

ងខ្ពន់នុំ៩ទ្រះ**ខសាមញ្ញ**តួខតុលាភារតម្លូវា

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

ಖ್ಯಾಮಾರ್ಥನಾಗುವುದೇ ಜ್ಞಾನ್ಯಾಪ್ತಾ

Office of the Co-Investigating Judges Bureau des Co-juges d'instruction សំឈុំឡើឡូចមានឈ្លា

Criminal Case File /Dossier pénal

រោខ/No: 002/14-08-2006

Investigation

1018/No: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ

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ជាង ខាមសា ព្រះធសាមវិនិ

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ទំនាន់ចោត<u>ខែការស្វាប់បច្ចើយសាភ្មិ</u> Written Record of Intelview of Winess

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ថ្ងៃ ខ្មែរ នៃការបញ្ជាក់ (Certified Date /Date de certification):

We, YOU Bunleng (ឃ្មុំ ប៊ុនឡេង) and Marcel LEMONDE, Co-Investigating Judges of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the "ECCC"),

With Mr. Som Ratana (សោមរពនា) and Mr. LY Chantola (លី ច័ន្ធតុលា) as Greffiers;

Noting the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, dated 27 October 2004 (the "ECCC Law");

Noting Rules 24, 28 and 60 of the ECCC Internal Rules;

On the sixth of May, the year two thousand and nine, at 9.15 a

With OUCH Channora (អ៊ូច ចាន់ណូវ៉ា) and BELL Sakpheakdey (បែល សក្ដិភក្ដី), sworn interpreters of the Extraordinary Chambers;

Noting the ongoing judicial investigation against NUON Chea SS 23 and other Charged Persons in relation to charges of Crimes Against Humanity and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, offences defined and punishable under Articles 5, 6, 29 (new) and 39 (new) of the ECCC Law;

Recorded the statements of the witness who provided the following information regarding his personal identity:

Last name: SUONG សូង

First name: Sikoeun ស៊ីគឿន

Alias: Kung គង់ or Thorn ធន.

Born on 15 December 1936 in Chrôy Âmpĭl ជ្រោយអំពិល Village, Châmbâk ចំបក់ Subdistrict,

Prêk Prasâb ព្រែកប្រសប់ District, Kratie ក្រចេះ Province.

Nationality: Cambodian Occupation: At home

Father's name: SUONG Kăk សួង កាក់ (deceased)

Mother's name: NOU Rēn § \$\$\$ (deceased)

Present residence at Kbal Spean ក្បាលស្ពាន Village, Malai ម៉ាឡៃ Subdistrict, Malai ម៉ាឡៃ District,

Banteay Mean Chey បន្ទាយមានជ័យ Province.

Wife's name: TAING Huy Eng តាំង ហ៊ុយអេង (living)

Children: 5 (one of whom died in 1979)

Previous criminal Record: None

The witness declared that he can read, write and understand the Khmer language and the French language.

Therefore, the original of this Written Record is written in the Khmer language.

The witness told us that he is not related to either the Charged Persons or to any of the Civil Parties.

The witness took an oath in accordance with Rule 24 of the ECCC Internal Rules.

We advised the witness that an audio and video recording was being made of this Interview.

Questions-Answers:

Q: You gave us the text of your "revolutionary biography" and also a commentary dated 7 March 2003. Why did you write this commentary and why at that time?

A: First I want to state that I have nothing to change in this document; it was written on a proposal by my PHD supervisor, Professor Stéphane Courtois from Nanterre University. The idea was to append this text to my thesis. Finally, I abandoned my thesis in 2004 following heart surgery. It has been replaced by the project of writing a book.

Q: Why isn't the commentary on your "revolutionary biography" appended to the manuscript you gave us?

A: It is possible that it will finally be included in the book, but discussions with the editor are in progress through Stéphane Courtois about the details of the publication.

