




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ISSUE 6 JUNE 1976**

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In Tandem with the Movement to Grow Rice, We Must Go on the Offensive to Plant Other Crops and Vegetables Densely Everywhere



The strategic mission for this year is to achieve three tons per hectare in rice farming.

In order to advance toward achieving the strategy of three tons per hectare during this rainy season, we must first have sufficient manpower to go on the offensive. So then, we must sort out the livelihood of the people to the maximum during this transitional period. If we cannot sort out the livelihood of the people during June, July, August, September, and October, this will have a major impact on combat forces. We will lack the manpower to go on the offensive. This is the problem that faces us.

The Party determined many months ago that in order to sort out the livelihood of the people, we must attack tactically, meaning go on the attack with early season rice, mid-season rice, corn, beans, potatoes, and various vegetables. We must go on a strong offensive to plant various secondary crops and vegetables thickly everywhere. We must make this tactical attack to gain a tactical win during this transitional rainy season. We must attack repeatedly in every form, attack non-stop, attack in both large and small scale. The Party's slogan is: Plant, plant, plant; plant everywhere, plant densely, plant until no land is left over; male youths, plant; female youths, plant; elderly and children, plant; both the able-bodied and the weak, plant; plant collectively; plant individually; plant farm fields; plant one or two clumps around the houses and around the worksites ... and so on. When we plant like this, we can fully sort things out during this transitional period. We can truly achieve this strategy during 1976.

We must push the movement to plant secondary crops and plant vegetables more densely everywhere throughout the base areas.

In general, our people, our youth, and our cadres grasp the Party's strategy and tactics of increasing production and implement the strategy and tactics well and correctly following the direction of the Party. Therefore, in many locations, in tandem with movements to go on mighty offensives to plow, harrow, and transplant the rainy season rice crop, there are also non-stop and lively movements to plants secondary crops and vegetables of all varieties, different from previous years to both serve the forward battlefield and make our villages and cooperatives show a fresh and strange new appearance. Crops surround the houses. Crops surround the rice paddies. There are crops along the banks of the feeder canals. There is planting everywhere. So then, there are both large- and small-scale attacks to implement the Party's combat line in a lively manner according to the situation of the soil, water, and manpower in large and small

forces. Everything is being used; nothing is being left idle. Allocation of manpower and use of manpower is highly effective.

A very strange and exciting aspect is the aspect of change in a number of upland areas. Originally, they were dried out and shriveled up in both rainy and dry seasons. Now, there are large canals tens of kilometers long. In some locations they are 40 kilometers long, and in some locations they are 60 kilometers long. Water fills the canals. The area surrounding the canals is fresh and lively with activity much like river bank areas. So then, the change is enormous. The people are happy and bright, and they fight even more mightily.

In tandem with this, there are some locations that have not yet firmly grasped the Party's strategy and tactics of increasing production and have not yet implemented the line well at all. The movement to increase production is strong, but the implementation of the combat line is not yet lively. For example, at some locations, island land, riverbank land, fertile land, locations there used to be abundant in vegetables, but not this year. This is because all the manpower has gone to the front. The elderly are gone; the young are gone, tied up on the front. As for the rear, there is no manpower and the land has been abandoned and left empty. This is not because of the soil. This is a result of the leadership's non-lively and inappropriate management of manpower. We must allocate and use manpower more appropriately and more effectively, which forces are to go to the front and which forces are to remain in the rear to plant secondary crops and vegetables.

So then, any location that has a lively movement to grow secondary crops and vegetables must push the movement further and make it ten to twenty times mightier.

Any location where the movement to plant secondary crops and vegetables is weak must draw experience and study and learn from the experience of other locations where the movement is at a boil. We just plant, but do not impact manpower. The forces of the elderly and the children can plant. Plant corn, plant potatoes, plant vegetables, plant gourds, plant pumpkins. Plant everything. Plant a lot. Make each location into a garden. Aside from this, in the forward battlefield, seize the opportunity to plant. Each person can plant two, three, four, or five clumps. Plant rice on the low ground. Plant vegetables on the high ground. Plant along the banks of the feeder canals. Plant along the paddy dikes. If we plant like this, we will be lack food supplies and vegetables. We will have full-fledged mastery during this transitional rainy season and we will have the manpower to go on the offensive to achieve three tons per hectare.

Push the movement to increase production at every office and every ministry to be busier and mightier.

In the offices, in the ministries, in the factories, our good cadres and our youth have seized the opportunity to increase production, growing rice, farming, and planting vegetable to support themselves. Some offices are totally self-supporting in terms of vegetables and are 60-70 percent self-supporting in terms of rice. Their fight to fulfill their core missions is also strong, and increasing production to support themselves is busy

and active. So then, the atmosphere in the offices and ministries is an atmosphere that is connected to labor, connected to the base area, and connected to the cooperatives. It is an atmosphere of socialist revolution and building socialism.

However, many other offices and ministries are still weak in terms of increasing production. They still completely or almost completely rely upon the Organization, upon the State. Not only do they rely upon the State to support them with clothing, rice, salt, fermented fish, fish, and meat, they even rely upon the State for vegetables too. So then, this is a great burden for the base area, for the people, and for our cooperatives. They live and work cut off from the base areas and cut off from the people. When they have free time and rest from work, sometimes they play badminton, play ping pong, or sit in circles talking uselessly. Through this, capitalist and mandarin view and stances gradually penetrate into the offices and ministries. On this point, we must take notice and quickly reform.

When you have free time from work, when you rest from work, do not remain idle. It is imperative to seize the opportunity to increase production, carrying water to water the crops, and caring for the crops.

In comparison with the fight to increase production of our people in the base areas, our office and ministries are very inferior to the people. They are even inferior to the new people from Phnom Penh.

How about our people? Our people are proletarian. Therefore, our people constantly fight to live. And how about the offices and ministries? Even though they have no salaries, they have food and clothing rations. Whether they work or not, they have sufficient rations. So then, they have resources. These resources are taken from the base areas, taken from the people. So then, if we are not vigilant, mandarin stances and capitalist stances are able to gradually strengthen and expand in the offices and ministries and they change in nature to capitalization. We must see this so that we can study and learn from the people in order to constantly increase production more busily. In tandem with this, strive to conserve more, conserve rice, conserve salt, conserve clothing, and so on. Conserve and increase production in order to fuse our office and ministries with the base areas and with the cooperatives.

So then, our offices and ministries increase production not just to serve immediate objectives and modify their own livelihood, but also to carry out socialist revolution, eradicate mandarin stances, eradicate capitalist stances, and build the stance of socialist revolution and the collective stance by being close to the people, close to the base areas, and close to the cooperatives. Foster habits of strengthening and expanding the habit of loving labor and join in making a contribution toward building socialism.

Push the movement to increase production in the Revolutionary Army to make a contribution to building the country

The core missions, the primary missions of the Revolutionary Army, are to defend the country and defend the domestic security of the country.

