yuon as well.

- The matter of the people, farmers, workers

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stands on the foundation of the poor masses. 97 or 98% of its composition was poor peasants – middle lower middle peasants. Other than that there were middle peasants and other classes.

Seeing this composition, we see the original source of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea.

- Can it overcome? Overcome further in the future?
  - Must look at class.

The class of the people – the poor peasant middle and lower. The base peasants are 80%. That is a lot. It is a source which won't dry up. So we do not worry about it drying up. This is speaking about numbers.

- Our Army has a nature following the class of the people. The people of the poor peasant and lower middle peasant class = the proletarian and the semi-proletarian in the countryside. We can maintain this nature

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forever, (that is, this proletarian nature), because it springs from the poor peasants and the lower middle peasants. The poor peasants and the lower middle peasants are not isolated, they are under the leadership of the party and are in the collective. So all these poor peasants are highly stable. Like the poor peasants at the base, the line of our Communist Party of Kampuchea is good → so our sons and daughters who are the Revolutionary Army make it good in this way.

In the future, what will be the source from which the Army is built? In the past, some bad elements were selected. This led us to research personal histories so that our Revolutionary Army would have purity. This was in order to make it even stronger. If its sources are not good, no matter how well and strongly it is armed, it cannot be strong. Recruiting an army must be based on health and politics, not based on ideology.

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If the health and politics is no good, see an airplane, see a tank, see an artillery piece, and there is fear, not fight. In the army, personnel is the number one factor, supply is number two, and technology is number three.

- In what status, on what occasion?
  - It was not created in peace or in a military school, but in the bright flame of combat, combating obstacles, tested in war. In the inside (68-70), the war against the imperialist Americans (70-75), the war against the land-grabbing Yuon since 75.

Finally, this November and December has shown us how strong our Army is. Only when we fight can we know if we are strong or not strong.

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They worry, but they believe in us because we have had armed conflicts before. The people of Southeast Asia are satisfied with us. The entire world is satisfied with us now that we have attacked and broken the Yuon. Our influence is increasing to another level

- Is this victory finished? The Yuon will continue, but will be defeated again. This because its army does not fight. Its army eats rice bran provided as foreign aid. We have cut the roads not allowing them to transport rice bran for their army to eat. This is their foundation. They are in difficulty.

- We must have a really high level of revolutionary vigilance in the front of the battlefield and in the rear of the battlefield.

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The Svay Rieng (ស្វាយរៀង) battlefield. They (the Yuon) have attacked up to Kampong Chak (កំពង់ ចក់)+ Traey Ta Hao (ត្រើយ តាហៅ), but they have not entered Svay Rieng (ស្វាយរៀង) because we attack them closely from the rear. One more spearhead of the Yuon came from Yuon [territory] to Kraol Ko (ក្រាលគោ), but we smashed them all.

The matter of politics. We have gathered forces inside the country outside the country and have isolated the Yuon.

- Must raise the revolutionary spirit of vigilance another notch. We must take concrete action to fulfill our tasking. Attack the enemy in the front Attack the enemy in the rear. The talk which says we cannot defeat the Yuon, that is Yuon propaganda.

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Experience allows us to overcome. Our Army is getting ever stronger under the leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Example: Artillery pieces in the fight  
tanks in the fight  
infantry in the fight

that's when we know the weak points and strong points of our army.

So, this army will absolutely achieve victory because we have already seen the true nature of our army.

Poor peasants + lower middle

\$2,000,000 One tank = 8,000 - 10,000 tons of rice

\$400,000 One mine = 2,000 tons of rice

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This explanation is so we can firmly believe in our Revolutionary Army, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, our people. They really do have faith already, but there are still some elements who are vague on whether we can resist or not, this is subjective. World propaganda said our army may not be able to cope with the contemptible big one [A-Thom អ័ណ្ណ].

We look back at 68 again. A-Nol's (ណុល) group said that imperialist America had 60,000 troops (army, air force, police) and we had 4 to 10, that is, not even 1,000. At that time we attacked 60,000 well-armed troops. Back then the enemy was the elephant and we were the ants.

Back then the imperialist forecasters and their supporters said the Khmer Rouge would be smashed to bits because they [we] had no army, no people to support, no economy, and no doctors.

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It really did look like the ants and the elephant. This led to vagueness in ideology. Every time these forecasters attacked us. But now has our army been smashed? But in fact we overcame with the army. In 70 there were 4,000. There were tens of thousands of militia. We made war in 17 provinces. There was a liberated area with 60,000 people. There were militia base areas with 100,000 people. The militia areas held hundreds of thousand more. In March 70, we had more than one million people supporting us.

We were bigger and stronger. The enemy was at a dead end. They made a coup on 18 March 70. Before 70, we had carbines, muskets, and other little guns. We did

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it like this because we had the correct line.

- The period of attacking the imperialist Americans during 70 → 75.

The enemy spread propaganda daily that the Khmer Rouge had been smashed to bits. They made us frightened. A-Nol (ណុល) had from 60,000 → 600,000 (?) and A-Thieu had 100,000, the imperialist Americans had about 100,000. The results: The victory of 17 April 75. This was a magnificent victory in Kampuchea + a magnificent victory in the world.

Why were we victorious?

- Because the army was led by the Communist Party of Kampuchea
- Because the army came from the peasant base
- Because the army fought

In the world, never had anyone liberated a capital city like we did. This led the world take this as an E3/833 example. The world recognizes our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea.

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But the imperialists and the feudalists still underrate us, saying we will not defeat the Yuon.

- Now the Yuon attack us. How is that? The imperialists and feudalists, they say that the Yuon can take Kampuchea in 24 hours because the Yuon have more than one million troops, and Kampuchea more than 10,000.

- Throughout the world there are some countries which believe in us, and some which are vague.

The Yuon: Security and border defense forces – (our Sector units). These are very bad, and they fire at us. This moves the border a little bit. This leads people to come and build houses with one half on Kampuchean land and the other half on their [Yuon] land.

These groups [Yuon border defense forces] make trouble. In the Southwest, they fire at us, and we lose

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on the average ten people every month. In the East they fired at us at Daung (ដូង) Village.

Now these security [border defense] people, they never dare to do this again.

- The provincial military of the Yuon. These groups intervene with the [border] security groups. Comparing weaponry, they are higher than our regular forces. They are broken now too.

- The Yuon military regional forces. These are central army forces. Their center commands them indirectly. The military region commands them directly.

- Regular main forces from Hanoi attacked us during November and December 77. Those from Hanoi act as the core forces to hit us. The East has two large battlefields: Highways 7 + 1. The Southwest also has two: Takeo (តាកែវ) – Kampot (កំពត). They moved tanks and artillery and a large force to hit us. Initially they hit us

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and penetrated in every battlefield.

Our Center did not order us to attack to block their lead elements immediately, but to let them in a little then hit them both body and tail. That is, they entered, then deployed, and re-deployed into smaller elements. Then we began to attack.

Example: In Takeo (តាកែវ), we attacked for just two days and broke their 9th Division. In Kirivong (គិរីវង់) we attacked for just one day and smashed to bits their division headquarters. This really frightened the others E3/833

We carried out raids, made major attacks, attacked tanks with mines, and attacked BAO. In the Southwest Brother 15 was in personal command, that is, he was on the battlefield.

Summarizing. Their regular forces broke, their regional forces broke even more, and their border security forces broken even more than the others.

