

CHOU CHET

"IV. From 17 april 1975 to 26 March 1978"

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[from p.1: This supplies first part of translation, missing from typescript translation]]

After liberation. I went to inspect Kampung Saom municipality three days after liberation. I saw M`u't, the current Kampung Saom Secretary. M`u't told me the old man had left just that morning. Maybe we had passed each other at Veal Renh. Also at this encounter were Chh`u'm alias Sek (who had just come from Kampot at the time of the victory) and Sau, the commander of the Kampung Seila troops, transferred to Division III.

I stayed overnight in Kampung Saom, and requested a Landrover and a Datsun from M`u't, along with some more of his war booty such as clothing and medicine, with which I filled up the two cars and returned along Route 4 with. I ran into M`o'k at Sre Knong. He was inspecting Route 4 on foot. He told me that Brother said I definitely had to come see him because there was something essential. He was at the train station.

After distributing cloth in Chaom Sangke district, I made the trip to Phnum Penh to see Brother Number One and Brother Number Two. I met both the Brothers. They asked for clarification about salt, whether it had all been moved now. I reported to them that half of the salt that we had been able to produce had already been transported, but now we had discovered tens of thousands more tons of it as war booty west of Kampot and along the island shoreline. Both the Brothers were happy and relieved and instructed me to gather up all the vehicles and gasoline and move it quickly because this month it was still dry, but soon it would rain and transport would become difficult.

I then returned and went to Pong Toek to instruct the truck transport corps to make every effort quickly to move out all the war booty salt that was lying out in the middle of the fields, and leave our stuff to move later.

Then I gave a little little of introduction to Miss Cheuan allowing her to go get things in Kampot for use in the salt fields unit of organization. When she got to Kampot, they let her in to root around and take things, but when she came back, they let her bring only a little, about a motorcycle trailer's worth.

I then had the idea of allowing the salt field and pepper plantation units of organization walk around and freely pick up material, because it seemed like if we asked for it, we would be given only a little, not enough for our use. So from the salt fields and pepper plantations, where there were transportation vehicles from Phnum Penh, they came by truck and drove down to root around with the help of their acquaintances. They received a lot of war booty [p.2], including a lot of cloth and ready-made clothing. The Zone Commerce Office unit of organization was similarly given a free hand.

At this time, the male and female youth began to enjoy themselves wildly, making use of ostentatious and luxury goods in the war booty, including clothing and consumer goods, and some of them even hid away perfume for use.

Following this, I made further contact with Teu Kam (the Yuon in the Liaison Committee) in order to find out how to arrange for post-victory contact. At that time, I talked things over with comrade Sae, saying that the meeting with the Yuon this time was to arrange for post-victory contact and the long-term plan.

I therefore suggested that the two of us go together in order to find out what his views and stance were. Sae was willing to go, and a courier was sent to ask Teu Kam to come. That afternoon, Teu Kam and an interpreter appeared, and the discussion began.

I expressed my opinion that the current situation in Kampuchea was that it was now liberated and in the process of arranging to put into motion of reviving and building up the country. What were the views and stance of Viet Nam about this going to be like now and in the future?

Teu Kam replied that currently he was still taking refuge on Kampuchean territory. What could he possibly do? He could do something once he was there was liberation. He said his view and stance were still those of committing aggression against and seizing Kampuchea and constantly harrassing Kampuchea, and in particular to seize a little bit of territory at a time among the islands and along the sea and land borders. This was the long-term strategy.

Sae expressed the opinion that he should say something definite, not say one thing and do another. For our part our Party believed in him and maintained close solidarity with him.

Teu Kam said Sae should have faith and trust in him. Kampuchean friends should know what he had in mind and what his intentions were. As regards contact, after Viet Nam was liberated, contact would still go on.

I made the presentation that Teu Kam should keep in touch with Sae because he was in place right next door already.

In May 1975 the first meeting of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Centre since the victory was convened at a secret location. The quorum let us know about the situation along the border, that there had been combat between the Yuon and Kampuchea. The Yuon had been able to attack and take part of Vai Island, and we had suffered some losses. Currently, [p.3] the combat was continuing. I thought to myself that the Yuon were carrying out what they said they were going to do.

In the atmosphere of this meeting, I asked our comrades how things were going. Brother Ph'e'um and a lot of other comrades expressed the opinion that for the moment we shouldn't be too concerned. We should just think about gathering up war booty and having a good time.

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Once when Brother participated in a Zone conference, he gave a

renewed presentation about core duty number one. The duty of heightening revolutionary vigilance was to be put back at number one because this was an important problem. He then stressed that the opposition to the Party in the recent period should not be misunderstood as a matter of old stances and views that were not corrected in time. It also resulted from enemy plans. Therefore the primary thing was the necessity to be on guard against enemy tricks.

Upon returning to my rest house, I expressed additional opinions to Brother Number Two. I said according to the Buddhist Dharma, you chant whatever item is put first. Concretely, in the past period, we have been working hard to put up paddy dikes and find water, and did not give serious thought to the enemy. Brother didn't express any opinion.

On that day I reported to Brother Number Two that now the checkpoint at Prek Phnov seemed to be getting tougher and tougher. One day comrade Sar`u'n had been seized and taken to spend a day doing a life outlook session, simply because his pass lacked a serial number, although it had a proper seal, signature and date. I stressed being careful that this place not become a second Centre. B. I didn't express any opinions to or have any significant contradictions with any other Brother. These were my only discourteous words.

In sum, the things I said to the Brother leaders is not yet at all respectful and courteous. I would speak at them[] and shout. [p.43] This revealed my lumpen nature as well as my political opposition. This therefore cracked internal solidarity and unit so that it wasn't firm.

The 17 April 1977 celebrations had arrived. The situation all around the country was completely quiet. There wasn't a single phenomenon manifesting any sort of opposition at all. Moreover, the celebrations were even more pompous than those of the previous year. I couldn't stand it, so I went to visit the Independence celebration of the army in Longvek. The army had been practicing for a number of days before the celebrations. So they were vrey courageous about holding a rally and a ceremony. There was artistic accompaniment during the night as well.

More than a month later, I couldn't stand it, so I went to Tonle Bet to see Brother Ph`e'um and ask him what the situation was. We discussed the implementation of the 1977 plan. It was his opinion that problems had arisen because we didn't have mastery any more, and that's whe we didn't have a grip on the situation. I had him ask Th`u'n who the situation was turning out. Th`u'n reported that the Vietnamese army had established combat positions in some places, and in some places combat was taking place step by step, but it was not yet systematic. It was still a little fighting here and a little fighting there. The important fighting was in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri, which was to drawn Kampuchea's attention and make it guess that that was where Viet Nam was coming in, and then seize an opportunity when the Kampuchean army had all been withdrawn and sent there to invade from behind.

About ten days later I received a letter inviting me to a meeting of the army command committee. It was an invitation for the Military and Battlefield Standing Committee to attend an urgent meeting. Ph`e'um sent a youth with a care to bring Brother Nh`e'um so that he could attend the meeting, too.

On 30 June 1977 the Army Command Committee convened its meeting in

Tay Ninh. The participants included Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen T'a'k Y'o'ng and all the division commanders as well as Th'u'n. On the Kampuchean side were only Ph'e'um and Nh'e'um.

The concrete plan for invasion of Kampuchea in 1977-78 (30 June 1977).

1. The strategic military objective was to capture Phnum Penh and all of Kampuchea and set up a government that would be devotedly allegient to Viet Nam.

2. The tactical objective in case Phnum Penh could not be entirely captured was to take all of the territory on the east bank of the Mekong from Steung Treng all the way to the border with Viet Nam.

In case it was also not possible to take all of the east bank of the Mekong, the last requirement was to make absolutely sure to take the Parrot's Beak sector cutting it off from Kampung Chak directly south into Svay Rieng province.

3. The Battlefields that had to be arranged for combat.

- Make sure to liberate Chhlong and Boeh in order to use as a reliable fall-back base;

[p.44]

- Invade along Route 7 aiming for Suong and Kampung Cham and then for Phnum Penh.

- Liberate Schoeng[?] village in order to use it as a reliable fall-back base.

- In the Parrot's Beak, Kampung Chak, Chantrea-ei and Thlok there would have to be direct combat with the troops of the General Staff and it would be necessary to make sure that a breakthrough was made along the road to Phnum Penh.

- Attack on the Sector 25 battlefield (Kah Thom), aiming for Phnum Penh.

- Invade Kah Andet and Kampung Chrey, aiming for Takaev and making sure to liberate Takaev.

- Invade via Lok and the Kampung Trach market, and come in an establish a camp in the Kampung Trach market.

4. The Use of Troop Forces

- On Route 7 one division would be used to to fight its way into Phnum Penh.

- Steung: one division.

- Chhlong-Boeh: one division.

- Parrot's Beak: five regiments (a division and a half).

- Sector 25: put in four regiments.
- Kah Andet: use on division of troops.
- Lok: it would be enough to use one regiment of troops.

5. On the Military Supplies During the Invasion

- This invasion would require the use of Soviet heavy armoured vehicles and a lot of heavy artillery and heavy weapons.

- Aircraft would be used to provide air cover.

6. In order to make sure of being able to attack, the following had to be set up or assigned:

- border reconnaissance forces (using border espionage and security);
- use a number of Kampuchean troops to guide the troops to their objectives;
- border security forces should launch step-by-step small-scale attacks in order to open the way for the main forces to come through;
- arrangements should be made for there to be boats and ships at Tonle Bet to go in to Phnum Penh, along with arrangements for there to be trucks to go in by road.

7. On the Appointment of a Kampuchea Battlefield Committee:

Vo Nguyen Giap, Chairman of the Battlefield;

Brother Ph'e'um, Vice Chairman;

Nguyen T'a'k Y'o'ng, member;

Th'u'n, member and Chairman of all the Divisions.

We would be informed of that date the campaign would be launched later.

After the meeting was over, both Brothers went back. I asked them what they thought would happen. Nh'e'um said the plan was detailed, but [p.45] it seemed as if they might be afraid and might be relying on their heavy artillery and tanks.

Brother Ph'e'um said we should now let them do things the way they wanted to. It would create good opportunities which we could take advantage of to expand our work.

Then we made vague plans about what we had to do when we went back. It was Ph'e'um's opinion that:

- The Northwest should make arrangements all the way from the North to the Northwest, and the important thing to do once he got back there was to put together a battlefield command committee to lead the fighting.
- The West was also in charge of the Southwest because Sae and S'o'k

had now been removed, and only Chon, Yeuang and Chea [?] were left.

- Ph'e'um was responsible for Kracheh, Ratanakiri, Preah Vihear and the East.

Finally Ph'e'um admonished us that if anything unclear emerged we had to come ask him immediately.

Upon my return I went on to Chon's and Yeuang's (Kampot) in order to assess the situation since the transfer away of Sae. I handed duties over to Chon as the replacement for Sae and put him in charge of

- contact with the Yuon (Teu Kam);
- leading the forces there were in Sector 35 (forces on our side).

I asked whether Sae had said anything when he left, and he said no, that he had only talked about the Yuon, about Teu Kam.

I continued my presentation, saying the responsible person was Chea in 25. I wanted to know whether he had ever known him, and he said he had, that they had studied together all the time.

I then returned to the Office. There I saw a letter from Sae which told me about his transfer to the North, and that he had handed over the duty of contact with Teu Kam to Chon. If I wanted to know anything about this, I could get in touch with Chon.

I then wrote a letter to Chea in which I said that Ph'e'um had told me to tell him he should try hard to work to take on the new plan, in which the Vietnamese army was to come up and make contact via the 25 Route. So he should be there to receive it.

The arrangements for boats, ships and vehicles should be made in advance in order to make sure that the Yuon army could be quickly taken to Phnum Penh. He said invite Yon and Yeuang to an organizing meeting too, because Sae had now been transferred.

From June 1977 on the sound of some fighting was heard along the border, such as in Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, along Route 7 (Snuol-Kracheh) and over in Kah Andet and Kirivong. The fighting was very occasional, not very frequent. Most importantly, it was border security forces that were coming in to carry out reconnaissance and got involved in occasional clashes.

At that time I sent a letter to Ph'e'um asking him again what was happening. He responded that they were now attacking already, but these were still guerilla attacks using border security forces. However, he had a plan to arrange [p.45] our forces to fight with them in the future. He said he grasped these forces with his own hands.

There were no problems as regards liaison between us and the Yuon. We had easy contact by radio. The contact said that maybe their plan would begin in late December 1977 or January 1978 because they couldn't arrange their forces any sooner.

In July 1977 a session was convened in Kampung Speu, and study went on for three days. Brother Number One also participated in this session.

That was when I put into action my plan to poison him by putting a resin from my finger into his afternoon cake, at two, before we were to go to the school. But it seemed like that day everybody overslept a bit, and once they got up. So we were behind schedule, and Brother suddenly was of the opinion that as we were already behind schedule, we wouldn't have any cakes now. That could wait until nightfall. So we all got in the car.

Fearing that I might be exposed, I threw the cake away in the water in front of the house, and then went to the school with everybody else.

After the study session convened was over, the Zone began having one session after another for the masses. Among the masses I deviated [b`^a'ngv^eng] from the substance a lot. In particular, with regard to the underground enemy infiltrators boring from within, I said: "This enemy cannot be seen. It is currently holding power in some cooperatives and districts. Therefore I would like to ask all the brothers and sisters and friends to take a close look before making certain of your analysis. Don't just keep saying its impossible.

With regard to the problem of state power, my analysis was: The Party which is today trying hard to find your interests is looking for those of the poor and lower-middle peasants, but these poor and lower peasants today don't yet know how to do things. Therefore things have to be handed over to the middle or upper peasants for the time being. You'll have to wait until you know how to do things before they'll be handed over to you.

It was at this session convened at Kampung Speu in which Brother Number One participated that I proposed the the project of rearranging the sectors, and most importantly those responsible for the sectors. My strategic direction was to remove Brother P`a'l entirely from the sectors in order to make it easy to rearrange forces in Sector 31. However, my proposal said that it was in order to strengthen the leadership of the Zone so it would be solid with a collective leadership, because currently all of us were sick, and not a single one was well. Therefore the only way was to concentrate the leadership.

I suggested removing Brother P`a'l and bringing him to the Zone and then putting R^an at 32. Seuang would instead be put at 37 because today the army was along the seacoast and among the people at the grassroots[?].

Brother agreed. Brother also stressed that such transfers were strategic because the Brother was old already. Things should be turned over to the young for once. After that R^an came from Sector 37 to Sector 32, but he didn't take on any duties because Brother P`a'l didn't hand any over. [p.47] R^an was a district secretary for the time being, at Thpong district.

On 12 August 1977 an incident erupted in Sector 32 at the Detention Office called Mo-99 which was located in Ta Sal subdistrict, district 27 (Prey Prayut), in northern Kampung Speu Sector. The incident was that the Chairman of the Office Defence Unit named ... [elipsis in original] made trouble: he shot office cadres and unshackled the prisoners so they all escaped from detention. One cadre named K`u'l was shot to death, four combatants were killed, and N^am was wounded. More than 200 prionsers escaped, taking with them 16 weapons.

The views and stance of Brother P`a'l vis-a-vis this incident, in his capacity as being responsbile both for the Sector and for the Zone, were to place a very slight value on it. I asked him from whom this incidented was

born, saying I thought it came from N^am. P`a'l said he didn't think things had yet gone that far with N^am. It came about because the chief of the defence unit was really in contradiction about has being transferred up.

Once the prisoners had escaped from jail, P`a'l did nothing to lay ambushes in front of them, but instead just let them go almost all the way to Thailand. N^am went to have his wounds treated at the 17 April hospital. On 30 August Ch`a'p N^am left that hospital and come to be treated in the (32) hospital at Angsi[?], from which he prepared to escape. However, because the combatants at the hospital immediately made a sure assessment, they seized him that very moment. P`a'l was not informed.

At was at that time that I began to be suspicious about why P`a'l was not at all absolutely detremined to defend against this bad group. I had been asking him questions about N^am four times already, in his capacity as responsible for Sector 32.

- The first time he replied that Chap N^am had been taken away by L`e'um (Ktat) to the south.

- The second time he replied that N^am had been arrested in District 28.

- The third time he said if one viewed N^am from a distance one wouldn't be so satisfied with him, but if one were with him for a long time then one would know he was good.

- The fourth time I asked him was at the time of the 12 July incicent, which was when P`a'l replied that he didn't think things had yet gone that far with N^am.

Later I presented a long report to the higher level of the Organization talking about P`a'l, and proposed the measure of taking him and giving him a rest from work for a period, until he was well from his illness, and then come back to work again. At the same time I conducted a revolutionary life outlook session. However, upstairs did not respond.

Then one day Brother Haem suddenly showed up to see me at the coconut plantation to clarify this problem. Upon first arriving, Brother Haem asked about the current situation in the West, what state it was in. I reported to Brother Haem about the current concrete situation. The most important thing was the P`a'l affair, which was part and parcel of the northern Kampung Speu affair, that is the trouble made by the Chap N^am group. [p.48]. He had defended Chap N^am from the very beginning to the bitter end.

- He had allowed the trouble-makers to escape almost all the way to Thailand. He hadn't taken any measures to waylay them at all. If he had telegraphed Kah Kong to cut them off that would have gained something.

- He had put Kh`o'em in charge of the army to pursue and capture them. On their way back as when going after them, they let them run even faster and further away. [?]

I asked him to inform the Standing Committee about this affair, as I was afraid my reporting and analysis of this situation might be incorrect or excessive, as I also was not well. Nevertheless, I my feeling was this

was the concrete reality.

Several days later, Brother Number Two also came to the Zone Office. He was received at a gathering attended by all. The Brother asked how things were now, whether the tension had eased. Were there any troops that wanted to make trouble in 32? R^an answered him by informing him that there wasn't anything up, that everything was quiet.

In September 1977 Office 870 invited me to go to work for a while. A lot of us met each other then, from every zone: East, Southwest, West, Central, North, Northwest and Kampung Saom, to discuss the visit to Kampuchea of Chen Yonggui [?] (Tazhai). The discussion came around to the West. Brother put forward a concrete programme, the West should aim at Kampung Chhnang. My view was that I wanted this honour, because Tazhai was now coming directly to Khmeria. The only thing in the way was that I was ill.

In November 1977 Tazhai arrived. My ideology at the time was that I very much wanted prominence. In taking the guests of honour around on foot, I always walked in front, in front even of Brother Number One, Brother V`a'n and Brother Von. My attitude was that I wanted to demonstrate that I had a tremendous amount of knowledge and understanding.

When Tazhai got out of his cart to look at the paddy fields at Khlong Popok, I immediately asked him to help with his opinions about the construction of modern agriculture. Tazhai let something slip from his mouth, and Brother Number One laughed. I knew I had made a faux pas.

When the weaving of red mats was inspected, I was overly anxious, and I wanted the weavers to present a mat to the guest. But nobody was showing any interest in this. I couldn't stand it so I grabbed a mat myself and presented it directly. Tazhai took it, but no photograph was taken. In sum, upon reexamination of my attitude just then, I could see it was very much wrong. It was improper in the eyes of others. What I was doing was incorrect in terms of protocol. I was just doing whatever popped into my mind. After the visit of Tazhai, I feel ill again. This time the most important thing was a bad reaction to medication. I was unstable everywhere....

[p.49]

In December 1977 the situation along the border erupted. The Yuon invaded Kampuchean territory during December on a pretty powerful and large scale. In some places they penetrated as deep as 30 kilometers. The attack took place from the triborder area all the way down (Ha Tien). This war lived for at most 15 days, when the Yuon troops were broken and all ran away home.

At that time I sent a letter to ask Ph`e'um about the situation, about what kind of attacks were being carried out. Did we have any programme for taking advantage of the situation? Whether during these few days did they tell us about their attacks? How did they deploy their forces, and how did we fight with them, or did they not let us fight them? And now what were we thinking of doing?

Ph`e'um responded that on the day the attack began they did inform us. He had arranged for two battalions of troops to act as guides and fight on their side, but for some unknown reason when that day arrived those two units had returned. When asked they said all the Yuon had gone

back. They had destroyed a lot of paddy and rice, oxen and buffalo, and water and rice containers in the cooperatives.

The attack did not go according to the plan. As regards troop deployments, it didn't appear that they had attacked Chhlong-Boeh in order to use it as a reliable fall-back base. Instead, they had concentrated to attack along Route 7.

They didn't implement the plan of sending a division into the Steung Sector to liberate it and establish a reliable fall-back base either. So he didn't know what they intended to achieve with their attack.

At the end of December 1977 a broad meeting of the Standing Committee of the Party Centre was convened to assess the current border battlefield. How were the Yuon attacking us.

At that time I listed to the reports of all the comrades coming from the battlefields: from Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Route 7, the Steung Sector, Kampung Chak, Ta Ei, Chantrea, Thlok, and Prey Veng, from the Southwest (including Kah Thom and Kah Andet), Lok and the Kampung Trach market, the sea, etc. It was apparent that the Yuon had attacked on every battlefield, but had been unable to make a breakthrough. Where we were they had been able to penetrate deeply, such as Sector 21 of the East and Steung. Where we were not it was tough for them to get in, such as at Kampung Chak, Chantrea, Ei, and Thlok, where the fighting was fierce. There was pretty fierce fighting in the Prey Veng Sector as well. In addition to this there was also fierce fighting at Lok (Ha Tien). That was where the fighting was fiercest, etc. After hearing all this, I felt that the general plan and the military plan surely could not be implemented successfully in Kampuchea. This was because it seemed that the Yuon attack was very flabby, and they could not resist Kampuchea. And this was when Kampuchea was still not resisting powerfully. It was still [?], and had not yet been able to properly strengthen itself.

During a break I asked Ph'e'um what he thought was going to happen. He said he didn't know, [p.50] because he had been hospitalized for more than a month, and he had received his reports in the hospital. However, he had told Sat, commissar of the Zone regiment that in resisting not to force himself too powerfully. He should attack while waiting to see what the situation was, what was happening.

It was my view that it seemed sure now that it was a defeat because they could no longer advance. After a half a month they had withdrawn to the rear. Lessons had to be drawn from this experience so that in the second round of fighting victory would be assured. Ph'e'um regretting that although the forces existed, it hadn't been possible to use them. It was my opinion that Ph'e'um should propose to the Organization that he go down to inspect the battlefield for a moment, although there was now some sense in remaining hospitalized. [?] It wasn't until towards evening that Nh'e'um arrived. That night we rested by watching a film, and I was able to make contact among the three of us. We sat to have a chat on a bench. We then discussed the situatio

Nh'e'um was of the opinion he wasn't sure what the situation along the border was like, but it seemed now to be a defeat, as they were no longer able to advance.

Ph'e'um said he didn't know because he had been in the hospital for

the past month, so he didn't know what changes there might have been.

Nh'e'um asked Ph'e'um what he thought should be done now. Ph'e'um said he wanted to wait and go see first, because the Snoeng [?] flank hadn't been properly arranged at all, and the attack hadn't been at all powerful. Once he had gone to take a look and had come back, he would have the doctor give him a once and for all injection.

On leaving the meeting, I was of the opinion that I would like to go along, too, so that I would know the situation clearly. The opinion at that time was that if I went things wouldn't stay quiet, because Von and Pok were there. It would be better if I didn't go. I could wait and soon get the news from him.

Several days after going, Ph'e'um sent me a letter giving me the news that from what he had gotten from those who he had seen some lessons could be drawn to the effect that the reason for the defeat was that the resistance by the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and the Communist Party of Kampuchea had been very powerful. The Vietnamese army couldn't get in and advance.

- It couldn't resist guerilla warfare.

- When the armour and the artillery ran out of ammunition, the advance of the infantry was suspended, and sometimes if they took fatalities, they would even desert.

- They had no guides, food supplies or ammunition.

- The most important thing was food supply, because instructions had been given to the people to pound it and hide it, but when they heard it was being pounded and hid for the Yuon, they got lazy. There were only a couple of people who loved the Yuon in each subdistrict. Except for them, everybody had escaped into the forest.

[p.51]

Finally, Ph'e'um told me that in maybe three more days he would go back into hospital in order to get a once and for all injection and get some medications.

I hoped that we might meet in the hospital. On the appointed day I went into the hospital at night in order that could take a blood sample for a general check-up.

On the appointed day I saw Ph'e'um arrive at the hospital. I went to the hospital too that same night, and we were able to have a discussion of more than an hour. The problem raised was drawing out the experiences of the defeat in the border war.

Ph'e'um said it had been a result of our not having joined in with them. This was the important problem, because the poor things didn't know anything at all, the routes on the battlefield or the rice and ammunition stores. They didn't know where Kampuchea's weak and strong points were.

I asked what they were thinking of doing now. Would they recoup their situation of defeat this January 1978. If they could recoup it they

would. If they couldn't they would just have to go.

I asked Ph'e'um what about our forces in other zones.. Ph'e'um said they should lie low for the time being and wait and see what opportunities presented themselves.

I made the clarification that the reason I was bringing up this problem was because in the nation-wide plan and the military plan, the outside forces also had their duties. That was why the Northwest had gone ahead and done it, that afterwards they had set up a Battlefield Command Committee with kid forces which they set aside to remain underground further, such as Nh'e'um, Kaoe and K^a'nt'o'l. And once they contacted the In Tam forces in Thailand, they agreed. However this [?] the enemy, and this was exposed to the extent that the Organization found out, and a number more were arrested, such as cadres of the Northwest division, the Liaison Committee and of the grassroots. Ph'e'um was silent. I had heard all this said by Nh'e'um when doing inside work.

The next day, after the blood was taken, I went back home.

In January 1978 the Kampuchea Battlefield Command Committee chaired by Vo Nguyen Giap convened a meeting under the auspices of Ph'e'um and Y'o'ng in Tay Ninh in order to draw out experiences from the first round in 1978 and discover the reasons for th defeat.

The quorum was united that it resulted from the lack of direct Kampuchean participation on every flank.

The orientation for future work was that in January 1978 Ph'e'um must himself become chairman of the battlefield, and then give orders and make arrangements for all forces.

- Sort out all the problems that had previously been left unresolved, such as rice, guides, and some ammunition, food to go with rice, etc.

At that time every zone and sector received a circular saying they should stand ready with combat forces again in January 1978.

From January on the combat door opened again. This time, however, it was all artillery fired from a great distance. There was a very small proportion of infantry coming onto Kampuchean territory. There was also less armour than before. Then in mid-January 1978 it went completely quiet.

[p.52]

For the second round of fighting, Ph'e'um had a strategically and tactically very clear plan as regards the Yuon war of aggression.

In conjunction with this, he thought of a complementary tactic, namely to poison Brother Number One, who maintained something on the East battlefield. Most importantly, he more often came to his house than Ch'a'n's.

He assigned a cook to find a poison to kill Brother Number One by putting it in his soup or desert.

Poison his fruit, which he had regularly, like bananas, persimmons,

etc. When the war broke out, Brother would certainly be coming again.

When the border war ended and tension had subsided to the point where everything was quiet, the historic battle was on 6 January 1978. At that time I lost a certain degree of hope in reliance on the Yuon army to fight and bring victory to me in the struggle for state power.

In February 1978 the Zone conference was convened in Longvek in order to pass the Zone plan. Brother Number One also participated in this conference. At that time I raised the problem and put a question to the Brother about our radio, which was then making broadcasts about the Yuon desire to swallow our territory by assigning their people to come in and do sabotage. I said these broadcast seemed short and unclear. Did he think it would help or hurt to make broadcasts about Achar K^ang, Chey Suon, etc. He said this was not possible because this was reveal internal matters. I felt that was right, and so it would hurt.

Then I raised the point that the fact the the Yuon were able to get in to and commit aggression against our territory was in part the result of our own negligence, and that was why a quantity of paddy and rice and oxen and buffalo had been lost. Like Brother M`o`k had said, at this time all the guns had been taken away and put in the storehouses, and when the Yuon reached Kampung Chrey, the jump suddenly came.

The Brother was of the opinion that this was not the case. In fact, before they had come in ours, we had already gone into their territory to some extent, even as far as close to Tay Ninh. Some had even gotten as far as Kon Tum.

After the conference ended, Brother went on to Batdambang. I travelled to Prey Nup district to inspect the 1977 paddy, to see how far things had gone with it. I then travelled on to Kampung Saom to see Kr`i`n. He took me to a quiet house on a mountain where there weren't very many people coming and going. He told me about the progress of the port during the past few years.

Finally, he talked about the current situation since liberation, that there had been a lot of arrests, such as those of Ph`a`n, S`o`k, Chh`a`n, Naet, etc. Kr`i`n said seeing all these arrests made his back tremble with fear. I then asked what things were like now. He said all he wanted was to live in peace and survive. He had ceased doing anything other than his day-to-day work. I asked him why then the other day he had gotten mixed up with Long Botta. He replied that [p.53] it was because he wanted to live in peace and survive. There wasn't anything to it except that. I asked him then why when he came to Amleang was he so active. He said it was because of the atmosphere he saw there. Things were compelling there at that time, and I also tried hard. And now? He said now the atmosphere is one of building up the country. So all he was thinking of was building up the country and had stopped thinking about anything else.

I knew that this had been Kr`i`n's personality from the very beginning, it wasn't something recent. It was only that it was being clarified today. I asked him what about the other comrades, like H^an, Saut, and B^an. He said they were more or less the same.

I then said goodbye to him and returned to Prey Nup district. The next day I went to inspect the soil in Veal Renh, when I was surprised to see H`o`k riding in a jeep coming from Kampung Saom. When he saw me he

stopped and came to ask me how I was. I took H`o`k to Sari's place north of Veal Renh. Once we were properly sat down, I tried asking about how far the oil refinery construction had gotten. He said he didn't know when it would ever be completed because they were only able to work two days a month due to shortages of material. But they thought of eating nothing but the tastiest foods. They requested four hogs a month, two head a day, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. They would eat one at a meal and leave nothing.

I asked him what life was like in Phnum Penh these days given the state of the country. H`o`k said they lived in a good deal of fear, as one person was disappearing after another. There were reasons for this disappearances, but one was still scared. I asked him what the story was with Kr`i`n these days. H`o`k said he had known Kr`i`n from the very beginning, and he was someone who just wanted to get along peacefully. Now he wanted that more than ever. He wasn't thinking about anything other than doing what he was supposed to be doing.

What sort of contacts was H`o`k making in Phnum Penh these days. He said he was only in contact with the ministries that were in touch with him about fuel.

At the Industry Ministry he was in touch with ^AN and Say, but mostly with Say because Say was on duty at the Office.

At Commerce he was in touch with R`i`t and Ch`e`n H`o`ng.

And Agriculture, Railroads and the material section of Foreign Affairs (Teanh) came to get in touch.

I asked what Hou was doing these days. H`o`k said he seemed only to be receiving guests and not doing anything else.

And what was going on with our other comrades these days, such as Say, Ch`e`n H`o`ng, Nat and Hou. H`o`k said that only Ch`e`n H`o`ng remained....

