


[ERN0015275]



S-21 Confession of MEN Meng (ម៉ែង ម៉ែង) alias CHHIN (ឈិន)

Division 920

[ERN00015285-00015287]

Chinn's Forces in Phnom Penh Who Were Yet to Be Arrested

1	Kan (កាន)	Previous soldier in a battalion of Division 920. Staying with Kun (គុណ) in 1975.
2	Kry (គ្រី)	Previous soldier in Military Education Unit, North Zone. Current staff in water transportation unit.
3	Sat (សាត)	Previous staff in transportation unit, North Zone. Currently responsible for ferry quay at Prek Kdam (ព្រែកក្តាម).
4	Seng (សេង)	Previous staff in military logistics unit, North Zone. Currently staying with Nhem (ញ៉ែម) in a Chinese translation unit.
5	Hang (ហង់)	Chief of gas station.
6	Kroeun (គ្រឿន)	Battalion of Division 450.
7	Horn (ហ័ន)	Battalion of Division 450.
8	Thun (ធួន)	Battalion of Division 450.
9	Srun (ស្រ័ន)	Deputy chief of water transportation unit.

10	Horn (ហ៊ុន)	Previous soldier in a battalion of Regiment 309. Current staff at Kampong Som (កំពង់សោម) port.
11	Horn (ហ៊ុន)	Company within land transportation unit. Previous soldier in a company of Division 920.
12	Thun (ធួន)	Company of Division 920. Current staff in commercial trucks transportation unit.
13	Song (សៀង)	
14	Oeun (ឡឿន)	Previous courier for Chhin. Current bread baker at Phsar Thmei (ផ្សារថ្មី).
15	Kaon (កោន)	105 mm battalion of Division 310.
16	Lim (លីម)	Transportation battalion in Kampong Som (កំពង់សោម).
17	Se (ស៊ែ)	Battalion of Division 310.
18	Van (វ៉ាន់)	Battalion of Division 310.
19	Chea (ឆា)	Battalion of Division 310.

Confessions of Chhin in Division 920

on

his forces in Phnom Penh who were yet to be arrested.

Not Reported

Men Meng alias Chhin (Division 920)

Reported

[Signed]

[ERN00015289-00015316]

A Transcribed Text

I Would Like to Report My Traitorous Activities to Angkar:

My traitorous activities occurred in December 1973. At the time, Oeun advised me on conflict with *Bang* (Brother) Pok (ឈ្មោះ). I noticed that the conflict with *Bang* Pok happened partly because *Bang* Pok did not care about comrades who had been resisting in the past. Instead, he cared about new comrades, particularly Sombau (សំប៉ូ), Lon (ឡុង) and Thy (ធី); he often gave them both motorcycles and money whenever they went home. Oeun added at the time that when he was in a visit in Kampong Thom with *Bang* Pok, *Bang* Pok used strong words when speaking with him about unsuccessful implementation of plans, especially the attacks in Kampong Thom. *Bang* Pok said that “Comrade, if you were a combatant, how would it be?” Oeun started to talk about the issues continuously.

Afterwards, Oeun talked about our actions. We had to recognize that upper echelons did not care much about us. Therefore, we had to look for ways to stage revolutions in the future. He added that any way we selected, if there was only one Angkar, “I would respond”. We had only one more way to stage revolutions. And to make Angkar recognize these points, Oeun added that, we comrades had to keep it as a secret covertly.

In 1974, when soldiers were attacking along national road 5, two targets were assigned

..... Attacking Kampong Luong. During first attacks, it was successful to control these locations for an unspecified period of time. It was unknown at the time and these locations were controlled. Oeun further mentioned the conflicts with *Bang Pok*, especially when speaking through Combat Net Radio. *Bang Pok* asked too much. He asked about the attacks; how was it? Successful or not? Each of us often discussed among ourselves that he used too strong words through radios. Thus, I noticed that Oeun tried to provoke these conflicts continuously.

Afterwards, Oeun called me “74” as before. Oeun asked me to meet with *Bang Khuon* (ហ្មង). We went to see *Bang Khuon* in Batheay at the time. Oeun presented both internal situations and enemy situations. After the meeting, we further talked only about *Bang Pok*. There were Thuch (ថុច), Oeun and me. During our discussion at the time, I noticed that Soy (ស៊ី) and Suong (ស្វង់) had some provocative comments and then they started to say that “Comrades, it will be easy for us to work together because I am assigned to lead the army now; there will be no any other obstacles like the past because we are together now.” I noticed that they started to discuss the issues and outline various plans. In January 1975, there were more precise action plans. I was assigned to hold meetings at an office. He was in Pech village. He had the following plans:

First, we had to further expand our actions and strengthen our forces including the number of Party and Cambodian Communist Youth League and combatant forces. Afterwards, he detailed traitorous plots and revolutions that we, as comrades, had to carry out. It was our duty because we would launch large-scale attacks in January 1975. Therefore, we comrades had to have one specific duty—to attack the enemy with gun shots in all targets in this January. I was responsible for areas from Peam Satha (ព្រំសាតា) through Kampong Luong to Odongk, Atharoes Mountain

(ក្នុងអង្គការស្បៀង). The 1st Division was also attacking in Thom (តំ) village along both national road 5 and Baset unmarked road.

