



អង្គជំនុំជម្រះវិសាមញ្ញក្នុងតុលាការកម្ពុជា
Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia

ព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា
ជាតិ សាសនា ព្រះមហាក្សត្រ
Kingdom of Cambodia
Nation-Religion-King

ឯកសារបកប្រែ
TRANSLATION/TRADUCTION
ថ្ងៃ ខែ ឆ្នាំ (Date): 10-Jan-2012, 11:20
CMS/CFO: Phok Chanthan

ការិយាល័យសហចៅក្រមស៊ើបអង្កេត
Office of the Co-Investigating Judges
សំណុំរឿងព្រហ្មទណ្ឌ
Criminal Case File
លេខ/No: 002/14-08-2006
លេខស៊ើបអង្កេត/Investigation
លេខ/No: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ

កំណត់ហេតុនៃការស្តាប់បម្លើយសាក្សី
Written Record of Witness Interview

On the ninth of April, two thousand and eight, at 9:00 a.m. at Prey Sâ ព្រៃស (M1 ២១)
Prison, Phnom Penh

We **LIM Sokhuntha and Mike DIXON** Investigators of the Extraordinary Chambers,
being assigned by the Rogatory Letter of the Co-Investigating Judges, dated 11 March
2008,

Noting the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, dated 27 October
2004,

Noting Rules 24, 28 and 60 of the ECCC Internal Rules,

With **NIL Samorn** as sworn Interpreter of the Extraordinary Chambers,

Recorded the statements of **CHHOUK Rin ឈុក រិន**, a witness, who provided the
following information regarding his personal identity:

The undersigned CHHOUK Rin alias Sokh សុខ, age 56, was born in Trapeang Chrey ត្រពាំងជ្រៃ Village, Dâmnâk Kântuot ដំណាក់កន្ទួត Subdistrict, Kampong Trach កំពង់ត្រាច District, Kampot កំពត Province. He is a convict at Prey Sâ M-1 ព្រៃស ម-១ Prison.

His father, CHHOUK Cheang ឈូក ជាង, is deceased, and his mother, NHÊT LUY ញ៉េត លុយ, is deceased. His address before imprisonment was Châmkar 3 Village ភូមិ ចំការ៣, Pong Toeuk ពងទឹក Subdistrict, Dâmnâk Châng-aer ដំណាក់ចង្កើរ District, Kep City កែប.

He is married to YÊM Săo យ៉ែម សៅ, who is living, and he is the father of five children.

Prior criminal record: Convicted by the Phnom Penh Court of terrorism, homicide, intentional destruction of personal property, and illegal detention.

- The witness declared that he can read, write and understand the Khmer language.
 - The witness declared that he cannot read or write any other languages.
- Therefore, the original of this Written Record is written in the Khmer language.
- We advised the witness that an audio or video recording was being made of this Interview.
 - The witness told us that he/she is not related to either the Charged Persons or to any of the Civil Parties.
 - The witness took an oath, in accordance with Rule 24 of the ECCC Internal Rules.
 - We notified the witness of his/her right against self-incrimination, in accordance with Rule 28 of the ECCC Internal Rules.

Questions-Answers:

Q: You wrote a letter to the ECCC stating that you wished to help the court. What is it that you would like the court to know?

On 28 August 2002, the Phnom Penh Court of Appeals convicted me of terrorism, homicide, intentional destruction of personal property, and illegal detention. The court sentenced me to life imprisonment. Currently, I am a convict at Prey Sâ Prison in Phnom Penh. I want everyone to learn about what I say. I served in the army of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). I did not know anything about what happened, about the reasons for the killings. I spent a long time before I learned one of my younger brothers had been killed. While I served the Khmer Rouge, I was wounded in combat. The charged persons detained by the Khmer Rouge tribunal are all elderly. The court should call all the surviving cadres from the level of regimental commander and above, and the civilian leaders from district level up to provide evidence.

Q: What do you know about the CPK and the Khmer Rouge, and how did you become a member of the CPK and a Khmer Rouge soldier?