- Q: It seems that, in this commentary, you are more critical of the Khmer Rouge than in the manuscript. Indeed one finds very strong comments in the commentary compared with the manuscript, which seems more subtle, for instance:
- **p 11** "Then began an adventure which lasted 40 years (1956-1996) and which has led to an utter disaster, from a political, as well as from a personal point of view [ECCC translation]".
- **p_17** "The KR leaders seemed to engage in empty talk when they spoke of 'democratic revolution', 'peoples' democracy' or 'democratic centralism'. In truth, their regime was a dictatorship, the most totalitarian, the bloodiest and the most inhuman in History [ECCC translation]".
- <u>p 23</u> "...under the KR, you don't believe in something but you are forced, by your will and by vital necessity, to say the opposite of what you really think. That was why a lot of militants, confessing the mistakes they had made in accomplishing their activist work, were the subject of blind purges and thus lost their lives unfairly, whereas opportunists, who could swim in troubled waters, often managed to arrive at the top of the power structure [ECCC translation]".
- **A:** I think this is just an appearance and I invite you to read the epilogue to my manuscript. It is normal that the comments you quote do not appear as strong in a few hundred pages of manuscript because they are hidden among a lot of anecdotes.
- Q: In the commentary of your biography, at p. 36, you wrote: "I had been elected as member of the NUFK Committee in Beijing in charge of security matters. Consequently, I took responsibility for arresting KER Chhieng in the land, one of Prince Sihanouk with \$\tilde{\gamma}\$'s bodyguards and son of KER Meas in bids, then Cambodian ambassador in China. KER Chhieng in the land provided information to the Italian embassy in Beijing about the Chen Yang munitions factory he had visited with Prince Sihanouk with \$\tilde{\gamma}\$. I also took the decision to arrest NOUTH Chhoeum \$\tilde{\gamma}\$ \textit{UB}\$, a pro Sihanouk with \$\tilde{\gamma}\$ journalist, guilty of spying for the Hong Kong secret service" [ECCC translation] Can you provide more details?
- A: KER Chhieng កែ ឈៀង and Nouth Chhoeum នុក ឈឺម were subject to accusations by the Chinese government. However, China could not apply its own law because it had recognised the RGNUC as a legitimate authority, so it let us deal with that. Consequently, the RGNUC told the NUFK Committee in Beijing to arrest these people. As member of the Committee, I took care of it. I note that when I say I was in charge of security, my role was limited to these two persons. In addition, I was acting under the oversight of General DUONG Sam Ol ខ្លង សំអុល, President of the Committee. The arrest was conducted by a commando led by a colonel from Lon Nol លន់ នល់'s army who had joined the NUFK. Actually, these two people were later released at the request of Prince Sihanouk សំហនុ. KER Chhieng កែ ឈៀង was to be sent to France, but when transiting through Bangkok he preferred to go back to Phnom Penh where he joined Lon Nol លន់ នល់ before being killed by the resistance.
- Q: At p. 40 of the commentary, concerning IENG Thirith គៀជ ពីវិទ្ធ 's departure from Hanoi on 12 May 1975, you wrote: "During the farewell banquet organized by the staff of

«Voice of the NUFK» in [honor of IENG Thirith អៀង ធីវិទូ], I had been given the responsibility of delivering the speech for the occasion. At that time, I didn't know why, it seemed that she didn't like my address. I think that, afterward, my relationship with her as well as her husband wouldbe marked by mutual suspicion, which didn't manifest itself openly. Like Son Sen សុន សេន, Ieng Sary អៀង សារី has always naively hearkened to his wife's opinions, though she was at a lower rank in the KR nomenclatura [ECCC translation]". Can you provide more details about IENG Thirith អៀង ធីវិទូ's personality and her relationship with her husband?

A: In this excerpt, I emphasized the wives' influence; especially concerning Ieng Sary អៀង សារី and Son Sen សុន សេន. Both were seriously subject to their wives influence. Ieng Sary អៀង សារី always defended his wife, which did not necessarily mean he agreed with her, being more in the nature of family relations. Normally, a good communist should not have given priority to family relations but to the party.

Q: In Cambodia, one says "If the husband is a commander, the wife is a colonel". What would have been the consequences if the wife did not like someone?

A: I do not have any precise example since the couple was not working in the same ministry.

Q: You also write, at p. 9: "SIM Vansy ស៊ឹម ព័ន៌ស៊ី was a leader of Son Ngoc Thanh's Popular Movement. She was like IENG Thirith គឿង ធីវិទ្ធ in many ways: same conviction, same tenacity, same acrimony towards her political adversaries [ECCC translation]". Can you provide more details?

A: The remark applies to Cambodian women in general and not especially to IENG Thirith អៀង ធីវិទុ.

Q: Given that you worked very closely with IENG Thirith គៀង ធីវិទ្ធ in Hanoi, what can you say about her personality?

A: She is a very intelligent person, in the academic sense; she is an excellent writer, as much in Khmer as in French or English. She had very strong convictions regarding political matters; it was very difficult to make her change her mind. I would say that she was a very good "apparatchik", a good executor [of orders], very brave and very demanding of herself and her coworkers; she was personally trained her bodyguards, cooks, etc.

Q: When one reads your text, one has the feeling she did not like you that much.

