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


**REVOLUTIONARY FLAG
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HONORARY RED FLAG

1976

- 1. Prasaut District**
- 2. Kampong Tralach Leu District**
- 3. Tram Kak District**

**The Letter Presenting the Honorary Red Flag
Of
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Kampuchea
To All Cadres, Combatants, and Peasant People
In the Cooperatives in
Prasaut District (East Zone),
Kampong Tralach Leu District (West Zone),
And Tram Kak District (Southwest Zone)**



I. Introduction

In order to push the offensive movement to accomplish the missions of defending the country, continuing socialist revolution, and building socialism in miraculous great leap style year after year, the Party's Central Committee has decided that any district with the best qualifications in terms of defending the country, continuing socialist revolution, and building socialism must receive the Honorary Red Flag.

During the past year of 1976, in a situation where we had just emerged from war and had shortages of every single thing, every base area, every unit, and every ministry bravely and unceasingly raised the flag of combat and went on the offensive to fulfill the tasks of the Party in the highest spirit of sacrifice to achieve the 1976 political mission well and to the maximum in every field, including defending the country, defending the fruits of our revolution, continuing socialist revolution, and building socialism, to strengthen and expand its strong position so that every base area, every unit, and every ministry could surge forward and achieve the 1977 political mission to seize further huge, miraculous great leap victories in every field.

In the active revolutionary movement of the masses throughout the country during this past year of 1976, the Party made an assessment and saw three districts with model qualifications in terms of defending the country, making socialist revolution, and building socialism. These three districts are:

1. Prasaut District in the East Zone
2. Kampong Tralach Leu District in the West Zone

3. Tram Kak District in the Southwest Zone

1. They are models in terms of increasing production and sorting out the livelihood of the people. All three of these districts have been poor, have had weak soil and have lacked water, and the livelihood of the people has been difficult ever since the Old Society. However, they carried out the 1976 tasks of the Party mightily and achieved the maximum paddy yields, kept sufficient rice seed, sorted out the livelihood of the people well, and supplied much to the State too.

2. They are models in terms of the highest stance of independence/mastery/self-reliance in fulfilling the Party's mission of building socialism in order to achieve three tons of paddy per hectare.

3. They are models in terms of the stance of socialist revolution, waging strong and profound class struggle within the entire district, especially inside the Party.

4. They are models in terms of the stance of collectivity, spirit of sacrifice, spirit of broad solidarity inside the district frameworks, inside the sector frameworks, and inside the zone frameworks.

Accordingly, the Central Committee of the Party has decided to present the 1976 Honorary Red Flag to these three districts.

II. Letter Presenting the Honorary Red Flag

Respects to all the beloved cadres, combatants, and the peasants and people in the cooperatives in Prasaut District, Kampong Tralach Leu District, and Tram Kak District.

During the past year of 1976, all the comrades, including the cadres, combatants both male and female, and the people and peasants in all the cooperatives held high their revolutionary spirit and fought unceasingly with a high stance of independence/mastery/self-reliance to overcome and sort out every successive obstacle that all the comrades encountered to achieve their missions excellently in every field, including the missions of defending the country, protecting the fruits of our revolution, continuing to make socialist revolution and building socialism, making all three districts, Prasaut District, Kampong Tralach Leu District, and Tram Kak District, rapidly progress and qualify as models from 1976 for the entire country to study in order to push the offensive movement to achieve the Party's mission to seize further great victories in great leaps in every field.

1. Comrades, your districts are models in terms of both increasing production and sorting out the livelihood of the people. Comrades, your districts have had poor soil, lack water, and the livelihood of the people has been difficult since the Old Society; however, all of you comrades overcame and implemented the Party's missions for 1976 mightily and achieved maximum rice harvests, kept sufficient rice seed stock, sorted out the livelihood of the people well, and also much to the State too.

2. Comrades, you are models in terms of the stance of independent/mastery/self-reliance:

Comrades, you had very few of the natural and material preconditions of every kind, and in part some were even bad; however, comrades, you all fought to achieve much production in a high stance of independence/mastery and high-level self-sustenance.

3. Comrades, you are models in terms of the stance of socialist revolution, doing the work of socialist revolution well, waging class struggle mightily and profoundly, especially inside the Party, in all of your districts.

4. Comrades, you are models in terms of the stance of high collectivity, spirit of sacrifice, and a broad spirit of solidarity inside the framework your districts, your sectors, and your zones.

Comrades this is your major victory and is a victory for our entire people, our entire Revolutionary Army and our entire Party.

This is a major contribution in pushing the missions of defending the country, pushing the socialist revolution movement, and pushing the offensive movement to build socialism and sort out the livelihood of the Party's people in systematic great miraculous leaps.

Accordingly, the Central Committee of the Party wishes to declare its praise and congratulations with intimate and extremely warm revolutionary sentiments to all of you comrades and wishes to present the Honorary Red Flag for 1976 to all of you comrades.

Beloved Comrades,

Your districts have received the Party's Honorary Red Flag for 1976. This is the highest honor our Party, our collective worker-peasant people throughout the country, and our Revolutionary Army can present to all you comrades. This does not mean that your mission ends here. Beloved comrades, you all must continue to further strengthen and expand the model qualifications of your three districts by:

1. Further strengthening and expanding your past 1976 victories to make them even mightier by studying your districts' experiences in every field: in political work, ideological work, organizational work, force organization work, technical work, the work of defending the country, the work of making socialist revolution, the work of going on the offensive to build socialism, etc.

2. It is imperative to strengthen and expand the stance of collectivity, the stance of socialist revolution, the stance of independence/mastery/self-reliance, the stance of high revolutionary responsibility, and the stance of overcoming all types of obstacles in order to continue seizing more victories by striving to strengthen the stance of constant

revolutionary etiquette, constant conscientiousness and good internal solidarity, being in solidarity with the various units and base areas even more excellently.

3. It is imperative to study the joint revolutionary heroism of our collective worker-peasant people throughout the country and to study the heroism of our Revolutionary Army throughout the country in order to push the building of your districts and to push all of your beloved comrades to be ever more quickly progressive in terms of the Party's politics, ideology, and organization, and by doing so push the missions of all your beloved comrades' districts to become even mightier in accordance with the Party's 1977 plan in every field, and to do so on into future years as well.

4. Based upon the pre-conditions that all you comrades have already fundamentally set up by actively fighting during the past period, Comrades, you must push the offensive to attack and absolutely achieve the Party's quotas of three tons and six tons of paddy per hectare, and even more.

The Central Committee of the Party sends its warmest good wishes and most profound revolutionary sentiments. May all you beloved comrades constantly achieve more victories one after another in fulfilling the valuable missions delegated to all of you by the Party.

The Central Committee of the Party has clear confidence that the other districts and base areas will accomplish their 1977 missions mightily and well for the Party, as Prasaut District, Kampong Tralach Leu District, and Tram Kak District have done, and will strive even more to improve. Comrades, may you all accept our respect in warmest revolutionary fraternity.