The Indochinese Communist Party met with high level cadres with an intention to create a similar political structure in Kampuchea. Those cadres refused, and created the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) instead, and this point became the source of the problems between the CPK and the Viet Cong (VC). Not long after that, we fought the VC victoriously in the border regions, driving them from the country and from the CPK. This meeting occurred during 1972 or 1973, and I do not know which leaders attended the meeting other than Ta Mok តាម៉ុក. The CPK had disputes with and fought with the VC from then on, up until 1979. The CPK refused to cooperate because the Vietnamese wanted to govern us, and we wanted independence. So, that is why we were in conflict with Vietnam, whose mission was to grab the authorities and dominate us. The major dispute between the CPK and Vietnam started from this point on. Internal disputes inside the CPK were created by the group which supported Vietnam and the group which opposed Vietnam. The CPK had been created before the 1975-79 Khmer Rouge regime, but the aim of the Party changed. During 1971-78, the aim of the CPK had been to build and defend the country. The structure of the Khmer Rouge was different; their aim was first to build communism by building core political forces which were at that time in the “liberated zone” in the Northeast Zone. When this movement began, the group which supported the Viet Cong was uncomfortable, and they began to create their own army. The Viet Cong opened the Ho Chi Minh trail to supply material for their war against the Americans in Vietnam. This factor pushed a short period of cooperation between the Khmer Rouge and the Viet Cong. In 1973, the fighting against the Viet Cong began, led by Ta Mok from amongst the Khmer Rouge. These bad relations created problems within the CPK, and I did not understand anything at all about what happened. In 1971, I joined and served the CPK through Sien សៀន, the Chairman of Kampong Trach កំពង់ត្រាច District.

Q: What do you know about the five persons currently charged by the court?

I was angry when Nuon Chea នួន ជា said he was not responsible for anything that happened during 1975-79. He was a high-level cadre. At that time, there was no personal property, and there was collective living. We all tried to work to build and defend the country, and there was no medicine. Even high-level military were arrested then, and I did not understand anything at all about the reasons. It is not true, what Nuon Chea said about him not knowing. He told us that all of us “had to be clean and equal.” He was a national-level Party Member, and he had to know about what Pol Pot ប៉ុល ពត was doing. There were cooperatives, collectivization, and labor in the countryside. I cannot speak about Khieu Samphan ខៀវ សំផន, because I did not know much about him. I met Pol Pot for the first time in late 1977, when I attended a

political study session. I met Nuon Chea for the first time in late 1977 in the Party's annual National General Assembly. I never met Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary អៀង សារី, Ieng Thirith អៀង ធីរិទ្ធ, or Duch ឌុច. There were three categories of people in the CPK: "Progressives", "Youth League", and "Party Members" of which there were two types, Candidate Members and Full Rights Members. Khieu Samphan was a member of the "Front" with Samdech Sihanouk. The CPK used Front Members as "diplomats" for communications with the various countries of the world. I did not know the status of their membership with the CPK. During 1971-75, there was a Southwest Zone level political meeting chaired by Ta Mok. During 1975-77, there were no political meetings, and there was a change of leadership in the Southwest Zone, from Ta Mok to Sâm Bít សំ ប៊ិត. After 1976, there were more meetings, but they were not all political meetings. In his status as Commander of Division [កងពល] 2 of the Southwest Zone, Sâm Bít had regular communications with Ta Mok, his superior. At that time, Pol Pot was Secretary of the Central Committee and other high-level leaders were Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, Son Sēn សុន សែន, and Ieng Sary. Son Sēn was Minister of Defense, including the security apparatus. The military was responsible for security. The highest persons in order were Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok. Between 1975 and 79, "there was an atmosphere of mutual mistrust."

Q: Can you describe your joining the military and your experiences, especially during 1975-79?