During the fighting that night, Khuon contacted the enemy and allowed them to surround Yi (យី) and made ways for the enemy to leave. He asked us not to shoot the enemy and just allowed them to surround us if we saw the enemy. I noticed that our forces were destroyed consequently. Most of our forces in Thom village and along Tamouk (តាម៉ោក) and Baset roads were severely smashed. Totally, it was perhaps almost a battalion including both wounded and executed soldiers.

As for my side, we also planned to destroy the Party's forces. At the time, *Bang* Khuon advised that we did not have to launch strong attacks at Atharoes and we thus started our attacks. Comrade Sinuon (ស៊ីនួន) was leading the attacks directly at Atharoes Mountain. The fighting against the enemy at Atharoes Mountain was not very strong. However, most of us were wounded at this Atharoes Mountain because we asked our forces to get too close and the enemy saw us. Immediately after gun shots, the enemy started to attack us. Apparently, the plans were not successful. The enemy still based where they had been though there was some fighting at Atharoes Mountain. It took a long time until the fighting was successful. I noticed that these actions were carried out successfully subsequently. Afterwards, we met each other every three days at his site.

After January 1975, a meeting was held every three days in order to wrap up our plans. He added that we just launched minor attacks and waited for those from the South of national road 1, national road 3 and national road 4 from Ta Khmau. If we attacked too fast, it would not only affect our forces but the fighting also advanced too quickly. As a result, the enemy would be destroyed severely as well. I later could not remember the meeting time. Khuon contacted 7th Division through [PR]C-25 Radio [Portable Radio Communications, Model 25]. I noticed at the time that *Bang* Khuon also contacted the enemy and informed them that a Division was currently coming from the North and it had fought successfully at all locations including the fighting in Thom village, Preaek Pnov. Therefore, he asked the soldiers be very cautious. This was a traitorous plot.

As for me, because of my loyalty to the Party at the time, I had no duty to make contacts through radios as I was not good at speaking and structuring my sentences. Only Khuon, Oeun and Yi were in charge of communications. I was just waiting to carry out the outlined traitorous plots, especially the plans to destroy revolutions successfully by all means. After our meeting, he went down to the battlefields and constantly asked about the plans we had discussed the other day—how was it going? Concerning the issues, I noticed that Oeun responded by saying that he was implementing it accordingly; he could particularly manage to contact different chiefs subsequently in Thom village. As for me, I said at the time that I did not make any contacts because I was not good at speaking and I could not even state the points precisely. As a result, I did not dare to speak, but to attack. I could successfully attack some weak areas. I fought constantly and I mostly killed revolutionary forces subsequently, making revolutionary forces worn out badly. That was what I did.

Afterwards, the third meeting was held. The meeting participants included: comrade Oeun, comrade Soy, Suong, Hean (ហ៊ាន), and me. New plans were outlined in the meeting. First, it was concerning our traitorous plots against the revolutions. We had to take actions continuously. We particularly had to use plenty of ammunitions and forces to attack each specific location in a wasteful manner that prevented us from fulfilling our duties successfully. *Bang* Khuon specified the duty of each person including contacts with enemy and destruction of revolutionary forces. Oeun was assigned at the time to contact both the enemy and all Divisions, while Hean was also assigned to destroy revolutionary forces. At the time, I was assigned to protect parts of national road 5 including areas near Chedei Thmei pagoda, Tep Pranam and Odongk. It was planned to destroy these areas as well and especially we had to launch our attacks. I was asked to launch minor attacks in a way that would not destroy each location but to waste the Party's ammunitions. I just had to make sound of gun shots. In previous nights, I enjoyed listening to plenty of gun shots and explosions but the result was in vain. This was one of our victories. Our forces just launched some attacks subsequently until Phnom Penh almost fell. We fought at Stung Kombot (ស្ទឹងកំបុត). My squad was ordered to leave Odongk, Kampong Luong and Kampong Tralach. After accomplishing our plans, we gathered together across Baset unmarked roads in order to launch attacks near Stung Kombot to Kobsrov (ក្របស្រូវ). We joined hands with the Special Zone along Somnoeng (សំណើង), Khmuonh unmarked roads, and carried out our plans.