In the Southwest, the Yuon boil their rice: perhaps they don't know how to properly cook rice,

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just out of school in Hanoi. Or maybe they have no time to do it because we attack them all the time. They can't find any time to rest. These Yuon, they have no rice to eat, have only rice bran to eat.

Why do we lose so few killed, so few wounded? And why do they lose so many? This is because they came in all at once in such big groups we could not miss them when we fired. When they deployed, we raided and were able to cut off their hands and feet

Presently, we summarize the initial experience of fighting the Yuon. Tanks can only run on major roads and major trails. They can't make it on rice field paths and across rice fields. The main canals and the smaller branch canals can resist tanks too.

When the Yuon attack us, the world has sympathy for us.

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The propaganda says that they are transported by the trainload. This is the action of an aggressor. We reeducate. If anyone says this, does it serve Kampuchea, serve the revolution, or serve the Yuon?

- Transport must be timely. Vehicles - ferries - boats, when one breaks, change it out with another. If an enemy causes this and that to break, this delays the journey. This is something which could prevent us from seizing victory.

So, must be constantly vigilant in maintenance and repair, without fail

- Medical. The enemy broadcasts that the wounded are very many, and that some people are injecting drugs to kill our combatants too.

- We listen to the battlefield command committees. Do not speak in a disorganized way.

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In war, calculations are made. In ten battles, we win in eight, and they hit us in two. This is our victory. Don't just pick out those two to talk about. All over the country, must listen to the Party Center in this matter

- Our rule is to build the Party - the core organization - the people - to further prosperity and strength especially in combat. At present, we have expanded the army already, in the fire of combat. We have expanded by standing on the principles and lines of the party.

Each time there is a storm, we must be quiet and still in politics - ideology - spirit, and build our stances. Be quiet and still, and organize.

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We must overcome with the people ever stronger. The people won't go with the enemy. Our people are good. They run to us; even if they were driven away, they would not go. In the Trabék (ត្រៃប៉ែក) area, at three o'clock [in the afternoon] they go to harvest at the border. At sundown they get to the border. They harvest. At dawn they transport the rice back. In the afternoon they go out again.

The first step, the Yuon stole 20,000 tons of our rice. This was rice in storage houses. The rice in the fields, they could not take that. Our rice is still thick in the rice fields

We in Phnom Penh are on the offensive in our tasking, in accordance with the victory of our army and the high spirit of organizational awareness of our cooperatives.

We take for study the battlefield front, both militarily + revolutionarily.

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Once in the past, near Tuol Tumpoung (តួលត្បូង), Brother saw them cock fighting. This is not welding oneself close to the battlefield front movement, eliminating the land-grabbing Yuon, or three tons + eight tons per hectare either.

Therefore, the management committees must lead the masses and reeducate the masses on politics and ideology and studying the movement of eliminating the land-grabbing Yuon.

We must overcome and build the Party and build our unit, build our combatants both male and female. Front + back, weld ourselves into one person. In each movement, we have experience in building the stances of ourselves and our unit ...

These Yuon, they come and deploy their troops. They bring in Yuon people, place them down, and set up their state authority.

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It being like this, we must attack quickly and strongly

The non-aligned countries - most third world countries support us. They condemn the Yuon as aggressors in Kampuchea.

Our stance is not to make wars of aggression, because our country is small, our people few, just recovered from war, and our weapons and ammunition are few.



- Our stance is not to solve problems by war, this is since the liberation. We still negotiate with the Yuon regarding the border, [but] the Yuon ignores us

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It does not get accomplished. The Yuon wants to pressure us to sign, like our neighboring countries.

- Contacts - They simply must respect us, our territorial integrity, that's all. If they move to make us their slaves, there will absolutely be no negotiating.

So what has it come to?

- As the rule, the revolution wins. The traitors to the revolution lose. Independence wins. The aggressors lose. We have designated it like this, because in the world they want independence, whether their country is small or large. Example: Imperialist America They keep on losing.
- Defeat them politically, economically and militarily, etc! We have the party, the Army, have the people who have been tested

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against the imperialists for a long time, and they are our forces. These forces are important in attacking and eliminating imperialist aggressors. Developments may be further complicated, but victory is ours.

#### Topics of Brother Number One

- Do not get personally indebted in petty things here or there.
- Do not let the enemy entice you to follow this or that.
- Do not be complex – complicated. If this exists, eliminate it in time. Complexity → Slow work
- Little flaws. Must get rid of them.
- National defense
- Make socialist revolution – strengthen your views.

Strive to work – to study + to conserve

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The line of the Khmer Sà . They say they liberate Kampuchea, they are a contemptible group of robbers.

The line of the Khmer Serei: They say they are patriots. They take Imperialist American as friend of their group.

The line of the CIA: They serve Imperialist America directly.

E3/833

Must discover their ranks, status, positions, and their salaries  
On the matter of meetings:

- Meetings are one or two hours long.

- Topics of the meetings are having our comrades to serve the Party's line of national defense. Never fail to hold meetings. Do not raise slogans, be busy on the offensive. We report. We draw experience from our rights and wrongs. Without meetings, the line stays on the paper, and we implement freely. During meetings comrades raise matters briefly and to the point. When there is a question, be quick. At present it is long, but it will become fast.

Meetings. Must be combative in meetings. On the offensive. Be on the offensive in core work  
 Labor time may be reduced for meetings

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On the matter of interrogating the enemy:

- When questioning, the enemy cannot understand, so must think about how to question so they can answer. They do not understand, and then the beatings start. When the beatings start, we get personal. Do whatever to prevent the enemy from grasping your intention. Example: Do not let them know that we want to find this person or that person. That is, have them talk about their contacts before 17 April 75. If they speak clearly about their contacts, we report on the location of those people whom we are questioning for and want to arrest.

- When we have question, have them answer directly and completely.

On being modest and soft-spoken:

- Whatever the organization wants you to ask, ask that, and do not get in the way. This is one type of modesty.

- But another thing, we are modest along the Party line. For example: A-La (ឡា) said that the connections of A-Mei (ម៉ឺ) [text cut off at end of line]. Hearing this, we must be modest and reeducate ourselves to find [text cut off at end of line].

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As for the interrogator of A-La (ឡា), he must be modest. Did only A-Mei (ម៉ឺ) do it, or connections of A-Kham Phoun (ខាំភ្នំ), or connections of someone else?

Modesty makes for speed. This is the Party's slogan.

Discussion:

- 1) The problem of slowness. How to solve?

- 2) Lazy to solve, how?
- 3) Guarantee in politics, morals, and security

Comrade D (B) summary:

Good qualities:

- Liberate ourselves from the style of interrogating just to get it over with.
- We maintain to a certain level our consideration about direct responsibilities to the Party.

Flaws:

Slow. In preparing new topics.

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Making three documents in ten days. Slow because of habit. This slowness does not come from new work methods, but comes from us not being fluent in these new methods. We must be on the offensive. Search out all enemy connections. Get a grasp of their connections in our Kampuchea.

- Stance of building cadres. The principle is national defense, building politics greatly. The key to building politics is researching enemy connections inside the movement.

Meetings lead to making comrades aware they are responsible directly to the Party, not exhausted and feeble like before. So, must keep on pushing even harder.

- Comrade group chairmen do not see the essence of these meetings. We must have meetings on this.
- Meetings are not yet vigorous in helping with opinions, not helping.

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This can be solved. But never fail to meet.

- In meetings don't overdo old matters. Must think up new matters. Plans on networks/connections -- having people up to standard.

- Propose study of all five Party documents. 15 minutes each day. Do not fail to do this.

