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"Learning from Important Experiences in the Fulfilment of the Party's First Semester 1978 Political Tasks" (pp1-46)

"Learning from Important Experiences in the Fulfilment of the Party's First Semester 1978 Political Tasks"

I. Special Aspects of Action to Implement the First Semester 1978 Political Tasks

As the Party Center stipulated, many problems were put forward by it at the November 1977 conference, including the joint political tasks for the year, core tasks and tasks in each sphere, in order that the joint and core tasks would be implemented. We can, however, summarize as follows a number of important problems:

1. National defence tasks
2. The task of continuing to make socialist revolution
3. The task of socialist construction
4. The people's living standards
5. The tasks of building up the Party's leadership and core forces, and especially of cadre-building
6. The situation of our revolution on the international stage.

The special aspects of the fulfilment of the first semester 1978 tasks are as follow.

The first special point.

During the first semester of 1978 there was a further continuation of combat between us and our enemies, both external and internal. This was tense, tough and profound combat in which we won remuot _____ and seething military and economic victories. Even the foreign policy combat was romuot _____, tough and profound.

This is one aspect of the special first semester 1978 combat. We stipulate that it is special because it is a combat continued from the past possessing a more sharply acute character than in previous years.

The second special point.

The combat during the first semester of 1978 revealed ever more increasingly clearly the true nature of both our external and internal enemies who have been going all out internally and externally to overthrow our Democratic Kampuchea and colletivist regime militarily and diplomatically. Here their most serious defeats have been in the military and political spheres.

We have thereby won greater victories than in previous years in the military, political and diplomatic spheres.

The third special point.

Simultaneously with these first semester 1978 enemy defeats and great victories of ours, the enemy has been able to wreck a certain number of our plans, particularly our 3 ton/6 ton plans. These had already received 90% results, but a certain number of losses were forced back on us. According to initial figures, we see losses of from 30-40%.

In this conjunction, they wrecked our people's living standards, preventing the achievement of the Party's plans in the food supply, clothing and shelter spheres.

Fourth special point.

What is of imperative interest about the first semester of 1978 is that the aim of enemy attacks was to overthrow the state power of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the collective regime of the workers and peasants in order that another party, the Yuon's so-called "Kampuchea Labour Party", a tool of the Yuon, could assume power and attack the current collective regime and bring back a regime or private capitalism.

In their intention to overthrow our socialist and collective state power, the enemies attacked us on the battlefield of leadership. This means that they paid attention to the Communist Party of Kampuchea's good cadres and instead set up cadres of the Yuon-lackey Labour Party. The enemies thus strove to pay attention to engaging us in covert and overt battle and brought in their cadres to hold power on every spearhead in order to create and enhance conditions for overthrow our socialist state power legally or by simple force of arms. This combat on the battlefields of state power and leadership can be seen to have peculiar aspects and special characteristics which we must raise here to be experiences for future mutual combat and struggle to take state power.

Experience Number 1

The experience of our perpetual past combat, particularly from liberation to the present, has been one of unremittingly tense annual combat between us and the enemies. We have, up through the present, attacked and smashed increasingly numerous chunks of them. This demonstrates that the battle to seize state power is a tough and continuous struggle.

The entire Party, army and people have basically adopted a class struggle stance. However, in certain spheres and at some times and on some occasions, we are pacifist, complacent and not seething in class struggle, and the enemies are therefore able to engage in activities. These enemies, for their part, engage unremittingly in these activities. This is one experience, one lesson which he had already put forward, but must put forward again.

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Experience Number Two.

Previously we were interested in both external and internal enemies, and were interested in internal enemies who were already unmasked. We were, however, very subjective about concealed domestic enemies who were boring from within.

Therefore, what we saw most strikingly clearly during the first semester of 1978 was the danger posed by enemies concealed from within. In attacking us this time, the enemies basically utilized domestic forces, namely forces in the countryside, the ministries and offices and the army, whereas external forces were merely auxiliary.

We have seen more of this experience, more of the noxious nature of internal enemies. This has led us to the lesson regarding measures that from here on out we must strengthen the class struggle stance such that it is stauncher and hotter in order to eliminate successively both internal and external enemies, but particularly internal enemies, so that they lose the initiative and are unable to launch shock assaults on our Party and revolution.

The measures which we are putting forward are no different from previous measures, but we must sharpen our stance and attack and eliminate internal enemies every more acutely, and continue further to take successive resolute measures against both our internal and external foes. We must do this because although the internal enemies utilize the monikers of being Communist Party of Kampuchea cadres and cadres of the Kampuchea people to overthrow the collective regime and the Communist Party of Kampuchea people to overthrow the collective regime and the Communist Party of Kampuchea, they are in their true nature cadres of the Yuon's Kampuchea Labour Party and CIA cadres doing this on behalf of this treasonous Labor Party of the Yuon, so that the Yuon and the CIA may return and bring back a regime of private capitalism. This is a threat to our Kampuchea people and race.

II. Make An Examination of the conditions in Which National Defence Tasks Are Implemented

1. The Party Center has put forward the task of defending the leading apparatus
2. Defend the Party's worker-peasant state power, Democratic Kampuchea and Kampuchea's territorial integrity and independence.

All the above defence tasks have overarching characteristics. If we are capable of defence, then we are capable of solving other problems, too; and if we are incapable of defence, this spreads its bad influence to all other spheres.

The problem that became salient during the first semester of 1978 was that the Yuon, Soviets and their faction went all out to recoup themselves strongly and overthrow our Communist Party of Kampuchea.

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In another sphere, the CIA joined together in cooperation with the Yuon and the Soviets to attack the Communist Party of Kampuchea, utilizing the Yuon as the Yuon as the important force.

We would like to bring up below each of the successive events in which we were attacked by the enemy.