The implemented plans during the first fighting were not successful because the enemy launched attacks constantly. Consequently, we could not manage to seize anything such as national roads or unmarked roads. During daytime, tanks attacked from side and opened fire from national road 5. As a result, front lines were cut off during the daytime and some forces were affected as well. More importantly, the enemy still occupied Phnum Baset (ភ្នំបាសិត) unmarked road during the daytime. We could come to pick up our comrades who had been wounded and killed only at night. I noticed that many of the revolutionary forces were smashed subsequently including the wounded and executed soldiers. As fighting continued, he was informed about the situations that Phnom Penh almost fell. It was impossible for us to resist. All of us had to make plans carefully. We had no duty to contact the enemy as before because revolutionary forces were very strong from all directions including national road 1 and national road 4 and around Phnom Penh. They started to fight fiercely. Therefore, we had to keep fighting fiercely and stop contacting the enemy in order to make Angkar believe that our forces were also strong. We had to launch fierce attacks in order to seize Phnom Penh. Afterwards, we started to launch fierce attacks as he had requested. We joined hands with the special Zone along river bank in all areas of the North Zone as before and fought fiercely. There was no plan to destroy the Party at the time. After having known that the enemy forces became very weak, we all decided to launch comprehensive attacks in order to gain faith from the Party in our army who was fighting at the time.

When our fighting was successful and approached Phnom Penh in 1975, another plan was outlined. There was a meeting near Wat Phnom at the time. It was held at a house located just West of Wat Phnom and this traitorous plot was discussed. One person asked him: The fighting in Phnom Penh was successful, what did we have to do next? If the whole country was liberated, how did we plan ahead? Concerning our traitorous plots, he stated that we had to reorganize now but at the request of Angkar. We had to evacuate all of the people from Phnom Penh. Consequently, each of us had to have duty to evacuate people and defend the targets we had liberated and looked for enemy in all of those targets. We carried out our duty and arrested the enemy subsequently, especially the high-ranking ones. We arrested those from Captain ranks upwards and smashed them completely. Some were arrested while others were not because they could manage to escape. This was the plan that was laid down subsequently. There were frequent meetings after Phnom Penh fell. In a next meeting, we had to examine and search for ammunitions and collect rifles and military equipment and different types of clothes. We had to collect plenty of it and keep it in a secret warehouse. We had to keep it covertly and protect it in case of war in the future. I noticed that the ammunitions were prepared for wars in the future.

At the time, comrade Oeun reserved one warehouse in Teuk Thla which stored radio spare parts and military materials. There were all kinds of radios in the warehouse. I was assigned to collect all kinds of bullets, rifles and radios in Tuol Kouk. After we collected the bullets, radio spare parts and other equipment, we did not bring it along because our Division had to leave for Mondolkiri. At the time, when I left for Mondolkiri, I gave all ammunitions to comrade Oeun, including rifles and bullets. I did not remember its amount at the time because I gave him all. I brought some of the ammunitions along with me when I was going to Mondolkiri, including 4,000 and 20,000 bullets of M60 and M79, respectively. Apart from these, there were some AR15 rifles, AK rifles and B41. A few were left from the war. I knew that we just collected and stored it all in Phnom Penh and I already mentioned above the number of ammunitions I brought along with me.

I would like to further mention our actions after Phnom Penh fell. We had to collect ammunitions. My Division had to go to Mondolkiri while comrade Hean had to go to Oudor Meanchey. As comrade Hean was leaving, Khuon called for a party among cadres from regiments, battalions, all the three divisions and ministries at the time. It was organized near Wat Phnom and we had a farewell party for comrade Hean who had to go from Phnom Penh to Oudor Meanchey. There was drinking at the party. Afterwards, I often reported to him from the time comrade Hean had left. Comrade Suong came to control squad 450. I often reported to him constantly at the time on situations of equipment collection and storage and other household materials. After we collected the equipment, we had to report to him daily constantly, even how the fire destroyed houses. I also reported our daily activities constantly. He later outlined plans for us when we did not go to Mondolkiri yet. He made another plan. We had to organize our forces firmly and gathered all of our forces who deserted their units, especially those who deserted their units. We had to collect all of them back including the disabled ones and those affiliated with soldiers in order to have many people in our army. This was the first plan. They started to gather forces and it was done by only two Divisions because my Division had to leave for Mondolkiri already. Therefore, we could not join them. While we were leaving, he advised us on the traitorous plots concerning the methods of building up forces in Mondolkiri.

I was present in a meeting at the time. Soy and Khuon stated that my Division had to go to Mondolkiri so I had to continue our traitorous plots as following:

1. I had to build up forces at supporting bases firmly in the Northeast.

2. Issues concerning Mondolkiri Sector, I had to contact *Bang* Laing (ឡាំង), *Bang* Sophea (សុផា) *Bang* Mey (ម៉ឺ) and *Bang* Sarun (សារុន) from an ethnic group.

The contacts with these traitorous networks were made after Phnom Penh was liberated. I was officially nominated to get to know them as well as Angkar. We did not talk about anything at the time and I just got to know *Bang* Laing and could recognize his face. After I arrived there, precise plans were laid down. Before that, I was just introduced to know each other. Hence, upon my arrival in Mondolkiri, we started to outline detailed plans such as communications channels to be in touch with the bases. We had to set up these networks effectively and expand the bases firmly in order to fight against the revolutions successfully in the future by all means. We would use these areas extensively and it would be efficient for us to be in touch. It was also convenient to be in touch from abroad to local bases. Therefore, I had to make our contacts go smoothly. After the meeting, we started our journey. One day he wrote a letter to me to inform me that I had to pay attention to indoctrinating people by all means, especially our traitorous forces. I had to indoctrinate them constantly because it was difficult there. Consequently, I had to indoctrinate them to struggle and to be part of the Party for a long time so that it would be easy for us to smash revolutionary forces in the future. I remembered that the letter was important after I went through its contents several times. I later burnt it down. I could not read it effectively. I just remembered some contents after I spelled it several times. All of the duties were carried out since 1975. The meetings were held after Phnom Penh fell. When we were in Mondolkiri, the traitorous plots were constantly put in place, especially the plans to fight against the revolutions.