In tandem with this, our Revolutionary Army must join in building the country inside the framework of socialist revolution and building socialism.

Up until this day, our Revolutionary Army has actively and unconditionally joined in the work of building the country. Our male and female combatants and our cadres have aggressive spirits and strive to work the rice fields and strive to make fertilizer. They are pleased with the movements to work the rice fields and make fertilizer and those movements have a mighty momentum. Our Revolutionary Army must push these movements further, including the rice farming movement, the fertilizer production movement, and the movement to plant various secondary crops and vegetables of every variety, and in particular, surrounding the mighty movement to double rice farming. The majority of the Revolutionary Army forces are youth forces and are special forces that are far stronger than the forces in the countryside. So then, these forces have a far stronger capability to go on offensives to increase production than do our people in the base areas. In particular, units that are deployed in the interior of the country have the best qualifications because they are not directly and routinely busy on the battlefield like the units along the border or the coast.

So then, the Revolutionary Army troops deployed in the interior of the country must supply themselves 100 percent with an equal ration of 13 bushels for both males and females. In tandem with this, they must also produce some annual reserves, at least 20 percent of their requirements, to be held in ready in case something comes up so that this additional portion can fulfill additional requirements. Aside from this, they must supply the State for building the country.

Therefore, our Revolutionary Army works the rice fields not just to get by on their own: they must produce large harvests. This view and stance on rice farming must be strengthened and expanded and made mighty in this sense. Previously, the Revolutionary Army were the scattered children and grandchildren of the peasants. But now they have become the revolutionary troops of the Party and the workers of the Party, highly-organized and scientific. During war, they fight and defeat the enemy. When the time comes to increase production, they are also mighty.

Someday there will be another war, and our Revolutionary Army will have to go to war to defend the country. The Revolutionary Army will hand over the rice-farming land and the cultivated land to the people and to the cooperatives. So then, our Revolutionary Army grows all this rice and all these crops to build the country, to wage socialist revolution, and to build socialism, not for the sake of its own private ownership or collective ownership. This stance must be constantly fostered by our Revolutionary

Army so that it can make a contribution toward building the country and defending the country to be mighty inside the framework of socialist revolution and building socialism.

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In summary, our peasants in the cooperatives throughout the country, our cadres and youths, every ministry, every office, our workers in every factory, and every unit of our Revolutionary Army have the mission of going on the offensive to achieve the Party's strategic goal for this year: achieving three tons per hectare. Everyone has the mission to join forces to sort out the livelihood of the people during this transitional period. The Party has clearly set the correct strategic line and tactical line. These lines are gradually showing working results everywhere in the form of paddy dike systems, feeder canals, rice fields, seedlings for transplant, and crop gardens. Obstacles and difficulties still exist, but the obstacles are not major ones. The issue is that all of us must go on the offensive more strongly and more effectively in order to win, to win tactically and to move on toward winning strategically. We must go on repeated offensives to plant in every form, to plant non-stop. We just keep on planting. When we plant like this, we truly will be able to sort things out during this transitional period. When we have sorted out this transitional period, we truly and absolutely will be able to achieve the strategy of three tons per hectare during 1976. Our slogan is:

**<<Young and old, males and females, plant, plant, plant.
Plant until not one cluster of land remains idle.>>**

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In tandem with the great non-stop movement to transplant early season rice, the our brother and sister peasants of the cooperatives continued on a mighty offensive to plow and harrow and to sow late season rice in order to absolutely achieve the goal of three tons per hectare during 1976.

Extract from the Instructions

of

The Comrade Party Organization

Representative

During a Zone Conference



From 3 June 1976 through 7 June 1976 a Zone conference was held. The Comrade Party Organization Representative attended this conference and gave opinions and guidance on many important issues that the conference raised for discussion, surrounding in particular the strategy and tactics to attack and achieve three tons per hectare during this year.

The experience of the right and the wrong that this Zone conference raised for examination and discussion and the opinions and guidance that the Comrade Party Organization Representative raised during this conference may be studied by other Zones and Sectors throughout the country in order to further improve our strategic and tactical lines to advance toward achieving the mission of three tons per hectare.

Therefore, we wish to provide the follow extract of the opinions and guidance of the Comrade Party Organization Representative during this conference to our comrades to examine, consider, and study, as follows:

The Opening Speech of the Conference

The Comrade Party Organization Representative emphasized the importance of the conference as follows:

Generally speaking, the destiny of the entire Zone lies in the hands of the Zone Party, but speaking specifically, it is in the hands of our conference ... We convene this conference to resolve the important issues of the Zone. At this time, the entirety of the cadres, the male and female combatants, and the people in the Zone are awaiting the resolution of the major issue of the Zone. All you comrades will return to whip up the movement to become even larger and stronger.

For this reason, we assume that our conference is an important political event for our Zone, the life-and-death of our Zone ...

1. As for the Zone, what are its roles in socialist revolution and building socialism?

This Zone has important roles in both building socialism and defending the country.

The Zone Party and Army have important duties in the work of defending our land and sea territories. This is because our geographic borders are streams and forested mountains. The coastal border is long.

But regardless, the Party and the army together with the people of the Zone been able to defend it to the maximum and on into the future will defend it to the maximum.

Looking in one aspect, it seems that we see that this Zone is poor, because it is mountainous and the soil is not very fertile. But in another aspect, this Zone has flatlands and many rivers and lakes and has vast seas. These rivers and lakes and flatlands and seas are very favorable for us. Comparing the difficult aspects with the good aspects, we see that the favorable aspects are more numerous. Therefore, this Zone is not poor; it has characteristics that may be built upon well. We have the potential to build it rapidly.

On this occasion, we join together to discuss and learn clearly the weak points and our strong points in our Zone and to lead innovatively the rapid building of our Zone. Can the slogan of the Great Miraculous Leap be achieved in this Zone, or not?

According to our repeated assessments, we see that we have complete preconditions. The key issue is the implementation of the activity line, how we must set the tactics to attack and win, what preparations we must make to get three tons per hectare.

So then, it is imperative to go on the offensive and get three tons per hectare before the Great Miraculous Leap. In this, it is imperative to sort out the livelihood of the people to the maximum during this transitional period.

How do we wage socialist revolution? We examine this and see that the class composition in the Party and in the Zone is fundamentally good. In general in the Party, the fundamental class plays an important role, and this is the quality that allows us to wage socialist revolution better and more quickly than locations that have non-fundamental class compositions.

So then, all that remains is to further strengthen and expand these preconditions. Assessing it like this, we see that the Zone has operated very well.

As for the composition of the people, it is good because their class composition is primarily base-area people, and they play an important role even though there are some people from the cities.

2. The issue of sorting out the livelihood of the people during the immediate transitional period

Repeatedly in the past, the Zone Party and the Army have resolved this issue, but we must continue to sort this out, in particular during this transition period. We must sort this out to the maximum.