A number of problems:

- The ideology of organizational discipline. Propose vigilance in speech, in moving about, in using documents -- store documents in their place, to a higher standard.

- Revolutionary modesty is a reflection upon us. Keep on modestly serving the Party. Modesty leads to speed, to strength.

- Solve the above two first -- That is, keep on striving -- sleeping and nodding off -- questioning alone

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For a later day

Units to build socialism:

- Must be done, do not overdo it and do not let it impact the core work
- Chickens die. Must solve hygiene. Must solve and be through with this within ten days.

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3) Propose making statistics for the first ten days, how many have we gotten. Good --average -- weak, how many? For the second ten days, how many? Good -- average -- weak. The third ten days. The fourth ten days, how many, good -- average -- weak?

Comrade Tuy (Tuy):

- 77: Untrustworthy enemy (inside)  
Actions to destroy the revolution (outside)
- 78: Many shortcomings. On people.  
Limited understanding of tricks. Mostly taken in by their tricks.  
Measures: Only beat them to break them, that's all.

Comrade Oeun (Oeun):

To documents 11

Comrade Khan (Khan):

|               |    |
|---------------|----|
| To documents  | 20 |
| Still working | 4  |
| Discarded     | 4  |
| Died          | 3  |

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Comrade Vut (វុត):

|                 |                      |
|-----------------|----------------------|
| Documents made  | 1 (and it was wrong) |
| Documents given | 22                   |
| Still working   | 5                    |

Comrade [blank] (hot)

|                 |    |
|-----------------|----|
| Documents given | 17 |
| Still working   | 5  |
| Discarded       | 2  |

*Summary of Comrade D (ឌ):*

*1) On enemy tricks*

*The enemy and we both have tactics to bring down one another. What veer is the possibility to bring us down, they do just that much. The forces they have, they use just that much.*

*1973: The trick of negotiations. - The air war. The coup to kill Brother (by A-Khmon (ឃុំខ្មែរ)) He destroyed many of our revolutionary forces (the Kampong Cham (កំពង់ចាម) battlefield.)*

*1975 (Late) Intended to make a hot coup with*

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*the group of A-Sot (សុត), A-Chhouk (ឃុំចក), A-Chakrei (ឃុំចក្រ) as a stepping board.*

*June 76: Made a coup with A-Chakrei (ឃុំចក្រ) as the core, that is, to attack the Party Center, especially Brothers 1 and 2. Later on, the unit of A-Oem (ឃុំឌីម) [text cut off at end of line] apparatus, that is, the Workers Party of Kampuchea with imperialist America, the Yuon, and the Soviets above them. They intended to grab Brother at Baurei Keila (ប្រទេស កែលា). We arrested many of them, especially 170. The Yuon and Soviet forces dissolved. There remained only the forces of A-Thuch (ឃុំថុច), that is, A-Sot (សុត).*

*Later on, there remained the North group with A-Peang (ឃុំប៉េង), known as Say (សាយ), as chief, to take the North.*

*March 78. The Yuon wanted to attack and take Kampuchea. He placed troops along the border.*

- *The trick of the coup*
- *The trick of sending in spies*

*The conflict between us and the enemy continues, but the situation turns:*

**E3/833**

*- The Yuon attacked us strongly in November and December 77 and entered 30 kilometers into our territory.*

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*2) Military tricks:*

- 18 to 25 years, take them for soldiers*
- On plans to attack us again.*

*3) Tricks*

- Negotiations*

*4) Tricks:*

- Entering or living in our land - our waters*

*In the North where A-Khmon (ឃ្លា) contacted Laos, there has been no movement at all.*

*Siam:*

*The plan of March 78 collapsed.*

*Internally:*

- They keep on taking action*
- In our office it is like that too.*
- So, we find out their plans aside from March 78.*
- Enemies still remain, they expand, because in our society there is still individualism.*

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#### The national defense situation

1) The Yuon send in troops to set up conditions for attacking us along their views. But our forces raided some places 20 kilometers deep into their territory.

The conflict between us and the enemy outside is tenses than before. But in this situation is the enemy has lost mastery

- Internally, the enemy prepares to make a coup and pick off our Standing [Committee]. The espionage situation in Sector 23, spreads moderately. Yesterday they said that the Yuon forces entered Kampuchea without burning anything at all. This, the enemy. Sometimes our army crosses the Vai Co

River (ទន្លេ វីត្យ), and they say we only crossed a little, no one objects when the Yuon attack. They have hidden five of the Hanoi group up until the present. (Now they have all been captured.) E3/833

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Lost mastery, that is, everything has all been unmasked already, and may point to the heads already arrested.

Tense, that is, our army has crossed the border already. As for them they still cling to us. Tense, all our core cadres have gone to the front.

Imperialist America controls this situation, because of the KMT. These KMT (កុម្មុយនីស្ត), we got one back in 76 (?) or 77(?). A- Chuon (ជួន), who A-Hak (ហាក់) interrogated. The KMT was born in 1920. Sun Yat Sen (ស៊ិន យ៉ាតសេន) . His party had three principles. In 25, A-Cheang Kai Chick (ធឿង កាយធឿង) took power. KMT – CIA. The KMT have plans to kill Brother with poison or with a bomb. In the West, the Khmer Sâ revolt. In the East the Yuon attack. The inside revolts strongly.

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1) When the Yuon come in, interrogate on the military situation immediately, so we can attack them immediately. Like making the tape recordings, attack them politically.

2) Those in 23, research them and get them all.

3) The KMT, must get them all too.

Topic:

1) Interrogate with vigilance, closely question to get it clearly.

2) Must be modest too.

Summary:

The conflicts are three:

1) Military, the Yuon against us.

2) Espionage

3) KMT

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On some situations.

The military situation:

We attacked at Peam (ព្រំ) on 14 March 78.

At Rong Damrei (រោងដំរី) we crossed to the East of the Vai Co River (ទន្លេ វ៉ៃកូ) already, and we attacked Bu Doc. The Yuon have sent in more troops to Rong Damrei (រោងដំរី). Some have arrived, and some have not yet arrived. In Sector 23, wherever the army of A-Sêl (ត្រែវ) is deployed, the Yuon attack right there and enter straight away.

Presently, groups of internal spies have again thrown grenades at our army. In the Northeast, we have attacked and entered ten kilometers into Yuon territory.

Summary:

In general, our military situation is good. On the topic of capturing enemy, do not let them flee their nest in time. We captured 37 already.

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We are waiting for clear case files 2 - 3 - 4 in order to reach some agreement. Really check for accuracy. This group has contact with the deputy chief of Rong Damrei (រោងដំរី) Province – A-Hai Sau (ហៃស៊ូ) in Long An (ឡុង អាង) Province.

Topic: Attack the KMT (កុម្មុយនីស្ត). A-Hong (ហុង) joined the KMT in 1933. The chief of this one was Khmer. This Chinese group has some Khmer too. These Chinese hide their forces, hide their contacts from one to the other. They hide their plans too. Their principle is really 3 - 3. Concretely, in their 3 - 3 they are connected with upper and lower. So be modest in interrogating them.

Must research out the perpetrators who used weapons and grenades. Capture them at all costs. Do not keep them. We attack the KMT until they dissolve. But in the Zones, we must find them.

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The key: the KMT, that is, the grenades and the weapons. Where are they capable of hiding them?

When any political party is created, it is not easy to totally dissolve it. We must dig it out trunk and roots, to get rid of it.