Afterwards, Khuon assigned Ya (យ៉ា) to contact me in December 1975. I met Ya in Kratie in December 1975. Ya went there by boat at the time. Ya at the time worked at a logistics office of Chief of Staff and had to organize the army bases in both Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri. Ya met with me and asked me to initially report the situations along borders. I reported to him that I could not manage to grasp-hold the situations there yet because we arrived long time ago but we could not transport rice there. It was now in a rainy season. From May to present day, we could not manage to go there yet because the roads were too muddy. Some of our members went there [borders] but they had to face food shortages along the ways. It was too much difficult to send food supplies there. Therefore, the plan that Angkar ordered us to go to the borders in all targets had yet to be accomplished. As for the important targets, Angkar at the time asked us to just arrive at Srepok (ស្រែប៉ក) River first. However, in fact, only one Division could go there. As of January 1976, the forces were sent to all locations. Before they were sent, Ya went to Ratanakiri. When he came back, he went to Mondolkiri. His journey to Mondolkiri at the time might be in

December as well. He met with me after he came back from Ratanakiri. He went to see me in Kratie again at home of Kratie provincial chief, located South of the market. During our meeting, we discussed that we had to go down to see our networks at the Sector so that he could assign me to meet with those in Sector 105, especially comrade Laing, in order to make our work go smoothly. Then, we arrived in Mondolkiri that night and we rested there. It was in December but I could not recall the exact day. Afterwards, we held a meeting at the time after our resting. In the first meeting, there were people from the Sector including *Bang* Laing, *Bang* Sarun, *Bang* Phea and *Bang* District Committee. There were other meetings at various locations that I could not remember. Those from the Division who were present in the meetings included Soy, Ren (រ៉េន), Pil (ពិល), Phon (ហ៊ុន) and me. We all were present in the meetings. However, we did not make any comments concerning assignment of forces that we had to contact in the meetings at the time. Ya said at the time that we comrades now had to organize the bases for one Army Division from Mondolkiri. The base people could select different locations and they had to organize locations for their bases in any way that allowed us to have efficient communications.

First, it was decided that the Division would be based in Chbar district, while the regiments would build a big base at Srepok River in Koh Meayeul (កោះម៉ាយើល) village. Regiment 92 would base in Kratie city, while regiment 93 would base in Ou Reang in which there were many smaller locations. Platoon 91 and one company of the Marines had to base in Ou Leav. 91 and 92 would be assigned to cooperate with each other firmly. One platoon would be in Trapeang Romiet and one company of Regiment 92 would be in Bu Sra. 93 would base close to the locations where the enemy had based before. One battalion would base in Ou Reang and another battalion would base in Pou Phlok (ព្រៃភ្នំ) in order to build roads. One battalion would base in Dak Dam and another battalion would base in Kaev Seima. One company of the battalion would base in Kaev Seima and another company would base in Phti (ប៊ុន). The army in each base had to be in touch with each other constantly from one base to another. The ones in Kaev Seima had to contact those in Kratie. The ones in Ou Leav had to contact those in Ratanakiri to be convenient. These were the issues we discussed in the meetings concerning the army bases where the enemy had used in the past, particularly the Vietnamese, who had come to contact Sector units within the Sector in the past.

When we arrived, we noticed that Yuon (Vietnamese) were coming to have contacts with the Sector units subsequently as well. At the time, I further reported to Angkar on the army bases. I

had to contact Laing as assigned by Ya and we met once per month in order to update enemy's activities and our activities for each other. We did that to build close bonds and know each other better. At the time, I started to take actions. The meeting participants with the Sector in Mondolkiri included *Bang* Laing, *Bang* Mey (ម៉េ) and *Bang* Sarun. The meetings were held constantly, especially to examine our plans. I could not remember schedules of following traitorous plots. In January 1976, I could not remember the day, all rice was transported and I met with Ya again. He asked me to work hard and build strong solidarity and relationships with the Sector effectively. He said it would be very easy as the ones in this Sector knew the Sector Army and geographical locations clearly because they were born there. They knew ways to Vietnam and locations where Vietnamese had based. They knew both names and locations very clearly. Consequently, it would be convenient for us to work. We had to closely cooperate with the Sector units constantly and to meet with Vietnamese. If they were on our territory, we had to ask them to move backwards a little.