First, attack from the outside:

In December the enemy attacked us in a big way. This attack was a nationwide attack with forces organized as follows:

-In the east, the Yuon attacked us from Ratanakiri down to Kampot utilizing their forces in strategic and supplementary locations. The important strategic locations were the East and the Southwest, among which the East was taken as the basic and key force.

The requirement of the Yuon enemy was to do whatever could be done to seize the East Zone, and then step out of the East Zone to seize various other locations.

There were two spearheads in this aim to take the East Zone. There was the Route 1 spearhead from Bovet to Svay Rieng to Neak Luong. If they had been able to capture Route 1 they would have been able to capture the southern part of the East Zone.

The second spearhead was Route 7. If they had been able to capture Route 7, they would have been able to capture the northern part of the East Zone.

If they had been able to capture the East Zone, they would have been able to cut our waterway and capture the Northeast Zone.

Once this is seen, it can be seen that the East Zone is the strategic zone.

Simultaneously, those despicables in the west also engaged in activities. Speaking generally, the despicables in the west were weak, but they had a plan to act as auxiliaries for the despicables in the east. The first requirement for them was to put supplementary pressure on the Kampuchean revolution to put it in difficulty. Their second requirement was to capture some land so that they would also have something for themselves. Their land forces, however, were minor, and so the important considerations for them were naval. During that time, an American warship came to request docking at a Thai port. In conjunction with this, they carried out maritime activities. This was the cooperative plan among the CIA, the Soviets and the Yuon, in which the Yuon played the most leading role.

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This was the plan for external attack. This external attack was very large-scale. If one takes as the only example, the utilization of forces and ammunition, the enemy used more than before. The enemy Yuon army employed 11 regular divisions, among which there were several elite divisions, namely Divisions 9, 5, 2 and 3. One of the divisions came from the north, namely Division 320. In conjunction with this there were hundreds of artillery pieces and armored vehicles, and there were even Soviet advisors.

They wanted simply to take Kampuchea in a single-stage attack, but they were unable to beat us. Our attack caused them to break and run, although the fact is that at that point in time we had not yet set things up in an agreeable way.

Even though defeated, however, they attacked us again, using three divisions per each location starting in January and continuing through April-May 1978.

They thus had a very big plan militarily.

Because, however, our attack broke them, those despicable in the west didn't dare to engage in any significant activities.

Second, the Attack from the Inside

- Military attack
- Political attack
- Economic attack
- Attacking on the leading apparatus

THE MILITARY ATTACK

Among the units of organization of the East, one battalion in every regiment was assigned to attack us from behind. And in each district, a company/??/ was assigned to attack us from behind, too.

It was the same over in Kracheh. Another element of the military attack was preparations to attack Phnum Penh. An attack on Phnum Penh would have had two parts: one from inside and one from outside.

The external attack was to be by Sector 22 forces speaking generally, and specifically speaking by Muk Kampoul. Muk Kampoul would have joined in this with Ponhea Leu. Sector 25 would have carried out supplementary attack from the south, too.

The internal attack would have utilized forces from the offices, for example those from the Ministry of Industry, Medicine and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Culture, because they had no troops. Such forces were not army forces, but guerilla forces.

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They were attacking from two directions: both from the outside and the inside. And the aim of their attack from the inside was the leading apparatus.

But they couldn't beat us, as we attacked them first. Their plan was pretty meticulous, but their coordination was not good.

THE POLITICAL ATTACK

This was to smash the leading apparatus by using poison. They were pretty meticulous in arranging for this.

This time our attack was right on the target: the head of the treasonous apparatus. We had thought previously that we had hit it right on the head, but in fact this was not the case. Now we have hit the target right on the head. If anyone is left, they are merely henchmen.

If they had won, it would have meant the disappearance of the Kampuchean race. In being able to attack them we were eliminating the CIA, the Soviets and the Yuon.

The reason that we were able to seize this victory is the lofty revolutionary vigilance of the entire Party. This is a virtue.

Our shortcoming, however, is that we are not yet up to the right level on points of vigilance; we remain anaesthetized and pacifist about which spheres do not imagine the enemy's militancy, especially that of the internal enemy.

This is a factor by which they can engage in a certain level of activities and prakoet _____ us. There were only 4-10 days between us.

-A measure for the future is that we must have ever increasingly revolutionary vigilance, especially as regards the internal enemy.

What ways are there to see the enemy? Our experience is that:

-Problems exist where an individual is systematically putting the line into practice in a "left" manner;

-Problems exist wherever an individual is systematically putting the line into practice in a "right" manner. Measures must be taken against all such individuals. Such measures include training and building up, removal and higher measures than these.

-Problems exist in any base or unit of organization in which the people have a depressed standard of living after a period of three years of successively of failed solution; either they are incompetent or they are enemies.

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If there is not yet any evidence, remove them for the time being, but if there is clear-cut documentation, further measures in line with it must be taken,

With regard to the problem of starvation, from 1978 on, problems exist if there is starvation for a single year, because we now have sufficient conditions. The people have now been through making the transition, and water, seed and fertilizer are sufficient.

Not only zones, but district, sectors and cooperatives must be examined in this manner.

CONCERNING THOSE PERSONS WHO RECEIVED THEIR ASSIGNMENTS FROM THE ENEMY,
THE PARTY WOULD LIKE TO PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING LINE:

First, any individual who was part of the traitorous networks of the Yuon or the CIA prior to 1968 is not to be penalized if they have subsequently engaged in no activities. We stipulate that they were confused by the difficult circumstances of those times.

Second, from 1968 to 1970. The Party already possessed an identity of its own and the light of the Party's line of political identity and self-reliance already existed fully. However, there is to be no penalty for having joined the CIA of the Yuon at this time, either. We stipulate that our struggle at that time was pretty difficult, and one could therefore take the easy way out. This wasn't correct, but we can forgive it.

Third, from 1970 to 1975. Subjectively, we were going from strength to strength. However, even if someone was confused enough to join the CIA to the Yuon, they also won't be penalized, either, because the question of defeat or victory was still posed. An error is an error, but we consider such an error an internal one.