In the beginning, I was ordained as a monk, but I entered the forest after the Americans bombed Watt Trapeang Chrey វត្តត្រពាំងច្រើន, Kampong Trach កំពង់ត្រាច District, Kampot កំពត Province, the site where I was in residence. In November 1971, I became a soldier in Company 1 of the Front army in Kampong Trach District. In 1973, I became commander of a platoon subordinate to Battalion "Khô ឃ" in the Kampot Sector, and supervised 36 soldiers. At that time, there were three battalions, each of which had 350 soldiers under the command the Military Commander Sēk សែក. Battalion "Kâ ក" had Chey ជ័យ alias Sakhân សាខាន as Commander. Battalion "Khâ ខ" had Chun ជន, a relative of Nuon Pèt នួន ប៉ែត, and Battalion "Khô ឃ" had Chorn ចន as commander. All three commanders were arrested and executed during 1975-76 at the order of Sâm Bít. Battalion "Kô គ" was created later with soldiers who had been monks who had been forced to disrobe during 1973. In May 1975, I became commander of Artillery Battalion 59, subordinate to Kampot Province where Rîn រិន was the Kampot Sector commander. (He was sent to the East Zone during

1978.) This battalion was a part of Division [កងពលធំ] 230. Division 230 had Yoeun យ៉ៃន as Commander, and was based at Kampot. Rïn was transferred to supervise the military in the East Zone in 1978, and Division 230 had been created to be stationed in Kampot Province, subordinate to the Southwest Zone Military Commander Yoeun. This division had three regiments designated 401, 402, and 403. In 1975, Kâng Chap កង ចាប់ was Secretary of the Kampot Province Sector. He was arrested and sent to the North Zone with a number of his soldiers in approximately May 1975, and Sâm Bít rose to replace him. All of them were arrested by Pol Pot during 1976-77, with Pol Pot and Nuon Chea announcing the arrests of Kâng Chap and other high-level cadres during the Party annual assembly in late 1977. Sâm Bít called a meeting when he became the Kampot Sector Secretary in 1975 and announced the military goals of the Southwest Zone. I saw Sâm Bít and Ta Mok frequently in the Southwest Zone.

Q: Which divisions participated in the evacuation of the people from Phnom Penh in April 1975?

I was not involved in the evacuation of the people from Phnom Penh, because at the time I was in the Southwest Zone; but I did participate in the evacuation of the people from Kampot following the instructions of Ta Mok and Sâm Bít. The soldiers ordered all the people to leave, and the civil side took control. Sâm Bít and his civil forces carried out these activities. After the combat, the soldiers were told to stay outside the provincial city. I did not see people being killed after the evacuation. The Security Office had been closed then , and it re-opened during 1976, but I did not go there. In 1976, Sâm Bít arrested many commanders, including: Phat ផាត, commander of Artillery Battalion 59; Chey ជ័យ, Chorn ចន, Chaut ច្នត, Sarum សារុំ, and Chun ជន (a relative of Nuon Pèt). They were all sent to the Kampot Province Security Office. I do not know what happened to them or the locations where they were sent next. In 1976, I was sent to be commander of the Intervention Battalion subordinate to Brigade 230 which was located at Kampong Trach (it had 600 soldiers). In 1977, I was sent to Svay Rieng ស្វាយរៀង Province and was inserted into Division [កងពលធំ] 703, subordinate to the General Staff of the Center, and rose to be commander of Regiment 402. Division 703 was stationed in Svay Rieng Province, and Regiment 401 defended Phnom Penh at the Boeng Trabèk បឹងត្របែក School. In 1977, Dy ឌី was the deputy commander of Division 703, and he later died in combat with the Vietnamese in 1979. His Deputy Thy ធី now lives either in Kampong Tralach កំពង់ត្រឡាច District, Kampong Chhnang កំពង់ឆ្នាំង Province or in Sâmlaut

