

[ERN: 00024348-002469]

I would like to report the dry-season plans to the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

My understanding upon leaving the battlefield:



My last phone conversation with *Brother* Khiev (ខៀវ)

After we finished our work, *Brother* Khiev told me to speak to *Brother* Vorn (វ៉ុន). Then I had them cut off the line with *Brother* Khiev and connect to *Brother* Vorn.

Vorn asked about the situation of the sweeping-clean, the organizational situation, and the enemy situation and ours. Then he told me to go to Phnom Penh for a while the next day. I wondered why Angkar had called me to Phnom Penh because Comrade Pin (ប៊ិន) had just told me that *Brother* Khiev would visit Svay Rieng the next day. If

Angkar wanted to give me advice, *Brother* Khiev should come and advise me directly because he was in contact with Angkar every day, and he could handle this himself. It was not necessary for Angkar to give me advice directly, but, if it were necessary to give advice, Angkar should give advice to *Brother* Khiev instead. I understood that there was a problem, or else Angkar was going to transfer me to the North because of the lack of cadres there. However, *Brother* Pin had told me that if Angkar needed to transfer cadres to the North, he himself would be the one to be transferred. *Brother* Khiev had already told him that.

The next day, I travelled to Phnom Penh with concern. One day after I had arrived in Phnom Penh, Vorn met with me and asked me to report all the issues in detail. After I finished reporting, he told me not to go back, but to stay in Phnom Penh and help with the work in the rear. He added that there were enough cadres at the front, and that they could control the situation because they were experienced combatants even though they had little leadership experience. I was very bored after staying at the General Staff Office for a few days. I used to work, and now I did not have any work to do. I then visited the radio site of Battalion 66, looking for food and

fruits to eat because there used to be a lot of sugar cane and coconuts there. I liked eating sugar cane because it could provide me with more energy than having an injection. At that time, I went to Battalion 66 twice for that purpose. Roeung (រ៉េង) asked me where I had been. I told him the truth. Roeung told me not to move around if not necessary, because Angkar could look for me at any time. Later, Vorn called me and told me not to communicate with Battalion 66 because I had left that unit already, and to let Roeung handle the work there because he was the Chairman I would like to clarify that, when I first met with Vorn, after I had finished reporting, Vorn appointed Roeung Chairman of the General Staff Office and myself as an Assistant. After receiving such advice from Vorn, I believed that it was more likely that I had been removed by *Brother Khiev*, and that Comrade Reoung had long been assigned to work in the office in order to prevent misunderstandings. Even so, I strongly believed I had been removed by *Brother Khiev* because *Brother Khiev* had been angry with me many times. It was because I had cleaned out the bad elements in Unit 290 slowly, and our combatants had been recently defeated by the Vietnamese. However, in actual fact, I had accurately followed his advice and instructions.

Unit 290 was cleaned out slowly because he had advised me to focus on Divisions 3 and 5 first: if we cleaned out all the units at the same time we would lose mastery. He advised me to clean up Unit 290 gradually and systematically. In the regiment, Saroeun (សារ៉េង) was not removed on time because *Brother Khiev* was concerned that this would anger *Uncle Chăn*. Saroeun was one of *Uncle Chăn's* Couriers. *Brother Khiev* was also angry because I did not give Comrade Rèn (រ៉េន) the name list which he had told me on the phone to make, but when I met Comrade Rèn, I could not find the list because it had been misplaced. In fact, those on the list had all been removed, except for Saroeun, whom he had told me to retain. When he had decided to remove Saroeun, it was too late because the next day our enemies launched the attacks against us. As regards the enemy offensive, I told him our enemies had launched a big breakthrough offensive against us. Our units lacked cadres because many had been removed from the Battalions and companies, so the lower ranks could not win. I myself could not monitor the situation closely because he had advised me to

focus more on cleaning out bad elements than on the front line. I explained the reasons to him, but he was still angry with me.

One morning, while I was talking to Comrade Roeung, Vorn made a phone call to Comrade Roeung. After Roeung talked to Vorn on the phone, Roeung told me that *Brother* Vorn had ordered him to make a list recording all the forces in all the units on the home front, including those farming and raising animals, the disabled and all the elements of the previous regime. Roeung assigned me to do this task because he had to travel so often. Three days later, all the units sent their lists to me upon my request. I did not receive a list from Unit 310, so I made a phone call to inquire about this. They replied that they had already sent me the list. I then rode a motorbike to Unit 310 to get the list and to relax. Before I travelled there, I had told them to make a copy of the list for me. When I arrived there, I met with Comrade Lay (ឡាយ), who then gave me the list. After I checked all the lists, I gave them to Roeung. Then Roeung submitted the lists to Vorn. After his return, Roeung told me that *Brother* Vorn had ordered him to mobilize forces to be sent to the front line and to set up combat units. I asked him when the units would be established, and Roeung told me that it was not urgent and that we had only assessed the possibility of mobilizing two Battalions of combatants.

Later, Vorn called me and Roeung to his house. He showed a film of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. A lot of people around his office also came to watch the film. When the film was about to be shown, someone made a phone call to Vorn. After speaking on the phone, Vorn told me that he had to leave and asked me to stay and watch the film. After Comrade Roeung and I had finished watching the film, we returned home.

Later, Vorn called me to meet him to report on my meeting with the Chinese Attaché. When I had met him, I reported what we had discussed at the meeting. After I had finished reporting, I chatted with him for a while, and then he told me that Angkar would assign me as an Ambassador. He laughed, and I also laughed with him. He then stressed this was serious. After laughing, he repeated what he had said and asked for my opinion. He told me that Comrade Teanh (ទាំង) and Comrade Hok

(ហ៊ុក) would also be assigned. I told him that it was up to Angkar. Then he explained to me that international politics was also a political battlefield. We could not make more friends if we did not focus on foreign actions. He added that ambassadors were also charged with combat tasks, but that there was also the political battle. Ambassadors attacked their enemies on the political front. I then carried out the Party's decision. Later, someone came in and informed him that his guests were waiting for him. Then he ended the conversation. When I left his house, I met Comrade Krin (គ្រីន) from Kampong Som who was entering his.