30 June 1977

Central Committee, Communist Party of Kampuchea



Photo: Our peasants in a cooperative in Batheay District, North Zone, busily spreading fertilizer in a rice field to care for the early season rice

Studying Experiences Regarding Political, Ideological, and Organizational Stances inside the Great Revolutionary Movement During The First Six Months of 1977



The objectives of this article are:

1. The great revolutionary movement under the leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea during the past six months has had many problems, leading us to gain much experience in terms of politics, ideology, and organization in the work of defending the country and defending the state authority of the our Party's worker-peasant people, in the work of continuing to make socialist revolution, and in the work of building socialism. Together we strive to do research and to clearly mention the major experiences and lessons as principles to enlighten future implementation.

We draw experience and find ways to continue attacking the enemy in order to defend the country, defend the revolutionary state power of the Party's worker-peasants and to make things even more effective and to further enlighten things by experience. We draw experience and find ways to give a mighty impetus to the work of building socialism, especially in carrying out the 1977 plan on the national defense side and in sorting out the livelihood of the people. We do this to discover the key to pushing the fight to sort things out even more mightily.

We draw clear experience regarding the problem of leadership, the leadership inside the Party inside every base area from top to bottom.

2. To prepare to go on a final offensive during the second half of 1977 to accomplish the 1977 plan completely and go beyond the plan in every field.

Therefore, to serve the above objectives we will raise for assessment and experience drawing some of the important work done in the past to carry out the 1977 plan in every field.

We have made an assessment and have drawn experience regarding:

1. Defending the country and defending the state authority of the Party's revolutionary worker-peasants
2. Making socialist revolution
3. Building socialism aiming at three and six tons of paddy per hectare

X X X

I. Defending Democratic Kampuchea, Defending the Victory of the Revolution, Defending the Revolutionary State Authority, Defending the Party, Class, People, and Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea

1. The external aspects of defending the country:

As for the situation of defending Democratic Kampuchea along the land borders and along the sea borders related to outside the country, when we make a general assessment, we were able to defend in totality, with mastery, completely.

The important reasons why the people and our Revolutionary Army were collectively able to well defend the country arise from:

- Correct and thorough implementation in accordance with the Party's political line on defending the country
- Having a stance of high revolutionary vigilance toward the enemy
- Having a correct activity line in defending the country

On the external side of the movement to defend the country in the past, by correct and thorough implementation in accordance with the Party's line of defending the country, we were able to draw important experiences in terms of political, ideological and organizational stances as follows:

- The Party, the people, and our Revolutionary Army recognize even more clearly the face of the enemy; there is no ambiguity; there is no confusion. The activities of the aggressor expansionist enemy -- artillery bombardment, strafing fire, espionage, sabotage, theft of livestock, theft of rice farming land and cutting plantations along the border -- have strengthened the stance of clearly defining friend-enemy boundaries inside our Party, people, and Revolutionary Army.

By taking a stance that clearly defines boundaries between us and enemies inside the ranks of the Party, people and Revolutionary Army, we are able to whip up even

mightier stance of anger toward the enemies of the nation, of the people, of the revolution, of the worker-peasant class, of the collective socialist regime and the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and along with this, inside the ranks of the Party, people, and the Revolutionary Army; we strengthen and expand our stance of patriotism and love for the people, love for the revolution, love for the worker-peasant class, love for the collective socialist regime, and love for the Party.

- We have an even more profound high spirit of responsibility in the work of defending Democratic Kampuchea

- Furthermore, we have passed through the movement to defend the country from the outside, to eradicate pacifist views and stances, inactive stances in defending the country, stances concerned only with building nationalism and not seeing the hostile contradictions with the enemies of the nation.

In summary, our Party, people, and Revolutionary Army have defended the country completely and well, gaining complete mastery following our Party's outlook and stance and line of defending the country.

2. The work of defending the country and defending the revolutionary state power of the worker-peasants inside the country:

1. The work of defending the country among the people:

The work of defending the country among the people has been carried out progressively well.

The reasons arise from:

- Absorbing and implementing the line of great solidarity, gathering the forces of the Party well. In particular, the lower-middle level worker-peasant class has strengthened and expanded and been made into a solid support inside the socialist revolution movement.

- Propaganda and training regarding the political and ideological lines among the people, especially among the people in the base areas, was carried out even better than it was in the past. Purging to strengthen and expand the various organizations among the people to make them clean has caused the elements among the people to become more pure.

- Simultaneously, the livelihood of the people was gradually better sorted out, making the people have warmer feelings and be more confident in the Party, the revolution, and the Revolutionary Army.

According to experience, when the revolutionary state authority in the base areas is well sorted out, specifically when the cooperatives are well-strengthened and are clean and pure, that truly is defending the people well and to the maximum.

2. The work of defending inside the Party and inside our ranks:

The defense situation inside the Party and inside our ranks has developed much better than before, both in quality and quantity. Specifically:

We internally purged the Party well at every echelon, in every section, from top to bottom. Many base areas were fundamentally sorted out. Some other base areas were mostly sorted out. All of them are fighting to further sort this out.

In tandem with this, the systematic purging and attacking of the embedded enemies led to [an increase in] the quality of the Party, the quality of the Revolutionary Army, and the quality of the combatants male and female, led them to understand the state of the hostile contradiction between us and the enemy, and led to gaining much experience in eradicating embedded enemies and joining to attack the enemy.

Therefore, the quality of our Party has increased. It increased in terms of politics; it increased in terms of ideology and organization; it increased during the combat to fight embedded enemies. This experience must be further studied by those of us inside the Party and inside the Revolutionary Army, and by those of us among the people so that we will become a screen to further attack embedded enemies, to counter embedded enemies, and to dig out embedded enemies.

But in tandem with this, the embedded enemies are not yet all gone by any means. The veteran forces that the enemies bored holes into are not totally gone. Not many remain, but some do still remain and are scattered in the base areas in various units, ministries, and offices.

How must we sort this out in the future?

1. It is imperative to have the clear view and stance that the fight against the embedded enemies is not yet finished. Old remnants of the embedded enemies still remain, and they are even strengthening and expanding.

2. It is imperative to take absolute measures, making no compromise, making no allowances, without hesitation or holding back at all.

As for the methods of operation in eradicating internally embedded enemies, we already determined that in April. Recall them:

1. Whip up and educate the masses, the masses inside the Party, inside the core organizations, inside the Revolutionary Army and among the people, and have them clearly see how the internal embedded enemies carry out their activities; have them

absorb this so they will become an enemy-seeking and enemy-attacking force. The same with each ministry and office; the same with each base area; the same with the Army. We operate in steps. Any location having already taken measures to sweep clean embedded enemies boring from within must whip up and educate the masses at that location so that they will become a force to find and further eradicate enemies.

2. As for the essence of researching and finding embedded enemies boring holes from within, assess the content of carrying out the Party's political, ideological, and organization lines to see if they are correct or not. Who makes the assessments? Use the forces of the masses to do the assessing. In doing so, what is to be used as the core? It is imperative to use the Party as the core. Specifically, the Party Center is the core for the entire country; the Zone Party is the core for the Zone; the Sector Party is the core for the Sector; the District Party is the core for the district. The offices and ministries must have cores. Each spearhead has to have a core to sweep clean the embedded traitors boring holes from within.