Our forces went to see them at the time. I did not go but ordered battalions in their respective targets to meet with Regiment 93. Comrade So (សុ) and comrade Phon went to see Khuon. They did not listen to each other in the meeting at the time. As a result, nothing was accomplished. They just saw each other and came back. All the targets just knew through their radio contacts that it was the border and they had to prepare themselves accordingly. Therefore, contacts with Vietnamese had yet to be done. Angkar later sent Ya to the Northeast Zone for a while. Ya met with me again and said that it would be very easy for us to work together as he was now assigned to work in the Northeast Zone and I was also in that Zone. First, he asked me to report both border situations and internal situations to him constantly. Second, he asked me to make good contacts with the Sector. Third, he asked me to contact the Vietnamese effectively and avoid any conflicts with them, especially armed conflicts, as it would make the Party difficult to solve the problems. We had to be ready to resolve problems and know how to avoid conflicts in order not to cause any conflicts with the Vietnamese. We had to solve all kinds of problems and avoid conflicts effectively. Afterwards, I noticed that Ya asked us not to have direct contacts with the Vietnamese. Contacts should be done through telegrams. He said that when contacting the Vietnamese, we had to assign one committee to do it so it would make our contacts go smoothly and it would avoid arguments. First, we had to establish one communication committee at Koun Rok (ក្បួនរក) Mountain; it could be called Koun Ruk (ក្បួនរុក) as well. Second, I would like to confirm Angkar that it was only one mountain. The following people were assigned in that communication committee namely: *Bang* Mey as a chief of communication committee, *Bang* Sophea and *Bang* Sarun from the Sector. While the communication committee of Division 920

included comrade Phon and comrade So. Comrade Sey (ស៊ី), battalions and companies were assigned to defend and guard it to ensure that communications were going smoothly.

The first contacts with Vietnamese at the time could not achieve any plans and the Vietnamese and ethnic languages were used widely in the meetings. Therefore, comrade Phon reported to me that nothing was accomplished because they just based constantly at their respective locations without moving. This was about border issues. Afterwards, they did not only ask each other to base constantly at their respective locations, but also allowed the enemy to take time to negotiate successfully and Yuon to seize some of our territory at Koun Ruk Mountain where the meetings had held.

The first meeting was held with Vietnamese. It was attended by *Bang* Laing, *Bang* Mey, *Bang* Sarun and *Bang* Sophea from the Sector in Mondolkiri; comrade Phon, comrade So, comrade Sey and me from the army; and three people from the Vietnamese side including the Zone Committee of Ba Min Thuok (បាមីនតូក) province. In the first meeting at the time, it was agreed that:

1. We had to report communications effectively between Cambodia and Vietnam and keep our communications as a top secret and respect each other.
2. We had to make communication schedules such as number of meetings being held per month and individuals assigned to participate in the communication committee in order to ask for their names.

In this first meeting, I noticed that the initial contacts were done as assigned by Ya. The names mentioned above had to contact the Vietnamese. The first issue was to make our contacts go smoothly, especially communications between Cambodia and Vietnam. We had to avoid conflicts so that it would be easy for us to work together in the future as we later had to work conscientiously. We had to make our plans precisely to destroy revolutionary forces successfully, especially Cambodia's revolutions. *Bang* Laing stated that Cambodia's revolutions could not be defeated easily. It was very strong in term of leadership and the ways it worked. Vietnam had to provide soldiers, weapons and equipment in order to prepare a coup to destroy the revolutionary forces. To organize a coup to topple the ruling Party in Cambodia, Vietnam had to make plans precisely and carefully, including infantry, artillery, tanks and aircrafts and other military equipment. They were discussing with each other for a long time at the time. However, as I mentioned earlier, the interpretation from Vietnamese into Khmer was so little that I could

hardly understand the contents. Khmer interpretation was available only for unimportant parts, while they discussed important parts critically using Vietnamese language. Both Vietnamese and Cambodian comrades were laughing and discussing at the same time, especially *Bang* Laing, *Bang* Mey and *Bang* Sophea; all of them were both laughing and discussing because they could understand Vietnamese language as they were discussing in Vietnamese. When language interpretation was interrupted, they started to speak ethnic languages or Laos language. When speaking ethnic languages, they spoke with each other for one hour. Cambodian side long later said that they were very happy to see Vietnamese comrades this time and just get to know each other for the first time in their first meeting. Therefore, I noticed that during the first meeting at the time, plans had to be made to make it efficient. *Bang* Laing said that according to the advice of our Angkar through Ya, we were asked to make constant contacts with Vietnamese comrades, especially to discuss our plans. We had to keep it as a secret by all means and fulfil our duties effectively. Because he was assigned to base in Mondolkiri, he knew all the geographical locations. *Bang* Laing was familiar with the geographical locations and knew all the places. He said that for Phnom Penh, units there would take care of it. We just cared about the problems here and tried to make our communications go smoothly by all means. The plans had to be informed section by section and we did not have to know all the issues. We just left it for upper echelons who would connect it all together. The meeting was later concluded.