A few days later, Vorn told me on the phone that Angkar wanted to meet with me and that the Brother Number I or Brother Number II had set the time for us to meet with him at his house. Comrade Teanh and I went there, but I could not remember whether Comrade Hok had been there. We arrived around 15 minutes before the Brother Number II. We received instructions from the Brother Number II for around half an hour, then we committed ourselves to carry out the assignments delegated to us by the Party.

On an unknown date, all of us went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### My arrival at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and before I left for Belgrade, I went to the General Staff Office three times. I did not meet Roeung when I went there the first time. When I went there the second time, I met Roeung and asked his permission to go to my old house to collect my old books, books of meeting minutes and books of the Party's livelihood meetings and other old books. This time, Roeung gave me half a box of cigarettes, and then I came back without discussing any important issues. I did ask him about the situation at the front line, and he told me that he knew only about the overall situation. Then he told me about it. I went there for the third time to borrow a car to take my wife to visit my mother in law in Stueng Mean Chey (ស្ទឹងមានជ័យ), without discussing any important issues. In mid September, I went to the General Staff Office again to request some cigarettes from Roeung. This time,

Roeung asked me why I had not visited him often. He told me he had wanted to meet me to discuss some issues, but he could not find me. He told me, “*Brother* has told me to mobilize two or three battalions of combatants, but I cannot do so.” I then replied, “This is your assigned task. I do not have any other assignment now.” Then Roeung asked me to help him, and I asked him how. Roeung then added that he could not mobilize two or three battalions of combatants, and that only elements of the previous regime were available. He added the elements of the previous regime could also be chosen because they had been indoctrinated for long enough. The most important thing was whether they could fight. He added he had been ordered to mobilize ten tanks and set up a company of combatants for the tanks. He told me that he had only tanks, but no combatants to operate them. The experienced tank combatants had all been sent to the front line. Roeung added that *Brother* Vorn had also ordered him to mobilize forces of workers. He added *Brother* Ân (អ័ន) was very concerned about this because he did not have enough cadres. He added the order was to organize four Battalions by selecting former soldiers who were now workers. Roeung added he had prepared Company 450 and Company 310 by combining two companies to create one Battalion. In addition, Roeung said he could withdraw some forces from Unit 703. He said he had already organized the tank unit by withdrawing some forces from Unit 488 and combining them with forces taken from other units. Now these combatants were being trained. I then asked Roeung whether the situation at the front line was tense. Roeung replied that it was normal, and these forces would be reserved in Phnom Penh. Thus, the forces of workers were also to be selected. Roeung told me that *Brother* Vorn had also requested me to help him.

Around four or five days later, after a dinner, I visited Roeung’s house twice. At that time, Roeung was at home alone. At night, one of his couriers stayed in another room next to his room. When I met him, he told me he was concerned about elements of the previous regime. I told him to mobilize them for indoctrination, and I closely studied their biographies. I added, if there were bad elements, we would remove them. We requested other cadres to help. Roeung did not tell me about the plan.

Later, in September, Ân sent me a letter saying that he had wanted to meet with me for some time, and that the meeting could be held at the Ministry of Industry at 10 a.m. the next day, or the following day, if I needed cigarettes.

When I met Ân, he said, "How are you? We have not seen each other for a long time. I have received instructions from *Brothers* Khiev and Vorn to inform you about the following issues:

The current situation remains good:

1. *Brother* Khiev took 100% control of combatants on the battlefield.
2. *Brother* Vorn took control of all the forces in the rear.

The guard unit at the Center was very thin.

Based on this situation, the two brothers decided to plot an attack against the Communist Party of Kampuchea Center in the immediate future, especially against Brother No I and Brother No II.

Based on Khiev's advice, *Brother* Vorn absolutely ordered Comrade Nat to participate in this, and that, if he did not participate, tough measures would be taken.

Now, I would like to present their tentative plans as follows:

1. *Brother* Vorn had some forces, but, as far as I knew, the number was minimal. He had control of only a small group, but this group stayed close to Angkar and could get access to come and go, like his guards. I did not ask him about the identities of these operatives because I would not have known them anyway.
2. *Comrade* Roeung controlled two infantry battalions and a tank company consisting of ten tanks.
3. Ân and I mobilized former soldiers who had been modified into workers, and he organized them into four Battalions. Two battalions were mobilized from the factories from Chrouy Changva Bridge to Kilometer 6. Two other battalions were mobilized from those from Kbal Thnal to Chak Angrae Kraom. *Brother* Vorn was in charge of supplying weapons and ammunition, and Comrade Maut (ម៉ូត) was in charge of providing logistical support.

Weapons would be supplied one week in advance and would be secretly stored in factories. These weapons would be used when the time was ripe.

4. In the East, *Brother* Khiev had two regiments, one of which was stationed on Phnom Penh's east bank and in Chrouy Changva. Some artillery was stationed on the east bank. The second regiment was stationed in Neak Loeang, on the west bank of the river. This regiment had trucks and was mobile. In Chrouy Changva, there were gunboats, and more gunboats would be brought from the Mekong. This regiment was under the control of Comrade Khēng (ខេង). Some tanks were withdrawn from the front line and stationed in Neak Loeang. These two regiments were reserved for any possible response.
5. All the forces had to be organized and ready by mid-October 1978.
6. The Joint Command Committee would hold a meeting half a month before the attack, at the end of October 1978, to evaluate all aspects of the undertaking and devise comprehensive plans. All those who had important assignments would attend that meeting and get to know one another.
7. The coup d'état would be staged from 15 November to 30 November. The exact date and strategy would be determined by the meeting of the Joint Command Committee.