A: It was not really a personal problem but more a political one. Among the Khmer Rouge, there were a lot of factions. Personally, I did not belonged to any faction and in these conditions it is difficult to rise in the hierarchy.

Q: On p. 47 of the commentary, you state: "In the beginning, I was surprised that Ieng Sary [H] had brought some people into the Party who didn't adhere to the communist ideology. Peh Bunret INFI ŸSIÄÄ, former representative of DK to the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, as well as Kor Bunheng IM ŸSIUH, former adviser to the Permanent representation of DK to UN-New York, are in this category. It was, for Ieng Sary [H] had for ilike other KR leaders, a common practice in order to bring together as many partisans as possible, to strengthen their clan, in preparation for a possible power competition within the Party, and, in this way, within the State [ECCC translation]". Can you give more details?

A: I may have been wrong to use the word "clan", which is not correct in my opinion. I prefer using the word "faction". Nevertheless, I maintain the analysis regarding the recruitment to make his influence stronger.

Q: On p. 15 you state: "The influence Khieu Samphan [2] [លំជន had on me was huge. He had personally taught me the fundamental principles of political economy. Notably, he used to tell me, before his departure to Cambodia, to follow the political line of the French Communist Party, hardened and experienced enough to merit our trust. Khieu Samphan [2] [លំជន was an example for everything: studies, modesty, helpful, relations with the masses, stringency on principles, etc... [ECCC translation]". Can you develop this?

A: What I have written concerns the period when I met Khieu Samphan [2] [លំជន in Paris; he was better known for his human qualities, his kindness and simplicity than for his political commitment. He was seen by the Khmer Rouge more as a tactical than a strategic force. He was made head of the Presidium because he fulfilled certain criteria: he was a doctor in economics, he was calm and self-controlled, but in 1975 and later he essentially played a figurative role. He did what the Party required of him, but he was not one of the leaders with real power, contrary to the members of the Party's standing committee, like NUON Chea § S m and Ieng Sary អៀង

Q: What form of contact did you have with Khieu Samphan ឱ្យី សំផន from 1975 to 1979?

A: It met him occasionally, for instance when he received credentials from ambassadors, but we never had the chance for a real talk. He was busy with other things; such as buying medicines and spare parts, etc abroad. Later, I lived with him and POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត៌ in 1981-1982. I noticed that his role was zero: under the tripartite governmental constitution, POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត៌ made all the decisions.

Q: In your interview on 19 December 2007, you said: "at that time, he [Khieu Samphan ខៀវ សំផន] came to meet me twice at the Foreign Ministry. He came to have me write a document to be put in the newspaper called Kampuchea. And I met him while he was

accepting the credentials of a French speaking ambassador." What was that document? What did Khieu Samphan ខៀវ សំដន tell you at that time?

A: Khieu Samphan ខៀវ សំជន came to find me because Pol Pol requested it. I remember vaguely that I was asked for a text on the international situation and foreign affairs policy of Democratic Kampuchea. Actually this text was never published; I assume that it did not correspond to the party's policy. Actually, I wonder if it was not a kind of test: there was a competition between POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត៌ and leng Sary អៀង សារី at that time and they were trying to pull me to POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត៌'s side. Khieu Samphan ខៀវ សំផន did not tell me anything in particular at that time, he is a man who can keep a secret.

Q: Did you have any contact with NUON Chea SS in from 1975 to 1979?

A: I never had any direct relations with him. I only saw him during a meeting organised in September 1977 for the drafting of the black book about the foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam towards Democratic Kampuchea. There were a number of representatives of the foreign affairs ministry present (THIOUNN Prasith ប្អូន ប្រាស់ទ្ធិ, KEAT Chhon គាត់ ឈន់ and myself). We had been summoned by POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត៌, and he was the one who spoke most. NUON Chea នួន ជា was more an observer than an active participant. After the meeting, I remember that NUON Chea នួន ជា called me at the end of 1977 to ask me to write an article about the foreign policy of Democratic Kampuchea for the "Kampuchea" newspaper. He asked me to do it as a "Samlor Kako សម្លាក់ប្រាប់" (a kind of Cambodian ratatouille) not too diluted, which meant that the article should be short and focus on the main points. This article was published at the end of 1977. I also had the opportunity to see NUON Chea នួន ជា in June 1976, at the Party school: he was one of the orators with POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត៌.