Reaching the strategy of three tons per hectare during this rainy season requires that we have sufficient manpower to go on the offensive.

If we cannot resolve the livelihood of the people during June, July, August, September, and October, this will have an impact on combat forces. We will have no major forces to attack. This problem does not arise just in this Zone; a number of other Zones have this same problem.

Many months ago the Party designated that in order to sort this out, we must make tactical attacks on early season rice, corn, beans, and various vegetables. This issue is not difficult. We can sort it out. The issue is to keep on making strong offensives that are more effective in order to win tactically during this transition period. So then, it is imperative to go more on the offensive with early-season rice and corn and vegetables. One hectare, ten hectares, one hundred hectares, we just keep on planting. We make repeated attacks in every form, non-stop attacks, both large- and small-scale attacks. When we attack like this, we have full-fledged mastery.

When we can sort out this transition period, we truly can achieve the strategy for 1976. If we cannot sort this out during this transition period, we will be unable to achieve the strategy of three tons per hectare because we will lack the manpower to do so.

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(Next the conference began to hear the report of the Zone Committee and to discuss the issues raised in the agenda. After listening to the report and discussing each of the issues, the Comrade Party Organization Representative provided opinions and guidance. We wish to provide the following excerpts of the opinions and guidance of the Comrade Party Organization Representative:)

I. The Enemy Situation

In the country-wide framework, the enemy situation during November-December through January-February, there were some enemy elements along the border and along the coast. But since March, the situation has been relaxed to the maximum.

In tandem with this, we smashed many enemies in the interior of the country and scattered them. They have no substantial forces.

It is like this inside the country and in the Zone.

- What will the enemy do next? Are they strong, or are they weakening?

We may respond by saying that the enemy will carry out activities against us and against our revolution in various forms. This is a continual struggle between revolution and counter-revolution; it will not stop. Arm yourselves with the stance that the enemy will exist for ten, twenty, thirty more years. National people's struggle is like class struggle: in short, the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution will continue.

Are they strong, or not? This issue does not depend on them: it depends on us. If we take absolute and repeated measures, the enemy will weaken. They will scatter into bits. When we are strong, they are weak. When we are weak, they are strong. By us being strong, what I want to say is that we have correct views and take correct political and military measures. In a Zone, in a Sector, in a district, in a village, or in a cooperative, it is the same. When a cooperative is strong, the enemy cannot enter. But when a cooperative is not strong, the enemy stirs up constant turmoil. Not being strong comes from the cooperative leadership committee not being strong and from the people not being strong. When the leadership committee is strong, the people clearly are strong. This issue depends on the Party and the revolution, whether or not they can grasp the people, whether or not the people understand when educated, whether or not the livelihood of the people can be sorted out. So then, this depends on us, on the Party, and on the revolution; it does not depend on the enemy.

Enemies still continue their activities. The enemy inside is like that; the enemy outside is the same. Outside, the imperialists and all the other enemies have not stopped; they attack us in every form. So then, we must gain mastery by ourselves. We do not blame the truth. In the cooperatives, we must gain mastery. In the districts, we must gain mastery. In the Zone, we must gain mastery.

We must be constantly vigilant. Thus, we must cooperate closely. We have taken measures to deal with the enemy, and we have strengthened and expanded our forces too. Even though they are poisonous, when we constantly take measures, they cannot enter.

In cooperating, we must know how to get along and be in solidarity with one another, even though there may be some minor transgressions against one another. For example, the Zone and the Sector armies cooperate with one another. Upper echelon cooperates with the Zone. When we do this, the enemy cannot enter. The enemy will grow weaker; we will grow even stronger. We will be even more capable of countering the enemy.

- The important issue is that it is imperative to grasp the masses; in particular, it is imperative to grasp the cooperatives.

Some of the contradictions among the people were not whipped up by the enemy; however, some were.

We are waging socialist revolution; there are always contradictions; that is unavoidable.


The important thing is to take measures, in particular to grasp the cooperatives. The Party must grasp the cooperatives. How can the Party grasp the collectives in the framework of countering the enemy? Grasp them tightly in terms of politics; make them understand the important political lines of the Party. Grasp them ideologically; make them crystal clear. Each mission of the Party, each plan of the Party must be explained so that they understand and are crystal clear. Paddy dikes, feeder canals, three tons, building the country and defending the country ... must be explained to them to make them crystal clear. When their understanding is crystal clear, they are pleased: they fight on their own; they have their children and grandchildren join the Army, join the mobile units, put up paddy dikes, and dig feeder canals.

Furthermore, grasp them organizationally; grasp them collectively; and grasp their biographies in turn. Use the forces of the masses in the cooperatives to counter the enemy. The Party Organization or four to ten cores cannot counter them. When our cooperatives are solid, the enemy cannot enter.

What are the methods to grasp the cooperatives? If we have the Cooperative Committee grasp them, they cannot. If we have the Cooperative Branches grasp the cooperatives, they cannot completely grasp them. This is because their forces are insufficient. The Party has instructed that everyone must grasp the cooperatives because

everything is in the cooperatives: paddy dikes, feeder canals, three tons, building the country, defending the country, all of that is in the cooperatives. The Zone and Sector and District Parties, the core organizations, all the troops must go down to grasp the cooperatives.

The Party has instructed that the majority of the Zone troops must live with the people. Only just enough troops must live along the borders. If we have tens of Sector cadres and District cadres grasp tens of thousands of people, there will not be enough of them to do so. Everyone must go down to the cooperatives. Therefore, the Zone must go down to the cooperatives to disseminate the Party line. Only by following this experience can we whip up the movement of socialist revolution strongly and to the maximum. This experience is most excellent.



Since during the past dry season our brother and sister peasants in the cooperatives fought to put up a dense system of dams and paddy dikes and dig feeder canals everywhere, this rainy season, our brother and sister peasants in the cooperatives have water to work the rice fields from the very beginning.

This photo: A team of our brother and sister peasants in the cooperatives are on an offensive to quickly transplant early season rice

Many locations have implemented following this experience and have achieved the very best results. Zone cadres arranged with one another to go down and educate the cooperatives and put programs in place. When we go down in person, we see the actual issues and we can sort out the actual issues and build the Party and build the cores quickly by building the cooperatives, by building the masses, by whipping up the movements.

When we do this, the enemy cannot carry out activities, because we already have a grasp on all of them. For example, the enemy curses us about fertilizer number one.

They say that never ever have they used excrement, but now the revolution uses excrement to make fertilizer. Some members of the cooperatives believe them. But, when we go down in person and explain the reasons to them, they understand. For example, in one Zone there are a number of old pre-liberation people. After liberation there are hundreds of thousands of persons. So there is a large population including both the old and the new people. The Zone, Sector, and District cadres are few in number. How can they govern the people? The Party has clear confidence in the people and in the cadres. This is why the Party has instructed everyone to go down to the cooperatives. The people have absorbed the revolutionary lines, and the movements are mighty. The enemy cannot enter.