Tactics:

1. The attack would be launched mainly from the inside by poisoning or shooting. However, poisoning would be the least likely option. This objective would be under the direct control of *Brother* Vorn.
2. After hearing three gunshots, all units would launch their attacks in their predetermined directions. Comrade Roeung would launch his attack from the west, I from the north and Ân from the south. The gunboats would storm in from the east.
3. Comrade Roeung's forces would play an important role among the forces from the outside.

Tentative Command Committee:

The Joint Command Committee consisted of *Brother Vorn* and *Brother Khiev*. The Command Committee in Phnom Penh consisted of Vorn, Ân and Roeung. The Committee for the outside forces consisted of *Brother Khiev*, as Chairman, and other unidentified members.

I did not know about their discussion or about their contingency plans, subversive plots or the radio broadcast.

When Ân mentioned the attack against the *Bangs* of the Central Communist Party of Kampuchea, my facial expression did not stay normal, I was terrified. I had witnessed attacks twice, one in the North in 1977, and the other in the East in 1978, and I had also participated in eliminating those elements. Upon seeing my facial expression, Ân assured me, telling me not to be terrified. At that time, I had only been with Ân for around 15 to 20 minutes. No sooner had we finished our discussion, 4 or 5 workers came to meet Ân. Ân ended the discussion with me and told me that there would be meetings again if necessary. During the meeting, Ân talked most of the time, and I only listened to him without making any comment. Sometimes, I asked him for clarification because he spoke softly but fast. Then I shook hands with him and said goodbye.

Two days later, I went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare for my trip to UN headquarters. I took the opportunity to meet with Ân. I told Ân I had to travel to UN headquarters on Saturday to do three things:

- Be stationed at the UN headquarters.
- Visit Latin America.
- Visit the Philippines and Indonesia with *Brother Vãn* (វ៉ាន់).

I did not *know* where or who would go nor the date of return. I did not know how long the trip would take. Ân told me that was alright, and he would report to *Brother Vorn* in my absence.

I would like to clarify that I had not known that Ân and Roeung were enemy undercover agents. Only after Ân had distributed his plot, did I know that Ân and Roeung were enemy agents. Previously, I only knew that they were Revolutionaries.

PS: Targets

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8/31

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1. Roeung was in charge of the attack in the centre of the city.
2. Ân was in charge of that from north and south of Phnom Penh.
3. Vorn was in charge of the attack from the inside.
4. *Brother* Khiev commanded the attack from the East.

Conclusion: As far as I knew, only a tank unit can serve as a quick intervention force. A naval unit can also intervene quickly.

### Conclusion

After I read the summarized copy of *Brother* But's (ប៊ុត) document, I realized that *Brother* But had known about the Central Party Conference, which was held in November 1978.

I received this information from Ân, who spread the plot to stage a coup d'état between 15 November to 30 November 1978.

Comparing the two sources of information, I concluded that:

1. The coup d'état must have been planned.
2. The Central Party Congress in mid-November would be held after they had achieved victory.

25 December 1978

Nat

[*Handwritten*]: Pages 1 and 2 are missing.

.... Page 3. *Brother* Vorn also considered indoctrinating people from ethnic minorities to entice and recruit people. Page 7.

20 March 1970 – He went to the liberated region. Pon (ប៉ុន) took him to meet with A

Si (ស៊ី), and A Si told him that the CIA had successfully staged the

coup d'état. However, the underground cells had to take firm control

of all the bases around Phnom Penh to achieve victory, and it was necessary to expand and spread the traitorous forces everywhere. The next day he went to meet with *Brother Vorn* in Chĕk Char (ថែកចារ) Village.

The main focus of the indoctrination was to instruct them to love the American system, which allowed private ownership, and to hate the Revolutionary regime, which eliminated private ownership. Page 11.

Late 1970 – He propagandized against the evacuation of people which made people lose their properties, fall sick and die. He also made a statement against banning people from going to the enemies' regions. Page 16.

Late January 1971 – He went to meet A Ham (ហាំ) to ask about the enemy operation to open National Route No 3. At that time, he was in contact with people whom *Brother Nat* had already communicated with such as SOKH Lun (សុខ លុន), commander of an enemy Battalion stationed in Prey Totueng (ព្រៃទទឹង) and Daem Trăng (ដើមត្រាំង),

THEA Pai (ថៃប៉ៃ), Chairman of Prey Toueng Commune and

Poun (ពួន), Abbot of Champa Pagoda; also owned a gun.

He was directly in contact with SOKH Lun and also with A Non (ណុន). The purpose of their contact was to look for ammunition. He did not know then *Brother Nat* became a traitor but was only suspicious. When we launched the Akinĕt (អគីនេត្រ) Operation, *Brother Nat* withdrew his forces without informing others. He once [Illegible], and *rotherNat* begged him not to reveal his connection

with A SOKH Lun's cliques. The end of page 18 to the beginning of page 19.

He met with Vat at the Zone Printing House. His comments were based only on the Revolutionary line. Vat had said Comrade Thon was a barrier. He then asked about operatives at the Zone Office.

Vat said they included Phoeun (ហៀន), in the Press Office, and Ma (ម៉ា). Page 202.

After meeting Set (សិត), he met with Mǎo (ម៉ៅ), based on an introduction by A Kèv (កែវ). He asked about the plan to increase recruitment of young combatants by 30 percent and put together a company of guerrilla fighters. Page 21. However, he was confusing about this point.

July 1971 - He broke dikes to undermine the rice-growing plans of the Zone Office. Page 22.