Some experiences to add to the experiences summarized in April 1977

1. In order to gain mastery over the enemy in advance and take timely measures, it is imperative to routinely have a clear view of adversarial conflict and a clear view that enemies of every category have agents that are their running dugs embedded and boring holes inside us. Having this clear view and stance in advance enables us to have a high spirit of revolutionary vigilance, and seeing the signs, whether minor or major, we follow up and research closely.

2. In order to assess the enemy and find embedded enemies boring holes from within, it is imperative to stand upon their actual personal history, their history before joining the revolution, both personal and their contacts, fellow workers and associates, and their personal history after joining revolution. What year did they join? Who introduced them? ... Past experience has shown that we have been very relaxed; this had an impact on Party secrecy and let the enemy embed and bore holes from within. We imagine that we are not relaxed. We are subjective. Some elements entered and took important leadership positions. Those persons had been attached to the movement since 1945. In general, we see that they have been attached to the movement for a long time. But in actuality, we have been hollow in grasping their personal histories; we do not know their circles of contacts before they joined the revolution.

3. In order to assess whether elements are good or not good, enemies or not enemies, it is imperative to their assess implementation of the Party lines. That is, how those elements carry out the Party's political line, how they carry out the Party's ideological line, how they carry out the Party's organizational line. Specifically, how do they implement the Party's defense line? How do they carry out the Party's socialist revolution line? How do they carry out the Party's line of socialist construction? Left is wrong. Right is wrong too. Left once, left twice, left systematically or right systematically. This is a problem. When any location has endless complications never

sorted out, there is a problem. Implementing the line of socialist revolution left, right, time after time. There is a problem. Carrying out the line of building socialism in a relaxed way time after time. There is a problem. Being unable to sort out the livelihood of the people time after time. There is a problem. Our past experience is like this:

- In some zones, traitor elements embedded are boring holes from within systematically carry out political, ideological, and organizational lines incorrectly. They are systematically wrong in terms of morality. Production is deficient time after time.

- Borders between one district and another have constant problems. We know that there are enemies; however, we imagine that the enemies have recently evacuated and left.

The above experience leads us to conclude that whether in national defense or socialist revolution or socialist construction, it is important to stand on the political position of fighting the enemy, defeating the enemy. If we do not win in the fight against embedded enemies, national defense will not be good, socialist revolution will not be good, and building socialism will not be good. Only after eradicating embedded enemies boring holes from within from the state authority large and small can the Party lines be carried out. An example: During this past 1976, we saw this clearly. So then, that is why we must take the stand of fighting the embedded enemies boring holes from within as a fundamental in national defense, waging socialist revolution, and building socialism. Our masses must understand this problem. We must constantly attack the enemy. Attack the enemy and put our cores in place. The masses are able to act as our cores.

4. Based upon our past experience in attacking embedded enemies, the problem of class rises up as another major factor. In the past, embedded enemies mostly were petty bourgeois class elements. There were some peasant elements, a few, but peasants who had lost their peasant nature, phony petty bourgeoisie, very playful.

In summary it has become experience that the enemy was able to very easily search out and attract inside petty bourgeois circles. This is because this class is very individualistic in terms of prestige, and they surrender. In a word, they sway back and forth.

Peasant elements have been traitors too in the base areas or in various ministries as follows:

- A large part have been veteran intelligence agents for a long time or are elements who surrendered to the enemy long ago.

- But another part, many other elements, are elements that are under the management of the petty bourgeoisie. They do not yet understand; they are not yet aware. The petty bourgeoisie closed them off from the line, their rights, and the Party Statutes.

In a word, the petty bourgeois source is a source that the enemy can easily attract.

In times of victory they eat, drink, play, are immoral and are hooligans...

But in situations of hard feelings and disappointment for some reason large or small, the enemy can easily attract them. Dissatisfaction at this person being prompted first, that person being promoted later. This contradiction, that contradiction, endlessly. Thus, the enemy easily provokes them. And the petty bourgeoisie themselves go around provoking one another to be dissatisfied with and be in conflict with the Party


Furthermore, in situations of hardship they scatter in defeat, are dissatisfied, and become complicated. Thus, this is a source the enemy can easily attract in any circumstances. This has been the experience, whether with city petty bourgeoisie, the rural petty bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie who have left the monkhood, or the middle peasants or some merchant peasants. As for the fundamental class, the enemy finds them harder to attract than the middle classes. Based upon this experience, we must take a firm stance on the class line of the Party. Previously, we implemented the Party line on class, but we were hollow, relaxed. From now on, we must carry out the Party line on class well and in great leaps.

5. Another experience is that it is imperative to rely upon the masses as a force to attack the enemy. Thus, it is imperative to educate the masses in politics and ideology to prevent the enemy from expanding. In continuing to search out the enemy, it is imperative to rely upon the masses.

Example: In one location, we went to a location once in a while, and there we saw that the enemy was not yet gone. The enemy was able to carry out activities to an extent since the masses did not yet understand. When we whipped up the masses, the masses understood and they discovered more enemies. So then, we must make the masses understand, and the Party must act as a backer for the masses so the masses backstop the Party in return.

Experience in another location: We whipped up the masses. The masses trusted us. When they are warm toward the ministry committee, they report to the ministry committee. If they are not yet warm toward the ministry committee, they report to the Party Office. These reports are not anonymous, meaning they took full responsibility. Through this experience, the base areas may be able to do this.

* * *



This photo: Our cooperative peasant in Sa-ang District, Southwest Zone, administers oral medication to protect and care for the health of a cow to keep it always fat, strong, and in good health.

II. Carrying Out the Party's Mission Of Continuing Socialist Revolution

Our number one positive is that we continued to strengthen and expand our collective regime, our socialist regime, because the collective regime of the proletariat, the socialist regime, does not waver, does not retreat, does not sway back and forth. With the great movement of the masses under the leadership of the Party, we constantly pressured a situation where we eradicated all the oppressor classes. The oppressor classes were successively dissolved and wiped out. This is one thing.

Another thing: None of the private regimes were able to rise up. The great mass movement applied constant pressure and pushed them even deeper. The tools that are the stand of the oppressor classes like money, like markets, etc, were unable to rise again. The masses countered them too. This is a sign that confirms our great victory in

continuing to make socialist revolution. None of any of the categories of enemies can return. To the contrary, they are wiped out even more.

In this situation of victory, we go on the offensive against the enemy and continue to sweep them clean even more strongly. Attack the enemy, sweep clean the foreign agent enemies, the embedded enemies, the class enemies; don't let them be able to keep trying to carry out activities, even a little.

Another positive is the spirit of awareness inside the Party, inside the Army, even down inside the poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants, even down to the middle peasants: they accept and are pleased with socialist revolution. This is political and ideological awareness.