One more network is Sector 25:

This network may come in links and chains too. Must go on the offensive quickly and thoroughly. The leader has come in already, the middle ones have come in already. This is an important network.

The fourth network has not yet come in, because the leaders have not yet come in.



On ideology:

- The possibilities are good, strive to go on the offensive, one and all, after 10 March.
- Whether this aspect is already strong and firm, or just one swoop.

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22 March 78

Aspects of making socialist revolution

After 10 March, [it is] still looked at lightly. Working a bit here, a bit there, it has been that way for a long time, that is, since adulthood. Some people like to shake their heads saying no because the influence of the old society covers them. Working like that is the capitalist class style – using other people while doing nothing oneself. Playing around, still just playing around. Just taking enough work to be enough, that is plenty. Some work sloppily. Bring in another one to work again, that is enough

So, this is a conflict with the collective, because roughly done work endangers the revolution. The collective does not approve. This is a conflict. This conflict expands, and after a while becomes a conflict with the collective, and one can no longer live with the collective. Example: A-Srim (ផ្សំ).

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22 March 78

Therefore, we must examine ourselves to see if we have the stain of the old society. This stain is in conflict with the collective. Conflict with the collective becomes enemy conflict. Another thing. Must be vigilant in morals. Example: Sectors 103 + 23.

Summarizing.

Be vigilant:

- 1) Rough work - careless work → Conflict with the collective
- 2) Morality with females

Some people (group chiefs too) just think of eating, eating this, eating that, without end.

Must know how to distinguish which enemies are important - average - weak.

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28 March 78

1) The Yuon situation:

The Yuon, central army – zone forces, are assembling and preparing both militarily and ideologically along the border. Another thing, they are contacting embedded enemies in Sectors 23 – 505 + 25 as well.

2) Internal situation:

The enemy in Sector 23: Their shell is the Communist Party of Kampuchea, they raise the placard of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They make a peoples movement to build the CIA. They have gathered

up hoodlums - old partisans - bandits and dig secret bunkers to hide the Yuon, to hide many weapons E3/833  
 They contact the Yuon in every nook and alley. The Yuon have reached Tracy Ta Hao (ត្រីយ៉ា តាហោ).  
 That is the handiwork of this contemptible group.

In Sector 23, they are arming every site, every ministry. They have radios too. This arming is being done with the intention of attacking us

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28 March 78

They are arming mobile units. Not only that, they are conducting other activities, throwing grenades -- they have thrown grenades at Brother Pin (ប៊ិន) many times, three or four times. They open the way for the Yuon to enter, they remove stakes, they remove mines.

We have removed five of the Hanoi group, and we keep on removing them, all the way to sector secretaries and district secretaries, and so on. The day before yesterday, troops were sent to surround Brother Pin (ប៊ិន). The chairman of a Zone division shot himself out of hopelessness, but not fatally. They are preparing plans to attack us and make a bloodbath. Therefore, we must do our part in attacking the enemy and not let the enemy disperse his forces in time. We must smash him in a timely way.

In 505 we have arrested nearly all of the Sector Committee. Only one remains, one sent there from the Southwest. The documents of A-Kang (កង) in the past have not been detailed.

3) The KMT situation:

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28 March 78

The Chinese capitalist, if the head is cooked, he eats the head; if the tail is cooked, he eats the tail. Therefore, these KMT, they must be looked at to see the problem. CIA as well. This group has prepared plans to attack the Party in April 78. This group has prepared grenades, prepared poison to kill our Brother(s).

Therefore, we must keep on researching and gathering.

In the past, the wolves howled at the border to the East and to the West (Sector 22 + Muk Kampoul (មុកកំពូល)). So the West has a problem as well. Must keep on digging it out by trunk and roots, so that nothing will be left. Must do a good analysis. A-Sor (ស័រ) + his chief used the ploy of begging and pleading. This is because they hold hope in the April 78 plan. Like this, we must attack the plan of Washington strongly, attack it at all costs.

Another one is playing games, he saw his brother's letter and said it was not his brother's letter.

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28 March 78

Observations:

E3/833

Now many documents do not have the name of the interrogator. (The name must be placed in the document to facilitate instructions + tracking down the enemy as well.) (Example: The document of A-Kakk (កក់), for one.)

The experience from Chakrei's (ចក្រី) group.

This contemptible group misled us, not letting us learn clearly about their September 76 plan. So with this current group, we must analyze closely their plan for April 78.

We must be on a hot offensive. Interrogate until it is seen which one is important. When we see the important one, we apply pressure.

- 1) Find the connections contacting the Yuon, that is, arrest the headquarters that allow them to be there, and arrest the messengers.
- 2) Have them talk about the trips + routes.
- 3) The situation on the hiding of weapons + the bunkers.

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28 March 78

Must discover:

- 4) Methods to counter us, where are the people being hidden - where are weapons being stored?
- 5) Sector 25. Must interrogate until it comes out. A-Ouch (អូច) has arrived, the uncle of Sok (សុក).

Interrogate until it comes out.

30 March 78

The situation as observed

1) Interrogation of A-Chêm (ចែម)

- 1) Contacting Yuon
- 2) Coup plan
- 3) The encirclement

Later on, suddenly report that "Letter Mâ" (អ័រ ម៉ា) came to a meeting at our direction.

We must think:

- The enemy makes this up.

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- Want to be good, then do really detailed analysis.
- Don't sleep after falling over, don't wiggle after a sprain.
- Don't sleep in your hammock letting your emotions take flight.
- When seeing that the enemy is firm, fight. Eliminate the stance of being a slave.

Stances for analysis:

Must analyze according to:

The heart of the conflict + the type of conflict.

Example: Student 12th - 7th + parents not CIA, only about a 5% probability of being CIA. Using simply being a student as the key, that is not yet an enemy conflict. If he is seen contacting the police + secret agents, then it's clear. So, must look for the face of the enemy conflict, before it's a done thing. Must think, and must raise the questions to ask.

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12 April 78

Celebration of the third anniversary  
of the great victory  
of 17 April 1975

Comrade's Speech

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12 April 78

17 April 75 was the celebration of the great victory and the creation of Democratic Kampuchea.

The celebration of 16-17-18 April 1978.

We come here today, 12 April 78, to grasp the general situation throughout the country. The content:

- 1) The national defense situation in Democratic Kampuchea.
- 2) The national construction situation in Democratic Kampuchea.
- 3) The situation on the forces of the people and the collective in Kampuchea.
- 4) The situation of state power - workers - peasants of the Party
- 5) The situation on our status on the international stage.

6) Our future tasks.

E3/833

1 The national defense situation:

This is the situation over one year (17 April 77 - 17 April 78). What is important? In general correctly, we have fought strenuously and have seized 100% victory, and even beyond 100% victory.

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1) Defending the frontier with Thailand:

Nothing new here. There were some clashes before November 77. Thailand in its heart is an evil reactionary. We are not worried about Thailand. We have defended our country during this time + in the future, because Thailand forces are weak and Thailand's government is weak. The Thai revolution attacks strongly + ever deeper.

2) Defending the frontier with the Yuon:

With the Yuon we fight tensely and strenuously, both in medium and large scale. These battles have been occurring for a long time, since 1970, but in different fashions. During 77-78, the Yuon hit us militarily on a large scale. In Svay Rieng (ស្វាយរៀង) they entered right away as far as Traey Ta Hao (ត្រើយ តាហៅ) with the intention

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of taking Svay Rieng (ស្វាយរៀង) city. They used 9 divisions to attack us, forces of the Yuon center. Among those was the famous 9th Division. This does not include their regional, provincial, district, and border defense forces.