Fourth, from 1975 to the present. We would like to bifurcate this:

Those who joined the enemy and engaged in activities opposing the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the regime of socialist collectivism must all be punished because they engaged in activities consciously and with a willingness to be of service to the CIA and the Yuon.

As for those individuals who have remained in confusion ever since 1975 and from now on don't engage in any further activities, no matter whether or not they display their errors, will not be penalized as long as they cease their activities and go all out to improve themselves and fulfil their tasks. This is in accord with the Party's line of saving human beings, because if we attack one, it doesn't effect just one, it effects while reducing the number of our enemies.

/18/ But if they continue their activities further, then their frontier is clear, and the Communist Party of Kampuchea must therefore eliminate them.

Our Party puts forward this line in order to:

1. Gather forces;
2. Attack the enemy

In order to be able to attack the enemy we must gather forces, so that the masses understand, so that they are a force for squeezing out the enemy. If the masses understand things, they will see the activities the enemies engage in.

This is why although anyone who was confused before liberation is to be considered to have been wrong, they should nevertheless not be penalized. However, anyone who has engaged in activities of service to the CIA or the Yuon since liberation has done so consciously and understanding what they are doing and must be penalized.

But, if in future they cease engaging in such activities, then they aren't in any trouble.

We put forward this line in order to gather forces.

We do this second in order to quiet and calm things down, to prevent the enemy from causing a stampede into his trap/?. Indeed, in the past, the enemy has been able to cause considerable panics. The enemy has been able to panic cadres and male and female combatants who had made minor errors. Even if these were morals mistakes, they weren't yet acute, and it was necessary for us to save them.

Furthermore, a regrettable loss of forces occurs when the enemy brings about morals transgressions and then causes panics. This damn stuff is an enemy plan, and this is why there are morals incidents everywhere.

THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF MORALS MATTERS

- One kind comprises mistakes that are a legacy of the old society
- The other kind are an enemy plan

We are now disseminating this line in order to carry out shock counterassaults against the enemy. The masses must be made to understand this line in order that they may carry out shock counter-assaults against the enemy. /19/ This is what we call gathering forces to attack the enemy. Previously, the masses did not yet understand, and wherever there were minor errors then the enemy was able to create panics. If the masses understand and the enemy tries to panic them, they will carry out shock counter-assaults.

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The Party is furthermore putting forward this line in order to clarify things within the Party and among the people, because some people don't want to attack the Party, but the enemy is constantly after and pressuring them, saying that if they don't continue their activities, they'll die because they are CIA or have joined the Yuon. /20/ For its party, our Party shouldn't push them away but must pull them over. In order to pull them over, they must be trained to understand the Party's measures. There must be a tug-of-war between us and the enemy to seize forces. Don't utilize intimidating slogans that will push forces away. We must use slogans that gather forces. This is a real battle.

It is a tense, tough, deep battle, but the revolutionary forces are stronger. The enemy does dare openly to put forward the slogan of attacking the revolution, which is a result of the tendency of the masses to go with the revolution. The tendency of the male and female combatants is also to go with the revolution.

Coming up with a solution to such traitors will lead to our national defence work being excellent. It will snap off the arms and legs of the external enemy.

The second potential is in terms of production. In the East, for example, the people have been able to produce quite a bit., but the women of Prasaut, Chantrea and Kampung Ro districts lack clothes.

It's the same in Tromoung district. The people lack food supplies.

/21/ There are also shortages in Chhlaung and Krauch Chmar districts. Once we resolve enemies, we can come up with solutions for food supplies, clothing and production. For example, Kracheh district previously lacked food supplies.

Now Kracheh province can guarantee food supplies to Chhlaung and Tromoung districts.

What we would like to make clear here is that whether the problem is the people's living standards or production, the determining factor is state power. If the state power is that of the Party then it will genuinely be strong, it will be possible to resolve the people's living standards and both production and defence will be strong.

Our experience is therefore that wherever there are food shortages a new state power must be set up.

WHAT IS THE DIRECTION OF FUTURE EVOLUTION?

We see that the defence situation in 1977 is good because we are rid of the despicable Thuch, the despicable Ya and the despicable Chakrei.....ets.

The situation of the enemy in 1978 will be one in which he finds that /22/ he has fewer forces than before. As we sweep him cleanly away, the situation will be better and better than in 1977.

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ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER

Previously we were hit by shock assaults and traitorous state power was even set up in one or two villages along the border in the Northwest and the North. The situation is now maximally eased off, both on our soil and on the Thai side, and the Tai revolution is even carrying out shock assaults against the enemy. The enemy now finds itself in a defensive rather than an offensive situation. The Thai communications routes along our border are cut and they are unable to use them. They have been forced to withdraw the people from many villages along the border and move them further in. A number of their positions have been withdrawn. District and frontier trades people have run away to the provincial towns, and some of the rich people in the provincial towns have run away to Bangkok.

Initially, in 1975-76, the enemy was arrogant and looked down on us. Now he is at wit's end/?/.

ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER

From 1975 through 1978, they have been unable to attack us further; they have more and more been no longer able to attack us.

/23/ In November-December 1977 they launched a surprise attack against us using big forces, but their attacks gained nothing. In the future, they will more and more be no longer able to attack us.

On the contrary, from January 1978 on we have been able to carry out shock counter-assaults. For every ten attacks by us, they are able to attack us only four times. Therefore, although there are some spearheads on which they are able to attack us and push us back, the general situation is that we are able to push them back.

In the future, we have the potential to attack and push but the enemies a lot more.

THE YUON, FOR THEIR PART, LACK FORCES

1. We have smashed very many of their forces from November-December 1977 through the present, especially in the Southwest. The Yuon enemy will have great difficulties no matter whether they press-gang soldiers from the north or from the south. They have only tactical forces for defence.