After *Brother* Vorn had returned, *Brother* Vorn directed him and MǎO Narin (ម៉ៅ ណារិន) to transport weapons from Baribour (បរិបូ) District to be stored in *Brother* Phon's warehouse in Srè Andaung (ស្រែអណ្តូង). The three of them provided 100 rifles to the Guerrilla Unit. A Kèv's cliques controlled the Guerrilla Unit.

December 1971- He started fires in forests at midday. They spread and nearly reached the warehouse, and then people helped put it out. Later, he told A Set to secretly do it again. Page 22.

Late 1976 – *Brother* Vorn ordered him to transport ammunition for *Brother* Mok at the Tram Khnar (ត្រាំខ្មារ) Battlefield. Upon arriving at Kdei Lpeou

(ក្តីណ្តៅ) Pagoda and Chheuteal Chrum (ឈើទាលជ្រុំ), he met A Brāk

(ប្រាក់), *Brother Teanh* (ទាញ), *Brother Rïn* (រិន), *Brother Rèn* (រ៉ែន) and *Brother Rân* (រ៉ែន) under a tree. *Brother Rân* said that Comrade Rèn had killed 400 combatants by shelling them and calling in bombers to bomb them. Page 27.

1973 – B52 bombers bombed extensively. He went to the 311 Office and met with *Brother Nat*. *Brother Nat* said, “All the big units have shrunk, so we should request Angkar to start peace negotiations. On the defensive lines, there are only trenches without combatants.” The end of page 34. *Brother Nat* added, “People in Sectors 15, 25 and 33 travel without fear to take back their children from all the units. In Sector 15, people have had their thumbs printed to demand peaceful negotiations.” A Soam (សោម) boasted about being in contact with enemies on the radio every night. Page 36. A Chey (ជឿ) said that, before we did anything, we had to ask the people. End of Page 38. A Hâm, Săng (សាំង), Mēt (ម៉េត) and Măb (ម៉ាប់) focused only on inciting people. *Brother Rïn*, *Brother Teanh* and *Brother Nat* were terrified. After he had received the information, he went to meet A Hâm to inform A KÈV San (កែវ សាន) to “let cattle out to eat grass because the here they were frightened and had run into their stalls.” Page 40.

February 1974 – *Brother Vorn* directed the Office to grow rice extensively. They grew rice even with shelling. They harvested 50 hectares of rice in Boeng Phnum Khsak (បឹងភ្នំខ្យក) and filled 50 baskets with rice. They also harvested 30 hectares at Kôk Cheh (គោកចេ) Pagoda, filling 30 baskets of rice. The beginning of page 40.

1974 – *Brother* Vorn directed him to transport salt, but he destroyed all the salt by melting it. End of page 42. When he transported weapons, he also destroyed them. When he met with *Brother* Hok and A Si at Rông Vêng (រោងវែង), *Brother* Vorn reminded him to ask about the condition of A Si. A Si had introduced him to A Sè (សែ) and A Tum (តុំ) from Sector 22. Page 43 and 47.

Early September, 1975 – He met with A Sè in Kampot. A Sè said that he did not indoctrinate old people because they would be draw attention when they were mixed with the youth. He added, young people had a brighter future, and that he had sent ten operatives who were among the leadership to destroy the oxen cart transportation routes. End of page 48. As regards rice growing, A Sè said he did not know how to indoctrinate long-time farmers who lived on farms with cattle and excrement all through their lives. He stressed that learning from them would be more appropriate. A Sè was a member of A Chey's group. Beginning of page 49.

### III. Key cadres activities

Late 1965 – *Brother* K (ក) brought him to stay at a house as a Security Guard and Courier. One day, Yēng, who was currently in Brigade 502, brought *Bang* Eu (ឃី) to that house. End of Page 3. He went to call Hoeng (ហ៊ឹង) to meet with *Brother* Eu. Then *Brother* Eu advised Hoeng who would be sent to the countryside and who would be allowed to stay. Later, *Brother* Vorn arrived and spoke only with *Brother* Eu. Hoeng told him that *Brother* Vorn was also a CIA Agent. After meeting with *Brother* Eu, *Brother* Vorn met with him and A Hoeng, and he told him that the groups of immigrants included the cliques of *Mi* Hong, A Sau's (ស៊ូ) wife, Chairwoman of the Chinese

Hospital, Heu (ហ្នើ)‘s group in Battambang, and A Sau’s cell at the Ministry of Foreign Commerce. Page 4.

Early 1966 – *Brother Vorn* advised him to contact TIV Oi (ទីវី អ៊ុយ) of the Teacher Association. End of Page 4. Before leaving, *Brother Vorn* directed him to work hard and cautiously because a human problem is a political problem. Beginning of page 5.

Around May 1968 – Sēng (សេង) and he went to collect *Brother Vorn*, A Si and *Brother Eu* from the countryside to join the conference at the Head Offices of two Chinese language newspapers, Sun Huor (ស៊ុនហួរ) and Mean Huor (ម៉ានហួរ). The people whom he knew included *Brother Ân*, *Chen Hong* (ហុង), A Sau, A Khmăo (ខ្មៅ) and the reporters of the two newspapers. He did not reveal the contents of the conference. We also asked him at the time, but he refused to say anything. Page 7.

October 1970 – *Brother Ân* directed him to collect A Hâm and A Kèv in Doek Peang (ដឹកពាង) Village in Sector 15. He told them that A Si had advised him to cooperate with them to organize one or two agents in each district to carry out counter-revolutionary activities. Then he introduced Ma, Savat, Săng (សាំង) and Pnorl (ព្រួល), alias Sâ, to A Hâm. End of page 14.

During that period, he reported his work to *Bang Ân*. At that time, *Brother Vorn* also told him to ask Chinese immigrants to provide medicine. At one time, A *Chen Yung* (យុង) asked for permission from *Brother Vorn* to take charge of Chinese immigrants in the Southwest. The Chinese immigrants did not agree because they

wanted to live with the Vietnamese. In 1965, *Brother* Vorn tried to brainwash these Chinese immigrants for the Vietnamese. Pages 15-16.