[p.54]

I said that from now on H`o`k was assigned by me to be chairman of a team for making contact with people in the city, which I had difficulty getting in and out of. Could he? He said he could. Those with him we were in touch as links were Hou, Nat, Ch`e`n H`o`ng, and Say. I asked where Sek alias Chh`u`m was these days. He said he had seen him at the Industry Ministry but he didn't know what he did there, although he often came over to see H`o`k.

I said if that was the case he should make sure he made contact with this group, and they should fortify themselves. If they weren't going to do anything that was alright. They could lie low.

One other thing was that I asked for a list of the forces because I had not been in touch with this group for a long time.

Regular contact was to be maintained with the Zone Office. Reports should be sent directly to me by courier.

On 20 February 1978 I received a five kilogram packet of materials

from Ch'e'n H'o'ng. These were poisons.... I sent them to Commerce in the Zone for distribution to the grassroots on the list. I also distributed some to Ch'e'n H'o'ng who turned it over to a woman at Social Action who was personally to implement the poisoning of Brother Number One and Brother Number Two.

....

That same day I received a little note from Ph'e'um saying I should arrange a location for discussion at the West Zone Commerce Office stationed in Phnum Penh. On 1 March 1978 he arrived and we worked for one night. When the time came, I went to wait for Ph'e'um there....

He announced that the plan for 1977 and the military plan (of 30 June) had now been defeated, and there was no recouping it because the Yuon said there was no way they could fight because they couldn't get in. All that we could do now was make our last plan so that we would feel we'd done everything we could. The final plan was presented as follows.

1. On the General Situation The current situation was a good one because of the state of war along the Kampuchea-Yuon border. Everybody and every country knew that Kampuchean and the Yuon were having a conflict over the border. Thus if we were to proceed there wouldn't be any contradiction.

2. The domestic situation in Kampuchea. Currently there were contradictions, fierce contradictions. An austere and severe plan was being implemented both in the countryside and the city, and those who didn't comprehend it or were slow to comprehend it couldn't run fast enough to keep up with the situation. They were therefore being accused of being enemies and even being arrested and taken to be killed.

[p.55]

There were contradictions between the cadres and the ordinary people, and contradictions about a lot of forces being expended and a lot being done but getting only a little of the results back.

3. On the strategy for this final attack. It was simply to smash the leading apparati of the Party and of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, and then to set up a new government.

4. The forces that must be employed in this round of fighting were:

i. The troops of our friends would come help with the attack. They would come via Route 7, Svay Rieng and Sector 25. They would employ a force of only three divisions, but armed with small automatic weapons, and make lightning attacks and withdrawals. They would avoid attacking with large forces like last time.

ii. Our troops, which when those of both zones were combined amounted to five divisions, had to be managed with great care. Currently all these divisions were on guard duty along the border.

- One battalion must be sent to Longvek to launch an attack from the rear, entering by way of Routes 4 and 5. It was important to employ special forces that would attack and withdraw quickly.

5. The Objectives of the Invasion

- On Route 7: come up to Tonle Bet and then go down into boats and head for Phnum Penh;
- In the Svay Rieng Sector: One number would fight and hold off the troops of the General Staff, while another unit would seize the opportunity to make sure it rolled forward and do whatever necessary to reach Neak Leuang and head for Phnum Penh.
- Another unit would enter Sector 25 and then push right up to Phnum Penh.

6. The Movement of Troops into Phnum Penh

On 14 April 1978, just before the celebrations, all of our troops could pull back to the rear to visit their homes. So we could transport troops right in trucks. It would be the same for the friendly troops because it would be a time of celebration.

7. On the Tactics of Complimentary Attacks

In this final invasion, we would not be using only military forces. He must make use of the means of complimentary attacks too. If these tactics succeeded beforehand, all the better.

- The means of poisoning. We had taken measures with regard to this question already by having Ch`e'n H`o'ng purchase the poisons from abroad. These had now arrived and been distributed everywhere. On his own, Ch`e'n H`o'ng had handed some over to a woman about 30 years old at Social Action, who was deployed to personally poison Brother Number One and Brother Number Two....

- Assigning special force units to assassinate them by shooting them or throwing grenades while they were sleeping, walking or attending meetings, etc. These forces were detached from the special force unit at Longvek and would be brought in starting now.

[p.56]

- The forces to act as guides were also these special force, that is, forces underground in every ministry of the state in which our forces were, such as Energy (H`o'k), the General Staff (Nat and Hou), Industry (Say), Commerce (Ch`e'n H`o'ng) or his forces, etc, and at Office 870 there was Seuang (P`ang), a teleguider.

- These special force units had to begin implementing things from now on by coming in for study, grasping the terrain, and going underground in houses on the pretext of being relatives.

8. On Kampuchea's Strong and Weakpoints

According to a general assessment, Kampuchea had a serious weakpoint in the city where there were no troops based. The only important forces were those in all the factories who furthermore had no weapons to carry in their hands. Troops were camped far from the city. Therefore the easiest thing for us to do would be to enter the city. The various ministries were not guarded by troops. The problem to which attention should be paid was

when entering Phnum Penh some unit might come to its defence.

9. In Case of Victory or Defeat

- Strategically the attack was to take Phnum Penh, seize the capital and sent up a new government there. This was the strategic requirement.

- But in the case that it was not possible to take Phnum Penh, then the resolution would have to be changed to making sure to take the east bank of the Mekong from the triborder area all the way to the Yuon border.

- If there still weren't enough forces to take the east bank of the Mekong, then the troops would have to be led to escape in the eastern forest and conduct a war of guerilla resistance against the government, using the Yuon border as a fallback. The fight would continue for decades until victory.

10. In Case of Victory Instead

- A government must be established with the name: "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam";

- This would be a member government of the Indochina Federation;
- It would a satellite government of Viet Nam;
- It would allow Viet Nam to station troops on Kampuchean territory.

11. On the Ammunition Dumps to Be Used During the War

- A ammunition dumps must be readied at Chhoe Kach belonging to the Zone in order to serve the Phnum Penh battlefield and at Longvek with enough in them to serve the needs of this battlefield.

12. On the Preparation of Paddy and Rice Dumps

The East Zone had a heavy obligation in sorting out the food supply. This was because this Zone had plenty of rice. Rice stores must therefore be readied along Route 1 and Route 7 and the Mekong River.

It was not necessary for the West Zone to do anything because it was poor in paddy and rice. However, rice should be continuously milled and set aside, and that would be enough.

Note. As part of the tactic of complimentary attacks, it was also necessary to make use of the forces of the people, taking them out of both districts, that is both Ponhea Leu and Udong districts in order to act in conjunction with [p.59] the army and march in procession into Phnum Penh.

- Udong district would march in procession in along Route 4.
- Ponhea Leu district would march in procession in along Route 5.

13. The time fixed for the implementation of this plan was on the verge of the holiday (17 April 1978). This was the schedule.

After announcing and disseminating this final plan ..., Ph'e'um said he was going to go and disseminate it in the Northwest, the North, the

Northeast and Kracheh.

After having received this plan, I went down to further disseminate it in every location, such as in the Southwest and the West. At that time I went to Kien Svay wanting to see the woman Bau to disseminate the plan, but I wasn't able to meet her. I then returned. I continued travelling around disseminating this plan up until 26 March 1978, which is the day I was arrested.

[namelist follows]

[p.58]

Chout Chet alias Si's List of the Names of Traitorous Forces Who Were Involved in Traitorous Activities Between 1975 and 1978

1. At Office 401 (West Zone)

Mo-71

....

Mo-72

....

Mo-73

....

Mo-75

....

Mo-76

....

[p.59]

Commerce

....

Hospital

....

Carpenters' and Mechanics' Shed

....

Mo-401

....

[p.60]

2. Division I

73. Veuan: Deputy Secretary of the Division ... (currently still in charge of the maritime troops)

....

3. Grassroots

Sector 37

....

Prey Nup district

....

Sre Ambel district

....

[p.61]

Thmar Sar

....

Thmar Bang

....

Sector Office

....

[p.62]

3. Northern Kampung Speu (32)

146. R^an (currently the Sector Secretary and a Zone Member)

....

[p.63]

4. Kampung Chhnang

....

[p.64]

5. The Zones

a. Southwest (Sector 37)

238. Saom Chon, Secretary of Touk Meah district, link of Si's 1964
(currently the Secretary of Chhouk district)

239. Yeuang, a link of Si's (currently at the Sector 35 worksite)

....

[p.65]

Sector 33

272. Ta S`a't, a link of S`o'k's from 1970 (currently the Secretary of
Samraong Tong district)

....

274. Kh`o'em, a link of Sok's from 1970 (currently the Secretary of Kong
Pisei district)

275. S`o`k, a link of Si's from 1968 (currently transferred to the North) (formerly the Secretary of Sector 33, southern Kampung Speu)

....

[p.66]

299. Pr`a`k, link of `O'n's from 1972 (currently the Sector 33 cadre (Secretary of Sector 33))

....

.... When `O'n was smashed, D`u`ch was transferred to Preah Vihear and S`o`k was put in charge as Secretary....

....

Takeav Sector (13)

....

[p.67]

306. Phaen (Deputy Secretary of Sector 13), link of Si's from 1970 (currently transferred to Kampot, duties unknown)

307. Saom (Secretary of Sector 13), a link of Siv's (currently still the Secretary of the Sector, but on sickleave)

....

Sector 25

310. Chea, a link of Ph`e`um's (currently the Secretary of Sector 25) (arrested)

311. the woman Bau, a link of Kah Kong Ch`o`ng (currently the Secretary of Kien Svay)

b. Northwest

312. Brother R`u`oh Nh`e`um, a link of Kaev Meah from 1956 (currently the Secretary of the Northwest Zone)

313. Kae, a link of In Tam's from 1967 (currently the Deputy Secretary of the Northwest Zone)

314. K`^a`nt`o`l, a link of In Tam's from 1967 (currently member of the Northwest Zone)

....

317. Ph`al, a link of Si's from 1968 (currently the chairman of the new Northwest Division)

....

c. The North

323. Sae, a link of Th`a`ch Thuon's since 1957 (currently the Secretary of

the North Zone)

....

[p.68]

327. S`o't, former Secretary of Siem Reap Sector, a link of Th`u'ch's (arrested)

....

d. The Northeast and Kracheh

329. Vi, a link of Kaev Meah (currently the Secretary of the Northeast Zone)

330. L`a'v, a link of Ya's (currently the Deputy Secretary of the Zone) (deceased)

331. Ch`o'an[?], a link of Si's (currently Zone Member)

....

333. Yi, a link of Th`u'ch's (currently Secretary of Kracheh Sector)

....

e. The Central Zone

....

335. Von[?], a link of Th`u'ch's (currently Secretary of Sector 43) (arrested)

....

f. The East Zone

....

339. Kh`o'em, a link of Ph`e'um's (currently the Secretary of Sector 21)

....

g. Phnum Penh Municipality

342. Nat, a link of N`ov Chon (currently at the General Staff)

....

352. Seuang (P`ang), a link of Kaev Meah (currently at Mo-870)

The Kampung Saom Port

353. Kr`i'n, a link of Kaev Meah (currently Chairman of the Port)

....

[p.69]

....

The above report drew attention to;

- the plan to seize power in the zone and in northern Kampung Speu Sector;

- on my wrong implementation of the line, particularly my attitude towards the Brother leaders of the Party

The reasons why I was led to walk down the wrong road resulted from the essence of my class origin, that is, my essential poverty and lumpness, vulgarity, love of a good time and revelry, drink and women, etc.

[p.70]

At the same time I was won over by subjectivity, such as my ideas of devotion to Buddhism, imperialism and colonialism Yuon).

....

... the leaders of the Party have Brother P`o'l as Chairman.

....

CHOU CHET

"IV. From 17 April 1975 to 26 March 1978"

handwritten document with pagination illegible dated 9 May 1978 (pagination starting from p.1 supplied)

FILENAME: CHOUCHE.T.002

After liberation day I looked for Brother M`o'k for several days but couldn't find him at all. I went looking for him at Office 201 at Kampung Chhnang, where I heard that he had gone to Kampung Saom. I went also to Kampung Saom, but by the time I got there he had already left on Route 4 to go back to Phnum Penh.

When I got to Kampung Saom, M`u't told me that the old man had just gone that morning at dawn, and that maybe we had passed each other at Veal Renh. While in Kampung Saom I met M`u't, Sek alias Chh`u'm (who had just come to take charge of Kampung Saom municipality at the time of the victory) and Suo, the commander of the Kampung Seila troops. (It should be noted that Kr`i'n had not yet come to assume duties there at the port).

I spent the night and at dawn the next morning I asked them to help collect cloth and old clothes that was left in houses and some medicines and for M`u't's Landrover and a Datsun. This was to move these things up Route 4. It was only when I got to Sre Khlong that I met M`o'k.

He asked me where I had been for the last several days, saying he couldn't find me anywhere. I said I had been going around looking for him.

He said I should go now for a quick meeting with Brother, who had been waiting for a long time to see me. He was at the Phnum Penh train station.

I met both the Brothers. Brother Number One asked about salt, about

how much of it had been moved already and how much was left. I reported to him that more than half of the salt we had produced had already been moved.

However, now we hadn't maybe tens of thousands of tons of more salt that we had as war booty east of Kampot and Traoey Kah. Both Brothers were very pleased and happy to receive this news. They instructed me to rapidly storm forward without waiting for anything to gather up the remaining vehicles and fuel and move it to Phnum Penh while it was still the dry season. Once the rainy months arrived transportation would be difficult.

After seeing them I went back. I went to make arrangements about the salt.

It then occurred to me that there was all that material which had just been won at the Kampot market. I wrote a little note introducing Ms Cheuan to Sae so she could ask for some of it to take for use by the salt field unit of organization. She exerted a lot of effort going through it all and finding what she needed, but was only allowed to take a little back.

When I saw what had happened, I became more and more strongly of the view that I wanted to get that war booty. I [said?] whoever wanted to go looking for it could do so wherever they wanted. [p2.] Most importantly, because at that time the vehicles moving salt were going to Phnum Penh, I let people go looking in Phnum Penh, wandering around looking for things they could use.

Contact was by acquaintanceship: one could go wherever one knew someone. I could see that by doing things this way, a fair amount of usable items were found both for the salt field and the pepper plantation units of organization.

In May 1975 the Central Committee convened a meeting to set up the new Zones. The Southwest Zone was divided into two, north and south of Route 4, and became the Southwest and the West Zones. I was assigned to be in charge of the West Zone. All of the salt fields and transport was handed over to the State. I returned to Speu.

It was precisely at this time it was necessary for me to collect a lot of war booty, in order to put away enough to be able to use for a long time. I pushed everybody on this: they should go wherever they knew somebody. Some went and moved old goods out of rowhouses.

Others went to Phnum Penh, Kampung Saom or Kampung Chhnang. As long as they could get something, they did whatever it took.

In conjunction with this I gave the male and female youth the freedom to use the stuff however they liked.

I would like to return to some clarifications about the conference of the Centre. The representative of the Party presented the news that the Yuon had attacked and taken our Kah Vai since 30 April. Even now things hadn't quieted down. I felt that the Yuon were already doing what our group had required. This contradiction wouldn't end easily because this was the line of the Viet Nam Workers' Party.

This meeting of the Centre was held in a secret place. Everybody who came was looking at each other wondering what would happen next. [?] In the evenings when they could walk around, everybody went out to look at the courtyard and walked along the long buildings saying to each other that now

we had won, and that we should enjoy a little comfort first before thinking about going on to something else. Everybody found themselves in a state where there was a lot of war booty, cars and consumer goods, which absorbed them and made them blind to anything else.

I discussed what ought to be done with Sae. Contact with the Yuon had to be firmly maintained. It shouldn't be allowed to lapse because they were already proceeding. Since the Yuon had won, Teu Kam had gone to stay in Prey Nokor or Ha Tien. He had an office in Ha Tien ready to receive contact from us. Sae had sent a courier to go personally to the border, where there was a little house on Yuon soil ready to receive liaison correspondence. From Ha Tien a telegramme was sent right to Prey Nokor. The next evening Ph'e'um came over to visit with everybody. [p.3] He walked over close to Sae and me, and while he was walking along looking at the images along the wall, he asked how things were along the border, whether there were any complications. I replied there were none. He asked what was going on as regards current contact with the Yuon. Sae responded to him that the contact was still good. Sae asked what his thinking was now that we were liberated. He said we should try hard to stay underground and infiltrate deeper so that no one would notice. He said if we wouldn't be able to do anything now. We should wait and see further circumstances, what they might facilitate. He had now already disseminated this policy to cadres at every level, and it was currently being well implemented in the work. To go deep underground meant to try hard to do mightier work and to erase entirely any errors in our records.

Upon hearing this opinion I thought to myself that no matter how hard I tried I couldn't see how things could be made to work in the West Zone, given how poor it was. No matter what was done there would still be starvation. Nevertheless, I would strive to bring about its recovery.

I then met Nh'e'um and Kaeo to ask for some of their tractors in order to be able to increase the amount of broadcast paddy planted in order to deal with there being no paddy from upland fields, to hold the fort with broadcast paddy. Nh'e'um said I could go ahead and have one or two, depending on how many there were.

After the meeting I went to Kampung Chhnang in order to keep track the style by which the broadcast paddy was being grown, and then I went on to Batdambang with a chauffeur and two female couriers ... in an American car....

Upon arriving at the tall building (the university faculty) I met Kaeo and chatted with him about the victory in Batdambang. He made it clear that there was really a lot of war booty in Batdambang. Nothing was lacking. I thought to myself that I didn't want anything - as I couldn't transport it - except tractors for plowing. I stressed I wanted to see Nh'e'um and asked how this could be done. Kaeo said he was a hell of a long way away, over at Thmar Kol. I asked how I could make sure I saw him, and said I would spend the night here and wait for him. Kaeo went off to work.

I saw him dawn the next day. I asked how many tractors I wanted to get. I heaved a sigh of relief. I replied I would please like 15 He said unfortunately he had just sent ten to the Organization the other day, and that I would have to make do with ten now.

We turned to discussing various matters and he reminisced about how we had known each other for a long time and how now I was now right in a

location where things were short. I would have to really try hard to bring about its recovery. Moreover, we were also part of the same group, and had a plan to go underground and infiltrate deeply.

[p.4]

In speak about contact links I asked how I would make contact if in the future something was up. He said I should come right to Thmar Kol because now we were legal. However the person who came should also be appropriate, like Cheat[?], the one in charge of the tractors, and that would be right.

As for me, I was now contactable at Kampung Chhnang.

What I was able to get from Nh'e'um at that time included the ten ... tractors, two [?] cars, two lathes, one generator, all sorts of tools for tractor repair, etc.

The last day Vanh appeared. He talked about a lot of things, about the victory. At that time one could get anything one asked for. I stressed that over in the West there was a lack of everything. Vanh said could propose anything I wanted to get, and that if they had it, it would be sorted out.

Vanh wanted to know what was going on with the situation entre nous. I responded that we should try hard to make sure we remained underground and infiltrated more deeply into the Party. I wanted to know whether Nh'e'um had ever said anything, and he said he had, but after a word or two he would walk off, and there had never been anything systematic. On the third day I went back, and waited for the tractors at the Kampung Chhnang provincial government offices, so that I could arrange for experimental plowing the first year. In June, July and August all I thought about was growing broadcast rice.

One day I went to Kampung Seila and Kah Kong to inspect and also to make contact with Nh'e'ok and R^an. On arrival in Kampung Seila I saw there was a difficult state of affairs as regards rice. I went on to Kampung Saom in order to sort this out. I saw Kr'i'n, B^an, Saut and H^an.

In the discussion they said I had already gone so far as to give all of their war booty rice to Kampung Seila and Kah Kong as aid, so why were they still hard up. Kr'i'n - Saom (Kampung Saom port), H^an (formerly Zone Commerce) and Saut asked about the situation in the sectors and districts, about how things were being arranged. I said things were now properly arranged, but there was a minor rice shortage. Kr'i'n said he had now brought together all the people with whom he had previously worked, such as Saut, H^an and B^an.

I asked who was responsible for State rice, who was in control there, and Kr'i'n said there was only one person, Nhaem. He was in charge of the rice. Kr'i'n had him called to come see me, and in a moment he arrived. I came to know Nhaem for the first time in connection with this rice matter.

Nhaem promised he would help to come up with a solution, and even if he gave out more than was allowed that wouldn't make any difference. We could figure that out later. I thanked him for doing me this favour of giving out rice to Kampung Seila and Kah Kong.

[p.5]

Kr'i'n asked for clarification as regard our own work. I replied that currently there was nothing out in the open. There should be nothing other than trying hard to strain to make every effort to do the current work powerfully, stay underground and infiltrate ever more deeply, try hard to build up a lot of forces, and put together a firm state power here. We should be a little bit careful about liaison. I then went with a Landrover full of war booty back to Kampung Seila.

I then met Chh'a'n (Chey Suon's son). He reported that he had met with V'i'nh `A'n, Achar S'a'ng and Th'a'ch K'e'um Sang in a team in Veal Renh. They had proposed reestablishing links. He had decided to have Nh'o'ek knock them off along with all of their family and relatives in order to eliminate the evidence. However, he had said to Nh'o'ek he didn't know what links these guys thought they had.

After that there was a meeting of the higher ups, but I don't remember the date. This was at the time when things were been smoothed out in contact with the Yuon, prior to the delegation going to Ha Noi. Brother Number Two came to see me and said that Teu Kam was asking for his people and had mentioned people named V'i'nh `A'n, Th'a'ch K'e'um Sang, etc. Did I know where they were now? I said that according to reported from Kampung Seila they had been seen in Veal Renh. Brother Number Two said if that was the case, they should be sent to Sae, who should send them to Kampung Trach one day. I agreed to send them.

After the victory in 1975, the Zone Office was set up west of Tang Po (Tranh Veng). I gathered up women and sent them there to work at a sewing place and a hospital and to set up a carpenters' and mechanics' shed.

[Describes the seduction of one of the women at the sewing shop.]

[p.6]

At was at this time that the male and female youths were dressing up, wearing nothing but nice clothes, using nice consumer goods from the war booty. Finding things led them to have a wildy good time. And so morals matters popped up one by one between the boys and the girls, although these were sorted out one after the other.

Talking about implementation of the line on agricultural construction by putting up networks of paddy dykes in every sector and district, but particularly Sector 31. I pushed to overfulfil the plan, and to just keep going on and on, most importantly along Route 5. Modern paddy dykes were put up on bad soil, high and gravelly ground, big and tall, as a result of which all the fertile topsoil was removed from the face of the paddy fields. Nor did was any attention paid to whether the dykes were straight or not or how they were laid out [?]. It was just get them done no matter what. The only result was to wear out and exhaust the people and make them fed up with the new regime.

A lot of places put up only a few near the highway, such as at Ang Snuol and Au Kreang Ambel. They went back from the roads for 50 to 150 meters at most. This was in order to be able to boast to everybody who travelled along the roads and would see it that now our paddy fields were modern.

As far as the 1975 yield is concerned, there were still a lot of shortaged in Prey Nup. The reason for this was that Nh'o'ek was instructed

to not to overexert, to just make a middling effort. And if the people were starving along the National Route, the Organization couldn't fail to see it and wouldn't fail to come up with a solution.

On the plan to build up political bases. Seeing that in the Kampung Seila Sector the people were either all new people or to the extent that there were old people they were bad elements, I discussed how to resolve this problem with Sari, R^an and Nh`o'ek. Everybody was of the opinion that this made things easy. Geographically, this sector had a seacoast close to the Yuon and the Siamese, and was moreover in the outback. We must try hard to build up our politics profoundly among them.

Concretely, two battalions of troops, one of men and one of women, would be demobilized to go down and grasp all of these people, starting from the cooperatives and going down even to the team and group level. R^an asked what these troops had been like during the war period. Nh`o'ek replied that during the war period they hadn't engaged in much combat. They were from the Chh`a'n-Suon[?]-Sat group. And the women's unit had never been in combat, either. R^an said that if that was the case to go ahead and demobilize them, but before they went to give them a little education. Altogether there were almost 500 of them.

Once everybody was united, the battalion commanders were called in for a meeting, including battalion political commissar Sat and commander Suor and a lot of company cadres, such as Cham, Sareuan and Kim. On the women's side there were K^ang, Meuang and S`o'.

I also attended this gathering. Nh`o'ek gave me presentation telling [p.7] me that Sat and Suor were long-time links of Chh`a'n, and Ch`a'm, Kim and Sareuan were also his links, as was K^ang. Meuang was a link of Nh`o'ek's.

I expressed my opinion that the situation in Prey Nup was still not stable. There were a lot of new people who didn't yet have anyone to administer them or educate them politically. The cooperative cadre didn't have an all-round grip on them. Therefore it only troops would be able to grasp them and act as our political base.

Having our troops go down to live with the people didn't mean the army was being dissolved. If at any time there was trouble, the same units of organization would be there and they could be armed for further combat.

However, in the immediate term they had for the time being to lead the people to sort out their standard of living, to grow rice and tubers for now.

After hearing these opinions, all were willing to go down to grasp the people in Prey Nup district.

Once they went down to grasp the people, complications and arrogance arose.

- There were thefts of poultry and tubers almost every night.
- There were repeated instances of people wandering across teams from one team to another.
- There were attacks on the Organization, it being said that a lot was produced but nobody got the results and there was nothing to eat.

- There were more and more morals cases between men and women, young men and women.

- The paddy and rice in the storehouses just kept dwindling and dwindling, and the search for a solution to this got nowhere.

The content of propaganda vis-a-vis at the troops that had been demobilized was aimed at transforming them all into forces in contradiction with the revolution. We educated them thus: You see what the Organization has done. The fighting has just stopped, and now we're transplanting paddy and farming the fields and have been stripped of our military role. Its non-stop hard times and suffering. There are no easy times to be had. And so both of these units of troops became forces belonging entirely to us from the chiefs down to the ordinary soldiers.

In November[?] 1975 I made a trip to Kah Kong province to inspect the terrain because I was completely unfamiliar with it. I went with R^an, N^ov and Ki. I participated in a work session with all four battalions of troops that were stationed in Kah Kong. All the battalion political commissars were invited, namely Phat[?], Pheap, Tong[?], Seuan and Ms L^an [p.8]. N^ov made a presentation about the situation along the border. A lot of Thai [s`a`nt`i`s`^a`mp`o`an][?] were coming in on top of us. Sometimes they strafed, sometimes they entered our territory. I said now we should put forward a policy of holding talks with them in order to prevent them from doing this any more. N^ov and Ki said that would be no problem. If we negotiated it would be over quickly.

N^ov then made a report on our troop forces. All of them were ours, the commissars and commanders of all the battalions, companies and platoons.

He said that these troops had been originated by Ph`a`t[?] from Sector 33, Pheap and Tong from 37 and Seuan from Sector 35. Ms K^ang's troops had come from Division II and most of them were from Sectors 33 and 35.

After listening to this history of the troops I knew that all of them hailed from bases of mine. The composition of the regimental command committee was:

N^ov: my link from 1968, the Chairman of the Sector Regiment;

Ki: a link of Sr`^a`h's unit 110, Vice Chairman of the Sector Regiment;

Pheap, a link of Nh`o`ek's from 1971;

Tong, a link of Nh`o`ek's from 1971;

Phat, a link of `O`n's from 1970;

Seuan, a link of N^ov's from 1971.

The 1976 plan.

Be sure to make contact with the Bangkok Thai army in the form of negotiations along the border.

Go on foot patrol in the forests and hills in northern Kah Kong in order to become familiar with the entire jungle with the idea of seeking out dacoits. However, in fact they had to learn and grasp the jungle terrain so they knew it all.

Try hard to build up forces among our troops so they would all become forces genuinely belonging to us, leaving none that weren't.

Provoke morals matters so that there would be falling in love, and then marry them off to each other.

For the time being let anybody who requested to visit their home do so, going allowing those from the same district to go in groups.

Upon my return from Kah Kong I took a car along Route 3 across Kampot to see Sae. However, it happened that at that time Sae was said to have gone to Kampung Trach-Toan Han. I waited for him overnight.

[p.9]

It wasn't until the next morning about nine that Sae returned. I asked him what he had been doing there, and he said in the districts they had informed him that Yuon wanted to enter Kampuchean territory in the vicinity of the area north of Toan Han. I asked where things stood now. In the districts they were resisting by taking their plows and their oxen and buffalo to preemptively plow up all this land and plant it to paddy in order to make it known that this was Kampuchean territory. However, if they came, let them come. It could be put off until a later day when a protest could be lodged with Teu Kam instead.

Then Sae handed me a letter from Teu Kam to read. Its contents were as follows:

After our country was victorious, my party and I decided to send troops to attack and take Kampuchea's Kah Vai. Kampuchea took a lot of casualties in the combat because the Vietnamese side had ships and planes. In addition there have been contradictions along the border from Takaev and Kandal all the way to Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri.

However, in the Kah Vai affair we have already withdrawn because the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea came to Viet Nam, and it was necessary to smooth things over for the time being. Strategically, however, the Vietnamese Party has not abandoned this strategy. Please have faith and trust.

Sae and I discussed what we thought about the contents of this letter. Sae said that he was only giving us a report for information, and there was nothing more to it than that.

It was my opinion that we should go ahead and continue to maintain this liaison. No matter what, we would still find out a few things.

I then returned to the Office at the end of 1975. I tried hard to build up forces at this time.

[He asks a women named Nan with whom he had had an affair to go construct a place where he could make contact with the Vietnamese.]

[p.10]

....

On 1 January 1976 I went to work in Sector 15. This harvest season they had obtained a very big paddy yield if only because those who had done the transplanting had all gone to Batdambang.

The only person in Sector 15 who genuinely belonged to me was Kaev. I only knew something about H`^a'm in general, but it was possible to work with him.

I asked for a report on how many forces there were in Sector 15. H`am reported on Ang Snuol district, Kaev on Ponhea Leu district, and Prach on Udong district....

[p.11]

....

We then discussed a number of work problems.

As to what extent it would be possible to build up more forces in the future, H`^a'm said there was still a lot of potential because the people in Sector 15 were escapees from the city and people who had been living on its periphery.

His assessment was that it appeared that such people were much more numerous than they had been in 1974. Now we should make a plan for 1976.

- Provoke the people to run off in search of markets, places to spend money and Buddhism. Be ready to hold demonstrations. Have people wandering on foot across districts from one district to the next.

Incite the people of the old Sector 15 who were now in Sectors 32 and 31 to [p.12] to run away back, and the people living in nearby subdistricts to go from one subdistrict to the next and escape to Sector 15 as well. In general, to do whatever could be done to make things chaotic.

Arouse people to run away from one place to the next, from one subdistrict to another, or to run away to Batdambang, Kampung Thom, Kampung Speu, Kampot, etc.

Build up a confidential spot for hiding things and not let anyone know where it was, at Phnum Chatoruoh[?], and use it in particular to hide guns, rice and medicines.