សំឡាត់. In late 1977, cadres from Brigade [កងពលតូច] 230, Kampot Province, joined with the Center's Division 703 and were sent to the East Zone to suppress cadres there, with those cadres being told they were being relocated and that they had to disarm and would be transported to Phnom Penh and sent to the airfield construction work site in Kampong Chhnang Province. I did not see that transfer with my own eyes, but later Son Sēn told us in a military meeting in Svay Rieng Province during mid 1978. Rèn រ៉ែន, the commander of the Center's division [កងពលធំ] stationed in Svay Rieng Province controlled four brigades [កងពលតូច] designated 340, 221, 703, and 460. Rèn, Ta Mok's son in law, died in Ânlung Vêng អន្លង់វែង in 1979. I don't know when this division of the Center was created. In this division, there were four brigades [កងពលតូច] designated 340, 221, 703, and 460. Brigade [កងពលតូច] 703 of the East Zone had Dy as Commander and Thy and Sung ស៊ីង as Deputy Commanders, and was based in the East Zone, in Svay Rieng Province. Brigade [កងពលតូច] 340's commander was Thy Poussē ធី ពួសសែ (deceased). Brigade [កងពលតូច] 221, an intervention unit, was commanded by Ieng Phan អៀង ផាន who is still alive now and has the rank of Brigadier General (One star) in Military Region 5, in Battambang. I cannot remember who commanded Brigade [កងពលតូច] 460.

Q: Who ordered you to go to the East Zone? How did you receive orders?

Son Sēn sent me to the East Zone along with others in late 1977 to arrest all the cadres there who were traitors. The division commanders and soldiers were arrested and sent to Phnom Penh and to the air field construction work site in Kampong Chhnang Province. There were suspicions that the cadres there had opened the way for the Vietnamese to enter the country in Svay Rieng and Prey Veng Provinces. I fought Vietnamese soldiers there, captured approximately 30, and transported them by truck to Phnom Penh, with my soldiers escorting them. The decision to purge [ធ្វើការបោសសំអាត - literally to sweep and make clean] the East Zone was made after the Party annual General Assembly in early 1978, with Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, and Son Sēn holding a special meeting with military commanders including myself in Phnom Penh. Pol Pot spoke about the plan to purge [ផែនការបោសសំអាត]; then Nuon Chea agreed with what Pol Pot had said. Nuon Chea and Pol Pot supplied detailed information on the plans to arrest and remove the cadres from the East Zone. He said that all of them had cooperated with Vietnam and that they would be arrested by our cadres from the Southwest Zone. All the group from the East Zone were arrested and sent to Phnom Penh, because we did not know what would happen to us when we arrived. I do not know their names, nor do I know if any of them are still alive.

Q: Can you clarify how you received orders?

High-level military commanders, including myself, received orders by telegram to travel to the East Zone, and we also received verbal orders in a special military meeting in Phnom Penh attended by military commanders. This meeting was held during about the same time as the Party annual General Assembly. There were separate meetings for the military commanders and the civil side. I attended the meeting for military commanders, with approximately 40 to 50 division and regimental commanders in attendance. Pol Pot talked to us; then Ta Mok spoke on the point of the necessity of “the internal purge of the Party”

[ធ្វើការបោសសំអាតក្នុងជួររបក្ស]. Nuon Chea spoke of “cleansing the Party ranks”

[ការសំអាតក្នុងជួររបក្ស]. The decision to purge the East Zone was made jointly by the Standing Committee, with Son Sēn acting on the orders of Pol Pot and Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, who were all present during the meeting. Among the military commanders present were Meas Muth ម៉ាស មុត, Ieng Phan, Sokh Chhean សុខ ឈាន (Phan’s Deputy), Thy Au ធីឌី and Thy Poussē. The meeting to provide instructions on the purge was held at a different site from that of the Party General Assembly which was held at the Olympic Stadium. This meeting to provide instructions was held at the Military Headquarters near Boeng Trabèk. That decision may be found in the CPK Flag Magazine [ទស្សនាវដ្តីទង់ ប.ក.ក], Issue 7, and it was discussed in the annual General Assembly in late 1977. Those who had the right to attend the assembly on the CPK Flag Issue 7 had to be Party members.

Q: What did you do to the East Zone cadres?