Our people have worked mightily during the last six months in revolutionary happiness and optimism and it is seen that:

First, they have enough food and they are in good health; they are very pleased with the collective regime. Shelter is very comfortable and plentiful; medicine is much better than before; there are guarantees for them and their children. Immediately after the war the brothers and sisters saw the results. So then, this is why the revolutionary movement to build the country is mighty and revolutionarily optimistic. The brothers and sisters are pleased with the water reservoirs, dams, and feeder canals. They see the results of their own work and that of the poor- and middle-peasant class. They see their own strength. They are pleased, and they are proud. An absolute majority are pleased. The poor peasants, the lower-middle peasants, the middle peasants, even the wealthy peasants and the petty landowners who lost every in the war of aggression, they are all pleased. A number of the new post 17 April elements are able to accept this regime.

In summary, more than 95 percent accept the collective regime of the Party's proletarian class.

In tandem with this, there are still problems of shortfalls:

The first shortfall among the people and subsequently in the ranks is that good and clear absorption and understanding of the collective regime still falls short. The reasons:

First, The Party has not yet educated and whipped up the masses down to the lower bases.

Second, embedded enemies within the ranks mislead them and indoctrinate them to misunderstand.

In the future, the Revolutionary Army, the combatants male and female, must educate them from top to bottom; whether young or old, it's just that they must be

educated to a different level. The fundamental class is to educate them very deeply. When they are mixed, educate them broadly first.

It is imperative to pry up the forces of the people more strongly by political and ideological education. Don't just hold meetings to whip them up. It is imperative to educate.

Our second shortfall is that the diet of our people in the rainy season may in some locations be somewhat poor, leading the people to be a little weak. Seeing this, we strive to be able to sort this out; we must sort this out because our collective regime is wonderful. Our mobile units can be assigned anywhere to build reservoirs, plant potatoes, bananas, etc. But the organization and use of these collective forces is not yet appropriate; there are still contradictions, like this or that force staying buried.

We must see the factor of the embedded enemy's destruction. But another factor is our capability of doing so. We have not yet searched out and sorted out this problem well following an effective action line, following an effective combat line. There is still a shortfall. We must assess and draw experience on this point.

After re-examination, is this a problem of action line or is it related to ideology and responsibility toward the people? Are we able to sort out these shortfalls, or not? They absolutely can be sorted out. The important matter is collective leadership. Drought here is not to the level of drought in other countries. We are short of water, but not as short as others are. The experience is that some locations grow rice constantly; they grow rice small scale, medium scale, and large scale: they farm constantly. Working like that, victory is certain. Other locations have water, but they do not grow rice. They to grow large scale, one time. When we wait to grow, then there is not enough water. When we grow one or two hectares at a time, there is enough water. Some locations have water, but lack seedlings. Why do they lack seedlings? Because the leadership is not collective leadership.

Some locations have water, but they do not conserve water; they do not seize the opportunity to work in for form of guerilla attack. This is the action line of turning a weak point into a strong one. This is just the rice problem. As for growing other crops, that's the same.

So, on into the future it is imperative to sort out following the action line of farming rice large scale, farming rice intermediate scale, and farming rice small scale. Plant other crops too. Each house can plant four or five clumps of sugar cane, three to four banana trees, according to the potential of the land. This way everything will grow close to the houses. Doing this is not difficult. One does it collectively, another does it at home. This way we plant everywhere. This contributes to sorting out livelihood to strengthen and expand our collective regime. Why strengthen and expand the collective regime? To build the country well, to seize the forces of friendly countries well, to defend the country well.

Following this action line demands collective leadership. Whenever the commune is short and the district is short too, the sector must help. Whenever the sector cannot look after it, the zone must help.

III. Carrying Out the Party's Mission Of Building Socialism in Every Field

During the past six months, the situation in terms of building socialism in every field has made much progress in agriculture, economics, public health, culture, education, in every field. We have achieved many successes in systematic great leaps. A large number of units made great leaps; a few units were somewhat slow.

Units that made great leaps were water construction projects. We achieved the quotas for individual base areas, and we even surpassed them. We constructed these strategic water projects to serve one and two rice crops per year. This is an important strategic matter because water construction projects have a strategic importance for increasing production. The movement has been strong in the history of Kampuchea. Strong in the sense of assembling the manpower and doing the construction in a short period to serve the movement this year. This is one of our good points, one of our fundamental points.

By this year's experience of what we have done, by 1978 we will achieve the 1978 plan with no difficulty. In this rhythm in 1980 we may fully gain mastery over water for two crops annually. So even though early this year there was some trouble with water, we were still able to make do because we had a position in terms of water works. Seeing this, in order to see the importance of water works, we will continue this. Looking at the construction in each zone, we see that they are both large and numerous. When we look nationwide, we see many large work projects. We cannot have imagined that our people could have done this in such a short period. We were able to construct Baray Teuk Thla size or even bigger within three or four months. This is why the people have such clear confidence and faith in us.

Aside from this, many other units including some dry season salt field locations, rubber, and water pumping equipment joined in systematic great leaps in production during this first half year and accomplishing the 1977 quotas, with some units greatly surpassing them and some slightly surpassing them, and some units achieving the six month quotas.

As for the economic and cultural side, there have been great leaps in some areas. Example: The problem of malaria eradication: that was at the intermediate level, and malaria was reduced by 70 percent. So then, the speed of malaria eradication is fast. This speed was not a material matter; it was the mass movement that was fast.

On the technical education side, we also made quick progress in systematic great leaps, like in the study of electricity, chemistry ... This experience leads us to have

confidence that our boys and girls have the full capacity to grasp technology to build the country.

Through this actual experience, we believe that we truly built an economic foundation for independence/mastery/self-reliance.

As for shortfalls in building socialism in every field during the past six months, the quotas for three and six tons of paddy per hectare still remain a problem. The reasons for not yet gaining mastery are both objective and subjective.

The objective factors are bad natural drought impacting our early year rice to the maximum. Other crops were also impacted.

However, we must mention this shortfall of ours in order to draw experience. Only when we bump up against obstacles can we gain experience and consider natural obstacles as lessons for study. Do not consider these natural obstacles as bad lessons and let them slide without sorting them out. If they are not sorted out, we will be unable to pass through the movement. These natural obstacles are not just obstacles in our country. Others countries have obstacles larger and more serious than ours. They have a systematic impact on agriculture and industry. But they strive to sort them out, and they have more difficulty sorting them out that we do. Nature changes a lot. Seeing this we use these problems as lessons for solving the water problem in a timely manner, and then we further strengthen and expand in order to gain mastery over water.

First, sort out the water problem strategically.

Second, use the available water to all its potential in the guerilla fashion. Don't wait for everything to be there.

In this year's experience, in seeding alone, we did not dare seed for fear there would be no water and the seedlings would be damaged. So, when the water came, there were no seedlings and we were not able to seize the opportunity. Thus, in order to build socialism according to plan, we have to master water. We have to continue sorting out water.