Hide away 10,000 **thang** of the 1976 paddy as a stockpile in case of emergencies.

Set up a team of 30-40 people to go take care of banana plantations in the North and in order to establish liaison from the North.

In sum the important issue was that in 1976 it was necessary to make sure to incite the people such that there would be unrest in order to make a political gain by demonstrating for all to see that all the people were dissatisfied.

Not long thereafter, in around February 1976, about 50 people went on the run with Meuan, the nephew of Seuan (15), taking with them three guns. They left Chan Saen headed for Peam subdistrict in District 12 of Sector 31. Their propaganda themes were that they were coming to look for freedom, for markets, for money and the return of Buddhism. These trouble-makers stayed in Peam subdistrict for four or five days and then split up among the houses there. Those with guns went into the forest.

It was maybe almost half a month before H`^a'm followed up this affair. He came to see me and reported that there had been unrest during which 50 people had run away from Chan Saen village. I told him he should go now and make contact with them to get them to come back. I asked him if he knew where they were. H`^a' replied that they were in Peam subdistrict. H`^a'm said he had been to get in touch with Y`e'um in District 12 to ask about this affair, and he said he did, but he thought they had all left already, and that's why he hadn't given it any heed. He then took him to see them all, and they were summoned to be propagandized to go back. They had proved willing to go. Those with the guns had come and turned them in and asked to be allowed to give up and return.

There was another great even in 1976, and that was the IVth Congress of the Communist Party of Kampuchea Centre. As far as I can remember it may have been held that same February.

Once we got into the work programme, after the representative of the Party had finished his report, the conference passed this report. Then the Party's name and age were brought up. Nobody expressed any opinions on these matters. [p.13] Not even I expressed any opinion, because I frequently been let know about the Party already, especially since after the victory. Brother Number Two was always saying that we were racing to make a break with the Yuon in every way, so that we wouldn't owe them anything or be entangled with them in any way, whether as regards the Party's name or its age. However, when the Party brought this up and decided it at the Congress, the expression on my face was deadpan. There wasn't a hint of a smile. However, I would like to stress that ever since the frequent announcements of the reductions of the Party's age one part of my mind kept thinking that I had been in the struggle for a long time, and now more than ten years was being cut off the age of the struggle, with things being calculated from 1960. I seemed to feel a little bit slighted. But when I thought it over serious, then I could see that my status and role had not been reduced by the Party. I continued to be a member of the Centre, and being a Zone Secretary was something very elevated. When I thought about it this way satisfaction returned.

Then the Party put forward the basic stances of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. These included the stances of independence and mastery, collectivism, etc. At this juncture none of the other comrades had any opinions. I requested to put an opinion to the conference. I drew attention to the stance of independence and mastery, saying that from the experience of these several years of struggle, it was apparent that independence also meant contending with difficulties and suffering, as well as courageous combat. Only thereby had this stance of independence and mastery emerged. Otherwise, there would be no creativity or lively activity.

On the question of collectivism, I was of the opinion that the most important reason why we had been able to seize a victory was precisely the collectivist regime. Male and female youths had been willing to sacrifice

their lives for collectivism, the revolution, the nation and the people. If our regime had been one based on devotion to an individual, had belonged to a king or a prince or some mandarin, or if it had inequalities due to the existence of ranks or big shots and small fry, then the male and female youth definitely would not go to die on its behalf. I stressed further that our collectivist regime was very solid and efficacious. Sihanouk had said: "The communists would absolutely not be able to take the territory of Kampuchea because Kampuchea still had its independence and religion" But now, had it been able to endure? It had come apart at the seams. Both private individuals and religion were gone. These were the only opinions I put to the conference. These interventions were shams to fool people into thinking that I was thrilled about the conference.

Then the congress quorum selected the new member of the Party Central Committee, of which there were a greater number than before.

In March 1976, after the Party's IVth Congress, there was suddenly a Labourers' Party of Kampuchea plan, decided by Ph'e'um, Ya and Th'u'ch. It was sent to all committee members informing them of a plan to have a coup which was projected to take place on 17 April 1976, precisely on the holiday.

The reasons why there had to be a coup were:

1. The Communist Party was strengthening its stance ever more solidly inside the country and on the international stage.
2. Our current forces were sufficient to carry out a coup without any need to spill blood. There were forces both in the countryside and in all the ministries and departments in Phnum Penh, and troops that were merely waiting for the announcement to lend their support.

It was to be Th'u'ch who was to come out in the open as the general author of this coup throughout the country (not everybody was going to come out into the open). The other comrades were merely to deploy forces in anticipation of the announcement which they were to receive, and that was it. And they were not to come out into the open, in case the coup didn't succeed.

According to the opinions expressed in the instructions as to how to proceed, the critical problem in this coup was that of smashing Brothers Number One and Two either by poisoning them or shooting them. If this was no success in this regard, the secondary problems couldn't be resolved either. The reason why Th'u'ch was supposed to do this was that Th'u'ch was their confident and had been in and out of their place.

after receiving these guiding opinions, I told Nh'o'ek of Kampung Saom Sector about them and went on to Kampung Saom as well. I also told Kampung Chhnang and 15. As to whether or not the coup would succeed, we were to listen for a siren over the radio. When the siren was heard, then it was sure we had won.

Nothing at all was heard between 14 and 17 April 1976. The lower downs became discouraged and looked depressed, because before they had been going around boasting to everybody that success was certain this time.

That day they listened to the radio from morning through until evening.

The reasons for the failure were not yet known. But the rumour was that at the rally celebrated the anniversary, a combatant armed with an AK and grenades who had entered the rally was arrested. He was a combatant from the North who had been handed over to the higher ups.

Once the 17 April 1976 holiday ended, myself, Seuang, my wife and a number of combatants went to visit Angkor Voat, but more importantly we wanted to check out the territory in Batdambang, to see what was so good about it, because we had always heard everybody saying it was so good. We went in three cars: a Landrover, a jeep and a 504.

[p.15]

We rushed that day to make sure we would sleep in Batdambang. On arrival we met with Vanh. He supported us with food and drink during the evening and the day, and also gave us a 404 so that we could move our things further.

Vanh whispered a question about what had happened with the plan for the coup on 14 April 1976. I replied that it had been defeated already because the combatant standing by to smash the two Brothers had been arrested. This was what was being said informally. I didn't know what the truth was.

I told Vanh he shouldn't go too far astray, but keep calm and just infiltrate deeper because he was already doing quite well, being the Chairman of Commerce for the whole Zone.

The next day we toured Batdambang town and then went to see the textile factory. It was evening by the time we went to see Nh'e'um at his home in Thmar Kol, where we spent the night. That night Nh'e'um talked a lot about coup activities, about which he had also received instructing opinions. He said he didn't know what the hell kind of risky venture these guys (Th'u'ch and Ya) thought they were up to. If they realized they didn't have enough forces, why did they go ahead and lay down plans, the only result of which was that they were exposed. I said they should meet Ph'e'um and let him in on things for once[?]. They would say they were going to do one thing, and then do something else, and just leave everybody spinning round and round[?], so that they didn't know what to think[?]. If it was not possible to do it, they should have just kept still and kept on striving to act according to the existing policy. That would have been the right thing to do.

I said that was my feeling as well. Now all I was thinking about was trying hard to do the work. He should go take a look west of Route 5 from Kampung Luong to Prek Phnov. It was now a vast expanse of fields all planted to broadcast paddy and corn. That was the right thing to do. I had seen it in the wet months, but not currently. At dawn the next day he took us to inspect east of Thmar Kol. I lost mastery because I saw that there was just so much land in Batdambang, an immense flat void of tens of thousands of hectares. A glance at my land would make it look no bigger than a watermelon shell.

Vanh then took us on tour, heading for Sisophon. The whole time I was just looking at this paddy land that went on as far as the eye could see, to the horizon, on until nightfall. It was night when we got to Sisophon. It wasn't until ten that we met H'e'ung, the Sector 5 Secretary,

who was just coming back from work. We didn't talk because I was feeling faint and wanted to sleep. It wasn't until the next morning that we chatted some. For the most part we talked about the problem of the coup.

H'e'ung said he had heard there had been a coup in Phnum Penh and wanted to know whether it was true. I replied I had only heard [p.16] what he had heard, but I didn't know who had carried it out. As far as my side was concerned, if we had heard the siren over the radio, we would have announced our support.

(In speaking this way I was hiding things from H'e'ung so that he wouldn't know too much about me.) This was because he had links of his own.

That day H'e'ung arranged for a cacophonous procession of cars to take us from Sisophon to Siem Reap. There was a jeep full of troops and a car carrying a lot of ice and fruit. He rode with us as far as Kralanh, giving us a running presentation about all the territory we passed.

On seeing the land in Batdambang both Seuang and I lost mastery and said to ourselves that there was no point in overexertion. A middling effort would do.

H'e'ung took us all the way to Siem Reap. He knew where the Sector Committee (S'o't and Sean) house was, and so he simply took us directly there. It wasn't until the afternoon that Sean showed up. After a discussion with him H'e'ung went back to Sisophon.

This was the first time we had met since we had been separated back in 1970. Sean gave me a warm welcome, asked me how I was, and asked after all the people we had known in the forest back in 1969.. That afternoon Sean took Seuang, my wifie and all the combatants to see Angkor Voat. I didn't get to go because I was feeling faint, and I had already seen it once.

While I was resting that afternoon, a bunch of medics were milling around, mostly combatant medics, but all they did was give me an injection. It was night before S'o't arrived. I asked him where he had been, and he said he'd been to Phnum Penh. I knew for sure that there was some sort of plan about Th'u'ch and his coup. After he had bathed and gotten comfortable, he came over and sat down for a chat with me. He asked me where I was headed. I said I had only come to inspect the land and see Angkor Voat. There wasn't any major duty. S'o't's face went blank, and he no longer wanted to speak to me.

But then in a moment his expression changed and he turned warm in his contact with me. He asked me why I hadn't gone to see Angkor. I said it was just because I was ill. I had had my treatment just now.

I asked him how things were in Phnum Penh. Was anything going on? I had been here four or five days and I knew nothing about what was going on. S'o't said the coup was now exposed. I pretended to be perplexed about who might be making a coup. I asked whose coup it was. S'o't elucidated that Th'u'ch had wanted to carry out a coup against Brother Number One and Brother Number Two, but the Organization had arrested a combatant among Euan's troops and taken him away. [p.17] There was no way of knowing how far it was going to extend now. I asked him what he had gone to Phnum Penh to do. He said with his duties he had presumed that if the first step had succeeded a second step would have been announced, but now that it had

failed, that was simply the end of it.

We had just said this much about this matter when those who had gone to see Angkor Voat came back. We started talking about something else. Then we ate dinner.

That night Sean came for an informal discussion. After talking about the life in the forest and the mountains (1968-69) I reminded Sean that with his class origin he really had to exert a strenuous effort to accomodate to things, because he had been a student (petty bourgeois). The Kampuchean revolution was going deeper and deeper, and if one couldn't keep up, they would definitely fall out of the movement. It was the same with me, too.

The next morning we got together to go back. We arrived in Kampung Thom at noon. We met Achar Vaen, the Chairman for Guest Reception of Kampung Thom Sector. We asked him for a lunch at his house and then continued our trip. We didn't talk about much, just pleasantries, but I said if he ever went to Phnum Penh, he should stop off at Kaev's place, and if he asked him where I was he would know. I was at Kampung Luong. There was a road going in to my place with a guard house there at the entrance. We then returned.

Several days later, I summoned Achar K^ap, Yim, Maen, `U't, R`i'n and Ta K`^a'nt`o'l for a work session at Kok Banteay (east of Prey Khmer). I wanted to know the situation in Kampung Chhnang. K^ap reported that in doing his work in Kampung Chhnang he didn't have any clear policies. He just did things by meeting people and then laying down and plan. He had met Kaev, Yin and Vaen.

His actions in the past had been:

1. Whoever was in a house would stay there. Their spouses would stay wherever they were.
2. He was inciting morals affairs between young people, between women and cadres.
3. He was inciting freedom of movement, in coming and going.
4. He was stirring up trouble to cause contradictions along the borders between one district and another, such as between District 18 and Batheay.
5. With regard to economic construction, he was inciting people not to overexert themselves, and to think that a middling effort was enough.
6. He was creating internal contradictions and causing internal splits between Sar`u'n and R`u't, who were just constantly having disagreements and contradictions.

I then gave Achar K^ap some helpful advice, that he shouldn't let anybody know who I was[?], and that for the moment he should go back home[?].

[p.18]

I advised him to come the next day, alone.

In the second meeting, I gave him friendly advice that he should try hard to build up a lot of forces. From what I heard the forces were still very few in number, but there was a lot of potential.

He should try hard to incite the people to hold processions demanding rice, clothing and to go home to their native districts.

He should try hard to do propaganda to cause a split between Sar`u'n and R`u't, so that one or the other would have to go.

He should try hard quickly to make contact with Ta Vaen in Kampung Thom, going via Yim in Kampung Leng.

However, in early 1976, a number of cadres exposed themselves too powerfully in their work by opposing the Communist Party of Kampuchea and were removed from their sectors. In April Nh`o'ek was removed from the Kampung Seila Sector and brought in to work in the Zone Office. Sarun and R`u't were no longer willing to have Achar K`ap working in the district, so he was removed from Rolie Ph'ie and sent to be the Chairman of the Sector Office.

After Nh`o'ek was removed from Kampung Seila, the two sectors were merged into one, that is Kah Kong and Kampung Seila became one, with R`an being charged with responsibility for it.

Sector 15 was also merged with Sector 32, with P`a'l appointed as Secretary and H`a'm as Deputy, while Kaev who had been the Secretary of Ponhea Leu district went instead to help with the work at the Office.

At that time my illness began to bother me more and more frequently, almost every day. In June 1976 I requested hospitalization 17 April in order to get a diagnosis. I spent about a half a month in the hospital. A lot of people came and went either to have illnesses diagnosed or to be hospitalized.

One day I left the hospital to visit Chey Suon at home. because he had a lot of duck embryo eggs. When I got there I saw Chey Suon going into the kitchen himself, while his wife sat outside on the bed.

Chey Suon boiled ten duck embryo eggs and we ate them all. So that night I went there for dinner. I would like to explain that I found out where Chey Suon lived from Neng, the Vice Chairman of Agriculture, who was hospitalized and who had a courier take me there personally.

After the meal, when things were a little quieter, Chey Suon asked what the current situation was like. I felt like I couldn't tell him and didn't know what to say. So I asked back [p.19] what he wanted to know about. I said I only knew what was going on in my domain, where there was currently nothing amiss. There had been a little of progress forward in the building up of forces and the carrying out of various activities, such as inciting disorder, marches, demonstrations and propaganda here and there.

There were delays making sure that a lot of paddy was produced. They were producing just enough to feed the mouths in their own cooperatives.

I asked him whether he knew the story about what had happened on the

day of the 17 April 1976 celebrations. He said his links at the Ministry let him know some of it. But what could he have done. I just knew that much, not more. We finished our talk and I took leave of him to go back to the hospital.

Four or five days later, Brother Number Two had me come see him at K^a-7 for a moment to discuss some essential business. He told me that the Standing Committee had decided that I should go for hospitalization abroad for a period, and come back once I was better.

Upon receipt of this decision, I left the hospital and went back to the Office to hand over duties to P^a'l, Sar^u'n and Seuang. I lived at the Office until the date of my departure. While I was making preparations to leave the idea occurred to me that in China they were still spending money. I therefore wanted to get a movie camera in order to make films about paddy production and the like. I dug out the dollars and Chiang Kai Shek Chinese money. I found \$2,000. There were also several Chiang Kai Shek banknotes, but I didn't take them.

On 26 June 1976 I travelled to Beijing with a youth medic named Baurat, the son of ^An.

While I was staying abroad, I didn't do any figuring about anything. All I thought about was my medical treatment, and I made a little tour of a cooperative, a district and a tea plantation.

When I got to Guangzhou in the province of Guangdong I met Ph^e'um, who had just arrived to stay there. He had left in May 1976, a month earlier than me, but a little of his time had been taken up at the hospital in Beijing, and that was why I had been able to catch up with him in this place.

I was elated to see him. He asked about the situation in the country and what the arrangements were for rainy season paddy production. I gave him a concrete report. That night the Secretary of Guangdong province gave a banquet for Ph^e'um and me.

[p.20]

The next day we met for another day before being separated. We had a lot of time to talk on this day.

First I asked whether in deciding on this 17 April 1976 coup thought had been given to preparations and possible repercussions.

He replied that Th^u'ch and Ya had just kept saying it would succeed, that it would undoubtedly succeed, for the reason that our forces were entirely sufficient. Among the ministries we had Commerce and Agriculture and people at Industry and Energy. In the countryside we had virtually all the zones, the Port and Transport, etc. The only problem they saw remaining was precisely solution of problem number one: namely assigning a youth to spray the rally with bullets. Ph^e'um said the thought given to this had been too superficial, with the result that it might be exposed, but Th^u'ch and Ya had replied that they had everything prepared already.

He said he decided to go along with them. I gave my opinion that this was a life and death matter, and there was no way that it should have been toyed with. He said we could afford one mistake. I said that Nh^e'um

was terribly dissatisfied, because there was no forethought or consideration of the repercussions, and it was always saying one thing but doing another.

I asked what the thinking about the future was. He said the tempo was picking up more and more speed now. The problem had to be thought of in terms of a conjunction of the internal with the external. If thought was given only to the inside we wouldn't succeed. However, he said once he got back he would make a stab once again at acting alone. He would pressure Chhouk and Ch'a'krei to do it this time, and not yet show his face. I didn't pursue the questioning any further because he was thinking.

Then we discussed our impressions of the China we had seen. I wanted to know what his opinion was. Ph'e'um said if we went down the road only as far as the China style, that would alleviate and ameliorate things. The people would be happy, there would be alcohol to drink, and there would always be beer snacks. He said if he could have just that much, he would forget about everything else. Instead we seemed to be just too tough. One little false move and it was an ideological, political or, in particular, a morals error. He said from what he could remember, if the teacher was vicious, the student would be vile. But if you let things become moderately lenient, human beings would get lazy. The important thing was to let the popular movement be the judge.

These opinions fit with my ideas as well. I gave them my full support. From what I could see things in China seemed easy and relaxed. Things were always evolving forward in every sphere of the economy and of technology, science, and industry, etc., and things seemed relaxed and easy. I hadn't been able to go everywhere yet, [p.21] and had only now just seen very little. This was all of the assessment that Ph'e'um and I made before we rested. The next day we were separated, and it was maybe almost a month before we see each other again.

I went for a month's treatment at in a hot spring area, warming up and fumigating the weakest nerve fibres. The Chinese doctors diagnosed this as a chronic illness. The treatment seemed to have made me better in this period. In August 1976 there was an earthquake in Beijing. Ph'e'um telephoned me in Guangdong to ask how I was from a distance of 5,000 kilometers. At that time he was already returning home. It occurred to me that the boredom was making my illness worse, so I decided to go back together with Ph'e'um.

The next day, in August 1976, I took a plane from Guangzhou to Beijing in order to return to the country. On the plane from Beijing back to Kampuchea we couldn't talk about anything because a Chinese woman translator who spoke Khmer was there too. So all I did was drink the whole time I was on the plane.

Upon my arrival back in Kampuchea I was still unable to work. If I did, I was always getting dizzy. If I travelled by car for a long distance I would also get dizzy.

At that time I wrote a letter to Sae asking what the state of contact with Teu Kam was. Later I wrote reminding him that 1976 was supposed to be the year of inciting disorder among the people to get them to rise up and demonstrate and run away into the forest, with the format being that propaganda about this would be known in the sectors as in the zones, and could even be known throughout the country.

Then on 30 August 1976 a demonstration erupted in the vicinity of Tuol village, Toek L"ak subdistrict, Kampot district. In this demonstration, the people of the entire village got together and ran away into the forest. Some drove off in their oxcarts. They marched in procession along the road from the village all the way to Kah Touch. There was no troop intervention that day. The demonstrators had also made contact with Prey Nup district, but those in Prey Nup didn't have enough time to make arrangements, and were intercepted along the road at Kampung Smach by a squad of troops who weren't in on the plan. They were unable to cross the road and so they went back. Two of the demonstrators went to Kha Tral and never came back. The scattering of people who were trailing along all went back to their homes.

Sae then went to clarify with the people in that village what the unrest was about. They said the two cadres had led them in the unrest. They were named L`a'm and Chou, and they had now heard that they had already run away [p.22] to Yuonland. Without having found out how the thing had begun and ended, Sae came back. However, before coming back Sae went to Prey Nup and saw Sari, the Deputy Secretary of the Sector stationed in Prey Nup. He asked Sari what had been going on that day in Prey Nup. Sari replied that there had also been demonstrators there, and they wanted to go join with those on the other side, but it seemed that one squad of troops had not been in on the plan, and so it had stopped them and detained them temporarily. When they withdrew to the rear, they walked along the road to the north, and it was evening by the time they returned.

Sae said he had also been in on this disorder, and had let it go to see how far it would go. We had also allowed it to happen for our own political purposes. Sae told Sari that in the future proper arrangements should be made.

Later Sae sent on a letter from Teu Kam to me. It said
.... It's been a long time since we had contact by letter. It's only today that I'm writing to you again about our actions. Ever since the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea came to Viet Nam, our side had thought that contacts would be eased. On the contrary, however, it has become more and more constrained because the Kampuchean side has held to a stubborn stance. Therefore our discussions achieved no results.

From now on Viet Nam would begin launching nibbling attacks to take a little bit of Kampuchean territory at a time along the border. In some places it had already taken a lot, and currently clashes were taking place up in Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri.

I would like to propose that some day you two comrades meet me for face-to-face discussions, which would make it easier to talk, at a location to be decided by the Kampot cadres. If it could be done at Kep, that would be even better. In any case, I would like to ask you two comrades to give me some sort of sign that will allow me to meet with the navy and clear me through checkpoints to the objective.

As regards this invitation for a meeting, I wrote back to Sae asking him what he thought. I could not go because my health was bad. My opinion was that we should have him come to meet us because it would then be easy for us to feel out his views. The easy way would be to meet him at Kah Po.

Because my illness acted up non-stop, and the medic Baurat had to go

to the Zone hospital, I suggested that Ms You, who was a pretty good doctor, come stay in my house and not go anywhere else. This Ms You had a Chinese father and a Khmer mother and had studied up to the third modern grade. She had been a friend of Ri, the wife of Kh`a'ch Paen, when they were studying together back in 1970. [p.23] I asked Sar`u'n to send her from Sector 31.

Ms Kh`a'k, originally from Takaev, a medic of the same class as You, was to come to stay with You, too.

Ms Li, another medic of the same class as You, was to come to live in the Office too. These latter two came only temporarily, as they were about to be taken to study medicine at the 17 April hospital. These two also came from Sector 31.

After they had been there a while, my illness caused me more and more severe distress, particularly pain in my gallbladder, in which there were stones. Every time there was an attack, three or four people would work on me for an hour before the pain would subside for a moment, and then recur. So all these medics couldn't do anything. Every time I got a rubdown from these women I would feel them up, and in the end I was vile with Kh`a'k because she was pretty good looking. I just couldn't resist. She was about 25. I then made her into one of my links.

In late 1976, the Ha Noi group, of whom there were about 100 in the Zone Office, got ceaselessly stropy and disorderly. Some took weapons and hide them in the forest on Phnum Pih. Others went hunting in order to take a look at the terrain in the forest and mountains. Others gathered their forces together [?]. Seeing that this was the situation, the Zone Committee and I decided it was necessary to take out the leaders and move them away from the place if the problem was going to be resolved.

The leaders were sent to the Southwest, including Nhaem, S`u'n, Ka, P`o'n and Y`i'n. However, Kh`o'n found out about this, that it was a matter of them being transferred, but of being smashed. This was why he committed suicide by hanging himself. When he died it occurred to me that in order to prevent the unrest among the Ha Noi group from getting worse and to prevent his wife and mother and brothers and sisters from being terribly angry at us, I would have the Chairman of the Office to go ahead and [secretly?] initiate a ceremony to commemorate his soul, because the deceased had not been smashed by us. Instead he had hung himself. Thus, the respect we were going to pay to his soul was merely a tactic to delude and reassure those who were still alive to prevent any further disorder. It didn't result from any stance or sentimentalism.

[p.24]

After Kh`o'n's body had been buried, things quieted down for a period. They weren't agitating. However, over at Trapeang Phov they were agitating more and more seriously. So it was decided to take them out a group at a time and smash them until none were left.

The reason why this Ha Noi group was smashed was that they were inciting disorder and not hiding this fact. Everybody could see what was going on. Moreover, they were inciting unrest among the prisoners of war as well. If this was allowed to go on for a long time, it might spread to everybody. However, anybody who wasn't active could be left alone for the time being, but all of them were at it at that time.

More than 30 prisoners of war who were living with the Ha Noi group were also smashed because they also wanted to be disorderly.

There were two contradictions in connection with the formulation of a plan to seize state power in the villages, subdistricts, district, sectors and zone: the contradiction between the revolution and the CIA group that had infiltrated the Party in the zone, the sectors and the districts.

In early 1976, a lot of infiltrated forces in the zone were unmasked and arrested.

Sector 31.

1. Achar K^ap, a link of Vaen's, who had been unmasked in the district and transferred to the Office, was arrested.

2. Yim, a link of Vaen's who was unmasked because of impropriety with Ms Maen, was arrested.

3. Ms Vaen, a link of Yim's who was unmasked because of impropriety was arrested because the phenomenon went so far that she shot Yim's first wife.

4. `U't, the Deputy Secretary of Kampung Tralach Kraom and a link of K^ap's, was unmasked. He had already been in trouble a lot, and this had already been exposed. However, he was only removed on that day. He was taken to the re-education office at Longvek.

t. Ta K^a'nt`o'l (Praeng) was unmasked because he hung around[?] only with the 17 April group and was inactive at work, opposed the plan, and had traitorous links with Zone Commerce, and was arrested and sent for reeducation at Longvek.

6. Sar`i'n (Chreh), of the Baribau District Committee, a link of K^ap's from 1973, was arrested in the Longvek barracks.

Sector 32.

7. Ta Chay, a link of Kaev's from 1972, was unmasked in connection with a morals matter and removed as Secretary of Aural district. He was taken to the Worksite Office of the Sector.

8. Kaev, a link of Kr`o'ng's [or an urban link] was unmasked for not going down into the work, for [p.25] directly opposing the work. After being sent to the Office for a period he was arrested.

9 Prach, Secretary of Udong district and a link of Kaev's from 1970, was removed and put into the mobile units of Sector 32 for a period and then arrested (sent to Longvek).

10. N^an, the Secretary of Udong district, a person of P^a'l's, but who was a little bit inactive at work, was removed on a pretext because there had been removals at all the districts.

Sector 37.

11. Tin, a link of Nh^o'ek's from 1956 and the Secretary of Sre Ambel district, was removed for a period and then sent to the re-education place at Longvek.

12. Chea alias S^a, Deputy Secretary of Sre Ambel, was arrested because he had links coming out of the city.

13. Siv, the Deputy Secretary of Sector 37, was unmasked on account of strong opposition as regards the question of farming the fields, digging feeder canals and putting up dams, and seriously splitting up the solidarity between himself and R^an. Siv was a link of V^an's and Prachha's [?] of the old (11). In the end he was arrested.

14. Phluong, the Secretary of Prey Nup district, a link of V^an's (a Siamese) from 1970, was also unmasked for directly opposing farming the fields. He was also arrested and brought to the S-21 Special Branch.

Addendum.

15. N^ov, a former secretary of Ang Snuol district and a link of H^am's from 1970, was removed to the Zone Hospital (77) for a while and was then arrested after being unmasked in connection with overt work and activities to make contact with and protect his own cronies. he was therefore opposed by the revolutionary group.

16. S^e't, Deputy Secretary of Udong and a link of Kr^o'ng's [or an urban link], was unmasked due to too overtly serious opposition activities. Arrested and taken to the Special Branch (S-21).

17. S^e'um, a link of Kr^o'ng's [or an urban link], was unmasked on account of overt opposition to production. Arrested and sent to (S-21).

18. Leuan, a Member for Ponhea Leu district and a link of Vaen's, was arrested for having links with Vaen.

So how were things to be arranged if a large number of cadres were already gone. In a session of the Zone in order to reorganize the sectors and the districts, I was of the opinion that the sectors should put forward names and then discuss them there. Sar^u'n of Sector 31 put forward the names of the comrades who were responsible for the districts at the time of the purge.

In Kampung Tralach district things had been handed over to Ms N^a'n (the daughter of Ma M^a'ng) and she was in temporary charge, but Sar^u'n was directly responsible.

Vaeng was put in at Toek Phoh district. He had come out of the army and was a link of K^ap's. S^an, the Deputy district secretary, was an old link of the subdistrict chief of Prey Chrov (L^u'n).

In Baribau district, Sam was put forward. He was the younger brother-in-law of P`a'l, but there was someone named Snguon, from the military, who was a link of mine from 1975, who was the Member.

In Kampung Leng district, Ms D`e'n was kept on. She was the younger sister of Kauy, a link of K`ap's and she remained responsible for duties there. Additional members were to be found later.

In Sector 32.

San[?] and Ms Heang, a person belonging to P`a'l, were put in at Ponhea Leu district, along with L`o'ng, a link of H`am`s from 1971.

In Thpong district, R`an himself was personally in charge.

At Ovrал, Dim was put in. He was the commissar of the Sector Regiment and a person belonging to P`a'l. We had smashed his older brother. His deputy was Keuan, who was high class.

Sector 37.

Savat was put in as Secretary of Sre Ambel district. He was a link of Nh`o'ek's. Von was a link of Siv's from 1970.

Sari was responsible for Sre Ambel district with Sat, a link of Thean's[?], and Ms S`an, a link of L`a'nh from 1970.

In Thmar Bang district it was Reuang, a link of Siv's from 1970, who was the Secretary.

In sum, on this occasion of district reorganization, merely the individuals were changed. The substance remained the same. Among the fifteen districts in the entire Zone, there were no more than maybe two or three where there were no underground infiltration forces.

As for state power in the subdistricts, if one speaks of administration, they all went as long as they were in districts where there was some sort of tendency. However, there hadn't yet been appointments everywhere, only in one or two districts....

However, Prey Nup district was a separate case. There were eleven cooperatives there, and all of them were link forces, most importantly among the cooperative secretaries. This was because this was a place where my side had built up forces by dissolving the army and sending it down to grasp the people from the top right down to the bottom.

No problems were posed as regards the sector committees, because every time there was a meeting, all the district secretaries were invited for education and to receive the plan. Therefore the sectors were not that essential.

[p.27]

On transfers in the sector military. In Kah Kong, due to the more and more serious phenomena of severe contradictions and grave wrecking, things were unmasked because they overdid it. It was proposed that R`an be removed and be sent to Division I to be put to use by it. He came to be with the division at the Longvek garrison. It wasn't but a few days when

N^ov ran away taking the opportunity of his being invited to study at Speu. The hypothesis was that he escaped back to Kah Kong, hid in the forest and went to Thailand.