The Center sent me and others to the East Zone to arrest all cadres in all nine brigades [កងពលតូច] and send them to the airfield construction project. The commanders were sent to Phnom Penh, and the subordinate soldiers were sent to construct the air field in Kampong Chhnang Province. I don’t know how many East Zone commanders were sent to Phnom Penh or to S-21. Almost all the subordinate soldiers were transported by military trucks with military teams as escorts to the airfield construction site in Kampong Chhnang. The divisions sent to the East Zone to purge the cadres there included Division [កងពល] 221 under the command of Ieng Phan, the Division [កងពល] 703 under Dy, Division [កងពល] 340 under Thy, and Division [កងពល] 460, a naval force from Kampong Saom. I don’t remember the name of that Division commander, it may have been Saom Savy សោម សាវី. More than ten thousand soldiers were sent to make the arrests. The purge of the East Zone began in

late October or November 1977. Battalion 360 was the first to be sent from the Southwest Zone; next was my Division [កងពល] 703, then Division [កងពល] 460. I was in the East Zone for half a month before I was called to attend the annual Party General Assembly and the special meeting where I was officially instructed for the first time regarding the plans. I was sent to set up positions on Highway 13 in Samraong សំរោង District, but I was based in Romeas Hèk រមាសហែក, Kampong Rô កំពង់ឆ្នាំង, and Chântrea ចាន់ត្រា Districts. I arrived there during the 1977 rainy season; I can still remember my vehicle got stuck in the mud. We never told those cadres that they would be arrested. When we arrived, we told them to lay down their weapons, and we put them on our trucks and sent them with armed escort forces to Rèn's headquarters. The Zone Secretary was Sao Phim សៅ ផឹម. He committed suicide in 1978. I don't know the exact time that Sao Phim committed suicide, because I never saw his body. There was a state of confusion then. I stayed in the East Zone until the Vietnamese entered Phnom Penh in 1979. I reported directly to Thy.

Q: When you were in the East Zone, how did you receive your daily orders?

I received and issued almost all military orders through a shoulder-carried radio on the battlefield. The radio was a C25 ស៊េឡឌី with a relay antenna. We could contact Phnom Penh from Svay Rieng Province. We used the radio many times a day, and I changed my code number frequently. Son Sèn and Ta Mok came down to the East Zone many times. Ta Mok came more frequently. Not many cadres from Kandal កណ្តាល Province were sent to the East Zone, just Dy and his deputy Thy, who is now living in Kampong Chhnang Province and Sokh Chhean, the Deputy Commander of Takeo តាកែវ Province, who is still alive. In 1978 Son Sèn convened one study session in Svay Rieng Province, and he spoke about the purge and the arrests of Zone leaders who were traitors in 1978. I did not know what other mistakes they had committed other than cooperating with the Vietnamese.

Q: What was the job of the Party inside the military forces?

Under the leadership of the Party, inside the military forces, everyone had to work with his own hands and study politics like the civilians. If [we] did not follow instructions, [we] would disappear. The decisions and plans of the leadership were to create internal security and defend the country. We had no choice; each person had to follow the orders of the Standing Committee. If not, they would without fail be arrested and disappear. I went to Phnom Penh twice to attend Party General Assemblies. The discussions regarding the goals of the General Assembly in 1978 were led by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok, and Son Sèn. I met Son Sèn there to receive instructions to defend against 100,000 Vietnamese soldiers attacking along the border. All of the Vietnamese soldiers who were captured along the border near

Svay Rieng and Prey Veng Provinces were sent to Phnom Penh. Initially, they were sent to Rèn at the division headquarters, and he decided what was to be done with them. Democratic Kampuchea Radio broadcast information from the confessions of Vietnamese prisoners of war who had been captured in the East Zone and sent to Phnom Penh during 1977-78. I think this group was sent to Duch at S-21, but I am not certain, because at that time we seemed to be in a dark world; many things happened that we did not know about, and movement was extremely restricted.

Q: What do you know about the purges and the reasons for them?

Pol Pot frequently spoke about the necessity of “purging” [ធ្វើការបោសសំអាត], meaning making arrests, and Nuon Chea talked about “internal enemies” [សត្រូវផ្ទៃក្នុង]. In 1976, Divisions [កងពល] 280 and 290 under the command of Chăn Chăkrei ចាន់ ចក្រី tried to overthrow Pol Pot but were unsuccessful, and Chăn Chăkrei was arrested by Pol Pot’s forces, Division [កងពល] 703. During 1977-78, Vietnamese commandos attacked the installation of the Center in the middle of Phnom Penh. The majority died; some were captured, and only a small number were able to flee. Dy, as commander of Division 703 and his deputy Thy had the responsibility of defending Pol Pot with Regiment 401, which had the task of the defense of Phnom Penh.