December 1970 – He attended the conference in the Southwest. At that time, A Chong had disagreements with *Brother* Mok. *Brother* Vorn stated, “I would like to draw attention to the fact that in 1971 and 1972 there will be various operations to seize land, people and the economy.” Page 18.

13 April 1972 – A Chey introduced these operatives to one another. After *Brother* Vorn had left, there were A Chey, *Bother* Rīt, A Kun, *Brother* Nat, A KÈV Saroeung (កែវ សារឿង) 801, *Brother* Teanh, Ma, A Soam, of the General Staff Office, A Chhon 33, *Brother* Rân, *Brother* Rèn, of the Southwest, A Mon, A Chakrei and A Tat. End of page 28 and beginning of page 29. After the meeting, On (អ៊ុន) directed him to contact Son (សុន) of District 56. End of page 37. He then went to meet Son, and he asked Son to keep a company of militia forces for him. Beginning of page 38.

1973 – *Bang* Vorn advised him that the Party had ordered us to continue fighting and close the door to expanding the Party. Subversive groups continue their negotiation tactics, frighten people with B52 bombers and encourage forces to withdraw. Then *Brother* Vorn advised him to meet A Hâm. Pages 30 and 37. After receiving *Brother* Vorn’s advice, he went to meet A Hâm. A Hâm and A KÈV San chose representatives for the peace negotiations in Sectors 15 and 33. Then he introduced the subversive group members in the 305 Office and the radio team. Page 30.

May 1973 – *Brother* Vorn told him to meet with A Hâm to ask whether the representative for the peace negotiations had come. End of page 36. When he met with A Hâm, A Hâm told him that the representatives for peace negotiations had already arrived. A On, in Tram Khnar, sent 15 representatives, who were charged with negotiations, and they

claimed that their government would provide economic support if the negotiations succeeded. However, the negotiations failed because our militiamen arrested them. After A Hâm learned about this, he went to meet *Brother Vorn*. Page 33. *Brother Vorn* advised him to deal with them gently to get a better understanding of the issue. Page 34. He also reported this to A Chey, saying that there was an information leak to District 55. *Brother Vorn* then advised us to transfer these people to the peace negotiation team. Then A Hâm told A Pnorl, alias Sâ, to release these people and sent a letter by A Hâm to A KÈV San at Kantuot (កង្វាត) School. End of page 39.

1974 – *Brother Vorn* advised him that those living along rivers were better off than those living in the countryside and that the rich were better off than the poor because this was the natural outcome of good and poor living conditions. He was also materialistic. Since that time, he had improved the living conditions of those in the Office. He claimed that three fourths of those participating in the conference were subversive operatives, but he did not identify anyone.

Those he already knew included *Brother Vorn*, *Brother Ân*, A Si, A Hâm, A KÈV and *Brother Krin* (គ្រីន). Those he didn't know, but could be regarded as subversives, included A Chey, A Sè, A Chong, A Nuon, *Brother Hok* and A Chhay of Squad 33. Page 17.

February 1972 – Office 305 was moved to Champa (ចំប៉ា) Commune, District 55,

Sector 33. When he transported weapons, they were to be stored there, *Brother Vorn* directed him to tell A Hâm that A ỖT Suong's (អ៊ុត ស្វង់) Division 7 planned to launch an offensive to open

National Road No 2 and seize Sè Va (ស៊ែវ៉ា) Market, Prey Lvea

(ប្រែល្វា) and Kaoh Thum (កោះធំ). Tell A Hâm to be well-prepared



for this. Page 23. Later, he went to meet A Hâm to report the enemy situation and the routes of their forces to A KÈV San. However, when they launched their operation, their forces were destroyed by a Brigade from the Southwest in Bat Rokar (ប្រតិភូការ). Page 25.

Late March 1972 –Brother Vorn told him to inform anyone coming to look for him that he had travelled far away. Three days later *Brother Rīt* enticed A Pon, A Chakrei and A Tat to meet *Brother Vorn*. End of page 23. A Pon said that A Phim told him to meet *Brother Vorn*, but A Pon could not. He told A Pon to come back in late April 1976. Page 24.

After the operation by Brigade 7 had failed, the Southwest zone provided a car for *Brother Vorn*. After a break, he reported that A Chakrei had sought to meet *Brother Vorn*, and then *Bang Vorn* advised him to keep it secret. *Brother Vorn* said he was angry with A Phim because they met to discuss Revolutionary Work, but A Phim also secretly discussed subversive activities. A Chakrei was under the control of *Brother Vorn*. Page 26. When he was about to leave, A Chakrei arrived. A Chakrei handed a letter by A Phim to *Brother Vorn*. *Brother Vorn* said, “Based on the introduction by A Phim, I would like to welcome you three comrades.” Then *Brother Vorn* sent a letter back to A Phim. Page 27.

... class stance. End of page 41. Later, *Brother Vorn* told him to meet A Hâm and tell A Hâm to order people to start farming extensively. People would see that carrying out the Revolution was hard, and they wouldn’t want to do it. Beginning of page 46.

One day, he accompanied A Sok, from the city, to meet *Brother* 89. After returning, A Sok said that the Party had told us to launch an attack from the inside, but *Brother Vorn* advised us to launch the offensive against the Revolution after the Revolutionary Forces had completely entered the city. Page 46. Then *Brother Vorn* told him to tell A Si, *Brother Rēn* and A Hâm about this and to remind A Hâm

and A Kèv to be in constant cooperation with A Si. End of page 43 and beginning of pages 44 and 46.