A next meeting was scheduled in March 1976. The second meeting was scheduled in February 1976 and the third one in March 1976. I could not remember the day. In the second meeting, meeting participants from the Sector had to include more military personnel—the ones from Sector Military. All of the people mentioned above still came to attend the meeting again, but comrade Leng (ឡង) from the Sector was also present at the time. Comrade Leng had to join the meeting as well because he based close to the borders. He would find it easy to make contacts. In the second meeting, they initially discussed the coup precisely. Everything had to be prepared by June 1976. However, the month to stage the coup had to be planned effectively. The issues were raised several times but it could not be decided. We had to meet with Angkar on Cambodian side first and then we would contact the Vietnamese side again. *Bang* Ya had already made connections so we could inform them later accordingly. We now just contacted to know each other first and assign communications lines effectively to make each target carry out their work well in the future. As for detailed duty of each person, we had to meet with Ya in 1976 as well.

After meeting with Vietnam twice, Ya called for another meeting in Mondolkiri. After the meetings with Vietnam, there was a first meeting to make proposals at the base of *Bang* Laing in

Koh Nhek (កោះកេរ្តិ៍). In the meeting, comrade Laing was the chief and I was his deputy to be in charge of this province and we had to organize things including both people and army. *Bang* Laing was responsible for both politics and food supplies in order to provide to the army in time of war. I was responsible for military and roads protection from Kratie. I had to make contacts with each other constantly. *Bang* Mey, *Bang* Sarun, *Bang* Sophea, So, Phon, Sey and Leng from “Sector units” were responsible for contacting the Vietnamese. Our discussions would be very efficient because these comrades could contact each other easily as our army had based close to each other. It was only one kilometre away from each other. In some locations, they could see each other. As a result, communications were very easy and those comrades had to communicate with each other effectively and productively. As for the combatants, we were advised not to let them know everything, just informing them about the plans that we had contacted Vietnam in order to protect our territory. As for other details, we did not have to tell them. We just waited until there was fight in Phnom Penh or in any province then we could tell them. This was the plan that Ya outlined in the meeting.

Afterwards, Ya reported that he himself had already met with Vietnamese in Ratanakiri. Furthermore, Vietnamese who attended the meetings saw a photo of Ya’s meetings. The Vietnamese took that photo to show where the meetings were held and it was the same as what Ya reported. There were meetings with the Vietnamese in Ratanakiri. The army also came to attend the meetings at the time including the ones from Ratanakiri and 801. However, no names were mentioned. The ones from 801 and the bases also attended the meetings. He said the Vietnamese side worked separately while our comrades also had separate duties. He added that we just knew certain points because it was also going smoothly on Vietnamese side. They did not have any difficulty. The Vietnamese wanted to help us at all time. This was his brief report for all of us to know.

Afterwards, Ya started to assign all the duties subsequently and the plans had to be completed successfully by May 1976. Therefore, we had to try our best to ensure that both communications and transportation means in both rainy and dry seasons went smoothly. We just had to organize it very well because this was our weak points. The problem was with roads. He said that as long as we prepared it effectively, we could contact and do anything we wished and we could travel anywhere quickly. Thus, we had to construct roads effectively. In 1976, we started to build road foundations as planned. We had to make ways from Mondolkiri to Kratie by using tractors. However, we could only use the roads in dry season because it was too much muddy in a rainy season. As a result, contacting and meeting each other could be quite challenging. We could contact each other only through radios and our contacts were quite limited. If we wanted to have

detailed discussions, Ya would inform me that we had to meet with each other efficiently and to be convenient, I had to go to meet with him at his base in Kratie. If we had meetings in Andeuk (អណ្តើក), it would be a waste of time because his side had to work in both Ratanakiri and Kratie.

Because my side had to work in Kratie as well, it would be convenient for us to meet in Kratie. He said I had to go to Kratie by trucks. Therefore, I had to have trucks equipped with cables so that it could be pulled forwards where it got stuck in the mud. By all means, it had to be ensured that we could meet to discuss our traitorous plots successfully, not to take risk. If we just took risk, we would not be able to win. It had to be well planned. He said if I could not go, I could send comrade Soy instead because he recorded and remembered many things. I could just stand by at the base. Comrade Soy had good memory. Whenever he did something, he could remember it clearly. I did not have that good memory so I just stayed at the base and comrade Soy would report the situations to me. I just did as he would advise.

Consequently, comrade Soy often went to see Ya subsequently and he had to report the traitorous plots constantly to make it easy for us to plan our work more effectively. I had to report all details concerning my forces, the forces who could fight. The Sector had to do the same. The number of forces who could fight and those who could not had to be controlled tightly. If compared between 1975 and 1976, fewer people fell ill. Therefore, we had to examine our forces frequently every month, checking the number of forces who fell ill and those who could work. In this regard, I reported to him that few people could work because in each area, there were only between 10 and 20 people left in each battalion. Most of them had chills while some experienced serious fevers. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult in a rainy season. Few could do farming as most of them had fever. The dry season from October would be less difficult. There was still some rain in October. However, the situations would be easier. Therefore, he planned that if we took actions in a dry season, it would be much easier because we would have enough food and we could also transport rice successfully to many of our locations. We could also transport our equipment and be in touch easily.