Q: What do you know about the system of security offices?

The system of security offices was set up by the local authority at the base [រដ្ឋអំណាចមូលដ្ឋាន]. I did not know of S-21 at that time, because it was very secret. I only learned the name of that office after I defected during 1994. I knew Duch, because he was in Division [កងពល] 703, but I don’t know in which regiment; ordinarily we did not speak with people we did not know. I became the first military commander to join with the government after 1979 (I surrendered in 1994). Now I am hesitant to show everything I know; I am extremely worried about my personal safety. I think about the influence of anything I might say regarding the Party, and I need guarantees from the court. Nuon Pèt may know many things, since he was always with Sâm Bít. He was a civilian before becoming a soldier. I spoke with Nuon Pèt, but did not discuss in depth with him what I have told you. What he does with you is his business. I know what I know.

Q: What did Pol Pot say in that 1977 political study session?

Pol Pot spoke about the goals of the CPK, independence, non-alliance, not joining the Indochinese Communist Party. Another thing was the policy of building the nation in the manner of Chhoe Ly Ma ឆឹលីម៉ា of North Korea. [On] internal reinforcement, Pol

Pot spoke about Vietnamization, saying that Vietnam had built many forces inside the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, especially in the East Zone led by Sao Phim. The objective of the Party Chairman was to send core forces from the Southwest Zone to purge [ប្រោសសំអាត] the Yuon forces embedded in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, and Kampong Cham. After this plan, a purge campaign [យុទ្ធនាការប្រោសសំអាត] was implemented. Nuon Chea, Son Sēn and Ta Mok were also present at that time. Son Sēn said in a military meeting in Svay Rieng that the subordinate soldiers arrested from the East Zone were taken to build the airfield in Kampong Chhnang and the military commanders were sent to a reeducation site, probably meaning S-21, I imagine.

Q: How did you know Nuon Chea was a high-level leader of the Khmer Rouge?

Before 1975, when I joined the Party, Ta Mok introduced the name of Nuon Chea,. [In] Party building, I had known that Pol Pot was Secretary of the Party, and Nuon Chea was Deputy Secretary of the Party since 1973. For someone to join the Party, that person had to know the roles of the Party and the Party Leadership.

Q: Did you know who was above Sâm Bīt who gave him the order to kill Chey, Chun, and Chorn?

I don't know who Sâm Bīt received orders from; the Center probably gave the orders. Without the Center level having ordered it, high-level military commanders like this could not have been arrested.

Q: Where is Rĭn, from the Kampot Province Military Staff, at now?

He was killed in late 1978 after the campaign to attack the East Zone, at the order of Son Sēn. Son Sēn ordered Rĭn shot to death in Kampong Cham. I learned this through Son Sēn telling Rèn, the Svay Rieng Division Commander, that Rĭn had not listened to orders and had not fought the enemy.

Q: Regarding the announcement of the arrest of Kâng Chap, what did Nuon Chea say in the Assembly regarding that arrest?

Pol Pot was the main speaker, but Nuon Chea was present, and Nuon Chea knew. This was a single plan. After Pol Pot spoke, Nuon Chea just added to some points that were lacking.

Q: What were the military aims announced by Sâm Bīt when he became Kampot Sector Secretary?

The military goals were to defend the border, to put in place the preparatory lines, and to prevent the people from fleeing to Vietnam. Some were captured and sent to a reeducation site at the province.

Q: Who made the decision to use the East Zone cadres to build the airfield at Kampong Chhnang and to Phnom Penh?

Orders came from Son Sēn, and Son Sēn received orders from the Center. The transport was done by removing them and taking them to the division location of Rèn at the airfield west of Svay Rieng, and they were transported to Phnom Penh by GMC trucks and Chinese AZINE trucks. About 5,000 persons were taken.

Q: Where were the telegraphed orders sent from, and who signed them?