At that time, they attacked us from the coast all the way to Kântuy Neak (កង្កែបខ្លាត) [The Dragon's Tail.] In September 77, they began small attacks. In October 77, in medium scale. In December 77 and January 78, in large scale right away. By 25 December 77, our forces arrived. On 3 January 78, the Southwest had driven them out. On 6 January 78, Svay Rieng (ស្វាយរៀង) drove them out from Traey Ta Hao (ត្រើយ តាហៅ) back to Yuon territory. During April 78, they are intending to swoop down on us on 17 April. To achieve this, they moved 11 divisions to the attack on February 78, but they could not enter. The contemptible 9th Division suffered 60% losses, was smashed, and withdrew.

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After 6 January 78, we drove the Yuon back to their land. It was not until then that the Yuon stopped shelling the people – driving and capturing our people. Our forces, clean and pure, broke up into groups to raid the Yuon

Our military groups, each group had one B-2 + two M79s – tank mines + AKs + PRDs. We entered ~~001833~~ saw them guarding, and we did not attack. When they gathered together, we attacked immediately. The Yuon were always preoccupied, and they died.

The principle designated by the Party: One against 30.

1) Svay Rieng (ស្វយរិញ្ញៀវ), 1 against 90.

2) Other locations: 1 • • 15 - 1 • • 30 and so on. In general we implemented the principle of 1 • • 30

At present, The Yuon are retreating ever further away from the border. The Yuon are braggarts. That is, the fourth army in the world. The Yuon attack us, but they are afraid, not us.

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The politics of the Yuon army:

The Yuon are drafting by force, and very severely. The world is paying attention. In August 77, the Yuon swallowed up Laos. The world saw that clearly. When the Yuon attacked Kampuchea, everyone saw it. They saw the Yuon as evil doers; they worried for us, whether we would be able to withstand the Yuon. When we smashed the Yuon to bits, they did not dare move again.

Politically, we profited greatly. (8 million people, the army under 100,000) We attacked the Yuon with independence and mastery. We decided to attack, and we were victorious too. They had never seen anything like this. They admire us, they praise us. We announced immediate attack, and we were immediately and decisively victorious in all sectors. In August 1930, the Yuon created the Communist Workers Party, which in its charter it declared there must be only one army, one party, one government

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without borders in Indochina (Kampuchea - Lao - Vietnam) They raised the line: Broadcast the Communist Workers Party to cadres and soldiers to support and implement at all costs.

As for us, our line was different: After liberation in 75, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and one member of the Standing Committee went to the land of the Yuon to solve the border problem. The contemptible Yuon would not speak about this matter. When they attacked, they did not talk about that either. In February 78, they announced a withdrawal back five kilometers from a border they did not recognize. On 7 April 78, the Yuon were willing to talk about the border, and wanted to negotiate the sea boundaries. So what was our stance? What we recognize, do not recognize, we do not know, but the borders of Democratic Kampuchea must be respected. On 31 March 78, the Yuon broke and moved toward dissolution. The Standing Committee.

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of the Yuon met. They said, "We will attack Kampuchea in small scale, that is, with raids. We have seen that large scale has not worked, so we go to the small, and that will certainly dissolve them." So off they went, begging. At the United Nations, imperialist America opened a place for begging by raising the

slogan of helping to repair the wounds of war. The Yuon army goes off together to the whorehouses E3/833. There are robbers and bandits. There are the Cao Dai -- Thieu - Ky -- rebels in the jungle. Creating conflicts with the people of Kampuchea Kraom. They want make the blood line of the Kampuchea Kraom disappear. They put their people in Khmer houses, they want to make the economy disappear, smash the Khmer.

The reason for victory.

- We have the principle of not surrendering to the enemy -- not being defeated by the enemy -- and attacked the enemy with independence and mastery

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The Yuon army, when they just hear that they go to attack Kampuchea, they run away and abandon their units, run away and abandon the battlefield, run away and abandon their country. Foreign newspapers interviewed those who fled to Malaysia. Sixteen years old, and they fled from their country, afraid they would be forced to be soldiers. The Yuon army abandons its dead on the battlefield, they don't take them.

In 1973, with the Workers Party traitors, the Yuon attacked and entered as far as Chhouk (ឈ្នួក). They wanted to take Kampot (កំពត) Province and Kampong Scila (កំពង់ស្ពឺល). The people were very angry at the Yuon. The Kampuchean people hated the Yuon. Had to listen to the situation on the radio. As for our Special Branch, we went to the front (the battlefield front) to see the enemy in Sector 23 before we had a hatred for this enemy, before we made good documents. These Sector 23 enemies abused our Party and our army all the time. Now this group comes after us with much malice.

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In attacking the Yuon, we in Special Branch must interrogate clearly and make documents clearly. Do not sleep. A-Chhun (ឈ្នួន) is one example already. He did not implement the line of attacking the Yuon.

The Yuon economy: The Yuon have no rice to eat. As for us, we do have rice to eat. Our army has been able to expand. One has become four. The Southwest had one division before, and now has four divisions, complete combat divisions.

II. The situation of national construction:

Examine agriculture, industry, economics, education, hygiene, the population number.

1) Agriculture and industry: Twice as fast as in 77. How has agriculture prospered? The comrades that do the work know this already. They must look at what is related to rice, water, fertilizer, rice-eating pests (rats).

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The collective sites + in depth. Now we have been able to do it already. Our people have plenty of ~~to eat~~ to eat, and various foodstuffs have moved forward. The people themselves see that clearly. Others see that clearly too.

As for the enemy, they do not serve the people as the Party has directed. Their intention is to have the people join them when they make their coup. Example: Sector 23, Sector 106, and A-Chhin's (ឈ្មោះ) division.

When the Party arrests the contemptible traitors and solves them, the people are pleased and happy with our Party. Throughout the country of Kampuchea there are no bandits, no police. The people are not worried about robberies or murders. Our Party has smashed all of those.

Summary

90% of the people are strong and firmly believe in the Party, the collective, and defend the Party.

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9% are weak.  
1% very weak  
1% are enemies.

Therefore: Solve the livelihood of the people no matter what. Screen out the enemies no matter what

The people believe that:

- Setting up like this, working like this, must be done before we can live + prosper. Defense is effective and good

IV. The situation of the state authority, peasants, and workers of the Party:

The first thing, whether state authority, peasants, and workers have a strong capability to solve the national problems, or not? What other state authority has solved its national problems? In the past, concretely, in Kampuchea, it has been seen that only the state authority of the peasants and workers of the Party has been most able to solve the national problems well and is the strongest of any in the world

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Other state authorities never solved things like our Kampuchean state authority. The Kampuchean state authority has done this easily too, with independence and mastery.

In 1975 we were truly liberated, but it was complicated because capitalists in disguise came into the state authority. The Party has solved this all along with the enemies, that is, has made immediate arrests. This way, it has been clean, and complications have been few

|                          |        |
|--------------------------|--------|
| - The good and pure part | 90%    |
| - Sectors                | 80%    |
| - District               | 70→80% |
| - Cooperatives           | 50→60% |



- Army 90%

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Therefore:

- We keep on solving, using politics and ideology as the guide, using organization as the key.

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In Sector 23, the main figures in organization, they have organized prisoners to grasp the situation, grasp the special units. There is a struggle between them & our party.

- Keep on screening, standing on the line.
- Revolution in the style of our Kampuchea up until today is ever more red.