2. In a circumstance in which the Yuon already have this difficulty, they now have yet another difficulty. We have correctly evaluated the direction in which things would evolve from 1975 through the present.

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/24/ The Youn strategy has been to take Laos and then surround Kampuchea . Now the Yuon are losing in Kampuchea, whereas the Laotians have nothing with which they could attack us. The Thai and ASAN are not going along with them, and the Yuon cannot make any entry into the Thai and Southeast Asian revolutions.

Now the Yuon are furthermore in contradiction with the Chinese. This is a Soviet political and military strategy. Now that the quarrel is overt, they don't dare to withdraw forces from the north to attack Kampuchea. They cannot withdraw in division strength. They can only withdraw some cadres from here and there.

They cannot press-gang force from the south, either.

3.They have been in economic difficulties for a long time now, and now the Chinese have also cut aid. According to what the Yuon say, the Chinese have cut 72 projects, and this makes ever more difficulties for the Yuon.

Military and economic difficulties lead therefore to political difficulties as well.

The Yuon thus do not find themselves in an offensive situation. We find ourselves in an offensive situation militarily, politically, economically and /25/ even diplomatically.

MEASURES

1. Continue cleaning up inside the Party, army and state power so that they are ever increasingly clean and pure.

2. Impel strongly forward the carrying out of shock assaults along the border at the level of smashing the enemies' living forces, politics and economy.

/26/ WHAT ARE THE CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN OUR REVOLUTION AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION? WHAT ARE THE FORCES OPPOSING OUR REVOLUTION?

We put this forward in order to have exchanges among ourselves and to continue making further assessments, as problem is a political one.

As it has been put forward internationally, the contradiction is between socialism and the capitalists. This is basically the correct problematic, and it is basically correct that there must be measures attacking capitalism.

In Kampuchea, however, there is a concreteness to this contradiction which we must examine. Speaking generally, it's a contradiction between socialism and capitalism, but there is something more concrete that we must examine.

Immediately after liberation the attacks against us began. Who was attacking us? It was the CIA, the Yuon and the KGB. We never encountered any ordinary bourgeois or

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petty bourgeois elements. That is why we would like to stress that if we speak generally about capitalism we fear that our analytical viewpoint /26/ will be unclear and our measures will be scattered and not hit on the head the target we must attack. The heads we must attack are CIA, Yuon and KBG. Since 1975 the forces that have attacked us have all nothing other than CIA and Yuon. The despicable Chakrei, the despicable Chhouk, the despicable Thuch, the despicable Deuan, the despicable Pheum, the despicable Sy, the despicable Kaev Meah and the despicable Chey were all CIA. The only difference among them was that some of these CIAs were more on the American side while others were more on the Yuon side.

Document after document demonstrates that they initially were together with the despicable Nol to attack the communists.

Only thereafter, once they saw that American imperialism was more and more in retreat, did they join with the Yuon to attack the communists.

What we want to make clear here is that these traitorous networks have always been with the CIA and the Yuon, and that inside the Yuon the CIA is already predominant.

In sum, we have seen no forces other than these traitorous network attacking us.

The forces that have been opposing our revolution were organized as traitorous networks in Kampuchea by CIA organs representing American imperialism and other reactionary forces and the Yuon and Soviets. /28/ They had already organized such forces, they are organizing them now, and they will continue to organize them. All such opposition forces are CIA, Yuon and Soviet espionage agents, and it is these forces that we must attack.

To sum things up. on the other side in the contradiction with us are the CIA, the Yuon and the KGB, and among these the Yuon are the most noxious and acute.

Proceeding from such an analysis of this acute life-and -death contradiction, what are our attack measures?

1. Our sharpest attack is on the aggressive, territory-swallowing Yuon.

2. At the same time, we attack the CIA and KGB.

We attack simultaneously, but we pay most attention to attacking the Tuon because they are the most noxious and acute.

In being the most acute, the Yuon are not bigger than American imperialism or the Sovietus. But it is inherent in their nature that they must take Kampuchean soil for themselves. The policy of taking Kampuchea and putting it into the Indochina Federation derives from economics, as does the measure of attacking Kampuchea militarily. Another

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way in which the Yuon are acute is that they are doing this directly whereas the CIA is far away; its country and middle-man /?/ organs are far away. It's the same with the KGB.

/29/ In this conjunction we must examine whether the Kamouchean people have any contradictions with the revolution and have anything in unity with the revolution.

In the period of the national-democratic revolution, we successively gathered forces in order to seize successive victories. But if one compares the forces we were able to gather in the national-democratic revolution period with those we have been able to gather in the period of socialist revolution, the popular forces we have been able to gather in the period of socialist revolution are stronger and more numerous than those back in the national-democratic revolution era. They are stronger and more numerous because our Party holds state power throughout the country. Moreover, the poor and lower middle peasants are generally on the side of the revolution. Petty bourgeois pupils and students are not as strong as poor and lower-middle peasants, but they are generally with the revolution. Only a minority are complicated or hesitant /?/.

We must see things this way to see that our revolution is not isolated. We possess greater popular and mass forces than /30/ at the time of the national-democratic revolution.

We do not see any powerful forces emerging from the people attacking our revolution. There are only CIA, Yuon and Soviet forces attacking our revolution.

/31/III. EXAMINING THE DUTIES OF CONTINUING TO MAKE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

What virtues and shortcomings have we had over the past six months?

OUR VIRTUES IN TERMS OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

First, We have continued to eliminate the feudalist and private capitalist systems. No matter how the enemy tried, he was unable to recover during the first semester of 1978. We continued further to attack him and to seize victories in the ideological, political and organizational spheres. Among these victories, those in the organizational sphere played the important role because we attacked and smashed to smithereens the top apparatus of the force that we were waving the flag of private capital. Attacking them meant inflicting defeats on the positions of feudalism, capitalism and privatism. Both imperialism and revisionism were defeated, as were the domestic feudalists and capitalists.