Late 1975 – Trains collide. *Brother* Vorn was ordered to arrest train drivers and workers who had at least five-years driving experience. Then *Bang* Vorn advised *Brother* Brang (ប្រាង) to abandon this plan because the Unit lacked technicians. He, Săng and ten of A Sè's operatives drove around and destroyed trains at the same time. End of page 49. He, Lây (ឡាយ) and SĒNG Ēng (សេង អេង) loosened the railway tracks to make trains derail in Tumnob Rolok (ទំនប់រលក). *Brother* Brang and *Brother* Vorn explained that it was because of the old tracks. He said that if we wanted to prevent train collisions, we had to go back to the old system. Engineers and technicians had all been accused of being CIA Agents and had all been arrested. Only a few of them remained, but it was not certain whether they could be protected. If we wanted to organize something, we had to get them out of prison. Page 50. A Sè also regularly carried out subversion. Page 51.

#### IV. Subversive operatives::

##### A. Those who have died or have been arrested:

1	BÈN Chun (ប៉ែន ជុន), alias Hoeng (ហ៊ឹង)	He was Secretary of Sector 5, the Northwest Zone. He has been arrested.
2	SUON Chamraen (ស្នួន ចំរើន)	He was a Student at YukunThor (យុកុនតូរ) High School and a staff member at Monk Hospital. He died in 1970.

3	LĂM Samēt (ឡាំ សាម៉េត)	After the liberation, he worked for the Ministry of Railways. He has been arrested.
4	BĂK Khhun (ប៉ាក់ ឃុន)	He was a private school student; died in 1970 when he stepped on a landmine.
5	NHĒB Sot (ញ៉ែប សុត)	He went to the countryside in the Northwest Zone in 1965. He died in 1968 with <i>Brother</i> CHHA Phăn (ផា ផាន់) of the State Fishing Unit.
6	NHĒB Suong (ញ៉ែប សួង), alias Phăn (ផាន់)	He went to the countryside in the Southwest Zone in 1965 and has already been arrested.
7	SOEM Sâm Aok (សឹមសំអោក), alias Pàng (ប៉ង់)	He was Chairman of S-71. He was in contact with this person for a year in 1965. Page 3.
8	PHÔK Chhay (ហោក ឆាយ), alias Touch (តូច)	He was a note taker at Angkar's Office, and he has already been arrested. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
9	KUNG Sokh Khun (គង់ សុខឃុន)	He went to the countryside in 1970. He died in 1977. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).

10	KÈ Kimhuot (កែ គីមហ្គុត), alias Sot (សុត)	He was Secretary of the Northwest Zone, Sector 7. He has already been arrested. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
11	KÂNG Sarân (កង សារ៉ាន)	He was a teacher. He moved to the countryside, but he later came back. He has already died. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
12	TĂN Tri (តាន់ ទ្រី, alias Chhoeun(ឈឿន)	He was Chairman of the Commerce Office during A Khuon's tenure. He has already been arrested. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
13	SĒNG Bunthân (សេង ប៊ុនថន)	He has already been arrested. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
14	YI Yon (យី យ៉ុង)	He was Principal of Kampong Speu High School. He was removed in 1968 and evacuated to Sector 24. He has already been arrested. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
15	Sarim (សារីម), alias San (សាន)	He was a Teacher in Angk Ta Saom(អង្គតាសោម) and Deputy Chairman of the Northwest Zone Military Committee. He has already been arrested. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
16	CHHUN Yông	He was in Kratie, and he has been arrested. (He was introduced by TIV Ol in 1966. Pages 5 and

	(ឈ្មោះ យោង)	6).
17	LAO San (ឡា សាន)	He may have died in prison. (He was introduced by TIV OI in 1966. Pages 5 and 6).
18	Mai (ម៉ៃ)	He was in the Northwest Zone. (He was trained by <i>Brother Vorn</i> to work as an underground agent in the countryside in 1968).
19	THĂCH Kimsoeng (ថាច់ គីមសឹង)	He was a Teacher and died in 1968. (He was trained by <i>Brother Vorn</i> to work as an underground agent in the countryside in 1968).
20	A On	He was Secretary of Sector 33 in the Southwest Zone, and he has been arrested. (He was also trained by <i>Brother Vorn</i> to work as an underground agent in the countryside in 1968).
21	<i>Chen Hong</i> (Chinese immigrant)	He was Chairman of Domestic Commerce, and he has been arrested. (He was trained by <i>Brother Vorn</i> to work as an underground agent in the countryside in 1968).
22	A Huor (Chinese immigrant)	He was Chairman of the Weapons Repair Unit at the General Staff Office, and he has been arrested. (He too was trained by <i>Brother Vorn</i> to work as an underground agent in the countryside in 1968).
23	A Sau	He was Chairman of the Chinese Hospital, and he has been arrested (Chinese immigrant).
24	<i>Mi Hong</i>	She was A Sau's wife, and she has been arrested.

		(Chinese immigrant).
25	TI Sambau (ទីសំប៉ូ), alias Pau (ប៉ូ)	He worked in Battambang and moved to Phnom Penh. He has been arrested.
26	A Khmăo	He was Deputy Chairman of Industry, and he has been arrested.
27	SIEK Poayhēng (សៀក ប៉ាយហេង), alias Ma (ម៉ា)	He was a Teacher and Chairman of a Regiment. He died in 1974. Page 81. He was introduced by Hâng from the city. Page 13.
28	Loeun (លៀន)	He was a nephew of <i>Achar Vèn</i> of KamSan (កំសាន) Pagoda. He was Chairman of a Brick Factory in Ponhea Lueu (ពញាធឿ) in Sector 15. He has been arrested.
29	SĪN Kim Ay (ស៊ីន គីមអាយ), alias Pon (ប៉ុន)	He was Chairman of the State Salt Farm, and he has been arrested. He was introduced by A Si in 1970. Page 5.
30	NĒAK Sarĭn (នាក់ សារិន)	He was a Mobile Commune Militiaman stationed in Chhuk (ឈូក) District, and he has been arrested. He was introduced by A Si in 1970. Page 10.