V. The status of our party on the international stage:

Speaking in general, our Party, our people, our Party line, are better than the previous year. All this is outstanding, because the Yuon came to attack us. We attack them in return. Now the world sees clearly that the Yuon have invaded Kampuchea, the Yuon are not revolutionary, are evil, and they see Kampuchea is correct.

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Other countries see it like this, and they want to set up their countries to have a proletarian class like Kampuchea's. This matter of attacking the Yuon has made our national influence widely known in the world. They want to have parties like Kampuchea's, stances like Kampuchea's. Experience shows that only when the Party leads can there be a win. It has been that way since 1917, in the era of Lenin. Other countries have embedded enemies inside and have turned free. China has not yet designated that socialism has won over the capitalists at all. But our Kampuchea has designated that win already, an immediate win. This all comes being rid of money, salary, markets. The collective is strong and prosperous.

VI. On our future tasks.

- Keep on fighting hard.
- The command must be close to the battlefield,

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on every battlefield. And building politics inside the movement has prospered too.

- Most implement the principle of 1 against 30. Sweep clean all the enemies, accurately.

(This is how it is with us, Special Branch.)

- Take the yearly plans for education. ( 3 tons, 5 tons - 7 tons). Must be issued 3 months - 1 month.

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1. Continue making socialist revolution (in stances)
2. Further strengthen the view of analysis + the stance of analysis in order to increase the offensive attack of interrogating the enemy deeply, especially his plans and his connections.
3. Miscellaneous.
  1. Further strengthen the stance of socialist revolution.

At present, our socialist revolutionary movement inside our country, our peasants - workers - army, support and arm themselves with the proletariat class collective stance. The Party designated this already in 77. They accept that this collective is organized.

78 Stances - Views

Example: The duty. The enemy responses exist. When removed and gathered up, it's confused. The Party asks who they follow. They say follow the wives. The Party removes them.

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Another example. One just thinks of sleeping. That woman has hard feelings toward the revolution + and when imprisoned is bad morally with a contemptible prison guard. Once out of prison and assigned to the Steung Mean Chey (ស្ទឹងមានជ័យ) messenger office, she is bad morally again. She goes to the liberated area.

- The younger sister of A- Long Botta (ឡុង បុត្តា). Her husband was smaller [of lower rank]. They met the husband, they questioned him. The husband claimed he could not escape the situation (1), nor did he want to escape the situation (2) either. (All this after the Organization had arrested her (the wife).)

- (1) - (2) - want to separate. Take (1) + (2) for analysis.
  - A-Sy (ស៊ី) creates conflict - internal splits - raising the matter of "worker + intellectual."
  - How must we strengthen ourselves? In this matter we must think that it is up to them, that is, is was against the party line. Let's leave it to them + the party.

We must think, but we know the party line + the collective, that's all.

- (1) - (2) - This shows it is still confused. The situation seen as is somewhat dark already.

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- Another person. A big talker, but when it comes to the concrete, is complex. So the mouth is hard, the concrete, both are hard.

When they give something, you must think. Is it given organizationally or given personally? If given organizationally, it can be accepted. If given privately, we do not accept it.

## II. Preparing documents

1. The document of A-Mâkk (ម៉ាក់): He joined the CIA a long time ago, but when interrogated it was only in his ministry.

2. The document of A-Leng Bunsean (ល្បង ហ៊ុនសាន). The document is convoluted, especially the final activities, because:

- 1) The enemy is not compliant.
- 2) We allow it.

3. The documents of A-Chakrei (ចាក់គី): At present they are seen as convoluted. However, at the time, we were striving hard, but only got one angle – upper echelon – Sector 24.

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We have been interrogating without achieving at all the requirements on details of current activities.

- Explanation.

The Workers Party – essence is the CIA – the Yuon

3. Gets the information. Likes to write so the revolution will pay attention to him. Example: The past, he has no grasp. But he must grasp some time period.

Some say the past + duties – the people. This makes no sense. Some say in the past, smuggling. This is suitable. But it must be searched out to a certain level. This matter of A-Chakrei (ចាក់គី). Why so stubborn? Because he relied on his forces. But at that time they could not all be uncovered. At that time did we not understand? The answer is at the time we understood.

4. Must think, "Everything is connected." Sector 23, arrested up to sub-district and company level secretaries.

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Therefore, must look for Sector 23 contacts with the 3rd Divisions of the East Zone. This is connected with 24 - 20 - 22 ...

## III. Miscellaneous:

\* Sector 23. Must make six copies of documents.

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\* The open situation must be much worked in order to send to the Party.

3 May 78

### Some tricks of embedded enemies

- For the work of interrogation
- For our self-defense too
- The enemy runs many tricks.

I The trick of dividing one into two: Example: The enemy has one connection, one boss, but he says he works in conflict Example:

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(a) Chicken thieves. One guy comes and jokes with the owner. Another goes and steals. Example: A-Pang (ប៉ាង) + A-Tai (តៃ).

3 May 78. A-Pang (ប៉ាង) is exposed. A-Tai (តៃ) has reported to us some things. A-Tai (តៃ) · A-Pang (ប៉ាង) are connections of A-Kâng Chhum (កង ឈុំ), (the teacher, accused of being CIA.) All this is to mislead and embed for the long term – to mislead and get information from us. → Must understand this problem.

II. The trick of beating to break off:

Example. A-Lon Nol (លន់ណុល) always used the trick and beating to break off. This is something that happened at the time the Khmer Serei came in and Sihanouk ordered them shot. In fact, A-Nol (ណុល) was Khmer Serei too. In our revolution it has happened already, and our Party has not yet paid much attention. They strive to cut it off. They even push it after their wives were arrested.

III. The trick of buying favor:

Buying [people] according to level, according to rank.

Example: A-Kê Meas (កែ ម៉េស) gave away nail clippers, a book, a coat. Taking care of them so they would strive to work, that is, give them anything.

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Therefore, we must have experience on this problem of giving. Example: A-Tai (តៃ) gave much medicine to our sick cadres → So we would protect them too.

III. The trick of buying favor with views:

They support our views in every matter, and they even extol us.

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Summarizing:

- If anyone gives something outside of the organizational path, do not take it.
- If someone supports us in all things we must examine that person.

2. On the military situation between us and the Yuon in the East:

- November 77. The Yuon reached Traey Ta Hao (ត្រីយ័ត តាហៅ) This is because A-Sou's (ស៊ី) group led the Yuon in.

- 6 January 78. We went and beat the Yuon thoroughly. The targets of the Yuon attacks were the front of the 3rd Division of the East Zone. More than 150 regiments.

That we say was a victory over the Yuon –

- We attacked inside Yuon territory
- Achieved the principle of 1\* \*30.

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In this successful attack, we see the building of a tense class. The contemptible embed enemy keep harassing us - they emplace mines - they snipe - they bring in women to poison us - they open the way for Yuon to come in and attack us behind our backs. But we smash more of them.

(c) Some aspects in our core work in the past:

Since April 77: we have the following groups:

- cold
- hot
- making documents
- Group "A" (អ)

There has been reeducation and the formation of groups. Reeducation both broad and detailed.

Results: We operate at the initial level. We fulfill our tasks with mastery.

Shortcomings:

The stance of the offensive, at times floats, at times sinks. We strive not to be lazy in meetings.

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3 May 78

Wants to break the group, beat one, that is beat to break right away, so the interrogator can just think of making the document. This is a problem raised for comrades to think about.