This year, though there has in fact been an impact on three and six tons, we are not out of hope because we sort things out by strong offensives. Attack strongly starting now; small attacks, intermediate attacks; major attacks. We prepare the conditions for mastery by the end of the year. Every location must grow heavy rice; every location must grow half-rice in order to seize two crops, even though it may be a little stunted. In January we will start transplanting again; raise two seasons in 1978, and we will not fail. So we must already be prepared. If we do half-rice, we can do it two and a half times in one year. So if we grow two crops in 1977 we do not fail even though it goes 1978 some, two months. Like this, we extend 1977 into 14 months, and if we grow two times in 1978, it will not fail. This is the strategic view in terms of preparation. If we prepare like this, we must prepare seed and ready the appropriate manpower and we must have clear

plans by lot and rice field. There is no need to finish one season before we get ready. We must already be prepared following clear plans. This is a major problem because it is related to three and six tons. If we see that there is not water at the beginning of the year, we cannot procrastinate. In tandem with this, any location where there is not yet enough water to grow rice must go on the offensive to plant other crops, potatoes, gourds, cucumbers, pumpkins, etc.

Our Party has determined to use the movement to carry out the 1977 plan in order to raise the quality of the Party. There are obstacles, and there will be more. We must join together to sort them out. It is imperative to have a combat spirit, the line to attack as necessary to achieve three and six tons of paddy per hectare.

IV. The Situation with the Livelihood of the People

During the past six month period, the situation with the livelihood of our people, generally speaking, was fundamentally good. Implementation followed the regime of the Party. Therefore, the situation was vigorous in terms of socialist revolution activities and building socialism.

For the future, when we compare the entire country, it is better off than the previous year, but in comparison to the regime designated by the Party to vigorously serve the objective of the rainy season offensive, some locations may have had shortages and not have had the full ration designated by the Party. Therefore, this may have some impact on momentum of the offensive and have some impact on health. That is, there is a contradiction between manpower and the matter of going on the offensive to achieve quotas.

How must this be sorted out, sorted out throughout the country, sorted out for the immediate future, sorted out in each base area? It absolutely can be sorted out, sorted out for the immediate future, and then sorted out for future reserves. It must be sorted out.

The method of operation is to strive to go on more offensives. As for the offensives to sort this out, manpower must be distributed appropriately following the correct action line.

1. Strengthen the stance of responsibility for the livelihood of the people.
2. Well organize commands at every echelon.
3. It is imperative to distribute manpower properly following the action lines, meaning any work that is not yet necessary must be left for a while. It is imperative to sort out the problem of food supplies first. So then, any manpower not required must all be pulled out. If we speak generally throughout the country, there is little manpower that is not required. Some locations are still walking around clearing grass along streets and houses. If that manpower was used to plant potatoes, they would produce more than a

little. In general, throughout the country there are many manpower shortages. The ministries and office are the same: planting and cultivation is not yet strong.

The slogan is "*Whatever is unnecessary must be removed.*" For example, it is imperative that we keep on building the paddy dike systems. However, the line and the process of making paddy dike systems must be correct as well. The objective is just to retain water temporarily. Therefore, working small scale first is alright. Manpower must be conserved to the maximum. Use manpower to pitch water, plant potatoes, plant bananas, and plant other crops for supplies.

Industrial production can temporarily be reduced, for instance, planting tree of quinine and pine oil.

The same for dams and reservoirs. The objective is to hold the water for a while. As for beautifying them and improving them, that can wait for later. Keep only the necessary forces to finish them and maintain them. Move most of the manpower to increasing production planting potatoes, pumpkins, gourds, wax melons, eggplant, etc. Other than that, set up the conditions on the rice farming side by plowing and harrowing in detail and thoroughly. When the water comes, we will have mastery and can go on the offensive immediately. So then it is imperative to make assessments: each ministry, each office, each worksite, each cooperative must move whatever manpower they can to increasing production. Do not scatter manpower.

The same for canals, dams, reservoirs. What has been done is enough; put them aside for a while; don't finish them or permanently improve them yet, causing a loss of opportunity during this rainy season. Stay on the offensive to plant other crops along with the rice: potatoes, bananas, pumpkins. Keep on planting one crop after another. The same even with textiles; when weaving scarves go ahead and weave them. But as for weaving raw cloth, stop for a while because we still have raw cloth. The old men and women can plant a mound or two of potatoes; we will gain more than a little bit from that.

So there are leadership committees and manpower organization. Don't just publish circulars on these matters; it is important to constantly go down to follow up in person.

If we work like this we will be able to sort it out, because our situation is not so serious that it cannot be sorted out. Our slogan is to go on the offensive of people's war. Doing this will lead both the people and our cadres to draw experience from this situation. The important stance in sorting out this is fundamentally self-sustenance. All the Party's forces, all the people, all the Revolutionary Army must move mightily and unceasingly. Meanwhile there will be difficulties, but after that we will fundamentally have thick crops.

Only after we have passed through this ourselves and tasted the bitterness ourselves, can we have personal experience. Just waiting and requesting food supplies

gains no experience. The Party is like that. The people are like that. The country is like that. Each base area is like that.

One more thing: In the current situation, do not grow just one type of heavy rice. It is imperative to farm half-rice for eating too. Grow heavy rice for export. If you just grow heavy rice, it will be December before it can be harvested.

V. The Party Leadership Situation

During these six months, our Party has passed through strong, hot combat on every battlefield: the military battlefield, the base area battlefields, the rice farming, social action, culture, ministry and office battlefields, etc. This has been a movement which led our Party to temper a lot and pass through many experiences.

This revolutionary movement has led our Party to make two clear distinctions:

- On one hand, a pattern of betrayal and boring holes from within the Party has appeared for many years. There are dangerous elements, bad elements, no-good elements that are not yet the running dogs of any enemy but which impact the revolution; they have fallen away because of this six month movement. They showed themselves clearly, and the movement purged them. According to assessments and experiences, these kinds of elements still remain.

- However, on the other hand, our Party improved to another level of quality during the first semester of 1977 because of the purging of enemy elements embedded and boring holes from within and the other traitor elements. This caused the Party to recover from the boils, the poisoning, and to be in the peak of good health. Good cadres and Party members further improved in quality in terms of politics, ideology and organization, and they gained additional experience inside the movement, seeing the enemies systematically, seeing each type of enemy network and what activities they carried out and how they were systematically organized. This experience is combat experience. Passing through this vigorous and profound combat on many battlefields has made us gain much experience and has raised the quality of Party leadership at every echelon, politically, ideologically, and organizationally, and has improved the quality of the Party now and in the future. We sorted out this problem well throughout the entire country to the maximum. We carried out the Party line by relying on the forces of the masses and we sorted it out well and cleanly. It is the same in each of the zones, sectors, districts, and base areas

As for the movement to defend the country, we have defended well and even better than before. Previously there were complications because of embedded enemies boring holes from within; they made provocations in order to create contradictions. Now the Army and the base areas are cooperating well in national defense matters.

Building the country has also gone well. Previously the embedded enemy bored hole from within; they exaggerated the lines of the Party. When one thing had to be done, they did something else; they destroyed us time after time.

So then, we sorted out the embedded enemies boring holes from within and the no-good elements and this enabled us to make Party stronger and will enable us to strengthen and expand the Party well on into the future.

In fighting to build Party leadership during these past six months, what experiences have we gained?

1. It led us to pay more attention to the Party's class line in organizing. The experience of these six months is clear it is increasing clear that the fundamental class is much better guaranteed than the middle and upper classes. The middle and upper classes are less reliable than they fundamental class. Experience shows that up until now at every echelon of the Party the fundamental class still maintains its position and did not abandon its position. The majority of the middle class fell away, fell into embedded enemy networks, fell into becoming complicated and having contradictions with the Party and with the people, and intentionally or unintentionally obstructed the movement.