31	Saroeun (សារឿន)	He was a Mobile Commune Militiaman stationed in Chhuk District, and he has been arrested. He was introduced by A Si in 1970. Page 10.
32	PĒCH Chân (ពេជ្រ ថន), alias Saom (សោម)	He was an Assistant to the General Staff Office. He was introduced by <i>Brother Hàng</i> in 1973. (He was introduced by <i>Brother Hàng</i> in June 1970. Page 13).
33	Savat	He was a Member of the City Defense Unit. His cell was not clear. He has been arrested. (He was introduced by <i>Brother Hàng</i> in June 1970. Page 13).
34	Pnorl (ព្រួល), alias Sâ (ស)	He was a student at a private school. His father was a Major. He was Chairman of Public Works in Sector 15, and he has been arrested. (He was introduced by <i>Brother Hàng</i> in June 1970. Page 13).
35	Saroeun (សារឿន)	He was ordained as a Monk at Kamsan Pagoda. He was a member of the Leuk Daek (លើកដេក) District Committee in Sector 25 in the Southwest Zone, and he has been arrested. (He was introduced by <i>Brother Hàng</i> in June 1970. Page 13).
36	PĂK Khun (ប៉ាក់ ហុន)	He lived in Baek Chan (ប៉ែកចាន), Angk Snuol (អង្គស្នួល). (He trained this person in late 1969 and then introduced this person to LĂM Samēt. Page 8. He then introduced this person to <i>Brother Ân</i> in

		1970. He has already died, stepping on a landmine. Page 16).
37	LIM Khorn (លីម ឃុន)	He lived in Prey Pring (ព្រៃព្រីង), Chaom Chau (ចោមចៅ) Commune, Dangkao (ដង្កោ) District. (He trained this person in late 1969 and then introduced him to LĂM Samēt. Page 8. He then introduced him to <i>Brother</i> Ân in 1970. He died after stepping on a landmine. Page 16).
38	BOEUNG Siphân (បៀង ស៊ីផាន)	He lived in Angk Snuol, Angk Snuol District. (He trained this person in late 1969 and then introduced him to LĂM Samēt. Page 8. He then introduced him to <i>Brother</i> Ân in 1970. He has already died, stepping on a landmine. Page 16).
39	A Set	He was a Member of the District Committee in Sector 15. (A Kèv introduced this person to him in front of <i>Brother</i> Ân. End of page 19).
40	Măo	He used to work at Office 305 in charge of training with A Rĭn and Châu in 1972. (A Kèv introduced this person to him in front of <i>Brother</i> Ân. End of page 19).
41	Beun (ប៉ុន)	He was Chairman of the Radio Team in Sector 25 and Chairman of the Oil Warehouse in Preaek Phneou (ព្រែកឃ្នោ). He has been arrested.
42	Rĭn	He worked at the Printing House of the Special Zone. After the liberation, he moved to the State Printing House. He has been arrested.



43	Măb	Later, he may have worked at the Ministry of Railways. Beginning of page 30. (He introduced this person to Săng in 1973).
44	A Saom	He was Deputy Chairman of Kampong Som Port, and he has been arrested. (He mentioned this person during the meeting to spread the plan to counter-attack on 17 April 1975. Page 44).
45	SREI Daung (ស្រី ដូង), alias Khè (ខែ)	He has been arrested. (He mentioned this person during the meeting to spread the plot to counter-attack on 17 April 1975. Page 44).
46	A Hâm	He was Secretary of Sector 15.
47	A Si	He was Secretary of the West Zone.
48	UM Chhoeun (អ៊ឹម ឈឿន), alias Mai	This person was a member of the old network, members which he met after the liberation. Page 48.

B. The subversive operatives whom he had trained and recruited, and who have not been arrested:

1	SBAONG Run (ស្រ្យាង រុន)	He was a teacher, and was educated in 1963.
2	KOL Kimsan (កុល គីមសាន)	He was a Student at Yukunthor High School. Contact was cut off in 1967, but he maintained contact with SBAONG Run. Page 2.

3	UN Să(អ៊ុន ស)	He was a Student at Yukunthor High School. Contact was cut off in 1967. He was evacuated to S'ang Phnum (ស្នាងភ្នំ), S'ang (ស្នាង) District, Sector 25. Page 2.
4	CHĂO Sie (ថៅ សៀ)	He was a Student at Yukunthor High School. Contact was cut off in 1967. He was evacuated to S'ang Phnum, S'ang District, Sector 25. Page 2.
5	CHĂO Sokhon (ថៅ សុខុន)	He was a student at Yukunthor High School. Contact was cut off in 1967. He was evacuated to S'ang Phnum, S'ang District, Sector 25. Page 2.
6	LIM Khorn (លីម យន)	He was a student at a private school. Contact was cut off in 1970. He was evacuated to Ou Krang Ambel (ក្រាំងអំបិល) Cooperative, Kampong Speu.
7	SVAY Samphân (ស្វាយ សំផន)	He was a student at Yukunthor High School. Contact was cut off in 1967.
8	Samnang (សំណាង)	He was a student at Yukunthor High School. Contact was cut off in 1967, but he stayed in touch with SBAONG Run.
9	Srauy (ស្រួយ)	He was a Student at Yukunthor High School. Contact was cut off in 1967, but he maintained contact with SBAONG Run.