This is the fundamental measure. On the military side, there are follow-up measures. As for another measure, sort out their livelihood. The people can sort the other things out by themselves. So then, we go down close constantly. When we have sorted out this two-month transitional period, the movement during the rainy season will be mighty.

Generally speaking, in order to counter the enemy everyone must go down to the cooperatives. The cooperatives are the fundamental force. When the cooperatives are strong, they not only counter the enemy, but socialist revolution, building socialism, and defending the country will also be strong. In tandem with this, we are able to eradicate individualism, authoritarianism, mandarinism, and subjectivism too.

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II. Socialist Revolution and Building Socialism in the Zone

Let me present some opinion so that the conference can pay more attention to our socialist revolution and building socialism so that the Zone can gain additional mastery.

1. On socialist revolution

We must continue to wage socialist revolution by continuing to attack any non-proletarian remnants, anything that is not collective, anything that is still private.

According the report presented a moment ago, we have very many favorables. But in tandem with this, socialist revolution demands further strengthening and expanding so that our national society will become a true socialist revolution and the forces of socialist revolution surrounding the building of socialism will become mightier and speedier in leaps and bounds.

We examine the shortfalls. We look at the cooperatives. Speaking about the cooperatives is speaking about socialism. Organization is very fast. But, there are shortfalls on the political and ideological sides. The socialist spirit, the collective habit, from storing and caring for agricultural implements and hatchets on up, is still deficient. This shows that socialist spirit and collective habit are still not yet firm. Socialist revolution has not yet penetrated deeply into our cooperatives. When the spirit of socialism is strong, it will clearly become a mighty and effectively managed material force. The cattle lack fodder: How must that be resolved? Can we resolve that, or not? We certainly can. Grass is not a raw material from some foreign country. It can be found in our country. For example: In each Sector, some locations still have grass, but lots of the grass is in the lower parts. So then, if we have the spirit of socialist revolution, we can make arrangements for this fully during this new stage. If we leave the cattle without fodder, in principle we let the private regime attack the collective regime, because the private regime can sort that out, but the collective regime did not. This is not an issue caused by the collective regime: it comes from the socialist spirit and socialist revolution not yet penetrating deeply. When we have this spirit, we are able to make arrangements strongly, for instance by assigning forces to find grass. When we are correctly and collectively organized like this, we are far stronger than the private regime.

As for the cooperatives that have a strong socialist spirit, they are able to sort things out; for instance, by making arrangements for straw to be strategically stored and organizing forces to tend cattle and buffaloes.

Compared to foreign countries, we have far better preconditions. First, they have no straw. Second, they have no grass. In their countries, straw is used for other purposes, not for cattle fodder.

So then, we must strengthen the socialist spirit and make it a collective reflex. We have the full potential to do so in each district, especially in each Sector, and even more potential in each Zone.

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2. Building socialism: paddy dikes and three tons per hectare

What potential does the Zone have?

Geographically, the Zone is very mountainous and has few fields and rice fields. Can we work them in great leaps and bounds, or not?

We must assess this issue and then resolve it. If we just manage to get by, we cannot build socialism. So then, it is imperative to reform views. It is imperative to think about: first, getting enough; then second, having something left over in order to build the whole Zone. Speaking of the military, we do not make guerrilla attacks just to make guerrilla attacks, but to build our forces to be strong and agile.

We don't look at the goal of just getting by. We must think first of getting by, then secondly think of having more than that. By getting by, I want to say that the first ration is three cans, the second ration is two and one-half cans, the third ration is two cans, the fourth ration is one and one-half cans. But that is not all we want. Our objective is to get twice that so that some can be stored to build the Zone and build the country. We must have enough to eat, 13 bushels per person per year. If the Zone has 600,000 persons, they have to have 150,000 tons. But we want more than that in order to get even more oil, rice-milling machines, rice-threshing machines, water pumps, and means of transport, to help with manpower and to make our production forces even stronger. So then, we must have not just 150,000 tons of rice. We must have 300,000, 400,000, 500,000 tons before we can build socialism, before we can leave behind the old regime and the old era of just getting by.

The Party has determined that during the next 10 to 15 years, we must turn our agriculture into modern agriculture. However, the Party's assessment is that with the current momentum throughout the country, by 1980, that is within just five years, we clearly will have a modern agricultural model.

So then, in the Zone framework, what preparations must we make? Said differently, how must we carry out the combat line? How must the activity line be set up? During the war it was the same. We raised the principle of attacking any position where we could win, attacking any position where the enemy was weak. The economy is the same. We attack any location that has the best possibilities. We must set the activity line and set the attack tactics not just at the Zone. We must prepare to attack throughout the country.

At the Zone, they attack any location that is the strongest. Each Sector attacks any location that is strongest. For example, Sector A has two locations, upper and lower. The lower is a good location with great potential where rice and crops can be grown and where there are fish. So then, they just concentrate forces to attack this location. Sector B is the same; District C is a fertile location. If we grow sown rice and just get two tons, that is not up to scale; we must attack to get eight tons. Suppose that there are 5,000 hectares of ground: the harvest reaches 40,000 tons, 20,000 tons for supporting 80,000 people, enough to support all of Sector B with 20,000 tons left over. So then, if we attack the right target, District C can support the entire Sector by itself and still have half left over.

In Sector D, the fertile location is District E. There are 8,000 hectares of good ground. If we get eight tons growing two crops, the harvest is 64,000 tons. Keep 20,000 tons for the more than 70,000 people, and more than 40,000 tons is left over.

In summary, at the Zone we have great potential. The problem is: Can we organize an attack on this target or not? We see that we can fully do this starting in 1977. Sector B in the lower part has plenty of water: water is no issue.

The Party's objective is to build socialism quickly. All that remains is for each Sector to organize its attacks on the right targets.

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3. A number of specific issues

(After everyone in the conference discussed this, the Comrade Party Organization Representative added the following opinions:)

The objective is to raise several other aspects in order to push our strategic goals.

We want to be strong in the conference, and when we leave we want to be strong in terms of views and stances.

Our Party always assesses these issues. It was the same during the war. Where should we attack? Are we able to attack, or not? We must agree with one another. When we are in agreement, we are strong and sharp and the enemy cannot hold us back. We were able to attack the American imperialists. Attacking the economy is not as difficult as attacking the American imperialists.

Sector D mentioned geographical obstacles, for instance the basin and another difficulty with cattle. How must we resolve that? Different Sectors also mentioned obstacles, like the obstacle of tending cattle, fodder, private ownership and other things.

- First: When we examine these obstacles, how are they serious? Can we resolve them, or not? These issues are not life-and-death contradictions, not fundamental contradictions. They are secondary contradictions that we can resolve. We have favorable fundamentals. We have the Party and have absorbed the line, we have the resources, the ground, the cattle, the forces of the people in the cooperatives. So then, we do not allow these obstacles to impede us from reaching our goals.