/32/ Such organizational attacks are of very strong help in ideological and political terms. It would not work to attack only ideologically and politically and not to attack organizationally, because those who do ideological and political dissemination are the cadres. If these cadres were CIA/Yuon and revisionist moles, they could then not do

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ideological and political dissemination /?/. In attacking all such persons we are attacking and eliminating enemy poisons.

In accordance with this experience we must continue to go all out throughout the whole country to do political and ideological work such that the good persons get better and better, but in conjunction with this we must go all out in organizational struggle to attack elements opposed organizationally to socialist revolution. If we don't think about organization, we cannot defeat them in battle. There is therefore one special point that we must add at this time, which is that socialist revolution is not made simply by political and ideological struggle alone. There must be a struggle attacking the enemy state power and strengthening and expanding the Party's state power. If there is no solution in terms of organization, we cannot uproot them politically and ideologically.

/33/VIRTUES IN THE SPHERE OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION:

In this interval we have gone heavy on political and ideological work. In fact, although political and ideological work help to nurture socialist revolution in terms of politics and ideology, they are insufficient. If all we do is give organizational training in schools, the enemy will always be right alongside is nurturing and poisoning as he pleases. We must therefore be absolute organizationally. If we are not absolute organizationally we cannot make socialist revolution. Because who is it that makes socialist revolution? Only those who are satisfied with socialist revolution.

We must purge enemy elements. Elements who are not good in an ordinary way must be removed to go fulfil other jobs. Don't rely on the fact that they may be Party or Youth League members, because the enemy set up their traitorous apparatus long ago. This is why organizational struggle is a key imperative. If there are organizational solutions, then things will move speedily and training will go quickly because the enemy will have no oppositional forces.

/34/ EXAMINATION OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION DUTIES

Our virtues are that we have completed the 1977 duties and continued socialist construction over the past six months with an enthusiastic mass movement, and gotten a big paddy crop.

Looking separately at the East Zone, with an average calculated at two tons of paddy per hectare, there was a paddy surplus of 100,000 tons in rice. But now what's happened. They gathered up all the paddy produced and gave it to the Yuon and sold it in order to attack our revolution. What we want to say, however, is that a lot was produced.

Generally speaking, the movement during the first semester of 1978 was powerful as regard the beginning of the year paddy movement and the dams and feeder canals movement. Some places where shortages previously existed now have enough to eat. They have been able to grow a lot more of strategic crops in the form of bananas, corn and tubers.

A deficiency is that 30-40% of the paddy produced was destroyed, which adversely affected export to a certain extent and at the same time adversely affected the people's living standards to a certain extent. From 20-30% of the people have food shortages and are not eating in accordance with the ration stipulated by the Party. This is the second shortcoming.

/35/ A third shortcoming, which is important causally, is the shortcoming of not have eliminated in time the elements who were wrecking socialist construction.

The measures to resolve this are:

1. Political and ideological nurturing

2. But what plays the important role is there must be organizational solutions because political and ideological understanding and nurturing have already gone as far as they can go.

The problem that is posed is who is that constructs socialism. Good persons put things into practice well. It is therefore imperative to struggle to eliminate enemy state power and set up new state power. It doesn't matter whether it involves Party members or non-Party figures, old cadres or new cadres, as long as they are honest and loyal they can do it. Therefore attention must be paid to doing this successively whether in the cooperatives, on each spearhead, or in the districts. The problem of whether or not the 1978 plan for 3.5 tons/7 tons can be achieved depends on organizing. And in the problem that is posed it is not the masses who are important but the problem of core leading cadres. In the zones it's the zone Committee; in the sectors, the sector committees; in the districts, the district committees; in the cooperatives, the cooperative committees and the leading cores in the various spearheads. Organizational problems must be successively resolved and organization must be successively improved. If this problem can be solved, socialism can be built strongly, and the problem of new and old people will not arise.

Will there be cadres if there are such transfers? There have been not a few transfers between 1976 and the present, but have been able to maintain control and are even stronger than before. This is because the determining factor is not whether the names are new or old; It is whether the persons in question are honest and loyal vis-a-vis the line or not.

S/37/ EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION OF POPULAR LIVING STANDARDS

Our experience is that the problem of popular living standards during the first semester of 1978 resembles other problems.

VIRTUES:

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A large number of places have been able to come up with solutions : clothing is much more sufficient, shelter much more meticulously organized and health and sanitation are much better than previously, and study is meticulously organized. Staple and other foods are in sufficient supply. Places that are so developed have a lot of capital for fulling guaranteeing popular livelihood.

They therefore possess mastery, and this mastery is not an accidental mastery, because they have their own foundations.

DEFICIENCIES :

We cannot utilize the 1977 produce to serve popular livelihood 100%. In amount we were able to achieve 100% paddy production, but there is a lack of staple food. Medicines and clothing. /38/ These shortages are not due to the popular movement, but are do to wrecking by traitorous elements. This is a major deficiency of ours in terms of solving the popular livelihood.

WHAT MUST THE SOLUTION BE?

It can only be overthrowing the concealed state power of those boring from within and organizing a new state power honest and loyal to the Party. Wherever we can have such a solution we can resolve the popular livelihood. The first solution is to take the paddy hidden by the enemy. The second solution is to take it from neighboring places to help out. We can have solutions in terms of rice, corn and tubers.

The light for solution of popular livelihood is clear : We have very many conditions for solution of popular livelihood. We have the social bases for good solutions.

From now on, as regards this problem, there must be transfers whenever there is starvation in any zone, sector, district or cooperative for one year, so that good and strong persons can come in with solutions.

/39/VI. THE PROBLEM OF BUILDING UP THE PARTY'S LEADING PORCES IN TERMS BOTH OF PARTY CADRES AND CADRES OUTSIDE THE PARTY

In the first stage we transferred cadres at the zonal, district and cooperative leves to a certain extent, but others remained.