Ki, the vice chairman of the sector regiment, was arrested on account of being unmasked for having outrageous morals affairs. Once he was arrested, he was sent to Phnum Penh.

It was therefore necessary to bring in Kaoek, a link of N^ov's, to pick up the responsibility. He was originally from Kampot, from Chhouk.

In 32, I had a plan to remove Kh'o'em in order to send him to assist with the work at the Sector Office, which was lacking cadres to control and examine the work of the sector. Then I took Lek, who had been introduced to me by Seuang, to do the work of the Sector army.

On the fashioning of strength in the bureaux attached to the Zone. From the time that I had gone to China, I handed over to Vi, the Zone Agriculture Chairman, the duty of grasping all the joint bureaux within the zone. He was the secretary of a Bureaux Committee. The Agricultural Bureau was divided into many bureaux, namely Mo-71 at Steung Thom; 72, the Prisoners of War at Trapeang Nov; 73, office of the late Kh'o'n and the Orange Orchard; 75, Baribau Agriculture; and 76, the Kampung Luong Agricultural Office. In addition to these there were the tractors and the tractor repair outbuilding.

....

[p.28; p.72 in original]

Mo-73

13. Tauch, former education cadre, a Yan link from 1973; currently in re-education

14. Cheuan, combatant, a Yuon link from 1972; currently in re-education

15. Huot, combatant, a Yuon link since 1970, currently in re-education

16. Grandma R'e'um, a Yuon link since 1970; currently in re-education

17. Khaem, cop's child, a Duong link since 1972; currently in re-education

18. Cheat, a Duong link since 1972; currently in re-education

19. Ri, wife of Vi, a Vi link since 1975

....

Bureau 201

25. `U'y, photographer, a Chinese link (currently in re-education)

....

Hospital

38. Sie, disabled combatant, a yuon link from 1972; currently under arrest

....

[p.29; p. 73 in original]

At that time, P'a'l invited the sector, district, bureaux and military cadres for a work session at Chamkar Daung. I attended the meals, but not the meetings. During the breaks, Seuang, R'an and Sari always came over to my place and chatted about the situation in the country.

Seuang said the internal situation was now revealing itself as more and more severe and stringent. Th'u'ch, Ya and Chey Suon had all been arrested and disappeared. Someone was disappearing every fortnight. And in the countryside, unmaskings were more and more numerous. In our Zone alone, more than 20 people were gone, and this didn't include the dribs and drabs that were taken with them.

R'an said that was right. One worked and got unmasked. There were no principles. [?]

Sari said the situation had now gotten to the point where it was severe and stringent. If this made things impossible, then the only choice was to try hard to make strenuous efforts to fulfil one's duties. There was no point in thinking about anything else.

In that December of 1976, the Organization invited the Zone Committees to come for a three-day work session in Phnum Penh. After it was over and people went back, a letter from Ph'e'um appeared which he had sent to me only. The letter asked after my health, how it had been since my return from China.

He said: that after I went to China (in May 1976), there had been a lot of changes in the situation in the country, particularly as regards those who had come out in the open in a coup.

Those of 17 April 1976 had all been arrested, including Th'u'ch, Ya, Chey Suon, Chhouk, Ch'a'krei, etc. As regards the coup plan, I had told you only about the Th'u'ch part, but not yet about the Chhouk and Ch'a'krei parts. In fact, Th'u'ch was to come out in the open and do it and was responsible for smashing the Two Brothers by spraying the rally with bullets.

The other part was that of Ch'a'krei and Chhouk, who were to fulfil the responsibility of shooting or throwing grenades at the Palace. (The dwelling place of Sihanouk, Penn Nouth and the other dignitaries who had just returned from abroad.)

In case of triumph, but there was a reaction from the troops of the General Staff, then the troops of Euan and the North that were stationed at Prek Phnov and the troops of Ch'a'krei that were stated at Chbar Ampov would enter into combat immediately.

In case of defeat, it was to be Chhouk's duty to bring in Yuon tropps immediately, either along the Mekong or Route 1, given that Chhouk had been in touch with the Yuon May L'a'm for a long time.

However, this plan was defeated because the troops defending the rally arrested an army combatant from Euan's unit (a North Zone unit

handed over to the Organization). And the Ch`a`krei troops whose assignment was to throw grenades in the Palace were also arrested by the troops defending the palace.

It wasn't long before Ch`a`krei, Chhouk, Ya and Kaev Meah were arrested. As for the other part, that of Th`u`ch, he and Euan and Deuan were also arrested. I would like to remind you that when I spoke to you in Beijing I didn't grasp the situation. It was only after I returned to the country that I was able to grasp it.

Now that I'm without Chhouk it's as if my hands and feet have been amputated. When I got home it was as if the earth had slipped away from under my feet and I was tottering with nothing to hold on to. Despite this I wasn't yet out of hope. There were still a number of other military, cadre and grassroots forces.

However, this time it's a bigger game than before, both internally and externally. Now contact with the Yuon has been broken on my side because in the most recent period I had had Chhouk make contact with May L`a`m, but given what's happened that's now broken.

Now I've gone to make contact with Ngien D`e`k Th`u`n, the Secretary for the East in 1954 who is also a member of the Youn Centre.

However, in order to recoup the losses, I met Nh`e`um and S`o`t upon my return from Beijing. I went to Batdambang and Siem Reap in the middle of August 1976. I met for a night with Nh`e`um at Thmar Kol and I gave him a report informing him of the defeat of the coup. In order to recoup this loss and not have things be politically counterproductive, it was necessary to incite the In Tam troops to make sure the soon invaded in cooperation with divisional troops of the Northwest. At they very least they could take Batdamangbang province, and even if this was completely impossible Kampuchea's political influence would be ruined. Nh`e`um was amenable.

I then went on to Siem Reap and had a momentary meeting with S`o`t. I informed him about the same matters and asked him whether he had the potential to carry out a counter-attack. He said he could. According to the assessment of potential that we did together, the leading forces (CIA) and the forces in the grassroots and the army were all still in place. Thereafter Nh`e`um assigned a delegate to go see In Tam via the Kampuchea-Thai Liaison Committee, and contact was made. Together they formulated a plan to invade Kampuchea. While the arrangements were being made, all the links over there rose up, including H`e`ung, M`a`i, Sau[?], and Vanh. [p.31]. Only Kae. K`^a`nt`o`l and Nh`e`um did not come out in the open, but were left to go underground long-term. The forces in the Zone division, such as Klaeng. However, once this group starting zooming around too much and their backs emerged above the water line[?], some cadres in the division came to indict them with Nh`e`um. Seeing that they were already exposed, Nh`e`um ordered their arrest, and a large number were arrested.

As for S`o`t's numbers, they joined up with Sean and the cadres of a regiment. They went out and made contact with the CIA in Thailand in order to get its help with external support troops. S`o`t went and met the CIA (an American whose name I don't remember) at the border of Utday Meanchey.

He reported that the major CIA leaders, such as Khuon and Ya, had all already been arrested by the Revolutionary Organization of Kampuchea. He said he wanted to know whether he could count on help in liberating the

provinces of Kampong Thom, Siem Reap and Utdar Meanchey.

The American asked S`o't how many troops and guns he had. S`o't said he had a regiment of troops and one or two provinces of people who wanted to come to Thailand. The American replied that he didn't think he wanted to get involved in any risky ventures because S`o't's big chiefs like Khuon and Ya had all already been arrested by the Revolutionary Organization. Given the puny size of S`o't's forces, how could they win? He therefore didn't dare to get involved in this matter. (Later, S`o't, too, was arrested.)

S`o't had pleaded vigorously with the American, but in the end he had said S`o't would have to wait until it had been discussed with others....

....

In sum, our coup plan has now been defeated, and our plan for recouping our loss has also been defeated. We should now think about meeting one day to draw out our experiences with regard to these problems.

Later Ph`e'um let me know that he was going to fomrulate a major plan of a nation-wide nature for 1977. Maybe I would be apprised of this plan in the upcoming meeting.

After reading his letter, I wrote one back to Ph`e'um, as follows.

.... First of all I would like to report to you about my health. Ever since the day I returned to the country, the still of my illness has been transformed from what it was when I, was in China. Now it's developed into a painful blockage of the gallbladder. [p.31] My nerves are becoming weaker and weaker. Therefore I'm not able to do any work these days. I cannot sit without getting dizzy and having repeated sudden shooting pains in my gut that never go away.

Ever since my return from China, I haven't gone anywhere, and I don't know much about what's been going on. If you hadn't told my, I wouldn't know anything coherent.

My feeling is that defeats are normal. The important thing is to deduce experiences and make sure what was done right and what was done wrong are brought to light. Only then is it possible to resolve the contradictions. I would like to report to you that from the day on which I received your guiding opinions about the coup, I have joined in the action by having Seuang assign T`o'n of Regiment 115 to carry out activities, that is, to move weapons, medicines and rice into the forest (Phnum Kbal Toek-Aural) in order to engage in dacoit activities. It was projected that for troops we would use the indulgent types and some of our core cadres. But this had to be shelved because of what happened higher up (the failure in the city) and because there was nothing in Batdambang and Siem Reap. My side also deferred things because there were no problems in our immediate surroundings.

On the question of S`ot', in late August 1976, when I was hospitalized at 17 April, I once saw him arrive at the hospital. I was puzzled as to what he was wandering around looking for. When I asked he said he had come to ask after the health of a patient. But his posture was sunken, not normal.

I asked him to come over and sit down, and I queried him as to whether or not he had come to assess the arrest of Th`u'ch, Euan and Deuan.

I said I thought that was the case and asked S`o't what he had in mind now. I made it clear to him that back on that day when I had gone to Siem Reap-Angkor Voat I hadn't talked that much too him because I was ill and hadn't felt much like talking.

I said now I would like to ask him whether he had felt hurt by the defeat of our coup policy, and what his thinking was now. He said he had pondered over it quite a bit, but he hadn't yet been able to figure out a way forward. And so how many forces (army and grassroots) did he have now. Quite a lot. If that were the case then it ought to be enough to sort things out, if we could count on finding foreign friends, particularly the Thai. The opinion was to go immediately, don't leave it for a long time. The requisite was that if we could not take the whole of Kampuchea, it would also be alright to take just the single province of Siem Reap, falling back for the moment on the Thai. We could wait and take some other province on some future date. When I said this his mind seemed to clear up. He then left, and I don't know whether or not he stayed in hospital or went to Commerce[?]. However, before he left, he gave his opinion [p.32] that he had already made contact with the Thai once. It had been supposed that they would meet again, but no date had been set. However, he was determined that even if the Thai did not help, he would act, because not to act was to die. I asked him what he was going to do. He said they would get together to rise up and attack those who had been in the struggle and cadres, and then make sure they could defend the districts and subdistricts. If that was not possible then they would pull back to the Thai border, using the Thai as their back-up, and become dacoits if necessary.

After the discussion he left.

As for the plan that you say is for next year, for 1977, I agree that it must be properly formulated and be large-scale. Let's think about how to get the interior and the exterior working in parallel. However, I would currently like to ask you to go make contact with the outside in order to ascertain their opinion. What have they got to say. And then formulate a plan that coordinates the inside with the outside. I agree on contacting Th`u'n, because he's a pretty high-ranking Yuon cadre. So such contact is fitting.

Finally, please exert every effort to make sure this currently complicated situation is rectified.

After writing this letter, I had Euan, my doctor, take it to `E'um, the Chairman for Commerce stationed in Phnum Penh, who then took it to S`o't, a combatant at the East Zone Commerce Bureau in Phnum Penh. It was passed on urgently.

When S`o't came back I received a letter inviting me to a meeting at Tonle Bet, where there would be someone waiting for me on 1 January 1977. It was stressed that a lot of people were invited to a big meeting. Therefore even if I was ill I had to come for a moment in order to pass the 1977 plan, because this invitation was being issued only to zone delegates.

A week later I was to go to Tonle Bet. I tried hard to take care of my illness and took medications to prevent gallbladder pain, which the doctors had given me to hold off the pain when it could.

When I went I went on the pretext that I was inspecting the zone4s of others to see how they were progressing and developing. This is what I told the youth named Chey who drove the car, doctor Euan and You. I borrowed a white 404 in order to disguise myself with the foreigners so that it would not be known where I was going. But by coincidence when I arrived at Prey Totoeng I ran into Pok, the Zone Secretary (Central). Once he saw me he called me to stop. He asked me [p.33] where I was going. After getting out of the car and shaking his hand, I told him that I had just come back from China, and I wanted to go around and get a little bit of a look at the country in the East. I was going to inspect Au Reang Ov and Tbaung Khmum and then go down the road to Prey Veng and go back. He took me in to sit down in a bureau near the road and sent somebody to fetch a green coconut and split it for me to eat the milk. I then continued my journey. He had ask me where I was going to have my meal since it was already almost ten. I said that wasn't a problem, as I had rice in the car and could eat anywhere.

I arrived at Kampung Cham at 11.30. I took a break for a meal on the river bank, and only after I was down was the car ferried across to Tonle Bet. Only when I got to the other side did I see Lin (Khn`o'l) come to receive me there. He had a youth escort me on my journey. I went by car all the way to Suong, and he took me into the a place among the rubber trees about eight or nine kilometers from the road.

It was a neat bureau. I saw Ph`e'um. Nh`e'um, Vi, Yi, Phuong, Chea and cadres of the bureau and sectors of the East. Those whom I recognized were Kh`o'em, the Secretary of Sector 21 and Lin of the Zone Standing Committee. I went in and shook the hands and asked after the health of the cadres, and then sat down to rest for a moment, after which I went to look for a place to rest. I would like to note that Sae didn't come because he was ill.

The work began in the afternoon, starting a two. The agenda for the meeting was:

1. A report on the work and activities of 1976;
2. the 1977 Plan;
3. any other business.

First, Pheum made a report. In 1976 our forces had suffered a large number of casualties. There had been losses in every zone, sector and district and in the city from high-level cadres down to those at the district level. Despite this extent of losses, general losses had not yet been effected. We had had cadres come and replace them immediately, either by taking them from our own grassroots or by having them handed over to us by other bases. However, their quality was a little bit less than that of the originals. As for actions that were to be carried out, in principle we had put forward a lot, such as the coup (17 April 1976) and the plan for reversing this defeat, which had been made in every zone, but which had also been vanquished. As for the actions that had achieved results, they had mostly been small-scale activities in the districts and sectors.

[p.34]

For example there had been the commotion at Tuol village in Toek L'ak

subdistrict of Kampot, the commotion in Chan Saen subdistrict involving 50 people in Udong District, Sector 31, who had demanded to go home, etc. We had to view these experiences as positive ones which we would repeat.

As regards the constant unmasking of cadres, this was a result of excessive subjectivism with respect to the overall general situation. As regards the organizational line, the people sent to fulfil assignment had not been given clear education. They had not been valiant and brave and had lacked technical skills. That was why there had been constant defeats.

About my tour of Viet Nam. Beginning in August 1976 I was able to make immediate contact with the Vietnamese named Th`u'n. We met once at Smach. Th`u'n understood my requirements as regards the question of contact. He then asked about the current situation in Kampuchea. I told him there was current rigid and tense state of affairs. All the veteran cadres and veterans of the struggle were being smashed one after the other. The leading cadres at the level of the Centre were currently being detained because they were allegedly in league with the Yuon or serving the policies of the Yuon. This was particularly so with regard to those who had participated in the struggle of the eight to nine year period. The Ha Noiians who were Khmers whom Viet Nam had sent back had been thoroughly smashed.

I would now like to get this contradiction resolved because it could not be resolved by a policy of dialogue. Now weapons were the only way, with the outside acting as a counterpart.

Another thing was that the current Communist Party of Kampuchea regime was highly dictatorial one, one that was too rigid and severe, one that had overshot the comprehension and consciousness of the people. Therefore a lot of people were muttering and moaning about how they were doing a lot of work and getting little back for it, how they couldn't get together with their families, couldn't rest, never had any fun, etc.

This is a synopsis of the situation, which I would like to present to you. There are a lot of other details.

Having met together to just that extent, he said I should wait for a little while and he would let me know the programme for our work together.

Th`u'n stressed that he would like to invite me to the country some time so that we could have more extensive meeting. Th`u'n asked me whether I could be away from home for two or three days, and I said I could. If that was the case, he said, he would like me to get myself all ready to go a long distance, but that the people at the bureau must be told to do whatever they could to sort things out properly.

Upon my return I laid down a plan that the people at the bureau [p.35] must stand by on defence, in case the Brothers from higher up came. However, the easy way out was to telegramme them in advance that I was going to work at the grassroots.

Two days later a courier came and told me to go. I was met by Th`u'n on my arrival at Smach, and then we went together by car to Tay Ninh. There we met Hay Sau, May L`a'm, etc., who were waiting to welcome us. We had only just eaten when we got right on a plane for Ha Noi. At the Ha Noi airport we were welcomed by Vo Nguyen Giap, and I was then taking to a place for a courtesy call on Le Duan, Secretary of the Viet Nam Communist Party Centre, and on Pham van Dong and Truong Chinh.

During the meeting we exchanged views on what the situation was in Kampuchea. I presented the full state of affairs to Le Duan, some of which I had already told Th'u'n. Le Duan presented his felicitations to an old friend who had been involved in the common struggle for a long time, and with whom he could still meet. Duan resolved that he would help his Kampuchean friends with all his heart and soul, and in this there would be only one Party, only one country and one people. If the people of Kampuchea were suffering, so were those of Viet Nam, etc.

There was a banquet as if we were one family, organized by Le Duan and attended by Pham van Dong, Truong Chinh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Th'u'n, etc.

The next day the discussions began. On the Viet Nam side were Truong Chinh, Giap and a lot of expert cadres. During the meeting, we exchanged a lot of opinions about political, military and economic problems, etc., but most importantly about the plan to invade Kampuchea in 1977.

Politically, both Viet Nam and Kampuchea were brothers who had live as neighbours for a long time. Both peoples had joined together to fight French and American imperialism and drive them out of their countries completely. Viet Nam and Kampuchea could not be pulled apart, whether politically, militarily or economically.

....

As for the plan for the future, today Kampuchea was liberated [p.36]. as was Viet Nam. However, Kampuchea had betrayed the aspirations of the peoples of both countries. It had been opposing and creating contradictions between Kampuchea and the Yuon constantly since the day of liberation. But this was just one part of the story. The important story was domestic, that inside the nation. The people of your country are in contradiction with a revolution which was oppressing and suppressing and massacring them, and profoundly splitting national unity. The Party was now split into two: the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Labourers' Party of Kampuchea. Taking advantage of the crisis in Kampuchea, the Yuon decided to help their Kampuchean friend who was the delegate of the Party and the people and was prominent there, in order to escape from the catastrophe that had been created by some Kampuchean leaders. The Yuon strategy vis-a-vis Kampuchea remained the same, that is, to make Kampuchea its satellite, a member of the Indochina Federation, considered a small country like that of a little brother.

The military strategy aimed at taking the whole of Kampuchea.

Second, if it could not be taken, then to take the whole of the east bank of the Mekong from Steung Treng all the way to the Viet Nam border along the Mekong River.

If the Mekong River was not possible, then take the Parrot's Beak (Svay Rieng), cutting down directly from Tay Ninh and Kampung Chak straight south.

The fighting tactics.

Infiltrate spies, commandos and secret agents to do reconnaissance of the important positions within the country. These would include men, women and children.

Use psychological warfare to terrorize the people's spirit to make them afraid and therefore easy to transport in. [?]

Use border security forces to conduct ambushes and nibble away taking a little bit of territory at a time without the other side being aware of it.

Use zoneal forces to eliminate the resistance and force the concentration of the Kampuchean troops.

In the end, if it appeared that it would be possible to seize some area, use large-scale forces to trounce in and take it. This would mean the troop strength of the Centre (the Supreme Command).

As for military material, the army would be strengthened by the use of tanks and artillery and air escort.

About liaison. From this day on we must establish liaison with a new party, namely the Labourers' Party of Kampuchea, which would have a post at the Treuang market or at Smach. Th'u'n would be stationed there as the delegate of the Communist Party of Viet Nam Centre.

I would like to put forward the decisions of Kampuchea and Viet Nam [p.37] in which I was representative that past month. In sum, today Viet Nam is already making arrangements. They will begin attacking the border, starting from the middle of 1977 through to early 1978.

Their request is that our side inside the country really try hard. That asked what our current strength was. I said there wasn't any problem in this regard, there was enough to fight.

My tour of Viet Nam lasted only two days and one night. I hurried back for fear of being exposed. However, I was very well received by our Vietnamese friends.

2. The 1977 Plan. I would like to put forward the 1977 plan as follows.

i. The general overall situation is good and is very favourable to us.

The Vietnamese will start attacking in 1977. Viet Nam is currently touring to test the feelings of the world and particularly of Southeast Asian countries.

ii. The current domestic situation is that the cadres of the Communist Party of Kampuchea are in contradiction with the people, Party members and other cadres. They have not yet been able to resolve the problem of uniting Party members and cadres.

b. The contradiction between the new regime, which is extremely rigid and severe, and those who do not comprehend it, which arised most importantly because of the cadres who are underground infiltrators are unwilling to propagandize and disseminate this line.

c. Our current strength is sufficient, including our political, military and economic strength.

3. The Overall Strategic Orientation for 1977

Our plans were defeated many times in 1976. I would thus like to put forward the 1977 plan as follows.

i. Fashioning a Strong Political Base

This means having a firm grasp on the people, such as is the case in Prey Nup or in Sector 21 of the East Zone. These are places where forces have gone in and been concealed such that they are invisible.

Sector 21 of the East Zone is a very solid political base. The Vietnamese who have come in and been concealed there have become invisible and left no trace. We had been able to build up such a base in Sector 23, Prey Veng, but it was revealed and dispersed completely.

ii. On Military Strength.

This year all the military that exists must be gathered up to rise up and fight.

Most importantly, the troops along the border in such places as Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Sector 25, Kracheh, the East, Kampot and Kampung Seila must carry out follow-up attacks behind the Yuon troops [p.38] when they invade. No matter where they come in, the way must be opened up for them to come right in. There's no need to resist. We can pretend to be bolting off to stop them from the front.

The places where it is possible to do this include Route 7, Snuol-Kracheh, Smach, Sector 25, Kampot, Kampung Seila and Prey Nup.

As far as the people are concerned, they should be kept in large numbers in certain places, so that once the Vietnamese arrive, they can gather them right up and take them away. The reason why it is required that the people be gathered up for the Yuon is that they aim to take them to educate them as cadres who in the future will come back and administer state power. Or, in the immediate term, they can be used for espionage, to gather intelligence for the Yuon attacks on Kampuchea.

The Objectives of the 1977 Attack Plan

1. Fight together with the Yuon troops all the way from the border to Phnum Penh and smash the government in Phnum Penh.

2. Completely smash the state power in the zones and sectors that do not belong to us.

3. Assign Division I of the West Zone as a special unit to enter and seize all the ministries and departments in Phnum Penh, so that the Yuon army will be able to enter, as it doesn't know where the important places are.

The date of the attack is up to Viet Nam, which will set it for us.

On putting together counterpart forces.

The troops on the rear battlefields must rise up and carry out

harassment, such as wandering around harassing the people in the villages and the subdistricts.

The naval forces of Division I encamped at the ocean would prepare a plan to attack the naval forces of the General Staff and wreck ships.

In the Northwest, the Zone Division and the responsible persons were to go and make sure of making contact with Thai forces or In Tam's army, and then invade, making absolutely sure of getting as far as Kampung Chhnang.

The troops of Preah Vihear must make contact with external forces, whether Thai or Khmer Serei, and join with them in making an attack that must reach Kampung Thom.

The troops of the sectors and districts must urgently get to work wandering around pillaging in the villages and the subdistricts on the prevent of revolutionary vigilance. In fact, we would be getting our troops into practice in advance, so that when the time came for concrete action everything would work like a charm.

3. Economic problems.

Organize economic wrecking or wrecking groups. The important thing was to destroy last year's paddy and rice so that there would be a disastrous scarcity. Destroy hogs, threshers, broadcasters, etc. Do whatever could be done so that there would be scarcity.

[p.39]

For example, hold off on harvesting fully ripe paddy. Wait until it is really overripe before harvesting it, and particularly until the stalks have already snapped.

For example, in threshing, only pound the paddy once and then throw away the sheaves while the paddy is still rough.

For example, when transporting it, it must be strewn about and not put away, and some of it must be spilled on the roads and abandoned.

Secretly burn down paddy stores so that there is not enough of a harvest.

In building stores don't make them too sturdy because in a few months all our paddy will be gone. It would do to use sugar palm tree leaves for the walls.

Once the threshing was completed, a lot of paddy must be hidden away in granaries. For example if there was 10,000 **th`a'ng** of paddy, a mere 5,000 **th`a'ng** would be good enough. This was in order to be able to sustain our forces in the time to come.

b. On production. For example, the growing of dry season rice and tubers must be held up. Whatever could be done to impede it and prevent it from moving quickly must be done. Just make a middling effort. And once action was being carried out, plant something unstrategic, such as watermelon, merely in order to satisfy the mouth's desire for something that tastes good.

Try hard to expand a lot private planting done at home.

c. On consumer items. Things like cars, motorcycles and bicycles must be wrecked so that they would quickly become unusable. Char them so that they couldn't be used for long. Most importantly, burn up the engines of transport vehicles. Means must be found to wreck them by putting in dirt or gravel. Do whatever necessary to make them wear out quickly.

Destroy gasoline and kerosene so that they would run out quickly. If, when arriving at people's homes, they wanted some, give it to them, just like some chickens[?]. Leave things running, not turning them off as would be appropriate, leaving our vehicles with nothing[?]

Destroy clothing, medicines, office equipment, typewriters, paper, ink, etc.

4. On the Problem of State Power

The purely revolutionary cadres must all be removed and smashed by accusing them of moral impropriety or conniving with traitors and carrying out actions to wreck the revolution.

Select for appointment anyone who comes from the same elements as us and who will serve our plans, and put them in charge of important posts and duties.

Anyone who has already been propagandized and educated but doesn't go along must be smashed quickly in order to avoid exposure.

We must apply the code of fire [th'o'a kd'a'v] to the people and push them mightily hard to do their work [p.40]. There was no need to let them rest or study. They would work even at night, so they would be drowsy and exhausted and unable to make any work progress.

Make the people afraid of state power, that is afraid of cadres and afraid of the organizational discipline. don't given them any room for maneuver. Every time they stir, accuse them of liberalism.

By lax and indulgent with our own people (organizational links). With those you know be forgiving and understanding, and connive with them in the work.

In sum, arrange state power such that it comes to belong entirely to us by sweeping out the good people, either by smashing them or transferring from from their positions and putting them in subordinate ones.

On contact with the Yuon.

This year we already have a high degree of contact, as we have been to see their party representatives in Ha Noi. Then they appointed a permanent representative to us. the only problem remaining now is the technical arrangements. Concretely, both their representative and us have a radio for daily contact.

In the Zones the same contact as before can be continued because zone work has its role to play serving those zones. For example, the Southwest, which has had contact with Teu Kam, must continue that contact.

Once Ph'e'um had finished his two presentations, the quorum began a further discussion. It was a fairly animated discussion.

Nh'e'um raised the question of what Ph'e'um thought about the constant diminution of our strength this year, both in the city and in the countryside.

Everyone was of the opinion that those who had been unmasked were all people who were not absolutely determined to fight, hesitators who when they were supposed to make a coup were not absolutely determined about it and made wrong force assignments.

Another thing was that the forces set up in Batdambang had not been given clear instructions. They therefore were so happy that they became shameless and began having a wildly good time, not thinking that they might be exposed. We know that all around us are a lot of good revolutionary people and cadres whose behavior is unlike ours. Now this mistake of ours is an experience. We must deduce something further from this experience, but it was something unavoidable.

Phoung asked about contact with Viet Nam, whether it constituted a loss or a gain. Comparatively speaking, it could be said it was as if we were already dead. Why? Because we were not keeping up with the popular revolutionary movement. If we had something reliable to fall back on, like Viet Nam, [p.41] it could be quite helpful to us for a lengthy period to come.

Vi asked: The contact with the Yuon this time was very grave. We had not even the least bit of independence. So once we were liberated, how would we set things up.

Ph'e'um said that was right. It would be better than the way we were living now with independence. Our friends know that our strategy once we are liberated we will set up a Kampuchea that is a satellite of the Yuon, that is a member of the Indochina Federation, that allows Viet Nam to set up war bases in Kampuchea.

On the appointment of a Military Committee.

Ph'e'um was the Chairman.

Nh'e'um was the Vice Chairman.

Si, Sae and Vi were the members.

On the reorganization of liaison links in the countryside: they would be appointed according to the current administration.

In the Southwest:

Sae, Chairman;

Chea, Vice Chairman;

S'o'k, member.

In the West:

Si, Chairman;

Seuang, Vice Chairman;

R^an, member.

In the East:

Ph`e'um, Chairman;

Phuong, Vice Chairman;

Lin, member.

In the Northeast:

Li, Chairman;

L`a'v, Vice Chairman;

Ch`a'n, member.

In Kracheh:

Yi, Chairman;

(Deputy Secretary for Mondulkiri), Vice Chairman

In Preah Vihear:

(H^ang), answerable to the bureau

(Ph`e'um), directly

On the City:

Nat, General Staff, Phnum Penh;

Ch`e'n H`o'ng, Commerce;

Say, Industry;

H`o'k, Energy;

Kr`i'n, Kampung Saom port.

They were to make contact with their old link, namely Si.

On the problem of mutual contact. It had to be arranged via the radios currently in use, but using slightly different call signs, different hours and separate encoders and decoders.

After having made the arrangements regarding contacts, Ph`e'um pronounced the meeting closed victoriously. The meeting lasted two days and a night. After it was over there was a sumptuous banquet.

On my way back I went on to meet Sae in Kampot. I gave him an oral

report about the results of the meeting. He didn't yet express an opinion. He only stressed that he thought it was correct and very productive of Ph'e'um to have gone to Ha Noi and made direct contact with Le Duan, Giap and Truong Chinh. Our contact up to now had been only at the zone level. It didn't seem like we could count on that for troops, because the Yuon would be considering us merely at the zone level. Teu Kam's status was similar to that.

That Ph'e'um can now make direct contact with Th'u'n is a very good thing, because Th'u'n is also a member of the Yuon Centre.

In early 1977, my illness caused me greater and greater misery. I was getting frequent hospital treatment in order to keep track of the disease because it was so agonizing. At asked Paen what he thought would happen with my disease. He shot back with the question what the Chinese had had to say when I went there. I said I didn't know, I had just done as much as I understood. When I heard Paen's words about what the Chinese had said when I went there, that made me feel hopeless, that there was no hope because in Kampuchea there weren't any other doctors. Think about it. I was angry and I walked out of the hospital. I wasn't going to be hospitalized there again. I went to stay at the Zone Commerce, and whenever the pain came on, I rushed by car to have the medics give me some treatment.