The communications from Mondolkiri to Kratie were good as well. He also stated that we had to have a thorough planning as the military had to welcome the military. It had to be thoroughly organized. Comrade Laing would be in charge of rice. Comrades in the military had to have detailed plans and had to protect roads effectively by all means. As for contacts with Mey, it had to be carefully done because it was already convenient. The units controlled by comrade Phon and comrade So also based near there. A battalion controlled by comrade Sey based near there as well. Therefore, the forces had to be well organized so that it would be easy for us to communicate with each other successfully. He stated again and again that we had to pay

attention thoroughly to keep it as a top secret. It had to be covertly hidden so everything had to be organized thoroughly. We did not have to inform lower-ranking comrades. We just kept ourselves informed among those who joint the meetings. If the lower-ranking comrades knew our plans, it would be disclosed. If we raised an important plan, some of them would be happy. However, some would not. Therefore, we had to have some prevention and we had to be ready for all possible incidents. We could not just see victory alone.

After a meeting with Ya, we had a third meeting in June in Kratie. The meeting participants at the time included *Bang Laing*, *Bang Mey*, *Bang Ron* (វ៉ន), *Bang Phea*, and Soy and me; both of us were from Division 920. In that meeting, I noticed that Ya asked us to report our previous plans and contacts with Vietnam. Concerning the contacts with Vietnam, *Bang Laing* at the time reported that it was going well as before. However, we had to look for more secret locations; we had to search for another secret location near Ba Min Thuok province along Srepok River because it was deserted there. We did not need to inform many soldiers about that; we just knew among those who were responsible. In the meeting at the time, it was to report the situations and contacts with Vietnam and internal situations and the organization of traitorous forces. I reported to him that my forces would fight to protect areas from Mondolkiri along Kratie borders. We could protect areas from Kratie to Mondolkiri. If any problem occurred, we could also communicate with each other because there were 3,000 forces who could fight. Therefore, there was no problem. My report was brief. *Bang Soy* further reported that our forces had no problems both in political and military parts as well as food supplies. In 1976, we did not face any serious shortages because our comrades were trained constantly. Our forces could fight in the future whenever there were fighting plans and ensure that our forces could fight and protect our areas successfully. Comrade Soy added that it was important that Ya had to divide targets for him, from where to where, so that he could take actions accordingly. Concerning the traitorous plots, Ya said that we comrades had duty to control our forces and did not have to join fighting anywhere. He added that our duty was both to protect Mondolkiri province and to make our forces readily available for any possible plans he might have after he had enough details in hands. I asked at the time that where our forces had to be readily available for. Ya said for now we did not make the forces readily available for anywhere yet. We just asked them to base at their respective units. We just had to organize them very well and ensure that whenever there was a chance, we already had our forces ready in case of emergency. Our forces would be ready especially when we staged a coup.

As for our contacts with Vietnam in 1976, he said we had to organize our forces well by the end of 1976 and put these measures in place effectively, especially the organization in June. We had

a meeting with Ya in June and made these plans frequently. We later had meetings with *Bang Laing*, *Bang Mey*, *Bang Sarun*, *Bang Phea* and Soy and me; both of us were from military section of Division 920. We met to discuss these plans. In the meeting at the time, we also reported to Ya again on the traitorous plots and Party. I reported to him that not many people fell sick in early June and there were enough forces for the fighting. Therefore, I noticed that the forces were good. I added that our comrades in both political and military parts did not have any serious problems. That was what I reported to him. He asked me about our contacts with Vietnam and how it was going lately. Concerning our contacts with Vietnam in this June, I said that we had to change to another new location. I asked him to send telegrams to Vietnam to ask if we could change to another location because it was difficult to make contacts at current locations. The soldiers were based too close to each other. If we went there frequently, our plans could be revealed. In my opinion, if we had to contact each other, we had better look for locations along Srepok River. It would be easier for our communications as it was also close to Vietnam. We could go there on foot as well if going by trucks was impossible. Ya agreed at the time that we had to search for another location to make contacts with Vietnam.

In our first contact, we went to meet the Vietnamese. We waited for them but they did not appear. Ya already set the meeting schedules with them in their communications through telegrams and asked for a meeting with them near a ferry quay where they often crossed back and forth. Ya asked us to wait at the ferry quay. We went there but we did not see them at that ferry quay. We saw the ferry and asked the Vietnamese there if they saw their commanders, who were responsible for Ba Min Thuok province, coming or not. They did not see them as well. Therefore, we did not see them at the time. Laing wrote one letter that day and sent it through the Vietnamese who based at the ferry quay in order to keep in touch with them later.