D. - Must designate aspects of future work correctly before it can go forward

E3/833

Example: Photographers think only of quarreling. In the photography group, no one can instruct anyone. Free, all of them

Example: The beat and toss group. We can see they just take the machines for someone else to work on, they do not do the work themselves.

Example: Must have a direction to take to grasp this to the company level in the future (personal history and location)

E. - Continuing on making socialist revolution

- To be lazy is to be imperialist

- To be industrious is to be a worker

- The feeling of the peasants: Entanglements with wives, children, husbands, this hinders the work of serving the nation. Love, must abandon and cast off this feeling. Our party always makes the example of socialist revolution. Brother Number Two arrested his nephew named Sat (สำนึก).

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We strive to do whatever necessary to finish documents quickly. The stance of analysis: Some documents are connected. 20% are good. 80% are serious in the beginning, but then lose it all in the end. That is, they are light in the end, not detailed in the end. Therefore analyzing which connection is which is still weak. We must analyze by family - school - friends, etc.

Southeast Asia:

1) Imperialist America wants control.

2) But if they cannot grasp control, they will allow it falls to the revisionists. What about them? It certainly won't fall to these two imperialists

The matter of analysis:

- Must analyze enemy connections, take firm actions.

- The enemy took three pages of documents and wrapped them up and sent to his people, who fled. Now he has been arrested.

- When enemy answers, don't go tell your comrades. Must report to upper level instead.

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This is our ugly habit. Don't cross over to other groups. Do not cross to other teams again.

The problem of writing:

- 1) Propose for now that one person from each group studies typing.
  - 2) Must maintain the typing machines, both old and new
- In order to have the strength to do it, must first see what the future aspects are.
- Therefore:
    - Strive to write well.
    - Strive to write really clearly.
  - Defense:
    - Must be vigilant because it has been a long time.
    - It is careless, taking a pregnant woman to put in a new house. She cuts her belly open.
    - When we get sleepy, put the enemy back [in his cell].

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Solidarity:

- 1) When there is a conflict, the line is not taken up to arm oneself, but instead to pressure others.

Summary:

Good: Complete tasks by striving.

Striving to finish work in the immediate term, not verifying the line. Leaving papers on the tables, breaking secrecy, and the collective makes the correction. Must modestly accept this.

Striving, striving, but not yet seeing line and principle → leads to conflicts, both individual and in views.

In leadership, must be tolerant with one another, patient with one another, no matter how the enemy is, how much time is demanded before it is finished. (Example: With A-Khuon (ឃុំវ) it took from 67 to 77 before he was arrested.)

II. Building politics:

- 1) If you want to build politics, you must stir up the people

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19 May 78

Good qualities: This year we have more mastery than last year (in guarding, in interrogating, in making documents)

Shortcomings.

Falling short in the view of improving our Special Branch work to be accurate, thorough, and good. Today, work seems to be done as daily routine (Guarding today not to allow escapes tomorrow, like that.) Interrogators have the view of finishing one document, then another, not verifying documents with the line, turning to dialectic materialism ... ) Say this is spreading, then it leads to you beating them to deny. Say it is not deep, and that leads to beating them to answer more.

Therefore, the documents must be perfect, deep, thorough, well-detailed.

4. So what all must we think?

- Must in the beginning think of their life stories. Where have they been living? See ...

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but power is lacking, that is, the masses can not be grasped, the masses can not be led, the movement can not be instructed.

Not going to help the East - sleeping - not checking documents - reporting the enemy internal situation not helping solve = lazy as well. It has taken the form of some type of laziness. There must be the view of self mastery, not that only I can do it and others can not do it.

When the Party allows independence, being afraid. Request + ask the opinion of the people + study Party documents and lead the masses, lead the movement. Must study from the movement and lead the movement.

Observations: Walking from one team to another, leading to hearing the cackling and taking sides. Stance of tracking down the enemy is still weak. Be vigilant of those who are clever at gaining favor. Most of them are enemies

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- Seldom supporting the line, and in implementing, it becomes ever more convoluted. The reason is not yet understanding the Party line – the present movement. In the position of leader, do not praise one and beat another to destruction. If we each praise and criticize individually, we as leaders cannot bring solidarity. If you want solidarity, you must distribute the Party line to them. Anyone at all, use the Party line to lead them. They will not be offended. Use the Party line to criticize their wives, and they will not be offended. They want their wives to be good too.

Know the Party line. Only then can you build the people, govern the people. And be revolutionarily modest.

- Team chiefs don't often take the enemies to work with themselves. This is a phenomenon of personal face and position. Example: When comrade [group chief] is brought in for a summary, he argues back. When with the people, he does not think of cooperating with the deputy chairman to stir up the people to work, but instead it turns into using this nature of personal face and position in that place too. Propose that you really concentrate on this problem, because it hinders the movement.



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No matter what matter, it mostly is blamed on the people. This comes from personal face and position or rank. Some groups like to announce they are members of the Youth League, they can always solve things. As for us, we cannot do that. These are not strong people.

Criticism:

Do not like to accuse others of this or that. Do not criticize the wife by impacting the husband, or say this person is a member of that person's clique. People are tired of listening to this.

Striving and striving, but in the status of a person who does not yet understand supporting the Party line, that is, striving only to be thwarted. Not understanding, not supporting the Party line comes from not striving to study the line, to study from the mass movement.

Comrade Bou (B)

Lead him not to have conflicts with others.

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Does not yet lead from the front as an example (personally). Does not yet think correctly about what is a gain and what is a loss.

Reason: Does not yet use the party line to reeducate and solve matters. That is, he uses individual anger to solve things instead.

3. Special Branch work:

- Is strong Understands this work to a certain level.
- Shortcomings:

Stance in grasping work on enemy responses are not there in general. Grasps just in general, which one is important. Stance in leading work masterfully is not yet there. Still cannot control groups closely, just those groups that take the important targets/subjects. Complicated. When the people ask something, facial expression is still, does not speak → power. When cannot solve something, stays still. Asks opinion of upper level, but after 2-3 days, [have to] go down to say it again.

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Personal interrogations. Mostly weak and numb. Asleep. No grasp. Free in thought, sometimes thinks, sometimes not. → Hinders the work. When blocked, displays power.

Comrade D (B) summary:

1) Is a cadre who has not yet mastered leading the movement.

Reason: The three individualisms: Laziness - Authority - View

All three of these hinder things:

- Does not yet have experience in the movement
- Use the masses + Party documents for study

Character: Instructs, on the offensive. Permissive (Independent). Personal in use of power. Conceited. That is, one offers an opinion with little influence. The people do not often dare offer an opinion. If they offer an opinion by attacking, accept it and draw experience from it to use the Party line to lead the movement.

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the movement closely and move straight with the movement following the Party line.

2) How is the national defense movement inside our ministry at present? Presently the people are serving the movement completely, and are ever increasing mastery, more than in late 77, in interrogation, making documents, and in striving to hotly and closely question. What is still deficient - still deficient in the stance of analysis and distinguishing enemy contradictions from internal contradictions. Still lacking in the stance of compiling documents. Documents on individual enemies are lacking, documents on the one line of enemy connections are lacking, and documents on all enemy networks in Kampuchea are lacking. Documents on the aspect of general enemy situation in Southeast Asia are lacking, not at the point they should be. This is called just seeing the immediate future, not seeing long term, not seeing strategically. Therefore, we interrogate one just to be through with one and get on with the next one.

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21 May 78:

II. Building the stances of cadres in the movement.

1) Must raise the flag of eliminating the three types of individualisms.