In the second stage we attacked and overthrew block after block of traitorous cadres boring from within in the zones, sectors, ministries and offices.

We saw an amelioration of the situation, and there weren't many complications. Things are now only 10-20% as complicated as they were previously, and things have been solved successively.

What is our experience in selecting new persons? Where do we get them from? We take the good pole from among the masses, the Party and the army, no matter whether they are veterans or newcomers. The newcomers are even stronger than the veterans because of their clean status.

On the contrary /sic?/, we have come up with newcomers who are very much stronger /40/ stronger by far. These cadres have been tasted in combat with the enemy, resolving popular livelihood and leading production, and they are up to such combat.

DEFICIENCY: We were unable immediately to resolve the traitors completely. As we resolved them successively, they had the opportunity to conceal themselves for a long time.

THE REASON WHY DELAY WAS NECESSARY

- In examining the documents, there was both meticulous weighing and analysis of them and a search for a correct orientation of solutions, because the resolution each cadre did not affect only a single person, but adversely affected entire networks. Whether the networks were big or small it affected them in their entirety.
- The second reason was that we could not clearly grasp the biographies of every cadre. We could grasp those of a part of them, but not of another part, and we therefore did not dare to make judgements without clear-cut accounting /? tou-toat/. We had to have a clear-cut collective accounting.

This is nevertheless to be considered a shortcoming. /41/ our experience is that we must be expeditious than this. We must grasp cadres' biographies more expeditiously. We must go down and survey and extract the essence of /? trâng-trang/ mass opinion in order to grasp cadres' biographies.

Second, make an examination of the concrete categories within the movement.

There must be an examination of "left" implementation which burns things to a crisp and also right implementation. Other behavior and acts must also be examined: liberalism, morals, authoritarianism vis-a-vis the people. Everything concrete must be examined, as this forms the essence of their biographies. This will result in us being able to make judgements more quickly than in the past. Don't let things drag out. If things drag out, losses will be incurred, losses in national defence tasks, losses in socialist revolution tasks, losses in popular livelihood.....Currently, the people, the masses in the Party and the army all are imbued with the line and can see what is correct and what is mistaken and what is revolutionary and what is not. We must inquire with male and female combatants about cadres. The masses judge who is good and who is not.

Those of us who are Party cadres must therefore maintain our mass /42/ character so that they will have the courage to tell us things and not be afraid of us. We must make

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the masses stronger and stronger so that in terms of morale and in terms of physical strength they can struggle to build up cadres well and eliminate cadres who are not good.

/43/ VII. THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE KAMPUCHEAN REVOLUTION

Is the international status of the Kampuchean revolution on the international stage evolving retrogressively or growing and developing forward?

1. The status of our revolution is not retrogressing, no matter how American imperialism and the reactionaries may be blaspheming us. If one makes an accounting of our opponents and those who are assisting us, the latter are ever on the increase, and those who are vacillating are ever on the decrease.

The international status of our revolution has a leap forward character particularly over the past six months. The reasons are as follows:

- The first reason is that it is renowned the world over that Kampuchea is selling rice, and in a situation where the Yuon and some other countries are starving we are building ourselves up by ourselves and with independence/mastery are able to resolve popular livelihood.
- The second reason is due to our ability to defend the country. The ability to defend the country is a matter of tremendous influence. Our defeat of /44/ the Americans has been greatly influential from 1975 to the present, but the elimination of the Yuon aggression and the difficulties our attacks have created for them are tremendously influential. We are waving the flags of independence and sovereignty worldwide and not allowing the Yuon to commit aggression against us as they please. This demonstrates our valiance and courage and our combat capability. The world sees that we are genuinely independent and are capable of defending our independence. Our friendship is therefore very much wanted. No matter what is involved, our voice is very much wanted because it is a voice of independence.

As for the Yuon, they now no longer have independence: their voice is the voice of the Soviets.

The Marxist-Leninist parties in both North and South America and in France and Italy defend us. On the one hand they stand on the side of revolution. On the other they are excited by and satisfied with our revolution.

Mass organization in various countries throughout the world defend us.

The stance of most of the non-aligned countries is of assistance to us.

Even though the Thai state and the various Southeast Asian states don't /45/ assist us, they nevertheless are glad to see that we can defend ourselves.

Japan's invitation to us is due to our possession of our own identity.

All seven of these perspectives clearly demonstrate that both as regards virtues and deficiencies in the revolutionary movement in this six month interval the key problem playing the important leading role is the problem of organization: eliminating the traitorous state power boring from within our state power and setting up a new state power of our Party and revolution. This problem plays the leading role and is the key because if it can be correctly resolved it will have a good influence on various other duties, including national defence duties, socialist revolution, socialist construction and popular livelihood. This problem leads to a further strengthening of our class struggle stand. Previously we attacked these seven duties equally. Now we see that the problem of organization, of eliminating the traitorous state power boring from within our state power and of setting up a new state power of the Party plays the key leading role and is most predominant.

Revolutionary Flag, Special Number, May-June 1978

"The Party's Re-adjusted Orientation for Fulfilling 1978 Duties in the Days to Come" (pp. 47-p3)

/46/ I. THE GENERAL SITUATION AND THE GENETAL ORIENTATION OF REVOLUTIONARY DUTIES IN THE COMING FUTURE DURING 1978

1. During the first semester of 1978 there has been a tense, tough and profound struggle between the enemy and us, and it will continue because both the external and domestic enemies will go all out to recover and attack the /47/ Communist Party of Kampuchea. the Kampuchean revolution. the collective socialist regime in Kampuchea and the worker-peasant state power of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

However, both the external and domestic enemies have been much more severely defeated in this instance than in previous instances because:

- On the one hand, we have attacked and smashed the aggressive Yuon enemy coming from the outside, inflicting successive sever defeats on them;
- On the other hand, we have smashed the traitorous leading apparati throughout the country together with their faction; concretely, the traitorous forces in the East, Northwest and West Zones, in Phnum Penh, in 103, in kracheh and in Sector 25.