The issue of shortages of cattle and buffaloes can perhaps be resolved inside the Zone framework. The Sectors cannot resolve this on their own. The Zone must resolve this with 50 to 100 pairs. As we understand it, Sector F has many cattle and buffaloes and experience in making plows that can be hitched to one cow. Sector D mentioned that there was one pair of cattle or buffaloes for every 8-10 families. If that is all we have, can we resolve this by using just one cow or buffalo to pull one plow?

So then, we resolve this contradiction in two ways:

- First, by the Zone providing the cattle
- Second, using one buffalo to pull one plow

When we resolve it like this, we have full potential. This is not beyond the capacity of the Sectors and the Zone.

These problems are Party problems. Party problems are leadership problems. Leadership is resolving contradictions.

- In District E there are 8,000 hectares of ground. If we work it twice and to get eight tons, we get a 64,000 ton harvest. We expend 20,000 tons. So then, more than 40,000 tons remain. Speaking in technical terms, we must dare to make a play; we must dare to expend resources to go an offensive at that location. Do not leave it abandoned.

- Second: The issue of livestock fodder. Can we resolve this issue of fodder shortage, or not? We say that in some locations the cattle and buffaloes are thin. If we assess this for a moment, it seems that the socialist regime is inferior to the private regime. But in fact, this is only a temporary issue. It is a childhood disease of socialism. This contradiction is a secondary contradiction and cannot impede our offensive. Our regime is already socialist, but views and ideology are not yet crystal clear. So then, we repeatedly educate politically and ideologically and we draw experience. We can certainly resolve this, and in actuality we have the full potential to do so.



Our Revolutionary Army attacks the enemy mightily and also magnificently and mightily increases production.

This photo: A team of our male and female combatants are on an offensive to transplant rainy season rice as fast as their arms and legs will go, resolved to absolutely achieve a harvest of three tons per hectare during 1976.

- Third: The issue of force management. The issue of manpower shortages is a secondary internal contradiction. For example, a subdistrict is not yet crystal clear about forces. We meet and draw experience from this obstacle. We agree and we manage to resolve it. The front must find large-scale forces, but the rear also needs forces. If the rear is left without forces, they cannot get by.

Generally speaking, all the contradictions, all the obstacles, that we have mentioned are of no importance. After the war, we were short of ammunition, but we were still able to fight. So then, we certainly can resolve the contradictions that we have mentioned this time.

- Fourth: Some other specific issues, for instance the ground in District G. The ground is better than the above-mentioned Sector B. As for Sector F, generally speaking it is the same, grade two or grade 1 ½.

We can sort out the water source issue; that just requires time.

So then, we have the potential to make three tons. However, we must set an activity line in order to attack. Select the locations to attack. We attack important locations, and we also make general attacks. We are fully capable of attacking three tons in Sector E. The other Sectors are the same. It's the same in each Zone. It's the same throughout the country.

- Fifth: Setting up leadership organizations. Every Battlefield Committee must cooperate meticulously with the others. Where Battlefield Committees already exist, there must be a Joint Committee. It is imperative to strengthen and expand them. They cooperate with one another in the sense of meeting to draw experience and sort things out. Suppose that we think only of the front and we have the rear without any manpower. The rear ceases to be the backstop of the front, and this is unworkable.

So then, there must be cooperation in order to sort out contradictions and prevent those contradictions from impeding our offensives. First, we must be crystal clear in terms of views. Second, we must be organized.

Compared to the war, this is nor more difficult than the war was. War means the sacrifice of many lives and many complications. As for building the country, having contradictions is normal. However, we can resolve these contradictions, meaning the entire Party can resolve them. The important thing is the Joint Command Committees that must push the drawing of experience and the resolving.

When our conference is strong, our Party throughout the Zone is strong. Thus, we leave to make them strong.

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III. Building Party Leadership Forces in the Zone

I do not have a detailed grasp of the Zone's situation.

I would like to contribute opinions on some issues in order to build our Party in the Zone on the keys.

Each stage has its own keys, its own special issues. Wait and listen for opinions, and wait to submit more opinions. For now, I only raise the issue of building the Party.

The Party has all the leadership roles. When the Party is strong, the Party seizes victory quickly. The Party has assumed this since before the war. Now, we want to wage socialist revolution quickly; we want to build socialism quickly, even though our people are few and our country is poor. We want to be quick. Can we go quickly, or not? It is our assessment that we must go fast. There are many reasons why this is so:

- First: We want our country to prosper really quickly, for our people to prosper and quickly sort out their livelihood for the sake of the honor of our people.

- Second: If we are not strong and are not fast in leaps and bounds, there are external enemies waiting to pounce on us. Enemies of every type want to take small countries and use them as their slaves. So then, to prevent them from being able to pounce on us, we must be strong. This is why we must strive to be fast. In order to be fast, we must think about every issue: the Party, the military, the people, the economy, social affairs, and so on. However, who is the thinker, who is the leader, and who is the manager?

That depends on the Party. All issues depend upon the Party leadership, the Party throughout the country, the Party at each base area, the Party in each of the cooperatives, and the Party in each unit.

Our Experience in Building Forces During the War

In 1970, the Party throughout the country consisted on more than 4,000 persons. We had few troops, two or three companies or four or five platoons. The world said that we were weak, small, and few in number, so how could we win?

In the cooperatives, we were in great difficulty. But in the cooperatives, the Party decided that we had to fight the American imperialists and their servants. We had to have our own Party, our own Army, our own people, led by us, no matter what the difficulties. In October 1970, the Party decided that it was imperative to fight by ourselves with independence and mastery.

The Party analyzed our forces and those of the traitors, the servants of the American imperialists. We saw that there were two possibilities: first, we might win quickly within three, four, or five years; second, the war might be extended and last for ten fifteen, or twenty years. But the first possibility was more likely, because we were strong politically and the enemy was inferior to us politically even though they were strong militarily. The Party determined that the first possibility was correct, that we would seize victory quickly. From that time on, we led the war until the victory on 17 April 1975.

We readied forces and attacked and won within five years. This was due to the Party. Had the Party not been absolute, and had the Party not had the correct strategic and tactical lines, we would not have won like that.