Except for these meetings, I never had any contact with NUON Chea 景島 的 from 1975 to 1979, because he was not dealing with the foreign policy (it was POL Pot ប៉ុល ពិតិ who took care of this). After the fall of the regime, I had the occasion to see NUON Chea 景島 的 in 1981 for a seminar with a hundred Khmer Rouge cadres. I add that, contrary to the seminars organized by POL Pot ប៉ុល ពិតិ or leng Sary អៀធិ សារី for instance, we had fun at the NUON Chea 景島 的 seminar of, since he liked to tell funny stories.

Q: When Ieng Sary អៀង សារី rallied [the government] in 1996, did he still have any contact with POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត, NUON Chea នួន ជា or Khieu Samphan ខៀវ សំផន?

A: No, I think Ieng Sary អៀង សារី had been sidelined for a long time. Officially, Ieng Sary អៀង សារី was excluded from the direction of Democratic Kampuchea in June 1994 when it was decided that the North of Cambodia would be administered by POL Pot ប៉ូល ពត៌ and Ta Mok

តាម៉ុក and the South by NUON Chea នួន ជា and Son Sen សុន សេន. Actually he had been sidelined since much earlier.

Suspension of the interview at 11h55

At 14h05 on the same day, we continued the interview.

Q: During an interview on 21 September 2008 (ERN 00231408), PHY Phuon \tilde{n} \tilde{n} \tilde{s} recalled that "Office 870 was responsible for decision-making on security affairs related to serious wrong-doing. If there was any confession, the names of those implicated were sent to Uncle Ieng Sary [4] \tilde{n} for him to clarify and tell them who those persons were and in what sections they worked. They were subsequently arrested by military personnel from Y10 of Office 870."

Do you confirm this presentation and can you give more details?

A: I cannot really confirm because I did not know about this. The only thing I can say is that you can trust what PHY Phuon ភ៊ី ភូន says because he was in charge of security and knows what he is talking about. I can only indicate that there were two units, Office 870 and the Security Committee (composed of POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត, NUON Chea នួន ជា, Son Sen ស៊ុន សេន, and then after the latter's move to the East, Vorn Vet វៃនិធីតិ until his arrest), which could be responsible for arrests, but I do not know exactly how all that worked.

Q: In the same interview, Phy Puon stated: "Cases of the most serious wrong-doing were taken from the implications in the confessions and reported by Duch 25 to Office 870, then sent to B1. Office 870 sent the information to Uncle Ieng Sary [H] h h h, who was the person who made the decisions on who was to be sent to be tempered. Uncle Ieng Sary [H] h h h told me that those confessions were sent to him with annotations. Sometimes he received them during communal mealtimes, and sometimes they were sent to his office via secret letters." Do you recall these processes that PHY Phuon h describes?

A: I do not know, this did not concern me. One of the regime's principles was that one must only knows what the Party wants us to know.

Q: Laurence Picq declared (ERN 00238499) that B1 was used as a transit area for suspect cadre before they were sent to S-21 to U 9. Could you provide details on this point?

A: You have the answer in my manuscript under the title "le ministère des affaires étrangères: antichambre de la mort? [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, antechamber of death?] (p.154). What I can say is that the cadre that Laurence Picq mentioned in her book were regional cadre who had problems in their region. They had been called to represent Democratic Kampuchea abroad. They received diplomatic training at the foreign affairs ministry, but the decision to call them to

Phnom Penh and name them as ambassadors was not taken by the foreign affairs ministry. It was an office 870 decision, i.e. POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត's decision. This is a common characteristic of all communist regimes. Consequently, in Kè Kim Huot កែ គឺមហ្វត's case, who was to have been nominated ambassador to Yugoslavia and disappeared before leaving, I believe that Ieng Sary អៀវ សារី took no part in the decision to bring him from the North zone to be nominated ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Q: Nevertheless, in your interview of 19 December 2007, you explained that when the Yugoslavian ambassador asked to meet Kè Kim Huot កែ គឺមហូត the day before he left, Ieng Sary អៀង សារី asked the staff in charge of protocol to respond that Kè Kim Huot កែ គឺមហូត was sick. Ieng Sary អៀង សារី thus appears to have been aware of his disappearance and the reasons for it?

A: Probably. It was not an isolated case either. There were other examples, like SUN Teanh ស៊ីន ទាញ, who was to be named ambassador to Thailand and was part of the delegation that went to Bangkok in July 1978 with Ieng Sary អៀង សារី. One may also name Nat ណាត, the former director of S-21 ស២១, who was to be named ambassador to the United Nations, and who disappeared.