So then, through this experience, from here on into the future it is imperative to implement the Party's line of class even better. The Party has always mentioned the Party's line of class time after time. Specifically, the fundamental class keeps increasing its numbers inside the leadership. In the base areas, the fundamental class plays even more of a leading role. Nonetheless, it is not complete. In the future it is imperative to expand the fundamental class. The fundamental class is guaranteed in terms of class and in terms of the worker's stance of the Party. The fundamental class passed through successive movements by striving to overcome obstacles, objective and subjective. It did not pass through the movements by being complicated time after time.

It is imperative to have the fundamental class strengthen and expand itself more in terms of leadership jobs. We need the fundamental class because the fundamental class better guarantees the Party's political line, better guarantees the Party ideological line, comparatively.

Matters of ideology and stance are different inside the Party. Even though they passed through successive movements, the fundamental class has the feeling of seeking out fellow members of the fundamental class more than the middle class. This being so, they have more contacts with the fundamental class. This being so, propaganda and education must emphasize the fundamental class more, even though the Party has successively educated the middle class and even though they may have feelings for the fundamental class that are no weaker than those of the fundamental class.

So it is seen that whatever class the leadership is, their people are from the same class. If they are petty bourgeoisie, they successively make the Party a bourgeois Party. If they are poor peasants, they make the Party a poor peasant Party. But they must be strong

too; if not, the petty bourgeois class will be able to take back power. This is a class struggle within the Party, but this class struggle follows the feelings and natural stances of each person.



This photo: Our revolutionary female youth at T-2 Textile Factory conscientiously organizing scarves, cloth, and mosquito-net cloth that the brothers and sisters have just produced for storage and transport to peasants in our cooperatives throughout the country.

When the fundamental class gains more core positions, there will be more of a guarantee. In easy times as well as difficult times, the fight with the enemy will be more absolute. This leads us to absorb even more in order to be in unity. However, the fundamental class has passed through the movements; the middle class has not.

2. During first half of 1977 we systematically swept clean the embedded enemy boring holes from within. Through this experience, we see that we cannot just look at their movements. After we look at their movements, we must also look at their personal histories. Which network? Who do they contact? Who brought them in? We know their circles. We know their origins. We are able to research them. So then, we must clearly assess their personal histories time after time. Only when their personal histories are clearly grasped can we feel warm about the quality of our cadres and our Party members. According to the scale of our present and future revolutionary work, the number of cadres and the number of our Party numbers are still very deficient, even though the quality of our Party has risen.

How is this to be sorted out? Strategically, how must we sort this out?

Assessing the situation of our Party, it is seen that one part fell away from the movement, but also one part rose. Some rose fast; some rose moderately; some rose somewhat. We must build this category into new cadres, new in the sense of their new additional responsibilities and new missions. So then, inside the entire Party from the top down to the Branches, it is imperative to select cadres today by their quality to carry out new missions. For example, in District, Sector, and Zone Branches or in the Army as well, when the quality of our comrades rises, we must add to their work according to their quality. This is one way to sort this out this is strategic in nature. This is not an organizational matter; it is ideological, a matter of clear outlook.

Another way to sort this out is expanding new Party members, about which we have already mentioned our plans. What are the possibilities of expanding new Party membership at this time? There are two possibilities:

1. The difficult aspects of expansion: A number of core organizations have been badly influenced by the embedded enemy elements boring holes from within. However, we may recruit for organizations from the good masses instead. This is a better possibility than bringing them into the Party from core organizations.

2. Locations where appropriate Party organizations are in control must concentrate on expanding, because the origins from which we originally recruited them were good. If that is so, we have possibilities of expanding Party membership to some extent. However, we must further assess thoroughly. But in doing so it is imperative to concentrate to expanding from the masses into the core organizations because they are new forces who have not yet been entangled with the enemy or no-good elements.

VI. Carrying Out the Slogan for 1977

The 1977 slogan is: Always be on the strongest offensive in the marvelous movement of great leaps.

In carrying out this slogan, we have some fundamental positive qualities:

1. In the Party and among the people we have absorbed that it is imperative to carry out missions large or small in the marvelous movement of great leaps.
2. It is a concrete movement that is seen to be lively, unceasing, and surging on the battlefield, and on many battlefield it has succeeded and it truly a marvelous great leap movement, for instance the water problem, the salt problem, the problems of some agricultural tools, the malaria eradication problem, etc. Thus it is seen that raising this slogan is a stance, a line, for the future, and it is necessary to indoctrinate and make propaganda on this slogan and put in on banners for the people to further absorb.

However, there are still deficiencies:

1. The attention given to the slogan of the marvelous great leap has not yet reached full intensity. There had been some forgetfulness. It has not yet become a flame keeping the cadres, Party members, and the masses constantly on fire. This is why some locations are soft and inactive; some are slow, and some move in routine rhythm and do not yet surge forward busily. An example that we have paid the most attention to is that whenever we face obstacles, be they subjective or objective, they always impede the marvelous mass movement of the great leap and the obstacle is not overcome. There are some serious and complicated internal obstacles on this or that. Some locations have overcome; some have not been able to overcome and seem to be at a standstill.

Examining the specifics of these shortfalls, we see the early year rice problem, the food supply for the people ... and neither of these problems has yet been achieved in marvelous great leaps. Other problems are the same. For example: clothing for the people. There is cloth; there are needles; there is no shortage of thread; there are sewing machines. But at some locations efforts to sort out the problem of clothing for the people is still deficient. Secondary cultivation in general has not yet been done in marvelous great leaps to have the people to always have green crops growing. Some villages plant new crops. Water is not favorable, the land is not favorable, but they plant plenty. Some villages have just houses and sky, no crops. Manpower is not short; there is the manpower of the older people, and the manpower of the youth in the rear is not short. As for the problem of drinking water for the people or the animals, ponds or reservoirs, there are still shortfalls. We raise some of these things as examples to make clear the implementation of the Party's slogan. In part, there have been marvelous great leaps; in part, there are shortfalls and the slogan has not yet been absorbed in the sense of specific implementation at each individual spearhead.

Why? What experience do we have on this matter? From where do the shortfalls arise?

The reasons for the positive qualities:

1. Absorbing the slogan of the marvelous great leap
2. We are able to attack on most of our major battlefields, water, rice, and the objective factors are favorable

On many other secondary battlefields we have not been able to go on the offensive, imagining we could not make the leap.

Not absorbing the slogan of the marvelous great leap, so the rear battlefields have not decisively attacked; for instance, digging wells from drinking water, planting secondary crops, growing vegetables, and planting fruit trees. When the rear battlefields do not leap, this has an impact on the battlefield. Work was able to be done just for a periods of time, with the rear not constantly supplying the front.

This, in particular, is clearly seen.