One day I was in great pain, and I telephoned to K^a-7 asking them to telephone P^o-17 April in order to request a Chinese doctor to treat me. But 870 said this was impossible. Doctor Sat or Paen could come to treat me. It occurred to me that I had probably made an error as regards the action line.

One day I met Brother Number Two at Bureau 401 (the Zone Bureau). I reported to him on this matter, and I proposed that if Paen didn't want to treatment, I suggested that I go abroad again, in order to have a gallbladder operation, because I felt pretty slighted by the what Paen had said.

Brother Number Two asked me to wait while he went at it was discussed.

Because I couldn't stand the pain, I gave in and rushed to the hospital, regardless of whether Paen wanted to treat me or not. I requested another X-ray of my gallbladder, and it showed that the strongs completely blocking the duct, and that my bile had gone thick. At was at that time that Paen decided to do an emergency gallbladder operation.

I was quite please to here that I was going to be operated on and get quick relief. However, Paen was of the opinion that it wasn't certain that I would be cured. Sometimes even after the operation one could get dizzy. The dizziness didn't have anything to do with the gallbladder.

When I heard this I vacilated. But I decided to risk the operation to remove the stones.

[p.43]

As regards my illness, it occurs to me that I harassed the Brother higher-ups and thereby annoyed them a lot. First I would propose one thing and then something else. This made it difficult for the problems to sort

out my problem, which is one thing. I also observed that the Brothers provided me with a lot of medications.

And I was given a lot of leeway as regard the hospital regulations on rest and recreation for someone with a disease of the nerves. I was allowed to go wherever I wanted.

Two important problems that arose while I was ill, and things which I did which I thought were correct, were:

While I was ill I rode in the best cars, such as Mercedes and 504s, all the time.

At the same time, I had a female medic with me wherever I went, namely You.

I ceased thinking about the action and morals lines. I just said whatever I wanted to anybody.

In mid-February 1977 I went into the hospital for the operation. At that time I met a lot of others who were hospitalized as well.

I met Vi of the Northeast. He was exhausted and he came for a day's examination.

I met H^ang of Preah Vihear, who at that time had also come to be hospitalized. He and I examined a lot of problems, especially things that had happened since we had parted. When he met me he checked everything I had, leaving out nothing. He took a photograph of me taken in China.

I asked about the work in Preah Vihear Sector. He replied these days there was nothing for me to be scared about. He had raised the red banner high and was waving it vigorously, moving ahead quickly in production. And what about contacts with the outside? He said there was currently good contact with the Khmer Sar near the Thai-Lao-Khmer border. He was maintaining and protecting a squad of them for use as couriers running back and forth, or to be used as forces of my own. They included some "mai houk" as well.

On the fashioning of forces, H^ang replied that things were pretty difficult for the compatriots in Preah Vihear. Therefore he took only relatives whom he had brought with him from his district, and he had been able to build up some strength through them.

Close to the time of the operation, Ms Sei, Chairwoman of the 17 April Hospital, came to see me in her capacity as the responsible of the hospital. She asked about my health and my strength and vigour, whether I could be operated on. After she had finished making her inquiries, I asked here what her original name had been. She said it was Tiv S`o'phan. She asked my back why I had wanted to know her name. I said I had wanted to clarify how many relatives Tiv `O'l currently had. [p.44] She replied that there were three brothers and sisters: Tiv `O'l, Tiv S`^a'nt`i'pheap and Tiv S`o'phan. She followed up by asking whether Tiv S`o'phan was in some sort of trouble. I said I didn't really know. Sei expressed her opinion that if S`o'phan was in some sort of trouble, I should be lenient. When I heard her say this I knew that Sei was protecting her younger sibling-in-law, who Sei knew had links. I hypothesized that Sei also had links, the links of her husband, Tiv `O'l. We just talked that much, and

Sei had to hurry off somewhere else.

I met Sei for the first time only when I was hospitalized at 17 April. I had never met her before. I had heard it said that during the five-year period she had lived in the liberated bases, that she had been Women's Chairwoman for Sector 15, and that she had been the Chairwoman of a hospital in the Special Zone, but I had never known her.

While I was hospitalized, she paid a lot of attention to me. Before the operation I asked her to come speak alone to me and my medic (Euan), and said that in this operation the person in political charge must really do their duty. Technical skill was one thing. Sei suddenly expressed her opinion that I should believe and trust that she was very careful with every cadre for fear that there might be negligence.

On 3 March 1977 I went in for my operation. The wound healed over the next 20 days. During this period I didn't meet anyone because I was in quarantine.

It was also April 1977, and I had still not seen any sign at all that my group was implementing the 1977 plan. The outside and the inside had vanished. I was so edgy I wrote a letter to Ph'e'um. He replied that the Yuon army was on its way from the north, but had not yet appeared. He didn't know whether there would be fighting by the middle of April or not, but he would pass on the news later. Things were currently pretty hard because he didn't know how to arrange his forces as he didn't know what their overall plan was, whether they would act first and where they would act later.

This was normally the way things were if one counted on somebody else. So all that could be done was to strive to endure it.

Then I received a letter Sae had sent to me once he had already gone off to Siem Reap. He said he had made the arrangements for liaison with Teu Kam before he had left. It had been turned over to Chon, the Secretary of Touk Meah district. If I wanted to know more, I should go and get in touch with him.

After I got this letter from Sae, I began contemplating [p.45] arranging further contact with Teu Kam. I put this off until later because Ph'e'um's side had already put this into motion.

I took care of my wound for another month, during which I didn't dare to travel for fear that the wound might act up again. For this period, I was taken care of by four medics: You, Kh'a'k, Li and Euan....

Therefore on the 17 April 1977 holiday I stayed at home. I didn't go around doing any propaganda or join in any ceremonies anywhere.

Before the holiday, I implemented the 1977 plan. I arranged for the troops to practice on the occasion of the holiday, opening the way for them to train beforehand for several days on the pretext that that were going to welcome the second anniversary of the national independence holiday. The training was at Longvek. Plentiful eating was organized. The troops were very happy because they had never trained like this before. On the holiday, they performed their shows, which were fun in nature as well as a little bit revolutionary.

At that time Seuang asked what was going on with our plan. I said it seemed they hadn't all arrived yet, and that's why things were so completely quiet. Now, however, it was necessary to rely on ourselves to some extent. Seuang said he had now selected two companies of special forces composed of pure infantry.

Then Seuang and I discussed Kampung Seila. Seuang reported that in Prey Nup the troop forces that had been dissolved and gone among the people had become as one flesh with all the new people. However, those whose opposition was modest and reasonable weren't in any trouble because they were not being seriously exposed. Anybody who was exposed was removed and put aside somewhere.

In order to create some harassment in the district, Seuang had assigned a few rude types to burn down four or five houses in Thmar Bang, and this would be continued.

In thmar Sar there was still a group of dacoits who were currently stealing tubers, paddy and rice and killing water buffalo almost every day.

In Sre Ambel, there were still some persons of high rank. Today there were two majors expert at infantry....

[p.46]

As regards the destruction of paddy in Prey Nup at the end of 1976, it reached 80%. Only a little bit of paddy was left. Therefore there was going to be a shortage of hundreds of thousands of more th`a'ng of paddy, something with which everybody would have to live.

It was my opinion that Prey Nup district had to make sure it established firm contact with Kah Tral because if there was any trouble, contact would have to be made. The person responsible for Kampot district found somebody over in Kah Touch to make the contact.

On contact with all the forces having contact

I went to Kampugn Saom after Prey Nup. Kr`i'n took me to his house up on the mountain. He didn't want me to remain at the port. Kr`i'n seemed to be trembling with fear about this contact with someone who was not his organizational link (this is from observing his attitude).

He asked me whether I needed paddy. I said there was no need, as it seemed that the harvest was better than last year's. Then he said it seemed the current internal situation for the most part seemed to be one of the emergence of more and more unmasked people who were in strong opposition. That was why there always seemed to be one person disappearing after another. From what he knew a lot were gone in the municipalities, such as doctor S`o', Chh`a'n, Naet, H`am, etc.

He was always scared, petrified with fear that he might have to abandon his wife and children. That was why he didn't dare to do anything contrary to his organizational assignment, and all he did was to exert efforts at his work.

I asked him how things had been with Long Botta at Ta Khmav after we had joined that organization together. He said he was always joining things in order to save himself for the time being, "begging for peace and

to be spared for now". I asked him then why he had been so active and hardworking when he got to Amleang. He said he had observed the overall atmosphere was like that there. However, now the atmosphere was similar[?], and he was very happy with national construction.

Hearing what Kr`i'n had to say hit me as if I had lost part of my body, because I could see that I had now lost one member. I knew his personality very well, that he was someone who didn't want trouble and just wanted to survive. He would go with whatever the strongest stance was. This was the way he had been since the beginning. It wasn't something recent.

I asked him how many forces he currently had. He said these days he'd never been able to fashion any. Rather, others would build them up and send them to him. So currently the forces included B^an, H^an, Saut and San, who had been forces for a long time.

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Today they were as one flesh. They were simply back to being brothers and sisters. They were not part of any organization. [?]

I asked what about the future. He said as far as he was concerned it was "all I want is peace and to be left alone". He didn't want to take on anything more than that. I said there's no such thing in the world. There's no neutral world. Neutrality was merely a policy. But there were only two stances: one side being in absolute contradiction with the other. He said that was right, but if one ducked things near and far one could go on for a pretty long time. In the in I took my leave of him to go back to Kampung Seila that afternoon.

A few days later, H`o'k suddenly appeared in a jeep from Kampung Saom and meet me in Veal Renh. He was on his way to Route 3, but I intercepted him and called him into my bureau at the foot of Veal Renh.

Once we were sitting comfortably, I asked him how things were going with the fuel factory. He said he didn't know when it would ever be finished, now that there had been that big storm. Everybody was petrified because they could see one disappearance after another. There were reasons for these disappearances, but given such disappearances, you never knew when your day might come.

I asked H`o'k what kind of contacts he currently had in Phnum Penh. he said these days the only contact he had was with the competent ministries, and he had contact with them only about work....

The ministries with which he had contact were:

Commerce (R`i't and Ch`e'n H`o'ng);

Industry (^An and Say, although he had never met ^An, he frequently met Say because Say was on duty at the bureau).

I asked him whether he had ever met Nat at the General Staff. He said he would see him once in a long while, whenever he came with Pin to make contact about fuel.

I asked him how things were with all these people nowadays. H`o'k

said from what he could see all of them were keeping quiet. When they met they mostly talked business. Only Ch'e'n H'o'ng would bring up the old days, and Ch'o'ng Y'i'n. He missed the oldtimers his same age. [] He missed the good times at Sector [] 33 Commerce in Angkor Borei.

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I asked H'o'k how he himself was these days. He said today he was stilling acting in accordance with the stance he had had from the beginning. He wasn't afraid. He had his ministerial job to do and could make contacts. Nobody could say anything about this. The important thing was that he could go to any ministry or department to make contacts about fuel because they all used it.

I asked him what was then happening these days with Kr'i'n. He said as far as he knew these days Kr'i'n was no longer engaging in any activities other than his work at the port. H'o'k said that Kr'i'n had said to them that all he wanted was peace and quiet and to be left alone. There was nothing else he wanted.

If that were the case, didn't it seem like things were hopeless, or what. H'o'k said maybe they were hopeless and there was no way forward. I asked whether there was anyone else in his group who might come to the fore. H'o'k saw them as just about the same. There wasn't anybody to be found. He was afraid things would regress if someone wasn't found soon.

I expressed my opinion about Kr'i'n that H'o'k should keep an eye on him and continue to educate him further, because he was an old comrade with whom we had been in the armed struggle together and who was also a studier like H'o'k.

I was of the further opinion that I wanted to ask that in Phnum Penh city H'o'k take on the responsibility of making sure that regular contact was maintained with Ch'e'n H'o'ng, Say, Nat and Hou, who were members of this group, and I added Sek alias Chh'u'm, at the cement factory.

I would like to recapitulate the assignment of the group in the city.

In the immediate term it was to try hard to fashion a lot of strength among the male and female youth and among the children.

Be inactive in day-to-day work or wreck the work that individual group members were doing.

Be sure of having a concrete grasp and keeping practical track of things in their ministries and departments.

Educate small children to know every last bit of the urban geography in order to make it easy for them to guide in combat forces in the future, if they were assigned to do so.

Incite lively moral impropriety among male and female youth.

It was suggested that they please try hard to expand their strength in every ministry and department and factory where we did not yet have forces.

Finally, I promised to provide H'o'k with 30 children to be taken and

educated and held in reserve for use in the days to come.

H'o'k asked me where he could find me on a regular monthly basis, and if he were to send letters instead where he could send them. I stressed that I would tell him later about regular monthly meetings. Letters could be sent via the Zone Commerce bureau in Phnum Penh, but he would have to know how to counterfeit the envelopes, putting the name of one ministry one time and another ministry the next.

After H'o'k got in the car, I asked him to help me find some welding irons at the cement factory from Chh'u'm and send me some, because I was suffering a serious shortage of them. H'o'k said OK and then he went off.

In June 1977 P'a'l invited district and sector cadres to an expanded Zone conference.. This conference was held in Chamkar Daung (Speu). I did not attend, but I stayed in a big house maybe 50 meters away. Brother Number Two suddenly showed up. P'a'l invited him to present his opinions to the conference. Brother Number Two proclaimed a presentation on the current situation in the conference. As far as I can remember, he added one core duty, namely revolutionary vigilance to resist the activities of the CIA, KGB and lackeys of the Yuon. His elucidation was that the meeting of the Party Centre early in the year had only put forward two core duties. [??] Now another one was being added. When he came back to my place, I was chatting with Brother Number Two and said that in the dharma whatever was given the chief place was chanted in that place. Brother Number Two pretended not to hear. Now if you say that the item ahead of all others is heightening revolutionary vigilance, then this would certainly be chanted first.

After Brother Number Two's instructions, I gave instructions that there be an examination of our cadres in the districts and the cooperatives, in particular of those who had not reformed. This was because the instructions said that those who hadn't reformed had not done so not because they didn't understand or know better. Rather, it resulted from the enemy's subtrefuges and designs.

At was at this point that a number of other good cadres were removed. For example, B'u'n, the Secretary of Amleang subdistrict, was removed and put at the bureau. M'a't, the Secretary of Veal Pun subdistrict, was removed and put at the bureau. S'a'n, the Member for Veal Pun subdistrict, was removed and put at the bureau. Ms 'O'n, the Secretary of Kreang Chek subdistrict, was removed and put at the bureau.

In June 1977 I went again to see Ph'e'um at Tonle Bet, after receiving a letter from him. Upon arrival the two of us had a discussion about the situation inside our country. He reported that now the Vietnamese had done some invading in [p.50] Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri and on Route 7. This was in order to draw the attention of the powerholders to these places, and once that was done they would take the delectable places over here.

They had sent down ten divisions, not including zone and sector forces.

I asked whether we and the Vietnamese now had parallel plans already or not. He said not yet. I suggested that there was a very proper need for a detailed mutual plan as regards combat tactics, which places would be attacked first and which later, how and where they would come in. This

matter should urgently be put to th`u'n. It was most important whenever the division commanders met. At that very moment a courier arrived inviting the Kampuchea Military Standing Committee to attend a meeting to decide on a detailed military plan between Viet Nam and Kampuchea.

Upon receipt of this letter, Ph`e'um assigned a courier to go urgently to get Nh`e'um. One day and half a night later Nh`e'um arrived. That afternoon they travelled to Smach, where there were a lot of cadres waiting there to receive them. I would like to clarify that the Command Committee invited to attend comprised only Ph`e'um and Nh`e'um. I was unable to go because riding in a car from my home to Tonle Bet had already resulted in my wound acting up a lot (it began to throb with pain). Ph`e'um was understanding. The critical thing was that I was dizzy and couldn't sit through a meeting. I laid down to wait.

The meeting lasted for three days and three nights, and only then did they come back.

On the Detailed Plan for Military Attacks (30 June 1977)

I. The strategy was to attack and smash the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and capture Phnum Penh.

II. The Concrete Tactics for the Attack.

A. Use undercover agents and spies to come in and carry out reconnaissance of important places.

B. Employ border security forces to carry out incursions first.

C. The places to be attacked:

1. Along Route 7 all the way to Suong, Tonle Bet and Kampung Cham (Phnum Penh); liberate Chhlaung and Boeh and make them into reliable bases.

2. Enter via Steung village and make it into a reliable base.

3. From Kampung Chak cutting directly south.

4. Chantrea, Ta Ei, and Thlok, heading for Svay Rieng (and heading for Phnum Penh).

5. Sector 25, heading for Phnum Penh.

6. Kah Andet, Kampung Chrey (Takaev).

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7. Along the Lok and Kampung Trach road in Kampot.

8. Prey Nup and Veal Renh, heading for Kampung Saom.

D. The forces to be used in this combat:

1. One division along Route 7; one division to liberate Chhlong and Steung village.

2. Kampung Chak: two regiments.
3. Chantrea: one and a half divisions.
4. Sector 25: four regiments.
5. Kah Andet: one division.
6. the Lok road: one regiment.
7. Prey Nup: one regiment.

There would also be a number of reserve forces on Kampuchean territory.

E. Kampuchean forces

- The Northwest Zone would attack and make sure it reached Kampung Chhnang.
- Preah Vihear would attack and make sure it reached Kampung Thom.
- The naval forces of Division I would go into combat at Kampung Saom.
- Division I stationed at Longvek would use special units to attack Phnum Penh from behind.
- The forces that were along the spearheads of the Vietnamese attack would be assigned to guide the Vietnamese into Kampuchean territory along each and every one of these spearheads. These comprised the troops of Kracheh, the East, Sector 25, Kampot and Prey Nup.

F. Means and material to be used in the movement of troops.

- Ships and large boats must be readied along the Mekong and Bassac Rivers to the greatest possible extent. Barges.
- All the vehicles existing in Svay Rieng and Prey Nup would be collected.

F. On Food and Ammunition Supplies.

- The maximum amount of food supplies must be readied for the Vietnamese army. The places to which they would be supplied were Phnum Pneh and other places where it would concentrate.
- The ammunition in existing Kampuchean dumps must be readied in advance so that there would be no shortages. We would wait and settle the accounts after the war.
- Prepare ships to move material from Viet Nam up the Mekong River to Phnum Penh.
- Get ready of aircraft to insure large-scale from Prey Nokor to Phnum Penh.

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III. Counterpart tactics.

- Use Soviet Mig aircraft to bomb important targets (positions of the Communist Party of Kampuchea; ammunition dumps; important ministries and departments).

- Kampuchean urban forces.

- Must rise up and cooperate with the invasion of Phnum Penh to the greatest extent possible.

- They should destroy in advance essential material for use in a war, such as gasoline and kerosene.

IV. On the Establishment of an Overall Command Committee for the Kampuchean Battlefield

- Vo Nguyen Giap, Chairman;

- Ph'e'um, Vice Chairman;

- Nguyen T'a'k Y'u'ng, Member (permanent)

- Nguyen D'e'k Th'u'n, Member (politics)

- All the Division Secretaries; altogether nine persons.

- The Headquarters was fixed at Suong (the Rubber Plantations).

- The meeting took place on 30 June 1977 under the auspices of Vo Nguyen Giap, at Tay Ninh.

After the plan had been read, all three agreed entirely on the policies and practices contained in this plan. Nothing was added, abbreviated or expunged.

However, there was one problem: when would it be implemented, and how would this information be known.

On the problem of the reestablishment of forces resulting from the transfers of cadres from one place to another by the Organization in the recent period.

Most importantly there was the Southwest, where Sae, who had been in charge of important duties at the Zone, had now been transferred to Siem Reap with S'o'k along with a number of other cadre forces who had followed them there. Therefore this one place was now a void.

So now how were assignments going to be made, with Chea alone left in the Southwest. I suggested the following assignments:

Chea, Chairman;

Yeuang, Vice Chairman (currently at the Sector 35 Worksite);

Saom Chon, Member (the Secretary of Touk Meah district).

A problem requiring thought was that a new Secretary had been transferred into Kampot, namely B`i't. The troop command was also new. Therefore the army did not belong to us. We therefore had to close off this exit by transferring the leaders somewhere else.

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Then there was the appointment of Sae, who was over in Siem Reap, with:

Sae, Chairman;

S`o'k, Vice Chairman;

H^ang, Member.

This was the North Zone (Siem Reap, Utdar Meanchey and Preah Vihear.

I proposed that on his way back, Nh`e'um go into Siem Reap to disseminate the plan to him, so he would know about it too.

For my part, upon my return I would see Chea and be taken to see Yeuang and Chon in time to give them their assignments.

I reported to Ph`e'um that one force in Kampong Saom had now been lost, namely Kr`i'n. He was now asking just to be left in peace and quiet, and he was no longer putting anything into forward motion.

As for Phnum Penh Municipality, I had assigned H`o'k to take charge of the duty of being chairman of a team to do education and make proper contact among themselves in every ministry and department. This was because it was fairly difficult for me to go into these places, find shelter and people. [?] Therefore I had left it to the youngsters who could more easily make regular contacts among themselves.

Finally, it was suggested that we use our own radios for liaison, but that we could only do this if we changed our names and location and major signs. Otherwis, things wouldn't get done in time.

I then returned safely home.

Upon my return, P`a'l came for a meeting of the Zone Standing Committee in order to put forward the policies to be carried out in the future. At that time it was decided to convene at the school on 2 July for a time, and invite cooperative cadres to study. Brother Number One also came and presided over the opening of this session. The study session lasted for three days. I wasn't in constant attendance because I was unable to sit. So all I could do was to lie down outside listening. I occasionally attended the meals, but didn't see people every morning and evening.

After this session was convened, a series of follow-up sessions for cadres and even the people began....[?]

In August 1977 an incident erupted at the Mo-99 detention bureau, where Chap N^am was chief. In this incident, counter-revolutionaries inside rose up and broke out of jail, escaping onto Kammuolbey [?] mountain (Veach Kong [?]) in order to make it their reliable base. The number who

escaped was quite large, more than 200 people. They took 16 guns. Chap N'am was shot and wounded in the leg as a disguise so that he could stay underground for a long time more.

[p.54; original pagination: ?98]

In this period, I went to see Chon, the Secretary of Touk Meah in order to ask for his opinions about contact with Teu Kam. He said ever since the day that Sae had gone, there hadn't been any more correspondence.

I hypothesized that Teu Kam was certainly hanging with the plans of his superiors and had met with them over there. I expressed my opinion that we should now arrange our links so that it was easy for them to go right up north. There was no need to set up a lot of intermediate stations, because we had motorcycles and they could run fast. What kind of person was the motorcyclist taking letters to Chea. Where was he from. Chon said he was someone who had been with him for a long time. Was he a relative of mine?

However, I proposed that if the letter was from Teu Kam, it be put inside another envelope, and they should wait and send it to me. No one should see that it was a letter from the Yuon.

Another thing was that I wanted to arrange for a second inside liny by footpath, so that in case the honda route was cut off, there would still be another route. Chon said he agreed. Was it possible that Chon could have somebody go from there to Sre Knong, and then on from Sre Knong further. It should be possible. He would simply take somebody from Sre Knong....

I then asked him how many forces he presently had, from the last several years. He said he hadn't built up very many separate forces, that most of them were right in the subdistrict state power. This was because they would go along. And currently he wasn't thinking about this, but just doing it through the state power. The orders would go through it. I said that was perfectly acceptable, that there was no need to fashion strength in any other way.

However, in addition to these, there were also forces to whom he was personally very close, who would be willing to die with him. [Follows as list mostly of subdistrict secretaries and deputy secretaries, as well as cooperative cadres].

[p.56; original pagination 199?]

Chon then told me that there were a lot of people whom he knew but were not systematically linked up, and asked what about them. I asked whether he was in contact with them and could find others. He said he had never asked them anything.

I then talked about Chon's new duties. Now that Sae was transferred to Siem Reap he had to replace Sae in this location.

Take charge of contact with the Yuon Teu Kam. If there was any correspondence, he would have to be able to sort it out immediately. He therefore could open the mail and send it to me.

Together with Yeuang and Chea he was in charge of the duty of leading the entire Southwest Zone. I asked him whether he knew Chea. He said he had known him in 25, and that they had studied with each other often. And what was going on with Yeuang these days. He said he might already be over

the hill, that he was completely inactive.

I then wrote a letter to Chea in Sector 25 saying that now that Sae had been transferred out of the Southwest Zone there would have to be a reorganization. I made it clear that the previous assignments had made Sae the Chairman, Chea the Vice Chairman and S`o`k the Member. Now only he was left, and he was the Chairman, with Chon as the Vice Chairman (the Secretary of Touk Meah district), and Yeuang as Member. I said I was writing in the name of Ph`e`um.

The current duties were extremely weighty. The Yuon army was going to come up through Sector 25 all the way to Phnum Penh. Chea's units would have to lead the way for the Yuon troops so they would reach Phnum Penh. He would have reckon on food and water, ships and boats and fuel for them. If any of this was unclear, something could be brought to make in the future for clarification. And I was having both Chon and Yeuang come to might him right there in Sector 25.

[Describes a visit to Ms N`a`n and asking her to come visit him in Speu.]

[p.56]

I returned to the Bureau and rested there. I let Kh`a`k and Li go study medicine at the 17 April Hospital according to the hospital's schedule. Only the medic You and Ms Seng, a former medic, were left. It was at that time that I got fresh with Seng, a 24-year-old virgin and in the end did morals with her, telling her that was enough so that she was no longer revolutionary, and she had no choice but to follow me.....

One day I went to the Baribau Agricultural Site, which was the place where the Zone was experimenting with the growing of broadcast paddy and hemp. I went by Landrover because it was easy to put a folding bed in there to lie down on. I took the medics and Ms S1`o`k with me. S`o`k was somebody with whom I had already been vilely immoral a lot. This was so they could treat my nerve disease, which was causing me greater and greater misery. The important thing was that when I lay down I would get woozy. If the medics helped with massage, I could get to sleep very quickly.

To sum up, wherever I went, I for the most part took young women with me on the pretext that they were cooks and medics, especially when I was ill.

One day Mo-870 came to work for a time. A number of problems were discussed. Upon arrival Brother Number One about the requisites of the work that was to be done, which was that Tazhai was going to come on a tour soon (in November 1977). I was requested to arrange for him to tour Kampung Chhnang. After a concrete plan was put forward, I went to a meeting with Sar`u`n, R`an and P`a`l to let them know about this plan.

My view when I heard that Tazhai was going to come to tour my zone was that it was a very precious honour to be receiving him. So I worked day and night, going everywhere. This was in contradiction with my illness, which kept causing me pain (most critical was the food poisoning that resulted from the weakness of my nerves). However, I wanted to receive such a guest as Tazhai. How should this be sorted out. My feeling [ideology] was that I would fight so that I could get through it this one time. However, I also told Sar`u`n to stand by in case I collapsed, then

he could take over and continue.

Concretely, when I received him, I was ecstatic, and forgot to think about Brother Number One, V'a'n and Von. I walked right up in the front row, even in front of Brother Number One. The words I spoke were not those appropriate for a revolutionary leader. They were not diplomatic or politic (discourteous). For example, as soon as Tazhai had only gone down to look at the paddy and the paddy fields, while he was still worn out from the train trip, I nevertheless immediately requested his friendly advice. At that juncture Brother Number One laughed.

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In taking Tazhai to inspect the mat-weaving and pot and pan-making cottage industries, I was anxious on behalf of the cooperative cadres who were not so smart about welcoming guests and didn't know how to present gifts. That was why I had to compel them by grabbing a nice mat that a young woman had woven and handing it over to Tazhai myself because I was over-excited. Once I did it I knew I had made an error because no still or movie film was taken.

While escorting the guest on the train, I made absurd boasts during my presentation to the guest about my Zone. I said a lot of things that were preposterous.

After having received this guest I was ill again because in receiving him I had overexerted myself. From then on I never recovered.

In December 1977 there was a meeting of the Standing Committee. It was convened on an expanded basis up top. I had to go because P'a'l was hospitalized, and the guiding opinion was that there was no need to invite him. So only two of us went from the West Zone: Seuang and myself. The agenda for this meeting comprised a report on the battlefield, the counter-plan, and any other business.

I listened to the reports from the Southwest, Route 7, Ph'e'um's spearhead, Kampung Chak, chantrea, Ta Ei-Thlok, Prey Veng, Kah Thom (Sector 25), Kah Andet, Kampung Trach, Ha Tien, the ocean, and Kah Kong.

My impression was that on the battlefields where there were those who belonged with me there seemed to have been laxity and weakness, and the Yuon had not been fought powerfully, or if they had hung tough, they had hung too tough, like in Ratanakiri. At Ang Snuol[?] the Yuon had penetrated deeply. And where Ph'e'um was fighting, the resistance had not been strong. Where things appeared to have been strong were the places right where the General Staff was, at Kampung Chak, Ta Ei-Thlok, and Prey Veng. In Sector 25 the Yuon had been able to penetrate deeply. In Kah Andet the Yuon had also been able to penetrate deeply, but in the end it had been possible to drive them back out again.

As for over at Lok and Kampung Tralach, in B'i't's places, things appeared to have been very powerful indeed. The Yuon had been drive back all the way to Ha Tien.

After hearing this report, I thought to myself what had happened to the detailed military plan of the Yuon and Kampuchea (counter-revolutionaries); where had it gone to? When the evening rest came, I walked over to see Ph'e'um, who was sitting on a bench, and asked him about

this. He said he was speechless because these guys hadn't done what they said they would at all. He said that if this was the way it was going to be then it was another defeat. The 1977 plan hadn't succeeded, and neither would the 1978 plan.

Moreover, by coincidence, he had been ill at that time with an irritation of the stems leading into the lungs [roliek tong suot], and had been [p.58] been hospitalized for more than a fortnight. However, he had instructed Sat, the commander on duty on the spot that in counter-attacking not to strike too hard, that he hold off until he came back from the hospital. From what he could see what had happened was that liaison links had broken down, because ever since he had been hospitalized he had ceased receiving news from Th`u'n and from his troop commanders. The only way now was to get out of the hospital immediately. Otherwise this time a very serious defeat would be sustained, and who knows when we could recover.

I said I understood things the same way. I asked him to please go quickly and sort out this problem with Th`u'n, and in particular with Giap, to the greatest extent possible.

I said that as far as this problem was concerned, he should wait until he got out and went back and then go right there in order to be sure of the situation and how to recoup.

It wasn't until evening that Nh`e'um arrived. That night there was a break from six until seven when the movie was shown. During it Ph`e'um, Nh`e'um and I sat on a stone bench and discussed a lot of problems.