I never saw signatures, but there were identification numbers. For example, Pol Pot was 99, Ta Mok was 15, Sâm Bīt was 37, for instance. But I don't remember the identification numbers in the telegrams. I personally saw the telegrams; they read the telegrams at meeting sites.

Q: What did Nuon Chea say in detail relating to “cleansing inside the Party ranks”? [ការសំអាតក្នុងជួរបក្ស]?

Nuon Chea spoke about purging embedded enemies boring holes inside, enemies that were the arms and legs of the Yuon. Nuon Chea ordered the arrests, meaning the purge. In that era, the term “purge” met to arrest and kill. I regret this very much. They accused the leaders of being traitors, and the subordinate soldiers were also arrested. This is the truth.

Q: How do you know that those not following the orders of the Standing Committee would be arrested?

I saw people being arrested one after another, like Chey, Chorn, Chun, and Sarum, etc, all regimental commanders. The Khmer Rouge leaders were deficient in virtue, morality, and education. They made accusations that all these people had not listen to orders and had collaborated with the Yuon. I will tell you more than this at the trial hearing if they need me. I will explain the reasons for this, the reasons I learned during 1975-79.

Q: What does that term used by Nuon Chea mean, “the enemy boring holes inside” [សត្រូវស្លៀងស្លៀកខ្នង]?

It meant enemy trickery by making a peace alliance or “*Santi sampoine*” [សន្តិសម្ព័ន្ធ]. It means to cut off sentimental attachment with relatives and friends and avoid being persuaded and influenced by them. You must not fall for the peace alliance trick; if

you fall for it, you fall into the trap of the enemy. Enemy trickery was when some plan had been set, and the planned results were not obtained. For example, the three-ton-per-hectare plan. If you did not obtain what had been planned, you were the enemy, and this was due to enemy trickery.

Q: Do you have anything you want to add about your knowledge of Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan?

I cannot speak about Khieu Samphan, because he did not know much. He was a force of the Front, not a member of the Center. Ieng Sary was in Foreign Affairs; I never heard him speak. I have struggled all along up until my current imprisonment because of all these leaders. Nuon Chea was Deputy Secretary of the Party, and was a person who had as high a level of responsibility as Pol Pot. Everything which occurred in Kampuchea during 1975-79 had been planned.

Q: Please clarify about the Center. Who was at the Center leadership level?

The Center was the supreme level of leadership of the Party. In comparison to the present, it was the supreme level of leadership of the government. There were many Khmer Rouge Center-level leaders, I can't remember them all, for instance, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ta Mok, Sao Phim, Vân Vết វ៉ែន វីត, Chēng Ân ចេង អ៊ិន, Mei Prang ម៉ី ព្រាំង, but as for Ieng Thirith, I cannot recall. Only after the end of the war, in 1977, did they make an official announcement about the Communist Party of Kampuchea, after Pol Pot returned from his trip to China. Since 1973 there had been many in the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, but it had been led in secret. As I know it, the leadership level encompasses from the Zone leadership level up, the members of the Standing Committee, except for Khieu Samphan.

Q: When the Center convened a meeting, were written records made which were sent to the high-level leadership of the Center?

At meetings, the Center always made written records, and they were sent to the high-level leadership of the Center, but in 1979, there were orders from the Center to destroy all of the Center's planning documents and various written records. I know this since I was a Party Member. The destruction was done by burning those documents, and I also burned documents. Other military commanders also burned documents, any documents involving the secrets of the Communist Party. Anyone not a Party member could not know the secret plans of the Party; they just carried out the plans issued by the Party. For instance, Khieu Samphan was Chairman of the Presidium of State; he was not a member of the Communist Party. He was a member of the ordinary masses. Therefore, he only carried out the plans of the Communist Party.

One copy of the Written Record was provided to the witness.

The interview ended at 11:00 a.m. on the same day.

The Written Record was read out to the witness; the witness had no objections and signed it.

After the Written Record was read out to the witness, the witness refused to sign it.

Witness

Interpreter

Investigators

Chhouk Rin ឈ្មោះ រិន

[Signature/Thumbprint]

[Signature]

[Signatures]