What led to the attack on the rear battlefields not being strong? The matter of leadership and manpower allocation in every section of the rear is not yet proper, because:

- Not yet knowing how to allocate manpower
- No cores

For example, in some places the rice farming side is seen as being actively fighting, but when we go among the houses there are still many started forces lying around, unorganized, with no commanders in the rear. So then, these forces are weak.

- So there, there must be organization. These cores do not necessarily have to be Party members or in core organizations yet. Take just the good masses that are close to the labor. Among every ten to twenty persons, assign a three-person committee, perhaps good male or female youths. There might be some no-goods, but the movement will tell us. Even boys and girls can be cores among the ranks of the boys and girls. By doing this, we can build Party members and build cores because they originated from within the movement.

If we can do this, the front will be strong, the rear will be strong. The front, meaning rice. The rear meaning vegetables, fruits, breadfruit, mangoes, etc. This will improve the residences of the people, serve the health of the people, and serve the livelihood of the people too.

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Instructions of the Party On Several Important Matters During the Second Half of 1977



The instructions of the party on a number of important matters during the second half of 1977 stand upon the foundation of the political mission of the Party throughout the whole of 1977 and add to the April 1977 instructions of the Party.

The instructions of the Party on a number of matters have the objective of pushing implementation of the 1977 plan of the Party to be more effective and to achieve 100 percent or even beyond during the second half of 1977 a number of important matters, as follows:

I. Concentrate Even Harder on Strengthening and Expanding Party Leadership

During the past first half of 1977, the situation of the Party was as follows:

On one hand, a number of elements within the Party from top to bottom were dropped the great, vast revolutionary movement of the masses under the leadership of the Party. These elements had already been enemy agents of every type for a long time that had secretly embedded themselves inside our Party to bore holes from within. In tandem with this, dangerous elements opposed the Party, opposed the revolution, and opposed the people time after time at various levels both high and low.

On the other hand, many elements within the Party were determined not to join the category of those who fell away; they raised and upheld the quality of our Party in ever fields, politics, ideology, and organization and had the qualifications to fulfill the missions of the Party with even higher quality.

These are excellent elements who bring with them the huge victories of our Party, because, for one thing, they fundamentally eradicated the embedded enemies boring holes from within the Party, and also made the Party mighty and pure and actively combative.

However, at the same time, our Party clearly absorbed successive direct experiences that embedded enemies boring holes from within are not yet gone by any means. Left with the opportunity to strengthen and expand themselves, they absolutely will break out of their shells and strengthen and expand their subordinates in the status of class enemies, enemies of the revolution, and enemies of our people. Thus, our Party decided resolutely that it is imperative to continue to uphold a constant spirit of revolutionary vigilance and to assemble all forces within the Party along with the Revolutionary Army and our collective people to search out and smash all enemy remnants that furtively embedded themselves inside to bore holes from within our Party, so that our Party might be even purer, completely pure, with absolutely no enemies old or new being able to embed themselves. We must do this profoundly and constantly to cleanse our Party so that our Party will be even mightier, even more actively combative, in its job of leading every part of its revolutionary movement. Our slogans are: "***When Party is clean, the Party is strong and the revolutionary movement is strong.***" "***A clean party Center is a strong Party Center to strongly lead the revolutionary movement throughout the country.***" "***A clean Zone Party, a strong Zone Party, a strong Zone revolutionary movement.***" and so on.



This photo: Revolutionary militia and cooperative peasants in the Pursat region preparing to build hand railing at Damnak Ampil Dam which feeds water from Pursat Tributary into the 18 April Canal

Following these slogans leads us to make the assessment that whether our revolutionary movement is strong or not strong depends upon the Party leadership, the Party leadership throughout the country and the Party leadership in bases areas large and small. In order that the Party be strong, the Party must be clean (clean in terms of politics, ideology, and organization). The Party can be clean only when there are no enemy elements within the Party, when there are no destructive opposition elements inside the Party. A clean Party means one political line, one ideological line, one organizational line, mighty and actively fighting inside one column inside the Party.

Seeing the situation that a number of cadres and a number of Party members still had many shortcomings when compared to the mighty, huge and profound revolutionary masses at present and in the future, our Party has decided that it is absolutely imperative to strengthen and expand the Party in a timely manner by concentrating partially on strengthening and expanding the cadres and leadership at every echelon, and partially concentrating on expanding among the ranks of the base area manpower of the Party, meaning Party members, core organizations, and progressive masses that are our Party's seedbed, the fundamental source supplying cadres inside and outside the Party.

1. It is imperative to strengthen and expand and increase the ranks of cadres at every echelon from above down to district, in the Army, in the various ministries, and in the various staff offices as necessary. It is imperative to recruit good elements, from one or two on up, to increase leadership forces at each echelon every single time. Good in the sense that good fundamental class, having passed through the successive revolutionary movements, is tested in grasping and implementing the Party's political, ideological and organizational lines well, in particular is tested by having passed through various large and small obstacles. Good in terms of proper living morality. Good in terms of having clear personal histories, controlled and assessed concretely from beginning to end. Increasing new forces at every level of the Party will successively increase leadership forces and make them stronger both in quantity and quality.

2. It is imperative to concentrate on selecting within the revolutionary movement of the masses:

- First, the progressive masses inside the fundamental class. Select them and assign clear work to them, whether in the cooperatives, the factories, the offices, the ministries, or the Army.

For example, in the cooperatives assign them responsibility for the fertilizer spearhead, the livestock care spearhead, the increasing production spearhead, the warehouse spearhead, the granary, plowing and harrowing, knives and hatchets, other agricultural tools, the hospital, children's spearhead, sanitation, etc. Train them in order to test them in the work by both doing the work and drawing experience and studying. Through this, gradually select them to work as cores and gradually strengthen and expand the ranks of these cores. These cores are the cooperatives' cadres outside the Party,

guaranteed and vouched for in the short term, and in particular vouched for in the strategic long term.

- Based upon the above cores from the progressive masses, it is imperative to select good elements to expand our core organizations (the Youth League and the Pillars). These core organizations originate from the fundamental class both in terms of class and revolutionary movement.

- Based upon the core organizations successively strengthened and expanded as mentioned above, it is imperative to concentrate on expanding new Party membership and expanding quickly upon the foundation of the core organizations organized as stated above.

Our objectives from now on to mid 1978 or late 1978 are to make every part of the leadership forces strong and to increase numbers successively (from Center level down to district in the base areas, the leadership in the army, the leadership in the ministries). Only after the above leadership forces are increased to be active and quick can the revolutionary movement be strong in 1977-78 and create the conditions to push the movement to become even stronger starting in 1979.

Along with this, from now on we much concentrate on building category two forces (progressive masses, core organizations, and new Party members) to become active so that this force can strengthen and expand itself in a timely manner and in mid or late 1979 our cooperatives throughout the country and our factories throughout the country will have a firm foundation of new manpower both in terms of quantity and quality. With this new manpower, it will be appropriate in mid 1978 or early 1979 to use these base area forces to join with the above mentioned forces to combine together into a mighty leadership force to lead our revolution beginning in late 1978 or early 1979.

As for the principles of expanding these forces:

1. It is imperative to stand upon the organizational principles of the Party and successively expand with all of our capacity.