Nh`e'um asked now what was happening to us. Why were there always these faltering fits and starts. If it was going to be futile, we might as well stop. Ph`e'um responded to Nh`e'um's question by saying he was ill all the time for more than a fortnight with some sort of irritation of the throat and breathing passages, and that he had not yet fully recovered. Nh`e'um said it sounded like nothing and he would get better and better. He asked where the situation was now. Ph`e'um said they had attacked into the country already, but they had not deployed their troops right because they had lost contact links with him for more than a month. Therefore they hadn't had anyone on the inside to give them intelligence about where they should make their entries and whether they should come through with and lot or a little. Concretely, these poor guys on the outside don't know where Kampuchea is currently strong and where it is weak. Therefore in coming all over the place the way they did, they didn't even win where they should have, and the places which were tough became even more impenetrable.

Nh`e'um said if things were thought out right there wouldn't be any victory. It was therefore necessary for Ph`e'um himself to go quickly. This minor little disease could be treated later.

The next morning we were back in the meeting. We were now onto any other business. The quorum decided that Ph`e'um should leave the hospital and go to the battlefield for the time being in order to make work arrangements, especially on the battlefield.

It was when Ph`e'um returned to the battlefield that I went along with him.

Sitting around one of the tables that noon was a group of people who were ill and couldn't eat anything greasy, including Ph'e'um, Khiev, myself and V'a'n. I said this time when we attack the Yuon let's attack them to create a new border, because previously they did not recognize our territory or border either.

Another thing I said was that when I heard the Yuon radio use the word Indochina my ears just went deaf with ringing, just like they were dissatisfied with this word. I put forward such phrases because at that time the atmosphere was one of fighting the Yuon. I therefore wanted to make it appear that I was also disgruntled with the Yuon, too. In fact, the rear battlefield was in unity with the front battlefield. [?]

After the meal, everybody left to travel home, and everybody was in a hurry.

Ph'e'um was of the opinion that I had to be a little bit circumspect about going with him because Von and Pok were on the battlefield as well. I said it was up to him to decide whether I should go or not. He said I didn't need to go now, and it would be easier if I didn't. There were be a lot of difficulties if I went.

I admonished him to do his work quickly so that things would be known, because it appeared to me that the situation was very difficult. I asked him please to send news back quick.

A week later a long letter came back. The contents were that he had already met Th'u'n and Y'o'ng and discussed things with them, and it had turned out that things were they way he had hypothesized.

1. Troops had not been deployed right because they did not grasp the terrain as they had no clear intelligence from the inside.

2. They didn't know where Kampuchea was weak and where it was strong, and in particular they didn't know how Kampuchea was going to counter with its troops.

3. It had also proved impossible to resolve routine problems, such as rice, salt and food to go with rice.

Ph'e'um [?] consoled them as follows. The current Kampuchean blocking forces comprise:[?]

On the Ratanakiri battlefield: one division;

On the Mondulkiri battlefield: more than one division;

On the Route 7 battlefield: one division;

In the Steung Sector: more than one division;

At Kampung Chak: one division;

At Ta Ei-Thlok: one division;

In Prey Veng: two regiments;

In Kah Thom: two regiments;

In Kah Andaet: more than one division;

At Lok market: more than two regiments.

Of all these battlefields, Ratanakiri, Kracheh, Steung and Kah Thom belong to us. [p.60] All the rest belong to Kampuchea.

Upcoming measures.

Use large-scale forces to enter into Chhlong and Boeh and make sure to take this place as a reliable base in advance and in order to resolve the problem of food supplies and food to go with rice.

Steung village was a place that was a base belonging entirely to us. Please come in here quick, and don't put it off for a long time.

Take these two places and points of deep penetration in order to be able to surround from surround. That would be good.

At Kampung Chak, Kampung Ro, and Ta Ei-Thlok it was necessary to use troop strength to strike quick and hard at the units of the General Staff so that they would be unable to move. They should be surrounded so they couldn't run away, and then we would use force to hammer our way right into Phnum Penh.

In Kah Thom use mainforce units and special units to come in via this route, because it would be easier than Svay Rieng as it was closer to Phnum Penh, and if we used a moderate amount of elite forces, victory was certain.

The forces at Kah Andet and Lok did not belong to us. Therefore there had to be strikes from front and behind in order to make sure that one sector or another was liberated.

There was no need to go to Prey Nup because this was not an essential problem.

Y`o'ng and Th`u'n agreed to these military measures and were content to deduce experiences from December 1977. These measures would be taken in January 1978.

I was to take in these measure and write up a copy of them for Nh`e'um and other comrades. At the same time I was to be ready to implement them properly, such as in Sector 25.

Ph`e'um said it was maybe the next day that he would come back to meet the Standing Committee in order to make a full report to the Organization about his battlefield. If I had any business I could write a letter to East Zone Commerce. Then he was going to go back into the hospital for an examination and to get medication that would cure him once and for all.

When I knew that Ph`e'um was going into the hospital, I also made a trip to have another examination of my nerve disease. In fact, I just wanted to see Ph`e'um and discuss things with him. I spent the night in the hospital so that the medics could take a blood sample. The next morning

I had a general physical.

It was that night that I see Ph'e'um again. We had a discussion lasting several hours, and we only rested after it ended.

The problems raised were:

[p.61]

1. The attack potential of the Yuon army.
2. Our strength in every zone and sector.
3. Counterpart tactics.
4. A number of technical matters.

From the illumination we have from previous discussions it is apparent that they have sufficient technological and scientific capability;

- In terms of fighting troops that they currently have, both in numbers and technique;

- In terms of war material of all sorts, which appears to make things hopeful;

- Their weakpoint is that they are very reliant upon us. If it weren't for us, they couldn't make a go of it.

2. On our strength in every zone and sector. The troop strength belonging to us in the zones include: the East Zone, Sector 25 and Prey Nup, along the border. In addition to this we have those in the interior, such as the Northwest, Siem Reap, the North, Preah Vihear, and the special units of the Longvek unit.

3. Tactics for counterpart attacks.. From the discussion that day with Y'o'ng and Th'u'n it appeared that we didn't figure on tactics for counterpart attacks at all because we were so preoccupied with thinking about purely military matters. Only when the military couldn't make a go of it did envision that there were existing forces not being used.

At that point Ph'e'um brought up the problem of tactics for counterpart attacks, asking what we thought.

I said I would go along with whatever he envisioned. I felt like I was fresh out of ideas, because everything we had done in the past had failed. Why didn't he try to think of something this time. Ph'e'um said there was nothing to worry about. All one needed to do was to grasp the weakpoints of Brothers Numbers One and Two with regarding to eating and drinking. If one wanted to know something about this, one could only go to P^ang and have him report on their strong and weakpoints as regards sleeping, walking about, standing, sitting, eating and getting dressed. This was because P^ang was somebody who had belonged to us for a long, long time, but it had not yet been the right time to make use of him.

I said I would like to express my opinion that in war it was moreover necessary to know the strong and weakpoints of your enemy. It was therefore necessary to obtain precise political, military and economic

intelligence about it, about its routine deployment of forces. Only then could combat be launched. If one went into combat without being clear on these matters regarding the other side, one would not be victorious in combat.

I therefore requested that Ph'e'um give this clear-cut assignment to Seuang (P^a). He could do it, because he had done it time after time already, and [p.62] he had always lived with the highest level leading committee, as his contacts were always at the highest level. Someone at my sort of level wouldn't know these sorts of things.

Ph'e'um agreed and said this would have to be properly arranged. From that day on, Seuang (P^a) was linked with Ph'e'um.

According to the policy put forward, Ph'e'um assigned someone who cooked for them to find a poison to smash Brother Number One, because ever since the inauguration of a battlefield in which the Yuon were fought, Brother Number One had been making an effort to go to the East. He would go to Ph'e'um's place or to Ch'a'n's place, but more often to Ph'e'um's.

Therefore he would inevitably succeed in poisoning him. Having discussed just this much, we went to sleep. The next morning after a blood sample had been taken, I went back home.

I would like to clarify with regard to Seuang (P^a) that the reason why he was not organized through his ministry like everybody else [?] was because most of his work was secret. It was not desirable that a lot of people know who he was. Then he wouldn't last long. [?]

In the period of the arrest of Kaev Meah, Ya and T'u'm, I went to work there, and while talking with him I blurted out something inadvertently, asking him why he hadn't gone somewhere with the others, because I was certain about his links. However, at that time he replied that someone like him would never go anywhere. Only the bad types were going.

In the subsequent period he continued to correctly fulfil the same assignment of reporting to Ph'e'um, but it wasn't unbroken. Most vitally, he did when there was combat inside or outside the country.

In January 1978 there was vicious and severe fighting between the Yuon and Kampuchea along the border all the way from the triborder area to Kampot. When I heard about this it made me feel good. The places where the fighting was slack included Route 7, Steung village and Sector 25. The other were tough, like Kampung Chak, Kampung Ro, Prey Veng, Kah Andet, Lok, etc. This combat involved armour and air support, and that's why deep penetration of Kampuchean territory was possible. When we heard this news we wondered whether the plan might succeed, or were they just fighting to keep afloat while waiting for something to happen. [?]

At that point I instructed Chea (in Sector 25) to make a big hole so that they could get in quickly, so that their troops would not be worn out. This would accelerate their movement towards their objective while they still had stouthearted forces, so that they wouldn't be broken in time.

After a fortnight of combat, the Yuon army hastily withdrew. [p.63] Therefore the plan to invade Kampuchea according to a detailed military plan seemed to be totally defeated. On hearing the radio speak of this, I

still didn't lose hope in the Yuon. I hoped they would succeed with this plan (1977-78). I still could not ascertain the reason for the withdrawal of the Yuon army. I was waiting for Ph'e'um to be invited to make deductions from this experience.

However, according to some informal news, when they came in this time the Yuon had been able to take possession of quite a large number of people, including those who had escaped after them and those who had been seized. It was maybe almost ten thousand people. My hope was that those seized by the Yuon would be the future cadres for the administration of a new Kampuchea.

Thereafter, there were occasional incursions through until the end of January 1978, but they weren't powerful. Before that armour was coming in 20 at a time, but after that only ten would come, and then the number kept being reduced until none were left. I still had hope in the 1978 plan.

On around 20 January 1978 a letter from Ph'e'um appeared inviting me to come see him in order to discuss the failed 1977-78 plan. When I saw him he gave me a presentation on the reasons for the defeat of the detailed military plan (that of 30 June 1977). There were a lot of reasons for it.

1. The most important thing was that the Party, people and army of Kampuchea had been steadfast in powerfully resisting the Vietnamese army, which had been unable to advance very far in its invasion, and which in some cases rushed to withdraw.

2. The Vietnamese army banked on its armour and artillery. Once the armour was no longer able to advance, and most critically once some armour was in flames, the rest pulled back.

3. The internal forces had been unable to stand up because the opportunity did not arise and it appeared their their strength was not solid.

So despite the armour and artillery, the offensive could not advance.

The Yuon army only get a very small amount of sustenance from the people. Only one or two people were fond of the vietnamese. Except for them, all anybody could think of was to abandon their homes and escape into the forest.

As far as food supplies were concerned, according to the instructions Chea was supposed to make rice available, but when the time came to provide this suppor to the Yuon army, he dodged into hiding and didn't act.

[p.64]

These we our own experiences. He hadn't yet been to see the Yuon, and he didn't know what deductions they might have made from their experiences. The important thing was what the plan for the future would be. I then returned home.

On 2 Febraury 1978 a conference was convened at the Longvek garrison to sum up the work of 1977. Brother Number One also attended. During the three days of this conference, I was so ill I could hardly endure until this Zone conference was over.

During the evening meals and breaks, I always talked a lot to Brother about various problems. Once I asked Brother to clarify whether it would be possible or whether it would entail losses if the radio made broadcasts to the people about the Yuon design to set up persons belonging to it such as Achar K^ang, Chey Suon, etc. Brother said this couldn't be done because these were our internal matters.

Speaking about the reasons why the Yuon had been able to come and plunder paddy and rice and seize some people, I said I thought it was because we had been a little bit careless. Like M'o'k had said, the guns from those who had been disarmed had all been put into storage. When the Yuon reached Kampung Chrey there were no troops. By the time troops could be organized, they had almost gotten Takaev.

Brother said that was not right. When they came into us, we had already attacked a good distance into them, almost as far as Tay Ninh. But then they concentrated a big force and gave us a hammering.

I said that along the border, such as in the Southwest where there was a big canal to act as a barrier against Yuon penetration, that would make things pretty easy. And we wouldn't have to use very many forces for patrolling, either. Brother's opinion was that in other places where there wasn't a canal, things were simple for us too: we would just go deep into their territory, deep inside.

In Brother's presentation, there was reference to the leadership in the Zone and talk about whether the action line was effective or not. At Peam Sedtha the way the people near the road were arranged was not good, not correct. They were doing a lot of work and getting few results, expending a lot of assets but getting few results. At that time I felt humiliated by these errors because I wasn't involved in the particulars of each aspect of the work.

After the conference closed, Brother went to Batdambang. He had been extremely vigilant while he was attending this conference. He didn't let any of my folks get involved with his food or drink. His people did it all. I was always hanging around waiting to eat with him. All my side did was find some vegetables and other food to go with rice for him. The serving was all done by male youths belong to Brother. There were no male youths of mine. It was therefore tough to find an opening for the plan to poison him. [p.65]

I would like to stress that during the discussions with Brother, he asked about the water at Kah Bau (the dam in Kampung Leng district). He wanted to know how things were going with the water, whether there was enough or not. I replied that it wasn't sufficient. At the same time I also made some attacks on the Central Zone. The Central Zone was always asserting that it had a lot of land and water and rice and looking down on those down below. But one couldn't even ask for a day's water. Over at Trachit[?] in District 18 (Lower Kampung Tralach) even now contradictions were still being constantly created. They were stealing water buffalo and firing off guns to scare the children and take oxen. I asked Brother to please help sort out this problem because when I tried to talk with Pok we didn't get through to each other very much, and each time we see each other upstairs, I would chit-chat with him a lot, but then we would try to exonerate each other.

When we inaugurated the Zone Agricultural School (in February 1977)

at Kampung Luong, I had expounded that we should exert every effort to educate other other to know everything there was to know about agriculture, so that we would gain a lot of experience, get a good paddy yield. However, if we did not know what we were doing, then we wouldn't be able to get a good yield. The way I talked put technology higher than the leadership of the Party. This made those studying their vainglorious about the Agricultural Technology School at Kampung Leng.

During this two or three months, I agonized a lot about my final plans, because the implementation of all the other plans had ended in defeat.

During this time I was ordered by Ph'e'um to make absolutely sure that I found and bought poison sometime in early 1978 because our plans for attack from the outside were being defeated every step of the way. I gave instructions to H'o'ng the Chinese at Commerce in Phnum Penh to find and buy some poison from abroad.

Later I again went to see Ph'e'um at Tonle Bet in order to discuss what was happening with the 1978 plan, in particular as the 17 April 1978 holiday was again drawing near. It would be here next month. Ph'e'um expressed the opinion that it seemed like this was going to be on us too soon, that we just couldn't keep up as the pace went from one to the next. [?] I said this was something we had to live with, and asked him what he thought the solution was.

Ph'e'um's opinion was that our affairs were related to those of the Yuon. If we wanted to lay down a plan, it could only be after he had seen the Yuon, only then could things be resolved. There was no way we could sort it out alone, because we had no idea what sort of plan they might have now. [p.66] I said it was now about time they met, not to leave it too long, or it may be after the month had passed. Ph'e'um had a courier go see Th'u'n. A letter requested a meeting with the Kampuchea Battlefield Command Committee (30 June) in our to deduce the experiences of the invasion of Kampuchea and discuss the upcoming plan. Th'u'n replied this would have first to be put to his superiors. It was not until ten days later that a letter came back with the reply that we were invited to a meeting on 20 February 1977 in Tay Ninh. Ph'e'um sent me back home, saying that he would let me know later what had happened. [?]

On 22 February 1977 I received a five kilogramme package, and when I opened it I saw it was poison for poisoning my superior and subordinate cadres. I arranged for it all to be sent down to the grassroots through Zone Commerce in Phnum Penh, where Ph'e'um was in charge. I held on to 1,000 of the pills, but I don't know where Euan kept them.

On that same day I received a letter from Ph'e'um saying he wanted to see me on 1 March 1978, and that it was important that I meet him at the West Zone Commerce in Phnum Penh. I was to make sure proper arrangements were made at the venue. We would be mighting for no more than about an hour because at the same time he was going to be meeting with the superior Standing Committee, and he was taking advantage of this opportunity to spend some time working with me.

On 1 March 1978 I waited for him from the afternoon until after dark. It wasn't until eight o'clock that he arrived. He came by jeep and when the jeep parked at Commerce, Ph'e'um came into the house that I had arranged.

He then began transmitting the final plan of the Labourers' Party of Kampuchea. It would not be transmitted to all members at once, but rather to each of them one at a time because the timing was not favourable. So Ph'e'um would be travelling here and there to see people, until he'd seen them all.

The Last Plan

1. The current overall situation was favourable, because along the border Kampuchea and Viet Nam are in contradiction and fighting each other. This creates a non-peaceful atmosphere along the Kampuchean border.

2. As for insdie Kampuchea, there is today a contradiction between the people and the power holders who are imposing a rigid and severe set of standards on a people who don't comprehend them and whose level of consciousness is not yet up to them, and who are shoving them into a position of antagonistic contradiction, that is by accusing them of being enemies of the revolution. They are arresting them, putting them into re-education or smashing them with impunity and without compunction.

As for us, we currently possess a sufficient combat strength comprising people, troops [p.67] and units of bureaucratic organization and all ministries and departments.

3. On the forces to be employed in coordination during the invasion, mostly vitally military forces.

- Friendly forces (Yuon) that would come to assist us in the liberation of Phnum Penh would comprise in total perhaps three divisions, viz.:

- One division entering via Route 7.
- One division entering along the road in Svay Rieng.
- One division entering via Sector 25.

This was a mininal use of Yuon troops, something which was a deduction from the past experiences in 1977. However, the material used must be really modern (small but effective).

- Our troops comprised five divisions, counting only the East and West Zones.

- Tactics for military invasion.

- On 14 April 1978 the friendly and Khmer troops along Route 7 would travel by boat headed for Phnum Penh. They would travel along the National Route and then down the Mekong.

- In Svay Rieng a number of forces would have to be employed to hold off the units of the General Staff encamped in Ta Ei-Thlok and Chantrea, and a division would then move and make sure it reached Phnum Penh.

- In Sector 25 (Kah Thom) a division of troops must make its way to Phnum Penh in boats and ships or by road.

- On this day the forces in all the other zones, such as the Northwest, the North and the Northeast, etc, must have an agenda for spearheads along which to attack.

4. Complementary Attack Tactics.

Complementary attack tactics must be employed in tandem with the military invasion.

1. On the poisons which Ch`e'n H`o'ng had been assigned to buy and had now be dispersed everywhere. Ch`e'n H`o'ng himself was to assign a young woman about 30 years old in the Social Action Ministry to make sure this poisoning job was carried out, because she had access to Brothers Numbers One and Two's place. Ch`e'n H`o'ng had already done this job by handing over the poison to this young woman so she could mix it with other medications....

[p.68; original pagination: ?12]

2. Set up a special unit to smash both Brothers while they were walking, sleeping, eating or at rallies. These forces would be drawn from the troops of Seuang's Division I. They would comprise one battalion and be infiltrated into Phnum Penh starting now. As for weaponry, they would have to use pistols and grenades, and if grenades ran out, they should go get some from the General Staff, from Hou's ammunition manufacture material place.

These troops would be given guidance to important places when they infiltrated by persons in each ministry or department.

H`o'k at Energy.

Nat and Hou at the General Staff.

Say at Industry.

Ch`e'n H`o'ng at Commerce.

And the guide behind the scenes at 870 would be Seuan (P^a).

The objectives of these attacks would be to smash Bureau 870 and the military material of the General Staff and to make sure of capturing Propaganda's radio.

5. On Kampuchea's Weak and Strong Points.

In the city, Kampuchea had some very weak points. There were no important positions at all. There were only all these factories where there were workers who had no guns. There were no problems here.

6. In case of victory or defeat.

The strategic objective was to aim at smashing the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and making sure that Phnum Penh was captured, and then setting up a new government with the name "Democratic Republic of Kampuchea"

However, if it was impossible to capture Phnum Penh, then we would

have to make sure to take the east bank of the Mekong from Steung Treng all the way to Yuonland.

And if it were the case that it was also not possible to take the east bank of the Mekong, then the troops would have to be led into the maquis, falling back on the Yuon border, and then carrying out ambushes and guerilla warfare inside Kampuchea until the objective was achieved.

7. After the victory, the establishment of Kampuchea as a Democratic Republic affectionately devoted to the Yuon must be proclaimed.

- A member of the Indochina Federation.

- A war base of the Yuon, who could put Yuon troop garrisons anywhere.

The time for the implementation of this plan is to be 14 April 1978.

[p.69]

8. On ammunition dumps.

Two dumps were prepared then, belong to the Zone, in the East: the ammunition dump at Chhoe Kach, or an additional one at Tonle Bet set aside for the friendly troops so that they would easily have enough for their use.

In the West an arms and ammunition dump was prepared at Longvek. There was enough ammunition in this dump to ensure that the friendly troops had enough. The ammunition most in demand was rounds for AKs and CKCs. Other types of ammunition were not problematic.

9. On rice caches. In making this war it would be necessary to be able to sort out having enough rice. The requirements of our friends were the same as before: there would have to be a solution that ensured they had enough rice. The people of the East would therefore have to guarantee a solution to the rice problem that would successfully produce good results.

They must prepare caches along Route 1 all the way from Svay Rieng to Neak Leuang, along which there were quite a few, such as at Trabaek, Kraol Ko and Neak Leuang.

Along Route 7 there were the caches at Tonle Bet, Prek Po, Rokar Kaong and all the way to Prek Ta Meak. All of these caches already had rice ready in them.

As for the West, it had very little paddy. Making preparations was one of our duties, but they would be carried out according to what we had available. The paddy granary at Kampung Luong was milling a rice reserve all the time in order that there not be a break in supply.

10. Political strength. While the military forces were attacking from the front, the people living in places abutting directly on Phnum Penh from the west, such as in Sectors 32, 33, 35 and 31, must rise up in disorder and march in procession into Phnum Penh so as to be there by the time the army entered it.

- Concrete programme.

- Sector 32 must assemble people from every district - Ponhea Leu and Udong - and then together they would march in procession into Phnum Penh. Their slogan would be: "Long Live the New Kampuchea! The Kampuchea of the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea!"

Sector 35 would march into Phnum Penh from the south in order to demonstrate that the strength came from every direction. This procession would march into Ta Khmav.

There would be a march from Sector 31 as well, but it would only have to go from Kampung Chhnang to Udong.

There would also be a march in Sector 35, but this march would take place only within their own province.

[p.70]

13. All the Forces That Were to Carry Out and Make a Success of the 1978 Plan

- The ambush unit forces coming from Seuang's troops have gradually infiltrated and gone underground in Phnum Penh with the status of visiting relatives.

- The 30 children that I requested as forces to be turned over to P^ang were already given to him at the end of February 1977. The only one among them whom I had educated was named T`o'ng. I hoped that T`o'ng would educate the others in turn.

- As for the forces in the city (I had an agreement with H`o'k that he would give me a precise report by the end of March 1978 because it had been a long time since he had made one, and I had never asked any questions. It was only on the day (in December 1977) in Veal Renh that I had assigned him to do this, had told H`o'k to make reports on the forces in Phnum Penh.)

I knew the chiefs:

1. H`o'k at Energy and Chh`u'm alias Sek at the cement factory.
2. and 3. Nat and Hou at the General Staff.
4. Say at Industry.
5. Ch`e'n H`o'ng at Commerce
-

On the forces in the East.

Ph`e'um never reported to me systematically about his forces, and it was the same for other places like the Northwest, the North, the Southwest, Kracheh, etc. I only had contact with the chiefs:

1. The East

11. Ph`e'um, the Zone Secretary;

12. Phuong, State Rubber Plantations;
13. Lin, Zone Member;
14. Kh`o'em, Secretary of Sector 21;
15. Sat, political commissar of the Zone Regiment.

2. The Northwest

16. Nh`e'um, the Zone Secretary;
17. Kaeo, on permanent duty at the Northwest Bureau and the Deputy Secretary of the Northwest Zone;
18. K`^a'nt`o'l. Sector 1
19. R`i'n, Secretary of Sector 5 (come in from the Southwest), a Si link from 1969.
20. Ph`al, Chairman of the new Division (come in from the West), a Si link from 1968.
21. N`ov, Commissar of Regiment 160, a Si link from 1968;

....

In the New North Zone

26. Sae, Zone Secretary, a Chey Suon link from 1950;
27. S`o'k, Zone Member, a Si link since 1968 (current assignment unknown);
28. Leap, Chairman of the Zone Bureau, Sae link since 1972

....

In the Northwest Zone and Kracheh

31. Vi, a Kaev Meah link from 1958, currently Zone Secretary;
32. Ch`a'n, a Kaev Meah link from 1956, currently Zone Member;
33. L`a'v, a Ya link from 1968, currently Zone Member (deceased);

....

Yi, a Khuon link from 1969 (Secretary of Kracheh)

In the Southwest Zone

35. Chea, Secretary of Sector 25, a Ph`e'um link from 1956, currently under arrest;
36. Bau (f), Secretary of Kien Svay district, a Ch`o'ng link from 1954 (still in place);

37. Saom Chon, Secretary of Touk Meah district, a Si link since 1966 (currently still there);

Sector 35

.... [39-60]

[p.72]

Forces in Sector 33

.... [61-79]

Sector 32

.... [80-123]

[p.73, p.74]

In Kah Kong Sector

.... [124-156]

In Sector 31

.... [147-186]

[p.75, p.76]

Addendum to Kah Kong Cadres

.... [187-196]

Bureau 401

.... [197-248]

[p.77, p.78]

Forces in Division I`

249. Seuang, a Si link since 1958 (currently Secretary of the Division and of Sector 37, too)

250. Veuan, a Si link since 1968 (currently Division Deputy Secretary stationed along the ocean)

....

253. Euang, a Ha Noi link since 1970 (Division economics cadre)

[254-261].

In sum all the above forces were core forces in their units of organization at each of their respective levels and in the army. There were a lot of other forces among the people outside.

For example, the division had a force of almost 6,000 people.

For example, the Zone Bureau also had a total force of almost 6,000.

14. On the Setting Up of Contact Links. When the plan was to be implemented and make to succeed it would be necessary to assign couriers who could make solid contact with each other, so that no one would be separated from anyone else.

1. Between zones it must be possible to use our radios for regular contact, but we would have to make new call signs, not to transmit at the times currently used by the State and the Organization.

2. Couriers would have to be assigned to make solid contact from zones to sectors, going back and forth without any breaks.

....

[p.79]

15. On the Signals of Victory and Defeat

In implementing the 14 April 1978 plan, every place was to listen to the radio to find out whether it had succeeded or failed. If it was victorious, then there should be a radio announcement appealing to all forces to rise up and defend the country. If it was defeated, there would be no radio signal.

By the time Ph'e'um had finished transmitting this final plan, it was midnight....

The next morning, after my discussions with him, I went to Sector 25 to see Chea and Bau at Kien Svay in order to convey the plan, and the assessment was that had had a lot of potential for success.

I went around conveying this plan to every sector and district that were to be involved in its implementation, that is in Sector 25 and Sectors 32, 37 and 31, in the Bureau, and, via H'o'k, in Phnum Penh municipality.

This went on from the 2nd right up through 26 March, which is the day on which I was arrested right in Phnum Pnenh.

I would like to report to the Communist Party of Kampuchea on my moral improprieties from the time I began making revolution on.

[p.80]

[lists incidents from 1951 through 1978, including six between 1975 and 1978]

....

In addition to this, as regards the organizational line vis-a-vis young women, I liked to have young women around and employed them as medics, cooks and to do all other kinds of work.

.... my report is complete as far as my memory of my behavior that was contrary to the political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, in terms of morals and ideology, for many years now.

In sum, I betrayed the Party's political line from the very beginning on until I have done this life outlook session, only after which I realized that I had made a lot of mistakes vis-a-vis the Party, the people and the army.

[p.81]

The most important reason for this was that me and my group have implemented a lax and permissive Party line, which is the stance of a Labourers' Party (Viet Nam). and the work of CIA agents.

.... the Communist Party of Kampuchea which has the Brother Secretary (Pol Pot) as Chairman

FILENAME: CHOUCHE.T.003

"The Contemptible SI = Poison"

"Passed On to the Organization in Three Volumes (Copies?) (Together with One Original)"

6 April 1978

SI says he would like to report on his plans to murder the brother leaders of the Party.

SI says that every since liberation on 17 April 1978 he he had the traitorous idea of smashing the two BROTHERS.

1. March 1976. SI invited the higher up BROTHERS to a lesson drawing study session at Chbar Mon on the 15th, asking the at those in the Standing Committee of the CENTRE help with their opinions. In fact, SI had taken up the plan from PHEUM and the CIA that also involved his personal antagonistic contradiction. A bodyguard was supposed to shoot them. On the 15 March, BROTHER NUMBER TWO came to participate. Everybody was happy because this was the first time a higher up had participated. BROTHER NUMBER TWO had the venue searched for guns and weapons and even went to look himself. He refused SI's invitation to take a rest outside, and in the place where he rested he blocked the bathroom and front doors. SI had the bodyguard executed to cover his tracks.

In May 1976 the Zone held another conference at KAMPUNG CHHNANG, but as it happened SI was not well and did not participate.

In February 1977, the Zone Conference convened its early year session to examine past work and draw experiences. SI invited BROTHER NUMBER ONE to participate, and the plan was to poison him. BROTHER arrived on 2 February 1977, and his combatants searched the location. The wife of BROTHER NUMBER TWO served the rice. and asked everybody to leave the place for a while. Everybody was ordered out of his resting place as well, so the plan failed again.

At the end of 1976, SI had asked the Overseas Chinese "CHÈ'N" Ha'NG at Commerce to get him some foreign poison by February 1978, after which they split up. There was a pass to go to KAH KONG to look for more forces to bring into the city.

In April 1977, SI organized and another study session, to study model districts. SI invited BROTHER NUMBER ONE to preside and he came. The session was at SPEU. When he arrived he moved his resting place from the market to inside. This time SI tried to poison him personally. (Others who attended this session included Pà~, SEUANG and RÂN.) However, he didn't eat what SI had poisoned.

In mid-1977, SI stopped at the Ministry of Commerce on his way from KAMPUNG LUONG and met Ri'T and Ho'NG there. Others there told him that a lot of items purchased from abroad had come in, and now there was anything one might want. A few days later Ho'NG came to see SI at his place at CHBAR MON. SI told HONG the way in was via BROTHER NUMBER TWO's wife, because BROTHER NUMBER ONE knows that she loves and protects you more than anyone else because you made a place for BROTHER NUMBER TWO to live during the political period. Moreover, the wife of BROTHER NUMBER TWO often goes to the 17 April Hospital for treatment, so HONG should go there to convince her of the skill of his doctors so that she'll allow them to get close to her.