2. This is a one more new big victory of our Party, people and Revolutionary Army. It could be stipulated /? sanamat/ that on 17 April 1975 we liberated Kampuchea from the American imperialist enemy and various other traitorous forces by liberating our country from the grip of an overt external enemy.

As for the current victory, it can be considered as a second liberation by attacking and smashing the enemies boring right from within our Communist Party of Kampuchea /49/ among whom there were those with status who had even snuck in and infiltrated themselves in leading organs.

3. The experience of this additional instance of combat leds us to a clear stipulation of what our antagonistic and acute contradictions are and of which of our foes must be attacked and smashed.

- The basic antagonistic contradiction in our society currently is the contradiction between our socialist revolution and capitalist forces opposed to the revolution.
- However, they take the concrete form of forces composed of traitorous ethnic Khmers /?/ who are agents of the American CIA, agent of the aggressive,

territory-swallowing Yuon and agents of the Soviet KGB. All such enemy agents are organs of American imperialism who represent international imperialism, international capitalist and international reaction. They represent the revisionists and expansionists of the Soviets, the Yuon and their faction and international reactionary forces. All such forces possess a dangerously noxious character because they are to be found concealed right in the ranks of our Party and revolution /50/ from within and to open the way for invasion by external enemies.

Our duty is therefore is to attack absolutely, powerfully and successively these CIA, Yuon and KGB agents, to attack them and attack them again so that they are liquidated and successively liquidated again and again. Only if they are attacked in this manner will their veteran forces be completely smashed along with their remnant forces and their new forces. We find ourselves in a situation where we are on the offensive, have mastery and are advancing to trample the enemy and seize successive victories, whereas the enemy is being smashed to smithereins, scattered to the winds and liquidated.

4. When we completely smash to smithereins and liquidate the enemy successively in this manner, it leads to the situation of our revolution in every sphere becoming more and more excellent and advancing ever more tremendously forward both in the context of the revolution in our country and in the good influence it has on the international stage.

- It leads to our national defence duties and our revolutionary state power becoming more and more excellent.
- It leads to an ever more rapid and powerful development of our socialist revolution and socialist construction duties and our raising of the /51/ popular livelihood.
- It leads to ever more excellent, quick and powerful building of the Party's leading forces at every level and in every sphere.
- It leads to an ever more excellent and lofty international status for our revolution.

IN SUM, WE MUST SEE :

- A. How tense, tough and powerful the combat has been between us and the enemy;
- B. In conjunction with this, we must see the greatness of our victories over domestic and external foes.

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- C. /52/ We must see the enemy's face clearly, without blurs and without confusion, in order to attack on target the enemies that must be smashed.
- D. We must see as key the duty of attacking the domestic enemy, that this is related to every one of all our other duties. Every Party level must therefore adopt the role of leading the army and the people to attack all such enemies, sweep them cleanly away, sweep, and sweep and sweep again and again ceaselessly, so that our Party forces are pure, our leading forces at every level and in every sphere are clean at all times.

III. EXAMINING THE RESULTS OF THE CARRYING OUT OF DUTIES IN EVERY SPHERE AND THE FUTURE READJUSTMENT OF THE ORIENTAION IN 1978

1. The general virtue is that we have defended the country, the Party's revolutionary state power of workers and peasants, the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Democratic Kampuchea fully, completely and with mastery in tough and sharp combat in which we successively smashed internal and external enemies.

We have , however, a number of deficiencies in that we were blurred about the enemy, particularly the concealed enemies boring from within the Party and the revolution. We do not yet have a clear-cut recognition of them, don't yet attack them on target, strongly, absolutely or successively. Futhermore, we found ourselves to be pacifist to be pacifist, subjective, underestimating the enemy and overjoyed with our victories and the state power we controlled throughout the country. This was the situation in some circumstances and in some spheres and bases, but it also had a general character.

/54/ One thing that must therefore be done in the future is absolutely to eliminate at all times the above erroneous viewpoints but always consistently nurturing a stance of high revolutionary vigilance. At the same time, we must adopt anger against the enemy, particularly the concealed enemies boring from within, and agitate the movement to carry out shock assaults against this enemy, while relying on the collective forces of the masses in and outside the Party.

2.Regarding the results in terms of the duties of making socialist revolution, constructing socialism and raising popular livelihood, our virtue is that we have a boiling mass movement. We have carried out this duty with maximum success, almost completely achieving the Party's requirements. We have thereby brought about an expansive development of our revolutionary movement in every sphere to another strong extent.

The deficiency is however that the excellent results that derived from the tempestuous efforts and combat of the mass movement were in important part endangered by our foes, particularly the concealed enemies boring from within who carried out systematic wrecking at various echelons and levels and in /55/ various ways and styles via their organized traitorous organs (CIA, and yuon and KGB agents). In

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terms of percentages, the losses were perhaps in excess of 30%. This had an adverse effect to a certain extent on the duties of continuing the socialist revolution and building socialism, as well as on popular livelihood.

The key problem in the future impelling forward of the duties of socialist revolution, socialist construction and raising popular livelihood according to the Party's requirements is the importance of gathering forces to carry out shock assaults against block after block of concealed enemies boring from within our Party and revolution. In other words, gather forces to topple the reactionary, anti-revolutionary, anti-people state power of the CIA and the Yuon and Soviet agents who have snuck in and are pretending to be cadres of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, liquidating it and setting up a new state power genuinely of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and in which genuine cadres of the Communist Party of Kampuchea hold state power totally.

We must see that this struggle is not little, ordinary one or one of normal transfer of cadres. /56/. It is a combat between the enemy and ourselves in order to smash the state power of concealed enemies and organize a new state power of our Communist Party of Kampuchea. The nature of the combat, of the shock assaults must therefore always consistently be powerful, razor sharp and absolute.