- Individualism in laziness, lazy in thinking, lazy in reflecting, lazy in interrogating harshly in order to deeply understand the true nature of the problem, all the way to being lazy, lazy to walk, lazy to write, lazy to listen, lazy to speak and instruct, lazy to reeducate. The weakest type of laziness is just thinking of sleep.

- Individualism in viewpoint: That we see only ourselves as all good and correct in all ten criteria. Meaning that whatever one thinks is all correct, whatever one does is all good.

- Individualism in power and authority: Not sticking to the concrete, not sticking close to the movement, not sticking close to the masses. And power is the second key factor, that is, must study from the movement, must grasp

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4 July 78

E3/833

The Yuon military situation:

- 1) The Yuon all drafting everyone from age 16 to 25 into the military. (The Hanoi Yuon)
  - Including those who had already left the military. One province one battalion.
- 2) The Southwest. Our army has gone thirty kilometers from the border into their territory.
- 3) China has cut all aid and withdrawn all technicians and engineers.
- 4) The Yuon are isolated from the world.
- 5) On the battlefield there are Soviet and Cuban sites.
- 6) The Yuon have joined the communist economic alliance. Russia is the ringleader.

Our screening :

We defeated A-Phim (ភីម) (captured dead) 3 June

A-Nhim (ណីម) (captured alive) 11 June 78

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We have condemned all of A-Phim's (ភីម) network, all were arrested.

The defense movement: A-Phim's (ភីម) group all punished, he did not escape.

The interrogation movement:

Must find those remaining, still embedded. A-Phim (ភីម) is dead, but who remains?

Political ideology: What must be thought about? Do not yet think of anything else, for example, face or rank. Interrogators are strong in interrogation. Must study the other comrade interrogators.

Comrade D (ឌ) adds: Strive to liberate the people and oneself from face and rank, since 76. But still there is A-Heng (អង) outstanding.

Second direction: Labor, raising animals, planting vegetables, be inventive in making things to use.

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16 July 78

- 1) The enemy escapes at the interrogation site, cutting off the responses by dying. (Request to remove)

2) Spreading + still a problem. Examine this and reeducate further.

E3/833

It spreads with the intention of an enemy, remove. Morals, if this remains, remove as well.

18 July 78

Secondary problems

1) Working hours:

Some comrades at 7:00 and 14:00 go bring enemies to interrogate

Topic: Propose that at 7:00 and 14:00 there should be enemies ready for interrogation.

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2) The telephone problem: Do not walk away and leave it.

3) The dining room:

- Do not smoke
- Do not spit
- Do not wear shoes when entering.

Some notes on views on the situation:

1) Why do we look for concrete evidence?

- Meetings with A-Phim (ភីម) that have the footprints of the Yuon
- The Party broadcasts there are Yuon. The Yuon do not respond. America says we have captured Yuon.
- Hiding Yuon in the Northwest. Find them.
- In Tramoung (ត្រាំមួង) we captured Yuon.  
X - XX |as in the original document|

View: We must be firm and strong: The Yuon will do whatever they have to.

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18 July 78

Some things are inappropriate:

- The matter of A-Buon (ប៊ុន). Cannot find the guns, because he hides A-Ouen (អ៊ុយ), A-Suong (ស៊ុង), and A-Sei (សឺ). He responds unclearly, that is, these three are his screens.
- This hiding of normal contacts, they must be found, and are hard to find.

4) Where to look for Yuon?

In Phnom Penh, in every ministry

5) Now if there is a movement to oppose our revolution, that movement cannot be separated from the Yuon.

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25 July 78

A number of experiences

I. Experience in supporting and implementing the line of internal screening. We are reminded of the May Special Issue of Revolutionary Flag

- The national defense movement
- The national construction movement
- The movement to solve the livelihood of the people.

In any place where the movements of national defense, national construction, and the solving the livelihood of the people are in danger, that place has enemies already. For example, Svay Rieng (ស្វាយរៀង) + Krek (ក្រែក) where the Yuon came in 20 or 30 kilometers in a flash because A-Sau (ស្នួ) – A- ... were enemies. In the North when they attacked from Skuon (ស្កួន) to Tang Krasaing (តាំងក្រសាំង) because A-Khuon (ខ្មួន), A-Taing (តាំង)... were enemies. In Posat (ប៉ោសាត់), there is no rice. A-Sot (សុត) is an enemy. When the enemies were removed, all three places became strong.

Therefore, in any place in which disguised enemies are embedded as cadres, in that place the national defense is endangered, the national [construction] stance is endangered, the stance of solving the livelihood of the people

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is endangered. When they are removed, and true revolutionary cadres are put in place, changes happen in steps, leaps, or further great leaps. The movements to defend the country, construct the country, and to solve the livelihood of the people become always strong. This is what the party has designated as the critical factor, the cadres. If the cadres are revolutionary the movement prospers; if the cadres are embedded enemies they destroy the movement.

2) The concrete experience of the revolutionary movement shows this clearly. Example: The old North before A-Khuon (ខ្មួន) was solved always had problems in defense, in national construction, in solving the livelihood of the people. Because A-Khuon's (ខ្មួន) connections were solved, the movements have made leaps in every sector. For example, in Sector 7 in the North, it is just like that.

3) In summary, we must arm ourselves deeply and strongly with the following principles.

The stance of screening out the groups of internal traitors is extremely necessary. It must be done without fail

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25 July 78

3) Find the Yuon:

We find them scattered everywhere. We know there are hidden Yuon in the East, in the Northwest, in Phnom Penh which we have not found. But they do in fact exist.

The problems of leaflets: We did not think about it. Leaflets at 17 April we did not [illegible] either. When the contemptible woman Sei (សី) was arrested, only then did it come out in the open. When rid of Mi-Ksei (មី ក្រី) we were rid of the leaflets.

- a. We must eliminate the view that designates that it is not necessary for us to look for this.
- b. Requirements.
  - Strive to find them (1)
  - Must be correct and thorough (2)

(1) Because anyone with the capability to do it, they assign that person to poison-raid our leadership apparatus. Or (2) they destroy our revolution (there are our revolutionary cadres (4). Or they hatch them (1) They attract connections from one to another (3). Hide Yuon (5). Drinking, partying and prostitutes (6)

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The names of the Yuon, if they do not know, and after consideration it seems they do not know, do not beat them to make them know [the name]. On this matter of the Yuon, our documents are correct and perfect.

The current enemy situation:

They are on their knees already, and gather their forces and raise pretexts to counter our documents, they did not arrest their connections for us.

(b) As the topic for study today. This is the most important topic.

III The Yuon cadres that are experts who have come to embed themselves in Kampuchea, since when have they come?

- Documents from A-I.in (លីន) say April 78
- Documents from Cheal (ធាល) say May 78.
- One document says 76.

- Another document says 76.

Find the Yuon connections, a number of the Khmer traitor connections have already been arrested.

#### IV. Our direction:

Find the leadership apparatus of the Workers Party of Kampuchea (Yuon slaves). Are they in Phnom Penh or not?

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CIA theory: Whoever wins, the CIA wins too. For example, if the revolution wins, the CIA wins. The essence of this victory over the CIA connections of A-Phim (ក្រិម) is as meaningful as 17 May 75.

2. In this type of situation, 1% or 0.5% still remain.

- Must find whether the command committee is East of the Mekong or West of the Mekong.
- Must analyze thoroughly and find the secret bunkers for hiding weapons, they must be found, but that is secondary.
- Who to interrogate, who to throw away.