Now, in 1976, we make an assessment. We are far stronger than we were previously. Party membership has multiplied by a factor of ten to twenty. The army consists of divisions. All the people are in our hands. We control all state power. We control the entire economy. Our influence in the world is strong. So then, our forces now, in comparison with 1970, are more than 1,000 times stronger, 10,000 times stronger. In this position, we want to build socialism quickly; we want our country to change quickly; we want our people to prosper quickly. But in particular, we want to prevent the enemy from mistreating us. Even now, the enemy harasses and provokes us and does not go away. When we are ten to twenty times stronger than this, the enemy will be even less able to do anything to us. Up until today, we have been able to defend the country. We have been able to sort out the livelihood of the people. In 1976, will we be able to reach three tons, or not? Whether we are able to or not depends on us and depends on the Party. We say three tons throughout the country. As for strong locations we will not accept three tons. We will take more than that, four, five, six, eight tons, in order to help carry the weak locations. So then, there must be a combat line before any location can be strong. It was the same during the war. Each battlefield was different. Some were strong; some were weak; but some battlefields were decisive. Building the country is the same. We must select good strategic locations, the first, the second, the third. Then we go on the offensive at these good strategic locations. Today, throughout the country, our number one good battlefield is the Northwest.

We want to use the good locations. The Northwest has 1,000,000 hectares of rice fields. So then, we attack this location strongly for the sake of the entire country. Each battlefield is the same. We must select the good locations to attack. Only by attacking the good locations do we get a large harvest that will help carry the entire country. The lower part is good ground; it is imperative to attack the lower part in order to help carry the upper part.

The Issue of Command

Command is the issue. We study and learn from the war. When command is strong, we win. When command is not strong, we do not win. Building the economy is also like that. We go on the offensive in every way to achieve three tons per hectare throughout the country. If we get three tons, that would be very strong. In the Zone, if we get three tons throughout the Zone, that would be very strong. So then, it is imperative to set the strategy and tactics to attack and achieve that. The issue is setting the important battlefields and the secondary battlefields. Our going on the offensive to get three tons has a very profound meaning. Three tons is meaningful in terms of defending the country. The enemy will be hesitant toward us. It is meaningful in another sense, in sorting out the livelihood of the people and building the country.

So then, throughout the country it is imperative to strive and throughout the Zone it is imperative to strive to organize however necessary to attack and win. Our Zone has 509,000 hectares of land. We will use only 300,000 hectares and will ready to work it meticulously. If the yield is three tons, we will get 900,000 tons of paddy. 150,000 tons will be consumed. 750,000 tons will be left over. Operating like this, the Zone will be very strong.

The Key to Sorting Out the Combat Line and the Activity Line

Is the Party at the Zone strong, or not strong? What is the key?

This Party is very strong, because it has the preconditions and it strives hard. However, when we are strong, we must attack precisely. If we are strong but attack all over the place, that will not do. The key lies in sorting out the combat line and the activity line. The battlefields that are the strategically number one battlefields use the strong forces. The secondary battlefields use the secondary forces. The battlefields that assist use the appropriate forces. This is no different than war was. We had a division attack along Highway 5, for example the attack at Sala Lekh Pram. But our division had many battalions. Thus, we used the important battalions to make the decisive attacks on the important spearheads. Ammunition was concentrated at those spearheads. Attacking three tons is the same. Our number one battlefield uses front-line forces, large-scale forces. Gather up all the implements and means. Then the Command Committee must go down to the battlefield. If we have third or fourth echelon cadres go down, we will have difficulty in attacking; when any problems arise, they will be unable to sort them out. The command must go down in person; then when problems arise, we can sort them out immediately. On important battlefields, we cannot just have the District go down in person, because the District's level of knowledge and understanding is limited. Sometimes the District sees, but does not dare to make a decision. The Zone and the

Sectors must go down personally along with the Districts. Therefore, to be successful on the battlefield it is imperative to: first, ready combat forces; and second, ready leadership forces. The leadership forces are the Party, meaning the Joint Command. This issue does not apply to this Zone alone: it applies throughout the country.

IV. Building the Country

1. Opening up strategic and tactical views in terms of agriculture

First, I wish to agree with the theme of the report. My objective is to present opinions and open up additional views on building the country, in particular in terms of agriculture.

Building the country is aimed at building following the direction of the Party, primarily building our backward agriculture into modern agriculture within ten to fifteen years. This is speaking about the entire country. It is the same here in the Zone framework. However, some locations, some base areas, have the preconditions to be capable of reforming backward agriculture into modern agriculture in a short period, just four to five years, give or take a little. This Zone is like that. Modern agriculture produces large yields: three, five, eight, ten tons per hectare.

Now, in the Zone, in some Sectors, like Sector A down below, B down below, and some locations in C, can these locations achieve eight tons by 1977-78? – Yesterday we discussed this and saw that the possibilities are great. So then, we are able run from thousands of years of backward agriculture to modern. In District E, of 4,000 hectares of ground, we have full potential, and if we care for the seedlings, arrange the sowing well, transplant well, and maintain with water and fertilizer, we clearly will get eight tons from those 4,000 hectares of ground. By 1977-78, we can expand that ground to the 7,000 hectares that the district has. During this period, we are using just enough fertilizer and we have no machinery, but we have already advance forward toward and reached modern agriculture.

Here, I want to say that in the framework of our Zone, as for some locations, in only three or four years we will have arrived at modern agriculture. As for ten to fifteen years, that is speaking about the entire country. So then, within at the longest five years, Sector A down below, Sector B down below, and Sector D will have moved forward and have arrived at modern agriculture. If this is so, by 1980 we will get ten to eleven tons easily. So then, within a short period, we will have the resources to buy machinery and buy oil and various implements. Then within three to five years at the longest, we will be 70 percent equipped with machinery. When we have lots of resources, a portion is sent to the Zone and another portion is kept for us to use in our Sectors. The Zone uses these resources to assist various locations, for instance District F in Sector A. By walking like this, we will walk fast. We attack the strong locations to get resources to help carry along

the other locations that are unfavorable and that lack resources. This is the Party's strategic and tactical planning in terms of agriculture in our Zone. In the future, we will grow rice and we will grow everything else too. For example, Sector B down below grows rice. Up above, we plant mung beans and peanuts. So then, with both modern agriculture and the production of many varieties of crops for sale overseas, we will have the resources to further expand our Sectors and Zone. Sector G is similar. We see it as being poor. But in truth, it is a location of wealthy people. When rice can be sorted out, we keep some for consumption and the remainder is divided in two, some to be sent to the Zone and some to be kept to build our Sectors. Aside from this, will have fish and shrimp that we might sell overseas to get even more capital for constructing roads and purchasing fishing boats and other machinery. Comrades, examine this. Can we attack like this, or not? When we use the correct strategy and tactics, we can implement. From our discussions, by attacking like this, we will win. We have firm confidence. Our only worry is manpower. But we have resolved all that. Collective manpower is mighty. The obstacles can be managed. Our tactic is to clearly select each battlefield, each location, that we must attack. When we attack, we must attack decisively and gather forces to attack; do not make scattered attacks. When one decisive attack has succeeded, then select another location. So then, if Sector F does not yet have the manpower, do not go ahead and dig feeder canals that are too large. If we dig large canals, that requires major manpower to dig them at one stroke and finish them. The full-potential is there. When any Sector has the potential, it does not have to be the Zone, for instance Sector D. Sector A is the same. Use the lower part to grow rice; grow beans in the upper part. But the upper part must have a canal before it can gain mastery over water.