On 25 February 1978, SI received a letter from HONG saying the poison had arrived. SI instructed that it be distributed to the following:

- | | |
|--------------------|------------|
| 1. EAST Zone: | PHEUM |
| 2. NORTHEAST ZONE: | |
| 3. KRACHEH: | |
| 4. NORTHWEST: | Rl'N |
| 5. NORTH | SAE - So'K |
| 6. SOUTHWEST | CHAE |
| KIEN SVAY BAU | |
| CHHOUK | PHÂN |
| KAH THOM | PHEA |
| 7. WEST | |
| | RÂN |
| | SNGUON |
| | Ro'AT |
| | HONG |

In PHNUM PENH the poison was distributed the Chinese nurse(s) serving the

FILENAME: CHOUCHEZ.004

Chouchet alias Si

"IV. From 17 April 1975 to 26 March 1978"

[71-page handwritten document dated 20 May 1978; scanned from typescript which provides middle section of Chouchet.001]

PHEUM said now they should accommodate with the CPK, work hard to cover up their bad history. SI also met with NHEUM to feel him out about whether he could get some tractors to do paddy farming. NHEUM said go ahead, and then gave him some.

Then the meeting divided the Zone into two. North of ROUTE 4 was the WEST ZONE. South of the highway was the SOUTHWEST ZONE. SI was put in charge of the WEST ZONE as its Secretary. He wondered to himself what he would do, as the WEST ZONE was a poor one with not such good land and few people. How

could it become as plentiful there as elsewhere. No matter what he did the land wouldn't be like that of BATDAMBANG and KAMPUNG THOM. He was very worried about the problems he would have with national construction.

After the meeting was over, SI went back to the Office. He made his best effort to arrange for dividing things in two, whether people or material, with MOK. This was on the initial occasion.

Then SI went down to PREY NUP district, which was still not properly arranged. Most importantly, the people who had come out of the town had accumulated in large numbers there. There was therefore a big shortage of rice and other foods. Moreover, there was a situation of much dysentery.

When he got there he could see how obvious the shortage of rice and the chaos were. He asked the Sector about this, and it said it no longer had any possibilities to resolve things because it had been issued with only a ten day ration and therefore didn't know where it could look now.

SI asked NHOEK and PON how they were thinking of sorting things out. NHOEK said the only way was to go to the town and see NHAEM to make contacts to borrow a bit at a time for the moment. SI went and met KRIN. He asked his opinion and it was the same. KRIN said he would put a lot of effort into making things easy about rice because he had understood both of these Sectors for a long time now. He had made efforts to collect war booty rice (? and send it to KAMPUNG SEILA and KAH KONG.

SI asked him now that they were experiencing shortages how he was thinking of helping them. KRIN said in the prevailing situation there was no shortage of rice, that it would arrive at any moment. All that had to be done now was to make a deal with NHAEM, who was in charge of the State Warehouses.

KRIN had somebody summon NHAEM, who SI now met for the first time. SI asked him whether he could lend out some rice ration as an advance because of the severe difficulties in PREY NUP.

NHAEM said it wouldn't be any problem to get an advance loan of rice for the Sectors where things were most desperate, and that it could be repaid gradually by taking something out of future rations.

SI returned to PREY NUP to join with NHOEK and PON in sorting out arrangements for setting up teams, groups and cooperative quickly.

At that time CHHÀ'N came to report that he had met VINH AN and agents of the Soviet Embassy in PHNUM PENH Achar SÀ'NG and THÀ'CH KÈ-M SÀ'NG. They wanted to reestablish links with the Organization. SI went separately to NHOEK to advise him to smash them because they had no insider links at all. This was in order to cover up SI's own tracks. However, for some reason NHOEK was tardy in smashing them

At one time there was a meeting of the CENTRE about ameliorating things with the Yuon for a period in order to go and resolve the tension resulting from the KAH VAI and border matters. BROTHER NUMBER TWO came to see SI during a brief break and said that TEU KAM said a number of his persons were still in PREY NUP,

including VINH AN, Achar SANG and THACH KEUM SANG. SI said they were indeed there, and BROTHER NUMBER TWO said to send them to SAE so he could turn them over to TEU KAM. SI agreed and wrote a letter to NHOEK saying to send them over.

In June 1975 SI travelled to BATDAMBANG to ask NHEUM for tractors. On arriving in KAMPUNG CHHNANG he made an assessment of whether it would be possible to grow broadcast(?) rice in the soil there. His assessment was that it appeared it would be possible on many hectares, that the time still had not passed.

Upon hearing this SI moved over some 30 troops from KAMPUNG CHHNANG and set them to work in the fields plowing with tractors. He took ten of them with him to BATDAMBANG.

Upon arrival in BATDAMBANG, SI stayed at the faculty house and met KAOE, who took him on a complete tour of the school. He said there was no lack of any sort of war booty in BATDAMBANG, that it had more than anywhere else and SI could get anything he asked for. SI said the only reason he had come was to ask to see NHEUM to request tractors with which to plow paddy fields. KAOE said NHEUM was far away, at THMÂ KÔL, and that KAOE would send someone to summon him.

Meanwhile the driver and two women couriers collected a carful of war booty, including electrical generators and various consumer items. The next morning NHEUM arrived and asked SI how many tractors he wanted. SI said 10 or 15, and NHEUM said that he had just given the Organization 10 a few days ago. SI said he had seen them being driven along the highway pulling trailers full of rice.

NHEUM said SI could have just ten, which would be collected from near and far. He said he was doing this out of sympathy, that otherwise he wouldn't give any, if it weren't for the fact that they had known each other for such a long time, since way back in 1955. It was also in line with the implementation of the plan for long-term infiltration of the CPK and because SI's Zone was the poorest of them all. He said if some efforts were not made to do broadcast(?) paddy, then there would be no easy solution. This advice excited SI, who expressed his determination to NHEUM to go all out to restore the economy and make it a place of comfort and plenty.

Then VÀ'NH arrived. He gave SI a presentation about post-victory BATDAMBANG, saying a lot of war booty had been seized. VANH told SI that if he needed anything, he should request it from NHEUM. SI said his only reason for coming was to ask NHEUM for tractors. He would think about other material later.

SI went to KAMPUNG CHHNANG to wait for the tractors and to make arrangements for the tractors to go down and do plowing. He was there for about a month.

At the same time, work commenced to put up paddy dikes according to the plan for building up modern paddy fields. In implementing his plan SI deviated (bâmphlai) from the Party's plan by taking a long time to fulfill the Party's plan and by putting up big and tall dikes so that all the fertile soil was taken out of the paddy fields. The putting up of paddy dikes focused on bad locations such as places where the land was gravelly or rocky, doing it just to get it done so that it would look good to someone walking along the highway.

Practically speaking, the paddy dikes put up from BOENG PO, TOEK L'AK, and PONGRO to BARAY in SECTOR 31 were just put up slipshod for appearances sake without any thought to whether they would produce anything or not.

And in SECTOR 32 in ANG SNUOL, AU KREANG AMBEL, the dikes went up only to 50 to 100 meters from the road. Everywhere else things remained the same. Then SI received via SAE a letter from TEU KAM addressed to the two of them. The letter said they hadn't met face to face for more than two months. It reported that in April and May launched a crushing attack to take KAH VAI using big patrol boats and F(?) -111 aircraft to clear away positions, after which half the island was seized. Kampuchea had suffered catastrophically big losses of men and material. However, a withdrawal had now been carried out because Kampuchea had sent representatives to Ha Noi for negotiations about the border.

There had also been a lot of clashes elsewhere, such as in TAKAEV, PREY VENG and SVAY RIENG.

The letter asked SI and SAE to have a firm faith that Viet Nam Viet Nam would would and assist them in their stance of fighting for the construction of a new party which would have intimate ties of affection with Viet Nam like the Party that had existed before 1960.

TEU KAM suggested a face-to-face meeting at KAEP, but said he would need a letter of authorization to give to the naval forces there so that he could get in.

SI agreed to a meeting and wrote to SAE that it should take place at KÂH PÔ. It would be easy to meet there because our army could seize him and bring him over(????) and then there could be a quick conversation after which he could return. This way there would be no exposure, and they could go on the pretext of inspecting the ocean.

After liberation, the Zone Office was put at a spot west of VOAT TANG PO, in PRAMBAY MUM subdistrict, THPONG district, KAMPUNG SPEU province, in the vicinity of TBAENG PHCHO'AP(?) village. SI collected together a lot of young men and women to set up a hospital, sewing shops and dig ponds and put up paddy dikes for paddy farming.

SI then had an affair with a young woman who was chairwoman of the tailors.

In November 1975 SI travelled to KÂH KONG, where he met NÔV+KI of the KÂH KONG SECTOR Regiment. Army representatives were invited to a work gathering. Those at the meeting were: NÔV, a link of SI's since 1964, Chairman of the Sector Regiment; KI, a link of SRÂH's since 1972, Vice Chairman of the Sector Regiment; CHEAT, a link of ON's since 1972, battalion, PHEAP, a link of NHOEK's since 1973, from 37; SEUAN, a link of NHOEK's since 1972, from 37; TONG, a link of NHOEK's since 1972, from 37; and Ms LÂN, commissar of the women's battalion from SECTORS 33 and 35, who came out of Division II.

After listening to the reports, SI felt that KAH KONG and the army could very much facilitate his buildup of forces and contacts with abroad. SI gave advice that all out efforts should be made to ease things well along the border, avoiding any shooting backing back and forth and maintaining contact right up to the commander level.

After this assessment of and meeting with the SECTOR 11 military, SI

returned to the Office.

In early 1976 there was severe starvation in KAMPUNG SEILA due to the plan to destroy paddy and rice. About 89% was destroyed between harvest, threshing and storage. Hundreds of thousands of thà'ng of paddy were needed to resolve this starvation.

Seeing this state of affairs, SI had the idea of turning this place into a political force and base for himself. So he put forward the policy of dissolving the army in the KAMPUNG SEILA SECTOR and sending the troops back to live with the masses. What was important was all the new forces who had come to PREY NUP district.

SI summoned RÂN and SARI to a meeting to discuss this. RÂN was of the opinion that dissolving the army and sending the troops to grasp the new people was a very correct thing to do, which he completely supported. SARI also agreed because his view was that if the cadres only were left to govern these people, they wouldn't win. SI thought to himself that this would really help him to build up forces along the seacoast and in out of the way places.

Then SARI summoned a meeting of cadres of both the military units, the young men's and the young women's units. NHOEK, SARY and SI went to explain things clearly.

It was stressed that it was the army's duty to defend the country, and that the country could have peace as long as the people were silent. It was therefore necessary to grasp the people directly so that there couldn't be any rumblings(?). It was important to go down and grasp the people and educate them from top to bottom so that policies were understood. All these people were pure new people, and if they could be QrasDed iust to this extent. it would be really excellent.

The duties were:

1. To give them political education about the current contradictions in Kampuchea.
2. To give them political education to see what a comfortable future our regime offered.
3. Agitate for immorality among men and women, young men and women.
4. Make an effort to produce a lot, but hide it and report small yields and that there wasn't enough to it, so that some was set aside to support whatever there might be to support.
5. Agitate for theft of tubers, corn, vegetables and poultry, so there would be chaos.
6. Agitate for running away from one team to another, one cooperative to another, so that this would go on without halt.
7. Do whatever could be done to create losses by destroying such material as hoes, knives, hatchets, plates, pots, spoons, clothing, etc.

The commanders of both units happily agreed.

That afternoon the troops of both units were invited by the commanders for a study session about these problems. All of the troops, numbering more than 500, applauded and were very pleased to be going down among the people to produce and defend the country according to their commanders' plans.

The formulation of assignments was that troops had to be appointed starting from group and team chiefs up through platoon and company chiefs, whether in the young men's or the young women's spheres. After a period of such assignments, the people and the troops would melt together into a single

flesh with the same blood. The important thing was that the troops not adopt a hard stance and that the revolutionary side would be dissolved among the new masses (17 April).

Their activities after a period were to include the emergence of robberies and muggings, immorality and hooliganism, people running away from one team to another. There was far more of this than before. There was more and more escaping into the jungle to be dacoits.

In February 1976 the 4th Congress of the CPK CENTRE was convened in PHNUM PENH. The number of participants in this Party Congress was greater than in the 3rd one. This was because there were new members and assisting cadres. This gathering was very meaningful for the formulation of a socialist revolution in Kampuchea. The important items of substance were the passage of a new Party Statute and the basic principle of socialist revolution.

SI's own opinions about the meeting were: he was not angry because BROTHER NUMBER TWO had frequently said distance between ourselves and the Yuon in every way in terms of the party's name and age, etc. In sum, with any lackey's or any colonial's old dirty skin. feel slighted by this. The Party's age out truly to However, SI was a Zone Secretary and a member of the pleased and satisfied.

taken back about the Party's that we were racing to put
-y, politically, economically, we were not to be stuck SI personally did not be calculated from 1960.(??) CENTRE, so he was very

In order to disguise and camouflage himself as someone who was satisfied with the Congress and as already a long-term veteran revolutionary, SI expressed his feelings on a number of questions.

On the implementation of the line of independence and mastery. The experience in the period just past showed that the only way to achieve independence and mastery was to fight to overcome many difficulties and much suffering. Independence and mastery were not things one got for nothing. Concretely, our Party, for example, had been tempered by unmitigated self-reliance in two years of internal political and armed warfare and five years of American imperialism's war of destruction.

Another thing this meant was a fight for all-round construction via giving primary importance to self-reliance.

On the line of collectivism. SI felt that the victory had basically resulted from collectivism because a collective regime was a most solid weapon and something desired by all the young men and women, namely equality, no exploitation of man by man, no ranks or status, no superiors and inferiors, no big shots and small fry. If there were big shots and small fry, maybe the young men and women would not die for it. SI stressed that even he himself was making revolution not to die for any individual, that he would die only for the nation, the motherland and the country.

SIHANOUK was always saying that the communists couldn't take Kampuchea because private property rights were generalized and Buddhism was solid. But it had now won, and an assessment made it obvious that this was precisely on account of the collectivist regime which had penetrated broadly into both things private and religion such that they could not remain in place and were overthrown block by block.

The Congress ended with the selection of the new Central Committee. After the congress, SI met PHEUM and asked him how their situation was developing. PHEUM said it was as if they were being buffeted by the wind. In particular, the direction which the CPK was taking could clearly be seen from what had happened in the 4th Congress of the Party CENTRE, and if things were left as they were, it wouldn't be too long before it became really solid and strong.

In March 1976 SI received an advisory instruction from PHEUM about the coup

plan. It said that PHEUM had decided to have THUCH and YA carry out a coup on 14 April 1976, a coup of a nation-wide nature. This had been discussed in detail in their Standing Committee, in which SI says PHEUM, YA and THUCH played the leading role and were influential enough to decide everything. This coup could be carried out without much bloodshed.

1. A combatant would have to be readied to assassinate BROTHERS NUMBER ONE and TWO on the occasion of the first anniversary rally.

2. Allocate a cook to make sure to poison BROTHERS ONE and TWO.

3. Concretely, assign a combatant from EUAN's troops (troops from the NORTH turned over to the Organization) to carry out the assassination on the occasion of the rally.

Assign a combatant from CHAKREI's troops (a Division from the EAST turned over to the Organization) to throw grenades into the Palace on the occasion of the holiday (17 April 1976) in order to unsettle international opinion (the Embassies in Kampuchea would probably know).

After receipt of these instructions, SI wrote letters about them to NHOEK in KAMPUNG SEILA and telling SEUANG and RÂN and KÂP(?) in KAMPUNG CHHNANG.

On his own SI made arrangements to hold an anniversary rally in KAMPUNG LUONG, gathering some 3,000 persons from the SECTOR 15 and Zone worksites so that they could welcome news of the coup over the radio.

SI had ayà'i and satù'm groups play at this rally so that a good time would be had during the daytime. Most of those who participated in this holiday were new people. When the period from the 14th to the 17th passed without any signal of a coup in PHNUM PENH, SI was discouraged.

Later he heard whispers that a combatant carrying an AK had been seized in PHNUM PENH on the holiday with a bandolier full of ammunition as he was entering the rally. He was a combatant in a Division from the NORTH that had been turned over to the Organization.

To relieve his anxieties, SI made a trip back to SIEM REAP and BATDAMBANG with SEUANG.

He arrived in BATDAMBANG on 18 April 1976, travelling fast because he thought something might be up in BATDAMBANG. He was met and very warmly received on his arrival by VANH. VANH asked him what had happened with the coup, and SI said it seemed to have failed.

SI said it appeared that it didn't seem that a victory could be won through a coup that didn't use force but relied on tricks. There was only one way, and that was to seize power legally. Like VANH, for example, he had now fallen to be Zone Commerce Chairman, which was tremendous. As long as he took it easy and infiltrated long-term, then he shouldn't be too hot-headed. (??)

The next day SI got ready to go tour the BATDAMBANG textile factory, and then to go on all the way to THMÂ KÔL to see NHEUM. He talked a lot with NHEUM about the coup. It was his opinion that there was no point in doing this the same way again and again if always led to defeat. He said just wait and see: there would now be word of arrests here and there. All that had been achieved was that the cat was out of the bag and people were alerted. NHEUM took SI and SEUANG to see the paddy fields at THMÂ KÔL, which

stretched as far as the eye could see from east to west. At that moment, they lost their stance of independence and mastery, and said to NHEUM that when they returned they wouldn't have to even try with just the handful of soil they had. It would be each to his own duties(?)

At lunch NHEUM said he still wasn't finished with these coup-makers: what the hell were they trying to do? If it was made clear that we should infiltrate deeply into the CPK undercover, that would be right and proper. There would be a rethink whenever it came to the point that we couldn't stay with it.

SI said the entire decision to make a coup had been made by just three persons, even though the task was a nationwide one. If things had been done right, there should have been a discussion among every Zone and Sector cadre. They had been too subjective. PHEUM said he would wait and discuss it with PHEUM when he met him and admonished SI to discuss things with NHEUM before doing anything.

After lunch SI was taken to SISOPHON by VANH, but as it happened when they got there Hè-NG wasn't there. The next morning HEUNG suggested that SI go to POIPET to have a look at the border with Thailand, but SI said it was too

HEUNG asked about the coup in PHNUM PENH and SI said it had failed. HEUNG said if it had succeeded, things would have been easy, because people just like them would have been the winners. Things were very difficult now. No matter what the instructions were or what was in our studies, we did things differently, and the young men and women understood this more and more as the Party line was disseminated.

SI's opinion was that they should proceed too much at cross-purposes, but should deviate just a little, so that they could live with things for a long time. HEUNG said that was very correct. He then guided SI to SIEM REAP. There HEUNG had a discussion with SEAN, and then left.

So'T arrived from PHNUM PENH with a very tired face. SI explained to him that he had come on duty to inspect the paddy fields from BATDAMBANG to SIEM REAP. SI said he had come to see ANGKOR VOAT and would be returning the next day.

SEAN said he knew that there had been a coup attempt in PHNUM PENH on 14 April 1976, but it had failed because the combatant assigned to the assassination had been siezed by the army at the rally.

SOT said he hypothesized that a lot of people would be involved in this matter because the combatant detained was one of EUAN's (CHÂM) troops and EUAN had been a subordinate of THUCH's and DEUAN's and even SOT's. SI said SOT was right and would have to take measures, to seize the initiative, and not wait until the floodwaters rose before making a jump.

SI asked SOT whether he had any forces currently in hand, and SOT said he had a regiment of troops and the forces of the state power at the district and subdistrict levels. SI advised SOT to get these forces ready and make contact abroad (the CIA), in Thailand, in case there might be something there he could fall back on.

On his way back SI stopped off at the KAMPUNG THOM guest house, where Ta VAEN was in charge. He asked after Achar KâP and YIM, and SI said they were fine.

A week after arriving back at the Office, SI went to see SAE to find out what the situation was.

At first SI met SAOM CHÙ'N, who he had not seen for a long time. He said there had been fairly ordinary progress. He said TOUK MEAH had the most paddy and rice, but also the greatest expenditure thereof.

CHUN said SAE was having him act as courier for contacts with the Yuon, taking letters back and forth. The contact point was in the HA TIEN area.

SI said it was a bad idea to have just one channel of contact, so he suggested setting another one from CHHOUK to Vo'AT CHÂK, SRÂNG, THNÂL To'TEUNG, from CHHOUK to DAMNAK SNUOL to SLAP LENG to THNAL TOTEUNG. SI had gone to see SAE, but didn't. He heard SAE had gone to CHÀ'N(?)HÂN(?) in TOUK MEAH to sort out the problem of the near breakthrough by the Yuon in that area which had resulted from his having put too many new people there. The Yuon therefore kept on breaking through and seizing land to grow paddy. SAE had collected plows and harrows and tractors to plow this land and get the transplanting done so it would be over with.

That afternoon SAE arrived and explained things to SI, who wanted to know what was going to be done if the Yuon kept on taking more land. He said to let them have it for the time being, to wait and talk it over with TEU KAM. He then handed over a letter from TEU KAM to SI and SAE. The letter said his side was continuing its activities by encroaching along the land, sea and island borders from RATANAKIRI. This was because the negotiations in Ha Noi had achieved no results whatsoever as a result of Kampuchea's rejection of the principle of an Indochina Federation and adherence to a stance of independence and mastery, of not cooperating with Viet Nam in the fields of economy, culture and technology. In overall terms, Kampuchea had discarded the the long-term strategic solidarity between the two countries and turned its back on Viet Nam. The younger brother was opposing the older brother, a small country was opposing a bigger one, etc.

The CPVN had now decided to continue fighting Democratic Kampuchea until the time it capitulated to Viet Nam, was willing to accept the principle of an Indochina Federation, to recognize Viet Nam as an older brother.

TEU KAM asked SI and SAE to trust him and in the Vietnamese view and stance of absolute opposition and determined help and support for them.

After reading the letter SI and SAE discussed whether they should continue their contact with the Yuon further or suspend it for the time being, as things seemed fairly routinized.

SAE was of the opinion that contact was only to exchange news about what the Yuon were going to do. Moreover, contact could easily be made if their side had anything it wanted to convey because the links were already in place. As far as invasion was concerned, it was already understood that if that happened it would be an opportunity for further activities, and if there were no external activities, it would be tough. SI agreed with this opinion, and so contact was further strengthened.

In May 1976 SI went into the 17 April hospital to give blood for a general physical. He was hospitalized for more than half a month. One evening he met again with SOT of SIEM REAP. SI wondered what he was doing there and could see anxiety on his face. He said he was calling on a patient, and

then said he was really trying to find out what had just happened. He told SI he had heard that THUCH and YA had been arrested, and that EUAN (CHOM?) had been arrested, and that this state of affairs was inching closer and closer to him.

SI asked SOT what he was going to do, and SOT said the only way was to do what SI had told him in SIEM REAP: to muster all the forces he had in his personal control and rise up to defend himself using Thailand as his fall-back in order to reverse the previous month's defeat of THUCH nad UA. SI said he should do just that, or otherwise simply run away. SOT then left to go back.

After a month in the hospital, the Organization decided to send SI for treatment abroad, and SI was very happy to see that the Orgasnization was paying him such special attention.

At that point SI returned to his Office in order to turn all duties over to the Zone Standing Committee. He summoned Pà~, SARÙ'N and SEUANG for a discussion. He asked to turn over all his duties to the Standing Committee until such time he was fully recovered and could go back to work. He would give up responsibiity for all matters, big and small.

On 26 June 1976 SI left for Beijing with a combatant medic named BAURà7T(?), th son of AN, Chairman of State Industry. After examination in Beijing he was sent for treatment in Guangdong. There he met with PHEUM, who had gone to Beijing before him, since early May 1976.

They spent a whole day in discussions about various matters.

They discussed the coup of 14 April 1976. SI asked what PHEUM had in mind in putting forward the principle of a coup without discussing it with his confederates below. they had everything _ had left it all to them. SI said NHEUM was tremendously angry ~UUUI ~ was saying that when they had talked about they had said they were going to do one thing, and then they had gone and done something else. SI asked why it had failed.

PHEUM said he had believed THUCH and YA when they said in hand, from the CENTRE's weaknesses to its strengths. He

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t Th i c? n ~

PHEUM said the that it had been because the combatant assigned to do the shooting had been seized by the troops on guard at the rally. Later he had heard that EUAN, THUCH and YA had been arrested. So this matter was going to unravel more and more. PHEUM said he was nevertheless not without hope, and once he got back to the country he would make arrangements to do it with forces of his own. He would certainly win, He wouldn't engage in risky opposition like THUCH and YA. Forces that still remained included CHAKREI and the division of the EAST that had been handed over to the Organization and the forces in the bases of CHHOUK (PREY VENG). SI said to assess the situation prudently and not take risks again.

As for his feelings about the situation in China, SI said he had not yet gone on any long tours, but it appeared from a look at the procedures that things were more relaxed than in Kampuchea. They were progressing in everything: politically they were able to grasp the people, they were able to sort out the economy, and science and

technology were also progressing. Popular production seemed to be carried out gallantly and enthusiastically everywhere. The cadre's lifestyle didn't seem too strict, things were lax enough that they could behave in certain ways. Alcohol was on sale in the cooperative stores.

PHEUM was of the opinion that as far as he was concerned if they got a regime similar to that of China it would be liveable. We were just too strict. If you did just some little thing it was always thought of as a deviation from the political, ideological, moral or organizational line. So one couldn't find a moment for a drink. We were living like a tralach in a prala (). Not like the Chinese, who were a lot more relaxed. If you wanted to drink, you could drink whatever you wanted. We wanted to build up a regime slightly more relaxed than that of the Chinese.

SI said they had to do whatever had to be done in order to be comfortable, and PHEUM agreed.

SI went for nearly a months treatment at the hot springs and then returned to Guangzhou. He received a telephone call from PHEUM in Beijing. He said he was going back to the country the next day. SI asked whether he could go along because he was getting bored being abroad, and PHEUM agreed.

SI got to Beijing that night, but he and PHEUM didn't have a chance to talk because they were too busy being on guard against the earthquake. They didn't get to speak the next day on the airplane either because there was a Chinese woman on it who spoke Khmer. All they did was drink beer all the way to Khmerland.

SI got back home in August 1976. He continued his treatment at the 17 April hospital, particularly his nerve treatments.

SEUANG and RÂN came to ask him about his treatment in China. They reported that there were a lot of difficulties and complications in the bases, and SI advised them to sort things out step by step.

His opinion was that the important thing in 1976 was to create unrest everywhere, to get the people to rise up in unrest signifying opposition to the current Kampuchean State. This unrest aimed at ruining law and order in the villages and subdistricts and districts, at being political counter-productive.

The theme of the popular agitation should be the search for freedom, for markets for religion., etc. If protest marches occurred, this would be a great political victory.

This advice was sent to SAE, KÂP and SARI in 37.

On 30 August a big demonstration broke out in TUOL village, TOEK L'ÂK subdistrict, KAMPOT district. Demonstrations broke out in both KÂH TAUCH and TOEK L'AK subdistricts with marches along the road headed up to PHNUM KÂMCHAY. They had their things on shoulder poles or their heads and were headed for the mountains. This demonstration was carried out in order to win a political victory. There was also unrest in PREY NUP on that day. However, the PREY NUP forces were not able to link up with those from KÂH TAUCH and TOEK L'ÂK because a team of

troops was on guard at KAMPUNG SMACH, which, not knowing the plan, turned them back.

Two days after the uprising, SAE went by car to TOEK L'ÂK to assess the situation and sort out the problems that had occurred during the unrest. SAE asked the people what had brought about the unrest. The people said they didn't know either, that two village cadres had done propaganda to the effect that everywhere else had already decided, and that everybody should follow them, and so off everybody had gone when their things. When SAE asked what had happened to these two cadres, the people said they had run away by boat to Yuonland.

SAE told the people there that this was all part of the plan and to say nothing more about it. SAE then went to see SARI at PREY NUP to ask him what had happened in KAMPUNG SEILA, why the forces there hadn't been able to arrive in time. SARI explained it was because troops on guard at the stream crossing didn't know the plan and hadn't let them cross.

Over in SECTOR 15 the situation was that 50 people in CHÀ7N SAEN(?) subdistrict had run away from their villages and headed along the road from UDONG to Laos(?), marching in procession toward SRE ANDAUNG village in PEAM subdistrict to do agit-prop among the people of that subdistrict, all of whom were relatives and relations. There were three in this group who had weapons, but they were living in the forest.

It was ten days before HÂM had chased up this situation. He went to sort things out with PEAM subdistrict and summon all of these people back.

In KAMPUNG CHHNANG, there had been agitation to get people to run away to their native districts, and a lot had gone in particular to ROLIE PH'IE, BARIBAU and TOEK PHOH.

Forces had been brought together at ANCHANH?ROUNG to demonstrate and head for KAMPUNG CHHNANG, but the Sector army had found out in time and broken the demonstration up.

The greatest attention to building up forces had been in SECTOR 15 because it was near the capital PHNUM PENH and on the frontlines of the battlefield. SI met HÂM, KAEV and PRACH on the riverfront to discuss the tasks and a separate plan for the Sector.

HÂM was the Secretary of ANGSNUOL district and of the Sector.

SI said there were a lot of possibilities for building up forces in SECTOR 15, and HÂM said that was really so, because it was near the city and there were people going back and forth frequently. Most of them wanted to be comfortable, not labour, and so they could be built up.

SI said it was important to build up forces in SECTOR 15 because it was connected by land to PHNUM PENH and straddled the ROUTE 5 communications route. He said the people should be prepared to engage in unrest like at CHAN SAEN subdistrict, because this had a huge negative effect on the party politically. He said to set up a store for dry season reason holding 10,000 thang, as well as storehouses for hiding weapons, ammunition and clothes and medications.

In 1976 a number of cadres were unmasked because of their forceful activities and their foreign contacts. So some were removed and others arrested.

At a session of the Zone Standing Committee chaired by PAL, the question was raised of how many cadres had fallen by the wayside and for what reason. SARUN said quite a few had fallen away in 31, and there was now a shortage of cadres to lead the work.

PAL reported that there were a lot of inactive cadres in 32 also.

In 15 KAEV had had to be removed from PONHEA LOE district and put at the Office for a period because of his more and more overt opposition.

In 37 TIN of SRE AMBEL district had had to be removed because of his more and more overt opposition, and he was being kept at the Division Office (LONGVEK). NHOEK had been removed from KAMPUNG SEILA and was being kept at the Zone Office. So a new Secretary for SECTOR 37 would have to be arranged.

In KAH KONG's three districts there no problems (SECTOR 11).

PAL wanted to know what to do now that NHOEK had been removed as Secretary of SECTOR 37. A request was made to the upper level of the Organization, and it decided to join together SECTOR 37 and SECTOR 11 and SECTOR 32 and SECTOR 15, so that only three Sectors would be left.