Q: In the interview on 19 December 2007, you stated: "as for Keat Chhuon (sic) and Chuon Praseth (sic), they had tens of documents, but Ieng Sary អៀង សារី told POL Pot ប៉ុល ពត៌ that if KEAT Chhon គាត៌ ឈន់ and THIOUNN Prasith ជូន ប្រាសិទ្ធិ were arrested, the entire Foreign Ministry would have to be wiped out". How did you know there were dozens of documents? When did Ieng Sary អៀង សារី tell you that? Why were KEAT Chhon គាត៌ ឈន់ and THIOUNN Prasith ជូន ប្រាសិទ្ធិ not arrested?

A: Ieng Sary អៀង សារី did not inform me personally. He said that in a meeting of the general policy department if I remember correctly, attended by his closest assistants, THIOUNN Prasith ជូន ប្រាសិទ្ធិ, KEAT Chhon គាត់ ឈន់, Toch Kham Doeun តូច ខាំខឿន, OK Saqun ឪក សាគន្ធ, CHAN Youran ចាន់ យូរ៉ាន់, PEH Bunret ពេជ្រ ប៊ុនជ៉ុត and myself and also Mrs SO Sè ស្ង សៃ, secretary of the party cell. THIOUNN Prasith ជូន ប្រាសិទ្ធិ and KEAT Chhon គាត់ ឈន់ had been accused of being CIA agents and the security committee had wanted to arrest them. Ieng Sary អៀង សារី explained that the ministry could not work without them. One must understand that he had complete trust in them, all of these people, like me, were part of the marxist-leninist group of Khmers students in Paris, of which Ieng Sary អៀង សារី was the founder with Keng Vannsak ក្រាង វ៉ាន់សាក់and Rath Samoeun រ័ត្ន សាម៉ឿន.

Q: On 4 December 2007 (ERN 00223553), LONG Norin ឡុង និរិន្ទ describes attending meetings in B1 with Ieng Sary អៀង សារី.¹ Topics included training along political lines where many people from different groups including laborers and intellectuals attended. One of the groups was called the veteran group which included yourself, THIOUNN Prasith ជូន ប្រាសិទ្ធិ, KEAT Chhon គាត់ ឈន់, Toch Kham Doeun គូម ខាំខៀន, Sieng An សៀង អាន, and Peh Bunret ហើជ្រ ប៊ុនធើត. Another group, named the new group, included Mak Ben ម៉ក់ បេន, Kor Bunheng កោ ប៊ុនហង, In Sopheap អ៊ិន សុភាព, Yim Nolis ឃឹម ហ្គាលីស, and LONG Norin ឡង់ និរិន្ទ. At these meetings, LONG Norin ឡង់ និរិន្ទ says [leng Sary អៀង សារី] talked about the political lines, like the line of mastery, like growing vegetables near the Ministry, and he spoke about those who had been arrested and brought in, what mistakes they had made, especially those arrested and brought in from the bases, like Koy Thuon ក្រុយ ជូន, for one. As for those arrested from B1, he never raised their names, he only said that now they were afraid, like rats fallen into the water. Do you recall attending such meetings where those who had been arrested were discussed?

A: I do not know exactly about which meetings Long Norin \mathfrak{F}_{1} is talking. Nevertheless, if he was there, I was certainly present at the meeting too, but he remembers better than I. What he says must be true.

I remember one meeting in particular, at which Ieng Sary អៀង សារី read out the confession of Dr PING Kimsea ពីឯ គឺមស៊ា (PING Say's ពីឯ សយ brother, director of the Democratic Party Journal in the 50's) which described the CIA admission ceremony I mentioned earlier, admission organized under the presidency of ANG Kim Khoan អាង គឺមយន (close to Prince Sihanouk សីហនុ). I remember one excerpt which described a foreign woman working at the Pasteur Institute. Ieng Sary អៀង សារី did not give her name but I thought it was the wife of KEAT Chhon គាត ឈន់, of Vietnamese origin, who was working at the Pasteur Institute.

I also remember that Ieng Sary អៀង សារី read some excerpts from KOY Thuon's កុំយ ធ្ងន confession while I was present. Later So Hong សូរ ហុង gave me the whole confession on 7 January 1979, just before leaving Phnom Penh, and I skimmed it rapidly. I do not know where he got it.

☒ A copy of the Written Record was provided to the witness.

[🖾] The original of the audio-visual recording was sealed before the witness and was signed by us, the greffiers and the witness.

¹ Long Norin, 4 December 2007, 00223553, page 5 (ENG)

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1019/No: D167

At 16.50 p.m. we asked the Greffiers to read out this Written Record of Interview of witness as recorded.

🗵 After the Written Record was read, the witness stated that he had no objections and agreed to sign it.

witness Interpreters Greffiers Co-Investigating
Judges