As for the other issues, they are not difficult, like fertilizer. We did not estimate that there would be so much. We had faith in our people, but not complete faith; we underestimated the people. Wartime was like that. As the leadership view, we estimated that throughout the country we could make at least 500,000 tons, with each subdistrict making 1,000 tons. Kampuchea has more than 1,000 subdistricts. We took it that only 500 could make fertilizer. We did not know where to find the money to buy it from overseas. If we made it in factories, we would have to purchase the factories, and we did not know how many factories we would need. So then, the fertilizer movement was very strong. This demonstrates that our people have a mighty fighting spirit and believe in the revolution. As for agricultural chemicals, according to reports, we are able to sort that out. We are still experimenting with them, to learn how to make them more effective. These are our strategies and tactics. Based on this, we can achieve our goals. So then, we must ready the forces and attack precisely. The Zone must help monitor by assessing and helping make corrections. The same with the Sectors: they must join with the districts and with the cooperatives. If we have the districts do this on their own, that won't do. There must be cooperation before the collective can sort things out. So then, in only five years, many Sectors will have modern agriculture. Based on this agriculture, we can expand industry. Later when we have rice, the Zone might grow jute on its own and assemble a jute factory on its own for making bags. The same for textile factories.

We must ready a strategy and open up a strategic view. We firmly believe that we can build the country rapidly. The enemies cannot attack us. On this issue there remains

only the line. The ground is still there. The fish are still there. All that remains is preparing the strategy and tactics. The strategy and the tactics are not the private property of the Center. The strategy and tactics must be disseminated to the cooperatives for their enlightenment so they can build the country quickly. If we set things up like this, what will happen in two or three years? It will change greatly. This is the concrete meaning of the Great Magnificent Leap.

2. Sorting things out during the transitional period

Grow more middle rice. Early season rice is slightly excessive already. Grow more corn and vegetables. For example: More should be grown on the riverbanks, particularly gourds and pumpkins, at least one clump for each three persons. But in fact, one person can grow five clumps. This ground is fertile, and there is a lot of water. But now there is land that remains idle. Now only tubers are left over from last year. It is imperative to plant a lot, to make each location into a garden that can be planted rainy season and dry season. I mention this example, but every location must plant. Another example: some locations are plentiful in vegetables, but not this year, because all the manpower has been gathered to the front. This is not due to the soil. This is because of leadership, because of management. We must think: How to manage the manpower at the front? How about the manpower to be kept in the rear? This issue applies nationwide. In our Zone, there is a level of momentum in planting already, but more must be planted. We plant, but do not allow that to impact the forces on the offensive. Secondary forces can do this planting.



This is a photo of our male and female youths in a cooperative in Leach District, Pursat Province, happily fighting to pick mung beans to be made into food supplies to support the livelihood of the brother and sister members of the cooperative to gradually prosper and be better off.

3. The important thing is to stand on agriculture

We stand on agriculture to expand other sectors, industry, factories, steel, oil, and so on. The fundamental key is agriculture. Self-reliance is the capital for agriculture. Starting in 1977, the State will have nothing to provide to the Zone because the spoils of war are gone now. So then, we must barter and must use rice from the Zone to make purchases. As for public health and social affairs, that is also based on agriculture. The hospitals are for looking after the sick. The medicine, especially the preventive medicine is food. When there is enough to eat, few get sick. Culture is like that too. When we have the resources, we may expand culture and science. But now we must grow rice first. Working the rice fields is tremendous study. The city people did not know what a rice field was, did not know what a cow was, did not know how to harvest. Now they know. They are not afraid of cows and buffaloes like they used to be. Our subject of study is concrete work. When we do concrete work, we gain experience. When we are experienced and we have the measuring equipment too, this becomes science. The important issue is to sort out food supplies first. When there is food, then we can gradually expand, expand the study of literacy and mathematics. Our study laboratories

are the base areas, so we can learn about the soil in our Sector, learn about medicine, and get experience and expand experience at our locations.

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V. To Lead Strongly, We Must Have Firm Confidence, Be Clear-Sighted, and See the Clear Path and Potential to Attack and Achieve Three Tons Per Hectare

Basically speaking, the Party leads socialist revolution and building socialism. Said in another way, in the implementation of this fundamental strategy, there is another key strategy: building backward agriculture to modern agriculture within ten to fifteen years.

The annual strategy this year is three tons per hectare. Next year we will get even more, until we quickly gain mastery within three to five years.

So then, the role of the Party is very important, as we have already discussed. I emphasize this issue. Today, I emphasize this issue, and tomorrow I will emphasize this issue again.

According to the experience of our Party, whether during the civil war or during the war of national liberation against the American imperialists, the key was precisely Party leadership.

Our conference now has clearly discussed the issue of Party leadership. You comrades have absorbed the strategy and tactics to a high-level. You have crystal-clear clear-sighted faith and see the path and see the clear possibility to make the decisive attack. This is a major victory. Being able to resolve and equip ourselves with this issue, we assume that we will achieve a fundamental victory because we have grasped the strategy and the tactics. We clearly know the path that we must walk and we are pleased to walk it, to walk it in mighty droves, collectively. We see that we are walking toward a goal. There clearly are obstacles along the way. Sometime a bridge is broken and there are snakes waiting to strike along the way. But none of that is fundamental. In actuality, sometimes there is a lot of water, and sometimes there is little, so we pump it or scoop it and throw it by hand. When our cattle are skinny, we feed them.

The war was the same. We prepared the battlefield annually; we always had discussions with one another. In fact, the Party Center had discussions on annual attack strategy and tactics. We are all in the lead. Today we are in the lead; tomorrow we will be in the lead.

Example: In mid 1973 the Party determined to go on the first stage offensive. In truth, we were short of ammunition. We were short of forces. The enemy assembled forces to attack us. But the Party's analysis was that we had the advantage over them. We assessed the enemy and ourselves to see if we could agree or not agree on the state of our forces and the enemy forces. We dared to take this up, and actually, we attacked. The North attacked Highway 6 and cut it off from Kampong Cham to Skuon. The East had to come across and attack Highway 1 along with the Special Zone from Kbal Neak Loeung west to Kien Svay. The Southwest attacked Highway 3 and cut it from Tram Khnar to Kampong Khtuot and pounded into along the railway to Kampong Tram. Highway 5 was attacked and cut from Sala Lekh Pram to Kampong Chhnang. We did not attack and push; we attacked and cut. We attacked in this strategy. In tandem with this, the Southwest and the Special Zone joined together to attack the Phnom Baset - Chrey Loas area.

Did the Party agree to make this first stage strategic attack, or not? Was each battlefield able to attack, or not? After discussions, the Party was in unity that we could attack if we set it up like this. We clearly were able to attack. We had at least an 80-90 percent chance. Based on this, The Party Center agreed throughout the country, agreed in each Zone, agreed in each division and each battlefield, that we saw a fundamental victory.