The next meeting was in August 1976. We met with the Vietnamese in August at that ferry quay again. I noticed at the time that the first discussion topic was related to the negotiations between Cambodia and Vietnam. It was agreed that some principles had to be set precisely so that it would be easy for our future work. *Bang Laing* said that our side and our units planned to take actions soon and he asked the Vietnamese side to organize their forces in any way convenient for our communications. The Vietnamese at the time said that it was fine. Their side would organize forces and that they already selected both soldiers and commanders sufficiently; those people were currently being trained in military tactics including bomb-dropping techniques from jet planes. They added that we [Cambodian comrades] already heard what was going on along the borders. They would bombard there subsequently. Hence, they were being trained effectively. When we had targets, we would do it carefully. This was about the meeting with Vietnam in August.

We scheduled to meet each other again in September 1976. We also planned to meet each other subsequently, at least once per month, in order to be informed about the situations on both sides. In the meetings, *Bang* Laing, as a meeting chairperson, stated that our side would assign one communication committee to make our contacts with Vietnam go smoothly. There were the same three people on the Vietnamese side. Cambodian side had to be organized more effectively. *Bang* Mey, *Bang* Sarun, *Bang* Sophea and comrade Phon, comrade So and comrade Sey had to organize contacts at the same location because they knew it already so they had to communicate with the Vietnamese constantly. Therefore, we contacted the Vietnamese subsequently and updated each other until an unknown month when Ya was arrested by Angkar.

Laing, Mey, Sarun, Sophea, Phot, So, Sey, Soy and I reported to Vietnam that Ya had been arrested already by Angkar in Cambodia and the plan to stage a coup was disclosed. The Vietnamese said it was fine; one person was arrested but there were many more. We had to make our plans effectively because Ya did not confess yet. Therefore, comrades in Mondolkiri had to contact each other well and search for another new network if possible. At the time, we did not have any other contacts and we just stayed with the army and Sector. We contacted each other and discussed among ourselves in order to keep in touch with Vietnam constantly subsequently in August, September and October 1976. Though we reported the situations to Vietnam, as far as I knew, there was no any division of assignments because *Bang* Laing said that Angkar also asked him some questions. However, Angkar did not accuse anyone yet. Thus, we just reported everything to Vietnam. Though it was really difficult, we still maintained our contacts with Vietnam and between us and our army in Mondolkiri. We could still manage to contact Vietnam smoothly because we had already strengthened this network successfully. We made our communication plans thoroughly.

In January 1977, we still managed to keep our contacts with Vietnam and reported to Vietnam that Cambodian army, as requested by the Party, had to fight against Vietnamese army somewhere near Koun Ruk Mountain and Chau Chrang Tir Mouy (ច្រូងជ័រទី១) and Ou Bak Dav (អូបាក់ដាវ). We had to launch attacks in all of these areas. Therefore, Vietnam had to do as requested by our Cambodian counterparts in order not to make it noticeable that our army and especially leaders, who based directly in these areas, conspired with the Vietnamese. We had to attack these areas. During the attacks, Vietnamese soldiers had to escape and we would burn down thatched houses to show that our army did launch the attacks against the Vietnamese. The

houses could be built again so it was fine to burn it down. Doing so would show that we had nothing to compromise with the Vietnamese. That was our plan. On 14 January, we started to launch our attacks. I noticed at the time that the attacks would destroy some forces of the Party and affect some forces of the Sector and Division 920 as well. Three soldiers were killed and more than 20 were wounded. Therefore, the plans to destroy revolutionary forces were carried out subsequently. In February 1977, we still maintained our contacts with Vietnam.

The contacts with Vietnam in February 1977 could be done as before. The Vietnamese said it was fine because their side also had some casualties. This was one issue and they would conceal Angkar in Cambodia. I noticed that the conflicts between Vietnam and Cambodia were serious and both sides did not get along well. Therefore, our contacting networks—contacts between Cambodia and Vietnam—were just going well as before. In this regard, Vietnam wrote one letter in Vietnamese language and sent it to Angkar in Cambodia. I could not remember the whole contents of the letter. However, it mentioned the facts that we all had been in the trenches together. Cambodia comrades did not need to attack the Vietnamese. We had better expand our solidarity with each other more widely and maintain our solidarity effectively in order to defeat enemy all over the world. The letter also asked about the wellbeing of Angkar. The letter was sent to Angkar. I noticed that the letter contents focused on good contacts with Vietnam constantly. Therefore, concerning our contacts with Vietnam, my Division and the Sector cooperated with each other constantly and we could manage to be in touch until February 1977 when I left Mondolkiri. Angkar asked me to go to Phnom Penh. Afterwards, I did not have any contacts because I had to go to Phnom Penh. I was detained by Angkar for one month from 21 February 1977 to 23 March 1977. Angkar arrested me on 16 March 1977.

My report to Angkar was done with greatest loyalty. I reported to Angkar on all of my traitorous activities against the Party, people and worker class and peasant class as mentioned above.

23 March 1977

[Signed]

Chhin

I examined and noticed that it was the same background as I mentioned.

[ERN00015435]

S-21 Centre

Phnom Penh

Confessions of MEN Meng alais Chhin in Division 920

On

His Background and Activities

Original KH: 00015274-00015543

Translated: 00015275, 00015285-00015287, 00015289-00015316, 00015435

[Excerpts of this document will be revised upon request]