2. It is imperative to concentrate on expanding any location which is a clean location and is not a source or origin that the enemy once controlled.

3. It is imperative to concentrate on clean and pure elements with no enemy entanglement.

4. Clearly designate which elements, which cadres, and which individuals have the mission of being responsible of carrying out this expansion, whether in the zones, the sectors, the dirties, the Army, or the ministries, in order to guarantee the quality of the elements that must go carry out this new expansion. Absolutely do not give general instructions for this or that echelon, so that enemy elements cannot embed themselves or let the no-good elements gain the right to expand new forces in their directions.

II. Concentrate on Continuing to Attack the External Enemy and The Embedded Enemy Boring Holes from Within the Ranks of The Revolution and on Destroying and Eliminating Them

Our Party clearly sees our great victory in attacking and eradicating the external and internal enemies during the first half of 1977. This is considered to be our huge, historical victory post 17 April 1977.

But at the same time, our Party absorbs the fact that the enemy, both internal and external, still strives to struggle free to continue to fight our revolution. This is the law of nature in the conflicts between revolution and counter revolution, between the people and the oppressor classes, between the worker class and the capitalist class, between the collective and the private, between socialism and capitalism, between true Marx-Leninism and revolution-betraying revisionism, between independence/mastery and aggression, expansionism, colonialism, imperialism, etc. This is a state of antagonistic contradiction that routinely occurs on the world stage and routinely occurs in our national society when antagonistic classes exist in the international world and in our national society.

So then, our Party has clearly determined that the entire party, the entire Army and the entire people, standing upon the past experience of resisting and attacking the enemy and must continue to resist and fight the enemy, both internal and external, through the lines and policies of the Party and follow the slogan of isolating the enemy to the maximum in order to attack the enemy and gather all forces that can be gathered as strategy number one, strategy number two, tactic number one and tactic number two, until the ranks of the enemy are broken and eventually annihilated.

The objective during the second half of 1977 is to concentrate sweeping the enemy clean and fundamentally eliminating the enemy in the various base areas, especially in the cooperatives.

III. Open the Battlefield to Go on the Offensive To Absolutely Achieve Three and Six During the Second Half of 1977 Tons

Based upon the preconditions that we fundamentally set up by actively fighting in every field during the first half of the year, we must push an offensive to absolutely achieve the Party's quotas of three tons and six tons of paddy per hectare and even exceed that somewhat. In order to achieve the objective to achieve three tons and six tons, we must continue to concentrate of the following two matters:

First, continue strengthening and expanding material preconditions by gaining more mastery over water, fertilizer, seed, fertile land, farming techniques (seeding,

transplanting, plowing, harrowing, working the land, irrigation, etc), the labor force of the people, the labor forces of animals, etc.

Second, the matter of leading the Party's offensive. This is the key, fundamental problem. Therefore, it is imperative to continue to strengthen and expand and improve each battlefield command committee to make them strong and to continue to do political, ideological and organizational work well and more clearly, to continue to constantly grasp the situation in every field, in particular the water problem, in order to distribute manpower in a lively manner making small intermediate and large attacks, attacking half-rice, attacking heavy rice, fully attacking other secondary crops, etc. It is imperative to improve action lines to be more effective in every field, for instance water use, manpower allocation, distribution of seedlings, arranging seeding and pulling seedlings to match situation estimates, specifically allocating machinery to here and there, arranging the mid year and late year attacks specifically and in a timely manner and mastering the arranging of seeding, transplanting and harvesting, then seeding again, transplanting again, and harvesting again without losing time, etc.

Summarizing in a word, this demands that the command is strong in every field in order to make a decisive attack on three tons and six tons from now until December 1977 and extending on to February 1978 for some locations that have objective obstacles.

Our Party had designated that the rear battlefields must put their manpower in order and make them strong to attack various tactical and strategic crops of all kinds, including vegetables by season when there is enough rainfall (in particular corn and potatoes) and fruits. It is imperative to organize rear battlefield command committees and to have cores leading the operations following in detail daily plans, ten-day plans and monthly plans in order to achieve the slogans "*The rear battlefield and the battlefront shake hands to achieve the Party's three and six tons*" and "*The rear battlefield is the backstop of the battlefront.*"

IV. Strive to Absolutely Sort Out And Raise the Level of Livelihood of the People Following the Regime Set by the Party

Based up the regime set by the Party, the entire Party, in particular cadres with important responsibilities in every field, must join with our Army and our people in going all out to absolutely sort out the livelihood of the people to guarantee their health, especially during this July, August and September. Locations with sufficient preconditions to achieve the Party's regime must go all out to implement this regime at other locations that have a few shortfalls and strive to find various means to sort out and fulfill the mission. Some locations that have many shortfalls must use the experiences of 1976 for study to whip up movements to sort out food supplies with all of the capabilities following the stance of independence/mastery/self-reliance and to build their stance of independence/mastery/self-reliance to become profound in their base areas in the Party, in the Army and in the people. This, in a deeply profound political and ideological sense is valuable capital for moving forward in independence/mastery/self-reliance. As for

additional ways to sort out food supplies for the people, the important thing is to constantly whip up the planting of both strategic and tactical crops, including yams, tubers, beans, vegetables, morning glory, corn, bananas, sugar cane, papaya, etc. Sort this out for both the immediate and long terms. In tandem with this, concentrate primarily of rice with the potential to provide short-term supply, and along with this sort out sugar in order to help the health of the people to some extent. Aside from this, it is imperative to have support from inside the district, sector and zone frameworks throughout the country for any locations that do not have the potential to sort this out by themselves while passing through the upcoming period.

The objective of the Party is that starting with next year's dry season food supply must be absolutely and completely achieved from the beginning to the end of the year and the technical preconditions must be set up for three meals per day with a breakfast of water lily, potatoes, gruel or other foods, and two meals of rice, lunch and dinner, beginning in early 1978. Therefore, it is imperative to increase crop production in the rear battlefields and to make ready and arrange the manpower, pots, and firewood to be able to serve the objectives of three meals per day.


Aside from food supplies, it is imperative to concentrate on the problem of sorting out to the maximum the livelihood of the people in various other aspects and to raise their living standards to be more progressive and quickly have good health, sanitation, housing, clothing, mats and mosquito nets, blankets, pots and potable water. (There must be many wells and small ponds in the cooperative groups).

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Our Party clearly sees the excellent situation of our Kampuchean revolutionary movement in terms of defending the country and defending the state authority of the worker-peasants, continuing socialist revolution, building socialism, spreading the influence of the Kampuchean revolution on the international stage both objectively and subjectively. So then, we have full confidence that under the leadership of our Communist Party of Kampuchea with the Party Center as the core and with our Revolutionary Army and our collective people, from now until the end of 1977 we will absolutely and certainly be able defend Democratic Kampuchea, defend the worker-peasant state authority of the Party, and achieve the Party's three tons and six tons of paddy per hectare with some locations having the potential of exceeding that.

Every cadre and every person must absolutely and completely achieve the Party's missions for 1977.

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This photo: Our revolutionary workers at an iron-crafts workshop in the Kratie region actively fighting on the offensive to produce sugar palm cooking pans