Here, I want to make this clear. How did we analyze? How did we organize the attack? When the attack came, how was it? We won at every location that we attacked. During 1973, we achieved 95 percent of the plan: that was a very major victory. The world shouted that the American imperialists were not able to concentrate their B-52s to attack the Kampuchean revolution. We attacked and cut the primary strategic routes and we pressured Phnom Penh too.

The role of eldership is important like this. However, there must be cores, leadership cores in agreement throughout the country and in agreement in each Zone, each division, and on each battlefield. This kind of unity is very strong.

During our conference, we had discussions for several days and we achieved a fundamental victory. So then, the preparation of the offensive to build the country, is similar to a military offensive, but is not as difficult as a military offensive. The obstacles in building the country are whether or not there is water, the fertilizer situation, the seed situation. On the military battlefield, lives are sacrificed. When we make this comparison, we see that there is nothing to worry about.

So then, when we are crystal clear on strategy and tactics we will achieve fundamental victories. If we get a little bit confused along the way, that's alright; we should be able to find our way. We will not get lost, because we already know the way. If we make a misstep, others will call us back because everyone knows the way, knows the direction that has to be taken.

On into the future it is imperative to make ready like this. When the Party at the Zone, Sectors, and districts are in agreement like this, the Party at the districts have no problems. They truly and clearly understand. The people certainly will be crystal clear. 99 and one-half percent will be pleased. The same with the core organizations. The same with the troops.

So then, the Zone must have cores. The Zone must have four to ten solid cores. The Sectors must also have four or five solid cores. So must the districts. When the cores are solid, this is very strong. And through this, the cadres keep rising just like the troops do.

During 1976, we have also gone on the offensive. By 1977, we surely will be stronger than we were during 1976 because we will have gained experience. We set the strategic and tactical lines during January. From February to June, strong as we were, in the future we will be stronger still. By late 1976 we will see the rice, see the yields, whether or not we reached three tons.

In the Zone, we designated only 300,000 hectares of ground. By year's end, we will be able to do that, or not? If not, why not? We gain experience. It seems that the chances are 80-100 percent. If we try hard in terms of the activity line, we clearly will reach 100 percent. When we get three tons, politics makes a leap; the people make a leap; living standards make a leap; building the Zone makes a leap. The people will clearly see that the Party line is correct and that socialist revolution is correct. They will have clear faith. The enemy will not be able to attack and open us up. It will be the same throughout the country. Waging socialist revolution is aimed at the collective, at strengthening the collective. In actuality, the key is three tons.

We must absorb this and be crystal clear on this issue. If they do not yet absorb this, we must discuss it with them to make them absorb it. When they absorb it, they will have faith. Having faith is having strength.

The experience of this Zone may push other locations

This Zone is the poorest when compared to the other Zones. We are the poorest in that we have the least capital. When we have the capital, we will use that capital to expand yet-unexploited hidden resources.

But even though we lack capital like this, this Zone has the potential to make three tons. This is the first thing. Second, if our Zone can do it, the other Zones must also be able to do it as well. If we use this experience to disseminate throughout the country, the other locations must become stronger and must get better yields.

So then, the experience of this Zone may push the others Zones as well.

A number of specific issues:

- The issue of logging: In fact, the forest must be cut, but boundaries must be set. This is because if we cut the forest surrounding the Tonle Sap it will be gone in ten years, and the Tonle Sap Lake will become filled-in. We will lose the water source and lose the fish. Moreover, when the waters of the Mekong come, they will cease to enter the Tonle Sap Lake since it will have been filled-in. The Tonle Sap Lake receives the waters of the Mekong into its stomach. If it does not take in those waters, the area surrounding Phnom Penh and the riverbanks below will be inundated by the Mekong flood waters.

The statistics mentioned by the Sectors:

I propose that the Zone make a map and mark it with numbers designating the dimensions of the land in every Sector and the economic numbers, the statistics in each field during each period.

As for the Sectors, I propose that each have maps and statistical tables of their own Sector.

By doing this, the Zone Committee will have a grasp and the others will be able to get a grasp. Immediately upon looking at these maps and statistics, we will see things clearly. And this will let us know how far the Zone has reached, how it has progressed, comparing the situations in each Sector. When the male and female combatant enter, they will see it at look at it.

Upper echelon must do this. The Party Center must have statistical tables.

Having these numbers is not just to have some numbers on paper: they increase our leadership.

Now, I propose that the Zone, the Sectors, and the districts have maps. By mid 1977 there should be statistics all the way down to the cooperatives. Every cooperative must have its own maps.

Parting Words at the Closing of the Zone Conference

This afternoon, we hold the closing ceremony for our conference after having worked successfully for three and a half days.

The Zone Conference has decided to make three tons per hectare this year. This is a great victory for the entire Zone Party, for the cadres, for the male and female combatants, and is a great victory for our entire Communist Party of Kampuchea, our entire Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, and our entire Kampuchean people.

We are excited to the maximum, because for one thing, the conference was successful, and for another, we have studied and learned from every type of experience. The studies of this conference are of benefit not only to us personally, but also to our entire Party. We will report the outcome of this Zone Conference to the Central Committee and will disseminate the experiences of this Zone and this conference throughout the country as well, and through this we will further modify and improve our strategic and tactical lines.

I also seize this opportunity to send parting words through all you cadres to all the comrades in the Zone that our conference has been successful inside our framework of finding a path, finding strategic and tactical lines, and finding an effective line of operation in order to achieve three tons per hectare during 1976. We are in unity; we are crystal clear on this issue, and we have firm faith that we will be able to achieve the objectives of the conference.

Our objective is to have all you comrade representatives grasp and use the outcome of the conference, in particular the strategic and tactical lines to achieve socialist revolution and build socialism and achieve three tons per hectare and implement them in all our base areas cooperatives, and ministries and offices inside the Zone in order to achieve three tons per hectare.

We firmly believe that all Party members, all Revolutionary Army troops, all the people in the cooperatives, and all the comrades in the ministries and offices, can truly and absolutely achieve three tons per hectare.

In closing, let me send my best wishes to all you comrades returning to the base areas to implement the decisions of our conference successfully, in particular to achieve three tons per hectare during 1976. I send my best wishes to the comrades, the cadres, and the combatants both male and female, and wish all of those comrades good health so that they can achieve three tons per hectare.

**Cheers! To the Communist Party of Kampuchea, correct,
clear-sighted, and magnificent**

Cheers! To the Zone Conference, to achieve three tons per hectare



**Our revolutionary workers always fuse themselves with the cooperative movement
by going on offensives to increase industrial production to
fundamentally serve agriculture.**

**This photo: Our female revolutionary youth workers in a jute bag factory are on an
offensive sewing many bags to be supplied to cooperatives throughout the country.**



**REVOLUTIONARY
FLAG**