Therefore a Sector Secretary would become available, namely RÂN would take charge. And with SECTORS 15 and 32 joined together PAL was appointed Secretary, with HÂM as Deputy and KAEV, KÂN and MEUANG as members. The number of districts was reduced from six to five, so that only two were left in the old 15: PONHEA LOE and UDONG. SI's wife LI was appointed the new secretary of UDONG.

SI stresses that there was fierce combat between the revolution and the counter-revolution over the build up of forces.

/This is in the context of a long and detailed discussion of changes of cadres in the WEST ZONE./

One day SI had a discussion with PAL about removing HÂM and giving him to the Organization. HÂM really knew how to be a back licker, and when he saw what a nice guy PAL was he was constantly telling him how great he was. SI felt that HÂM was a force belonging to PAL. PAL's opinion was that it seemed like there wasn't anything wrong with HÂM yet, it was only that he didn't take responsibility in his work.

SI's opinion was that HÂM was somebody like KAEV and SÈ-T. He was opposed to the Party in a systematic way. One thing he had said was that if he had known that making socialism would require such strictures, he wouldn't have made it from the start. It was SI's advice that he be given to the Organization for use as a diplomatic cadre at the Foreign Ministry. It was only at the very end that PAL agreed, and from that day SI presented HÂM to the Organization.

PAL brought up NOR BÙ'N for discussion and asked whether SI's opinion was that further duties should be handed over to him. SI asked PAL for his opinion, and PAL said he was thinking of returning him to his

duties because it seemed like there was nothing wrong given that what was in Achar KÂNG's answers was pretty minor.

SI's opinion was that BÙ'N hadn't done anything wrong except be slow, and that's why he had been removed from AMLEANG. So he should go ahead and return him to his duties. NOR should be tested, but minor duties should be sought for him, he shouldn't be anywhere important. (This was SI feeling out PAL's mind. SI's thinking would have been not to give him any duties anymore.) This was because it was obviously apparent that he didn't know very many persons, although he had brought bad persons to live with him.

After the arrest of CHHON, PAL's nephew-in-law(?), SI put forward SÂN, a longago veteran of the struggle, to take up Sector Commerce. PAL contradicted this, saying he was someone who had made mistakes many times, particularly morals matters without cease. SI pretended not to hear, because he knew SÂN had been one of MEUAN's links for a long time.

In the end SI had the idea by removing PAL and getting him away from the Sector he could make it easy to quickly put his appointments into the the Party Committees at every level. He could do whatever his heart desired. Moreover, forces belonging to him could be removed and put into the Office, the worksites and clothesmaking servies, so that none would be left in the bases.

In January 1977, SI's disease got more and more painful, with occasional shooting pains in the gallbladder. He had to rest at the Office. It was a month before he began to experience some relief.

In February 1977 a Zone conference lasting exactly three days was convened in KAMPUNG CHHNANG. BROTHER NUMBER ONE participated. It was at this conference that a number of traitors emerged more and more strongly. This was after the Organization presented the names of the major traitors like YA, THUCH and SHOUK and the traitors in the Zone and Sector contexts. The one person who emerged more than anybody else was KAEV.

After the conference was closed, SI went permanently into the hospital for a gall bladder operation. Doctor PAEN wanted to know what the Chinese had had to say about SI's illness. He said he didn't know what to do if the examination were based only on his own technical competence. SI was so angry he checked himself out of the hospital and went to stay outside (at the Zone Commerce Office). He was going to wait until he was in pain before and then rush back. He also telephoned Kâ-7 to request examination by a Chinese doctor. The answer came back from 870 that this was not possible, but if the examination took place in the hospital that would be possible. Or if the examination were to take place at home, doctors PAEN and SAT could do it. It occurred to SI that he was in the wrong vis-a-vis the organizational and action lines of the Party.

One day SI returned to the Office and there was BROTHER NUMBER TWO who came to ask about his illness. SI said he was in great pain, but Doctor PAEN wouldn't take on treatment. SI proposed going abroad again for the operation. He said this would have to be discussed first.

One day when the pain was too great, SI went back into the hospital.

PAEN seemed to receive him fairly warmly. He said it was better to operate now than to let things drag on. The decision was to operate on 3 March 1977.

The operation was done on 3 March 1977 and the wound healed after 20 days. After that he went to recuperate at CHAMKAR CHOUNG(?).

One day PSL invited district and sector cadres for a work session at CHAMKAR DAUNG.

In their free time, SEUANG, RÂN and SARI talked to SI about the state of affairs as regards treason, which seemed to be constantly on the increase. SEUANG said he was worried that they would all be implicated. RÂN said these people were working too fast, which was leading to exposure. SARI said they should make all out efforts to fulfil their duties.

At that time, the higher level of the Organization called the Zone cadres to study at the higher level for three days. After it was over SI received a letter from PHEUM via SEUANG. PHEUM said their internal situation was getting more and more serious, and that a lot had been arrested both in the city and in the countryside since the coup of April. PHEUM said that where he was CHHOUK had been arrested as an extension of the CHÀ'KREI affair, in which a combatant had thrown a grenade at the palace and been seized. Therefore what PHEUM had said to SI in Beijing was no longer valid(?). It was now necessary to have something firm to fall back on because it seemed that things were disintegrating left and right.

His fallback was a Yuon named NGUYEN DIK THUN(?), who was the Secretary of the EASTZONE in 1953-54. He had sent PHEUM a note asking for a meeting in January, but PHEUM had refused to meet him because it wasn't yet the time to do so. But now it was necessary to rely on him because the domestic forces were running out. Moreover, THÙ'N was now a member of the VNCP Centre.

SI responded with a letter to PHEUM saying he agreed with his advice. SI said he thought that THUN was a reliable fallback, given his Centre membership, and that his contacts with TEU KAM had produced many results, because he was only at the Zone level, and the Yuon evaluated SI as only a Zone level person. Therefore nothing could be obtained to play a leading role at the national level.

PHEUM was able to arrange an immediate meeting at SMÀ'CH on the border, and NGUYEN DÈ'K THÙ'N came personally. They discussed the situation and principles on the Kampuchean side, and THUN asked PHEUM whether he could go abroad for two or three days. PHEUM said it wouldn't be any problem. Three days later, a courier came and took SI to SMACH. THUN took them to TAY NINH, where they met HAY SOU and MAY LÀM (Yuon who had had contact with CHHOUK). That afternoon they went to Ha Noi by special plane.

Upon arrival in Ha Noi they were met by YO NGUYEN YAP (VO NGUYEN GIAP?). GIAP took PHEUM to meet LE DUAN, the Secretary (sic) of the Central Committee of the VNCP. TREUANG CHINH, PHAM VAN DONG and other cadres were there.

PHEUM explained the current situation in Kampuchea, saying that there

was a lot of internal tension because all the veteran cadres had been arrested and accused of being Vietnamese or CIA agents, and that up to that time nearly a thousand persons had been arrested. The internal situation was confused, and the line being implemented was very strict. The slightest little mistake led to accusations of serving the enemy and of having non-proletarian states of mind, to making moral or organizational mistakes or not following the line. He said that currently there was internal division into two or three factions, including the CPK, LPK and CIA factions.

PHEUM said that in the name of the LPK he wanted to tighten the links between it and the VNCP so that in times of emergency they could help each other.

The next morning there were formal discussions. On the Viet Nam side were TRUONG CHINH, VO NGUYEN GIAP, NGUYEN Tà'N Yo'NG and THÙ'N.

The result of the discussions was that the two sides reached unity that:

Since it had achieved independence, Kampuchea had abandoned the principle of an Indochina Federation, created constant contradictions with Viet Nam, broken up the longstanding solidarity between Kampuchea and Viet Nam and their peoples, and that it was now necessary to to restore the policy of one party, one country, one army.

This was one problem, but the important problem was that of internal splits in the Kampuchean Party, people and army, the contradiction between the fast ones and the slow ones, those who comprehended and those who did not, between cadres and people.

Taking advantage of this evolution in Kampuchea, Viet Nam decided to invade Kampuchea militarily to help the Kampuchean comrades who had already appeared in Ha Noi. The strategic objective was to make the whole of Kampuchea into a satellite, a part of the Indochina Federation, by establishing a government that was intimately in love with Viet Nam, like that in Laos.

Concretely, however, Viet Nam couldn't take Kampuchea as a whole. It could take the east bank of the Mekong all the way from RATTANAKIRI to the Vietnamese border.

In the end it would also be necessary to take sectors (??) in SVAY RIENG, too.

The VNCP resolved to maintain shoulder to shoulder solidarity with the LPK, give it intimate assistance until final victory.

One day SI received a letter inviting him to TONLE BIT for a meeting to put forward the yearly plan for 1977. To disguise his travels he borrowed a white Peugeot 404. At PREY TOTOENG, he ran into POK, the Secretary of the OLD NORTH ZONE. POK asked him where he was going, and SI said that since he had returned from abroad he had wanted to see his own country, how things were going in the EAST.

After arriving at KAMPUNG CHAM and crossing over to TONLE BET, SI met LIN. LIN assigned at combatant to take him to SUONG and beyond to PHEUM's place.

There SI saw PHEUM, PHUONG, NHEUM, VI, CHEA, YI and zone and sector cadres of the EAST, among whom SI knew only KHO'EM.

The next day they got into the work agenda, which comprised:

Evaluation of the past situation internally and along the border;
A report by PHEUM on the views of the Vietnamese; Laying down a plan for 1977.

PHEUM reported on the reasons for the failure of the 1976 coup plans. He said it had resulted from an underestimation of the situation which resulted in subjectivity in work. He said that following the coup's failure there had been a lot of arrests in the city and the countryside.

PHEUM described how well-received he had been in Ha Noi.

As regards the 1977 plan, he said the current general situation was very good. On the border there was currently fighting in a war with the Yuon. There was insecurity, and everybody knew that there was gunfire already.

Viet Nam had a plan to attack Kampuchea as a single party as well. Therefore, Vietnam's forces were tremendously helpful to us.

Internally in Kampuchea there were currently contradictions between the cadres and the people, between those who comprehended things and those who did not. There was still no solution to the problem of continuous splits into factions within the Party.

The most important thing was the the contradiction of the people who did not comprehend things and who were incorrectly implementing the line, who were being seized and taken for re-education and were even being accused of being enemies and taken away for smashing without any fuss.

In accordance with this situation, the following concrete plan was laid down for 1977.

1. Political. Only by close solidarity with Viet Nam could our party succeed because it forces were more and more in retreat as a result of its suppression by the Kampuchean government, with some arrested, others exposed, others having run away. Its clearcut stand was one of Indochina Federation with Viet Nam, based on a st p~ty, one people, one country, etc.

2. Military. In order to liberate Kampuchea it would be necessary to rely on Yuon army forces, which greatly outnumbered those of Kampuchea.

The concrete plan for the invasion was that on the occasion of the 17 April 1977 celebrations, another combat operation would be launched in the form of another coup like the last one in order to harass Kampuchea on this holiday.

As for the Vietnamese military, wherever it went the way had to be opened up fopr it so that it could advance without hindrance. The

Kampuchean army had the duty of leading and guiding it towards its objectives, most importantly PHNUM PENH.

The places where the Vietnamese army would be attacking were Route 7, SNUOLKRAHCHHEH, SMACH, SVAY RIENG and PREY VENG SECTORS, SECTOR 25, KAH ANDAET-LOK, KAMPUNG TRACH.

While the army on these flanks had the responsibility of guiding the Vietnamese military, the army on the rear must rise up to harass the people in the villages and cooperatives. This must be done in particular by the district and sector armies.

Division I must assign a number of forces at battalion strength to be prepared in advance to launch into combat in PHNUM PENH from LONGVEK. The army on the seacoast (the navy) must prepare plans for attacking the navy of the General Staff in order to destroy boats.

The army in the NORTHWEST must find a way to make contact with IN TAM or Thai forces so that they would definitely be able to invade to KAMPUNG CHHNANG.

The army in PREAH VIHEAR must make contact with outside forces, either Khmer Sâ or Thai, which should join together in an attack reaching KAMPUNG THOM.

3. Economically. Agitate for destruction and set up individuals or groups to wreck the economy in particular by destroying paddy and rice in 1977 (produced in 1976), creating a catastrophic shortage. Wrecking should commence with harvesting and proceed through threshing to transportation to graneries.

Hinder production of all kinds and prevent its progress, including dry season rice, tubers and vegetables of all kinds.

Destroy tools and implements, such as machinery, nuts and bolts, fuel, so that all is damaged, including vehicle engines big and small.

Destroy clothing, medicines, pots and pans, spoons, etc, so that they wear out and can't be used for long.

4. State power. Dictatorship must be imposed on the forces that oppose us. i.e., sweep clean from the state power the good people either by smashing or transferring them.

Our people must quickly be put in place everywhere.

Anyone whom we had already propagandized but had not taken our education on board must be smashed and disposed of in order to get rid of the evidenc.

Anyone who loved the revolution must be re-educated to love us instead, or otherwise they could be put into the army.

5. Foreign relations. We had to continue our foreign contacts, particularly with the Vietnamese, our neighbour and reliable fall-back. The current contact courier was NGUYEN Di'K Thù'N, who was a Vietnamese Party Centre-level person permanently stationed in Kampuchea. Zone level contacts would also continue because such

contacts also had a role to play.

This was followed by discussion.

VI said this level of contact with the Vietnamese was very serious, and there seemed to be no independence left. PHEUM said that this was the way it was, that we no longer had any independent existence or future. He said that if we coexisted with the Yuon we would't have any future, but we would have a good time.

NHEUM said that if we were now going to be so dependent, what would happen if they didn't give us all the help they could. PHEUM said we also had to make _forts ourselves. We weren't relying on them for everything. We would rely where we had to and make our own efforts where we had had to. In sum, in major matters we would be dependent, and in minor matters we would do things ourselves.

PHEUM then dealt with other matters. The Battlefield Command Committee was:

PHEUM, Chairman NHEUM, Vice Chairman SI, SAE, VI, Members.
As regards re-establishment of organizational links, the following administration was set up for the countryside:

SOUTHWEST: SAE, CHEA, So'K

WEST: SI, SEUANG, RÂN

EAST: PHEUM, PHUONG, LIN

NORTHWEST: NHEUM, KAOE, KANTOL

NORTHEAST: VI, Là'V, CHà'N

KRACHEH: YI and the Deputy Secretary of MONDULKIRI

VIHEAR: (HÂNG) answering to PHEUM.

Commerce: CHè'N Ho'NG

Industry: SAY

Energy: Ho'K

KAMPUNG SAOM Port: KRi'N

all in contact via the old link, namely SI

Upon his return from this meeting, SI went to see SAE in KAMPOT to report to him on the results of the meeting as he had not gone due to illness. SAE was impressed that PHEUM had been able to go to Ha Noi and thought this time there would be results.

Upon his return to the Office, the Ha Noi group was in chaos and was on the verge of unrest, because they could see that it had been almost two years since liberation, but nothing had changed and things were getting more and more serious. This time they put forward the question of going to work in the bases (cooperatives). After being apprised of

this event, SI delegated it to Pà~ for sorting out. PAL convened a Standing Committee meeting, which decided that for the time being all the big chiefs would be removed, and a wait and see attitude would be adopted towards the small fry.

After the big chiefs were removed, one of them, KHO'N, hung himself because he realized that those who were being removed were not being taken away to work but to be smashed and disposed of. There was then chaos among his associates at his office at TRAPEANG PHÔV(?). Seeing this, SI decided to have the Zone Office Chairman, SUON, conduct a commemorative ceremony for KHON's soul in order to quiet down those who were in confusion, at least for the time being.

However, even after this was done the Ha Noi group didn't quite down. There was more chaos at the Office at TRAPEANG NÔV. The only way was therefore to take measures to smash all of them (around 80 persons), because if they were kept alive they would engage in activities, with some of them hiding guns in the mountains and others having sent people out to become dacoits and do splittist propaganda.

In this period, the troops at PREK PHNÔV (the 310th) were in an arrogant state. They were making checks all along the road from PHNUM PENH to PREK PHNOV, and these checks were becoming more and more strict. One day they arrested SARÙ'N, Secretary of SECTOR 31 and compelled him to conduct a revolutionary life-view session because because his pass had no number, seal or signature. He was detained a day, from morning to night.

Later, SEUANG came along, and he too was arrested and his vehicle impounded. When SI met BROTHER NUMBER 2, he asked him why there was such a s~ of affairs at PREK PHNOV. SI blurted out that care should be taken against the emergence there of a second CENTRE, because they had seized SARÙ'N and made him do a revolutionary life-view session. BROTHER NUMBER 2 didn't express an opinion. He remained quiet. Later, he went into the school that PAL was conducting. He put forward a new duty, saying that now the first duty was raising the spirit of revolutionary vigilance, which played the leading role. Later, SI was chatting with BROTHER NUMBER TWO, and said that it was quite right (?) that he had put that lesson before all others. BROTHER NUMBER TWO again remained silent.

Then April 1977 came, and the situation in the cutry, in the sectors and the zones, seemed very quiet. There was no signal about the implementation of the 1977 plan. SI himself was in a state of mental confusion, wondering whether this year things would succeed or not.

At that time, SI wrote a letter to PHEUM asking him for clarification about the implementation of the 1977 plan. He said the Vietnamese army was currently arriving in the south, but that the rearguard wasn't all there yet(?). It seemed that the 1977 plan wouldn't be implemented according to schedule. He added that this was the way it was when one relied on somebody else's forces. Everything was up to them because we were not the masters. Now we would have to put up with it. SI didn't know what more could be done that year.

SI describes his incorrect implementation of the line from 17 April 1975 on.

SI says by way of introduction that by nature he is a degenerate, a liberal, and that in particular he had another party, namely the LPK and was a CIA agent. He therefore deviated (bamphlai) in his implementation of the Party line as he pleased, didn't implement it correctly according to the Party line.

He says that viewed in terms of external form he seemed to be exerting a lot of effort in his implementation of the daily and monthly plans, but the internal substance was deviation (bangvae-bamplay) away from the Party line.

1. As regards the plan to restore the economy in 1975, he did tremendous propaganda and conducted frequent study sessions for cadres, but in fact there was starvation in PREY NUP district, and the economy there could not be restored. The potential was there in terms of soil and water, but SI made a mediocre effort, and did not give things a powerful impetus. Concretely, he did not remove NHOEK, but let him stay to do a lot more destruction.

2. As regards implementation of independence and mastery, in this period of independence the Party appealed for agitation to bring forth a spirit of independence and mastery in the reconstruction of the country, but SI did not do powerful agitation along these lines. As regards creativity in all forms of production, when he heard that some place had been able to do something, that the medics had been able to invent something, that the mechanics had been able to use charcoal to produce electricity(?), he did not rush to observe and learn. He ignored them as if it did not matter.

In general, he did not have a national stance, did not love his own nation's ability to do things, not to the slightest extent. Instead, he constructed one electrical generator(?) so that he could show off, but everytime it was made it failed without cease. After making it and putting it to the test he was pleased and bragged to everybody. At that time BROTHER NUMBER ONE was of the opinion that it wouldn't be long before this place was electrified. After hearing this opinion, SI stopped thinking about things. It was only now that SI realized that what he had done was wrong vis-a-vis the plan. There hadn't been any plan to do this. That was why most of the comrades had not listened very much to what he had said, or seemed not to hear what he said, because it was wrongly oriented.

As regards independence and mastery in agriculture. According to the plan it was necessary to have 20-30% mastery over water and complete mastery over land. SI was unable to do this because he didn't really want to implement this plan, as a result of which the lower levels were unable to implement the plan. It was not known over what land to establish mastery, the higher ground or the lower ground. First he would give instructions to work the higher ground, then he would give instructions to work the lower ground, and construct waterworks. Therefore, three years after liberation there was still not any clearly modern agricultural base to be found.

For example, at the beginning everybody was putting up big, tall paddy dikes on either side of Routes 4 and 5.

Next, everybody went to dig feeder canals and reservoirs near the mountains.

Now everybody was working the lowlands instead.

Therefore, it was impossible to find any certainty. Up through the present, there was no knowledge of exactly where independence and mastery resided, to what extent it had been achieved, over how many hectares of land it had been achieved.

Therefore there were constant losses of paddy and rice every year, and there was still not enough to fulfill the rations required by the Party.

One point to which attention should be drawn was that SI put forward a plan that was impractical, divorced from reality. He wanted to do everything, no

As regards reservoirs, watergates, dams, etc, they were never built as well as those of others, but were just thrown up slapdash. /this line should be above, after: required by the Party/

matter what, by pushing it forward very quickly and powerfully. Everything had to be a great leap forward. However, to sum up the results were meagre. All he ever thought of was making big numbers. For example, if in growing corn, the plan put forward was 3,000, then it was increased to 6000 hectares. Therefore, on the lower ground one had to have four or five legs in order to keep up. This meant agitating the people to work day and night without rest.

3. The line of action and the deployment of forces. In proceeding with his work, SI never was conscientious about this and a lot of the time listened to what he was told by technicians. That was why he tried to do everything in one fell swoop and then sometimes had to return to do it two or three times, thereby wasting a lot of capital and resources.

For example, as was said about PEAM SA, no one knew how many times this watergate had been built before it was completed. This was because SI didn't pay attention, and never went down to see concretely what was going on. He only looked at things from above, and only gave commands on paper. Therefore state resources were wasted, such as cement and iron, time and time again.

Another was the dam at AU KRANG AMBÂL. The question was how much of a dam this was to be and how much water it was to dam. SI wanted more than was required, and the deployment of the water was incorrect, so there was a lot of water left over, which also ruined the road.

All of this was deviation (bamphoan bamphai) () from the Party line and destructive to the deployment of forces. In other words, on small battlefields a lot of forces were deployed, and there were only a few persons on the big battlefields. The attacks were not very effective. This was because there were too many in one place, so that they couldn't find anywhere to do anything, etc.

For example, in the working of dry season paddy in SECTOR 31, a lot of fuel was wasted transporting forces there and back because of incorrect deployment. First they had to wait to go to work somewhere else at BAU(?), in SECTOR 31. Then they were told they had to come

back to work in the own districts before being sent out for work elsewhere, such as in BARIBAU or ROLIE PH'IE disticts, etc. The forces were transported back according to these instructions.

For example,, back in the harvest season, forces had to be concentrated to go hold up the dam at PEAM POU. At first it was said a lot had to go, and no thought was given to the harvesting of heavy paddy. Therefore, forces had to be withdrawn and sent back on foot at a time when the rice was already overripe, and also come back in haste.

4. As regards SI's viewpoints, standpoints and ideology. From liberation day on, his viewpoints and ideological standpoints were not those of a revolutionary. His viewpoint was that of someone who wanted to have a good time. He was happy with the victory that had been won by the Party, people and army. He was happy with the war booty, with being able to come and go as he pleased, happy with being able to have women, happy with his status.

So every day and every hour his ideological stance was to gather up war booty, to look for women to come stay with him, and he thought only about setting up the Office and what food he would be eating. He wanted things to be easy, not like before victory, or during the war.

At night he never spent even an hour thinking about the Party's plans, about the post-war economy, about the post-victory reconstruction of the country. After receiving the plans from above all he did was summon the Sector cadres to disseminate them to them in a ready-made fashion, or if he gave instructions they would merely be typed for passing on. He didn't know whether they were doing what they were supposed to or not.

He gathered up persons who know how to cook dishes and noodles to stay with him, who knew how to make sweets, including a Chinese named Hù'N CHEU who cooked noodles at the Office.

He arranged for someone to cook nice foods for himself and his guests, etc., such as by brining in the woman SIEN, who had previously lived in PHNUM PENH, to cook and teach others for a period.

Moreover, he took such cooks with him wherever he went on a personal basis. He received a lot of instructions and nurturing after liberation about such things as the all-round plans of national reconstruction, but he seemed not to pay this much heed. In general, he didn't think about this at all. Only when something had an impact because it went wrong to he sort it out.

He also gathered up nice cars and kept them for use at the office for a long time. These included Mercedes and Peugeot(?). For the most part, he preferred to use nice cars. He was completely unwilling to learn from PAL's good example. Even though he was older than SI and ill, he nevertheless rode a jeep and without a medic.

In sum, in putting things into motion after liberation, he acted like some civil servant who was only on the payroll. He no longer possessed the nature of a worker or the party's proletariat.

6. Implementation of the organizational line.

A. Building up of leading forces. During the past period, in form, he seemed to be exerting efforts in convening study sessions for cadres from the district and cooperative levels, but the building up of forces did not proceed according to the party's class line.

He only liked to select upper strata elements to be cooperative cadres and chairmen of various units of organization. Poor and lower middle peasants were not very much brought into core or pillar organizations.

He inducted them into CIA organizations while reporting to above that they were being inducted into the youth league and revolutionary organizations. The number was small, and most were in KAH KONG. In the bases, most of the selection was done differently from the line, and they were put into positions of leadership as well, such as in the youth leagues and revolutionary organizations in SECTORS 31 and 32.

B. As regards internal solidarity. Life in the Zone Committee and the Office: he did not at all implement the principle of solidarity and unity with friends and youth. He for the most part ignored those who were at the same level as him and didn't speak to them very much. If they put forward problems, he did not discuss them, and just went right ahead and made strategic decisions, for example as regards whether snops (kinh) should be re-educated or smashed.

He didn't chat with anybody. When he was angry, he would hold it in and strive not to say anything, saving it for a later day. He would wait until a lot of things had built up before putting them together(?), as a major matter and then just go for a decision. This made his subordinates afraid. His superiors were also afraid and dared not come near him. Or if he made a decision about some problem, no one dared to protest.

PAL didn't chat much with SI. If the two of them were alone together, he would always walk out to find somebody else to talk to. He would get involved in conversations with SI only when there was something major up and it appeared that things were still unclear.

As for SARUN, the Secretary of SECTOR 31, in terms of external form they seemed to speak to each other normally, but if SI made a decision, SARUN would act hastily out of fear to do what he had been told. But for the most part, he would be creative outside of the collectivity, and only once something had been done would he present it for consideration.

As for SEUANG, he sometimes made a lot of objections to SI, saying that the plans laid down were not appropriate for his Sector. He raised objections in formal meetings. However, ordinarily he obeyed and immediately carried out the instructions he was given.

As regards the superior Brothers.

As regards BROTHER NUMBER ONE, SI did a lot of talking to reach the top and rearrange things below (?). He wanted to chat so as to create sentimental ties, but his words were not sentimental and sometimes were even depressing(?).

One day just after liberation, after five when he left work dressed to receive guest by car and didn't come back to six. When he got out of the car he was received by SI, KAOE and KANTOL, who were sitting in one spot together. He expressed his view that that day he was a bit busy receiving foreign guests. After saying this he walked over closer. SI wondered to himself why he was speaking that way. He thought that maybe he was ashamed of the clothes he was wearing to receive guests. SI blurted(?) out that one had to take on whatever duty was assigned and just fulfill it. After SI said this, he went into the house and changed his clothes. SI felt embarrassed by what he had said, thinking that this was really outrageous nagging. He later was kept awake with regret.

One day, SI told BROTHER NUMBER ONE that there seemed to be a lot of checkpoints in the city, and that everyday one had to obtain the release of he didn't know how many people who were going to UDONG or PONHEA LEU. It was only when one was in PREK PHNOV that one could do dry season paddy.

At that time, BROTHER talked about how he had gone to the 17 April hospital one midnight and been stopped at a checkpoint himself. He said everytime he was stopped at a checkpoint, he would be given a complete body search. That night they saw him sitting in a car, and it was stopped at the checkpoint. SI blurted out that maybe they thought he was some tycoon coming from somewhere. BROTHER smiled and laughed.

Another day later, he had alighted from a helicopter on an inspection tour of KAMPUNG CHHNANG town right at lunch time. SI said the market in KAMPUNG CHHNANG was even bigger than that of KAMPOT. BROTHER named silent and did not respond. SI had said this because in the WEST ZONE there wasn't any proper town. The only thing of any size was KAMPUNG CHHNANG. These were words that aimed to depress BROTHER, too (?).

SI had a lot of verbal clashes with BROTHER NUMBER TWO.

After liberation, SI went to meet BROTHER NUMBER ONE and BROTHER NUMBER TWO at the train station. BROTHER NUMBER TWO asked him whether he was pleased now that PHNUM PENH had been liberated. SI said that he was fantastically happy because this was the first time in history that we had been able to liberate ourselves, but that he personally wasn't living in a PIINUM PENH villa like the Brothers; instead he was in the paddy fields.

When he went through his revolutionary life-view session (1976) SI was asked by BROTHER NUMBER TWO about the matter in which the higher levels had received an anonymous letter saying he had committed a morals wrong with a woman cook, and was doing so every day. SI thought to himself if the letter was anonymous, it wasn't certain, so he responded that this wasn't accurate, and in fact what was happening was that someone was bringing up that old matter from KAMPUNG SEILA in 1971.

In the end SI said that if his reputation was still not clear on this matter of morals, he requested that the Party set him aside somewhere and allow some other comrade to do his work so that it wouldn't be hindered by him alone. BROTHER NUMBER TWO said nothing.

One day SI met BROTHER NUMBER TWO at the PHNUM CHATORUOH School and was told about the traitorous links in the WEST ZONE. He gave the instruction that former soldiers should not be kept on as anything because it was not easy for them to abandon their old ideas. So they all had to be smashed. SI replied that he was sweeping away anybody and everybody who opposed the revolution, and even even the generation of kids left behind were taken away.

One day BROTHER NUMBER TWO came to disseminate the decisions of the CENTRE STANDING COMMITTEE on the joining together of sectors and the story of the internal traitors, such as CHEY SUON to begin with. At that time he secretly revealed CHEY SUON's name first. After this, SI disseminated it in the Zone, telling the name of CHEY SUON to the members of the Zone within a limited context.

One day he asked about HÂM, the Deputy Secretary of SECTOR 32, wanting to know what his history was. SI said he hadn't grasped his history, saying that he only knew about some of his activities when they had been staying together. HÂM was an ultraconservative person who was a bit of an old dullard(? He hadn't abandoned his old ideas. He was opposed to the revolution and to socialism, most importantly to some aspects of collectivism. He had never done any propaganda about the socialist line.

At that point PAL said that as far as he could tell HÂM wasn't doing anything more than working without taking responsibility. Except for that, there was nothing wrong. BROTHER NUMBER TWO asked why the two answers were so different, and said in any case the matter should be the subject of further examination. At the time, SI thought maybe his view had been a bit extreme or even wrong. SI suspected himself the whole time.

At one formal meeting SI said with regard to BROTHER NUMBER TWO's attitude that it was sometimes a bit out of order(?) (hot), and asked that he please be a little more level-headed and modest, which would bring about more results. SI said this sincerely, without trying to depress him. SI said what he saw. He said this sincerely in order to build him up. BROTHER NUMBER TWO accepted what had been said and took it under consideration.