It is necessary at the same time to be attentive to carrying out even more strongly and profoundly the duties of making socialist revolution, to continue carrying out shock assaults to build socialism further in every sphere according to the Party plan, and to continue being attentive to resolving and raising popular livelihood, so that it undergoes a further increasing development in terms of food supply, clothing, health, shelter and training and education. In places where there are shortages there absolutely, the absolutely must be increasing develop to assure and guarantee things.

3. As regards the results in building up our Party's leading forces we have a virtue in that over the past first semester we eliminated and swept cleanly away a considerable number of concealed enemies boring from within the Party and our revolutionary state power in the bases, ministries, offices and military units of organization, and instead excellently assigned cadres of our Communist Party of Kampuchea /57/ to accept leadership responsibility and hold state power in such bases, offices, ministries and military units of organization. We thereby came into possession of sufficient conditions for the rapid strengthening and expansion of the ranks of quality cadres in and outside the Party according to our Party's qualifications. Things differ from the era in which concealed enemy infiltrators held leading state power, when they set things up to organize the systematic strengthening and expansion only of their ranks of traitorous cadre in and outside the Party.

Our deficiency was that we did not eliminate in a timely manner and completely cleanly the concealed enemy forces boring from within as requested by the Party, which led to their having many opportunities to build up, strengthen and expand their traitorous forces at various leading levels in the bases, offices, ministries and army, which meant that they could wreck to a fairly important extent the duties of defending and building

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and building the socialist revolution and popular livelihood and the building up of our leading forces. It also meant that to an important extent we encountered successive obstacles.

/58/ Therefore, in order to be able to build and build well and rapidly the Party's leading forces, we can only, on the one hand, strengthen and expand the leading forces of the Communist Party of Kampuchea at every level that are already good and make them ever more stalwart, and, on the other hand, must necessarily successively eliminate every last one of concealed enemies boring from within who are holding leading roles in camouflage /? banlam/ at various levels. and reorganize the assignment of the leading forces of our Communist Party of Kampuchea.

4.As regards the duty of gathering friends worldwide and raising the international status of our Party on the international stage, over the past first semester we have gotten excellent results having a leap forward character compared with previous periods. This is because on the one hand that we already had the pre-existing capital from our successive defence work and resolutions of popular livelihood. And then during the past first semester we engaged in combat in a full-fledged and total manner, both with the sphere of American imperialism and its faction and, in particular, with the aggressive, territory-swallowing Yuon enemy and its faction. As for uplifting and resolving popular livelihood, it also underwent a more increased development than in previous periods.

/59/ However, we still have many points of shortcoming due to our subjectivity in not yet powerfully fulfilling our duties in every sphere according to the Party's requirements, in particular as regards resolving and uplifting popular livelihood. The key reason for this is the successive assaults and wrecking by the concealed enemies boring from within. Futhermore, reactionary enemies and other factions actively and successively engaged in activities slandering us.

Therefore, in order to impel forward the gathering of ever increasingly more friendly forces worldwide and to raise ever increasingly higher the international status of our Party and revolution, we can only go all out to eliminate concealed enemies boring from within so that they are ever more excellently scattered to the winds and smashed to smithierins, ever more excellently defend the country and resolve popular livelihood.

/60/ To summarize generally, in order to impel further forward revolutionary duties in every sphere ever more powerfully and to make achievements according to the Party's requirements, the key problem among all the problems in every sphere is attacking and eliminating the concealed enemies boring from within. Only when all such enemies have been dealt with and cleaned out can the duties in every sphere, base, office, ministry and military unit of organization develop rapidly both qualitatively and quantitatively at the Party's pace of fantastic great leaps forward.

/61/ III.THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS MORE AND MOER EXCELELNT AND MORE AND MORE FAVORABLE TO THE KAMPUTHEAN REVOLUTION

We see clearly that:

1. There have to an important extent been qualitative changes in the current world situation because, on the one hand, the forces of revolution and independence are now more clearly prominent and the anti-revolutionary and reactionary forces and the forces of aggression, expansion and territory-swallowing have been clearly revealed on the international stage, with the result that all peoples and all countries in the world can assess and judge things lucidly. Our Kampuchea revolution has contributed to an important extent to this change in the world situation.
2. The good influences of the forces of revolution and independence have thereby been forever expanding and growing and have increasing forces of assistance have successively come into existence for them. The anti-revolutionary and reactionary forces and the forces of aggression, expansion and territory-swallowing have been ever more unmasked, are ever more putrid and have been increasingly condemned /62/ by all people and countries in the world.
3. In Asia the contradiction between the American imperialist and Soviet great powers is ever more acute. The situation of combat among various forces in Asia is complex, but gives an excellent perspective to our revolution. The despicable Yuon, who are our direct life and death adversary, have many contradictions of all types and are encountering many complex hardships in their own country and with Kampuchea, China, the people of Laos and Southeast Asian countries. The current situation of the Yuon's contradiction with China was a profound political character and also has an influence on them economically and military. It means the Yuon are now encountering severe hardships and these hardships will be prolonged into the future.
4. As for the situation in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Europe, as well as in Oceania, the contradiction between American imperialism and Soviet revisionism is becoming successively more and more acute. This means that both these great powers /43/ are more and more entangled in these places.

With specific regard to the Soviet revisionists and their faction, whose desire it is to expand worldwide and to seize the positions of American imperialism, they are entangled and bogged down everywhere, particularly in Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

Things of this sort are favorable to our revolutionary movement and the world national liberation and revolutionary movements.

In a situation where American imperialism is entangled in many places worldwide, the Soviet revisionists are entangled in many places worldwide and the Yuon are encountering increasing new hardships in every sphere, especially their difficulties with China, all this is directly favorable to our revolutionary movement in the spheres of defending and building socialism and uplifting popular livelihood, just as it is gathering friendly forces worldwide.