10	Sarân (សារ៉ាន់)	He was a Freelance Worker. He was Chairman of a Textile Factory in Sector 4 in the Northwest Zone. (He trained this person in 1970. End of page 10. After training, <i>Brother Ân</i> asked to assign Sarân and Loeun as core operatives. Sarân entered enemy zones to spread propaganda and was arrested by the enemy. After the liberation, he was released from prison. Page 11).
11	Phan (ផាន់)	He was an <i>A Char</i> . He was Chairman of Roka Commune Cooperative.
12	Hâb (ហាប់)	He was an Auto Rickshaw Driver. He was a Member of the Kandal Stueng (កណ្តាលស្ទឹង) District Economics Committee.
13	Soeung (សៀង)	He lived in Boeng Lvea (បឹងល្វា) Village. He was a Member of the Kandal Stueng District Committee.
14	Sambuor (សំបួរ)	He lived in Krang Mkak (ក្រាំងម្កាក់) Village, and he was Secretary of Kandal Stueng District. (He trained this person in 1970. Page 12).
15	San (សាន)	He lived in Kngaok (ក្បោក) Village, and he was Chairman of the Boeng Thum (បឹងធំ) Commune Cooperative.
16	Aok (អោក)	He lived in Prey Puoch (ព្រៃពូច) Village, and he was Chairman of Prey Puoch Commune

		Cooperative.
17	Sambok (សំបុក)	He was a Student at Chumpu Voan (ជំបូវ៉ាន់) Secondary School and Chairman of a platoon in Kandal Stueng District. Later, he joined Brigade 11. (He trained this person in June 1970. Page 14).
18	Sambau (សំប៉ូ)	He was a student at Chumpu Voan Secondary School and Chairman of a platoon in Kandal Stueng District. He, later, joined Brigade 11. (He trained this person in June 1970. Page 14).
19	Neou (នេវ)	He lived in Krang Mkak Village. He was Deputy Chairman of a Platoon in Kandal Stueng District. He later joined Brigade 11. (He trained this person in June 1970. Page 14).
20	Chol (ចុល)	He lived in Krang Mkak Village. He was Deputy Chairman of a Platoon in Kandal Stueng District, and he later joined Brigade 11. After the liberation, he joined the Sea Fishing Unit. (He trained this person in June 1970. Page 14).
21	Mon (ម៉ុន)	He lived in Damnak Ampil (ដំណាក់អំពិល) Commune. He was a Member of the District Economics Unit. Recently, he became a Fisherman in Sector 15 stationed in Ponhea Lueu.

C. Subversive operatives introduced by others, those whom he recognized during meetings and those who have not been arrested.

	MEAS Dim (ម៉ាស)	He was Chairman of the Teachers Association in
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1	ឌឹម)	1965 and was evacuated to Svay Rieng.
2	KHIEV Komar (ខៀវ កុមារ)	He was Chairman of Finance in 1965 and was evacuated to Kien Svay, Sector 25. (TIV Ol introduced this person to him in 1966. Page 5).
3	LEANG Háb An (លាង ហាបអាន)	He was Deputy Chairman of Finance in 1965 and was evacuated to an unknown location.
4	THUCH Rín (ធុច រិន), alias Krín (គ្រិន)	He was Chairman of the Southwest Zone Office and is, currently, Port Chairman.
5	KHUN Srun (ហ្មុន ស្រុន), alias Phoeun (ហ្នៀន)	He was a younger brother of KHUN Tri, a Teacher. Currently, he works in the Laboratory of the Ministry of Railways. (KUNG Sokhun introduced this person to him in 1968. Page 5).
6	SOEM Sarim (សឹម សារឹម)	He was a Teacher, and he moved to Kampong Cham in 1970. (KUNG Sokhun introduced this person to him in 1968. Page 5).
7	Bang Rân	He was former Secretary of Chhuk District, Secretary of Sector 37, Secretary of Sector 33 and Secretary of the new Southwest Zone. (A Si introduced this person to him in March 1970 in Thmei (ថ្មី) Village, Srè Chèng (ស្រែចែង). Page 9).

8	Bang Rèn	He was a Committee Member of a Company of Brigade 2. He was in command of 30 other combatants whose identities were unknown. He only revealed the names of A NĚAK Sarin and Sareoun. These 30 operatives were introduced by A Si to <i>Brother Vorn</i> through him. <i>Brother Vorn</i> paid special attention to A NĚAK Sarin. (A Si introduced this person to him in March 1970 in Thmei Village, Srè Chèng. Page 9).
9	05, alias Săng (សំរាំង)	He was a member of A Hâm's clique. He was Deputy Chairman of the Ministry of Railways Committee. He was introduced by <i>Brother Hâng</i> . Page 13.
10	Kung (កុង)	He was a soldier at the General Staff Office in charge of collecting intelligence for bombing operations by T28 bombers. He was a Member of the Fishing Unit of Sector 15, stationed in Kampong Luong, the West Zone. Page 13.

In early 1971, after he had been at the Office of the Special Zone for three days, A Nhoeb, *Brother Eu*, and *Brother Pèt* also came in. *Brother Ân* said that he would be away and told him to take charge.

Then he went to the Radio Office to meet A Set, based on an introduction by A Kèv. When he met A Set, he reported that he had recruited the following operatives:

11	An (អាន)	He was the Chairman of the Radio Unit of Sector 33. Currently, he works at the Radio Station in Stueng Meanchey (ស្ទឹងមានជ័យ).
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12	Thon (ថុន)	He was at Office 305. Thon was trained by Vat and introduced to him in July 1971. (A).
13	Phàl (ផល)	Phàl worked at the Printing House with Thon. He did not clarify who introduced Phàl to him. (A) (A): Page 22. They incited the people in Saiva (សៃវា), Bat Roka (បាតរុកា), Prey Lvea (ប្រៃល្វេ) and Kaoh Thum during the operations by Brigade 7 in 1972. Page 25.
14	Lây (ឡៃ)	He worked at the Ministry of Railways, and he was a Member of KOY Thuon's network. He was introduced by <i>Brother Vorn</i> after the liberation.
15	<i>Brother</i> Brang (ប្រាង)	He was a Member of <i>Brother Vorn</i> 's network, and was introduced by <i>Brother Vorn</i> after the liberation.
16	<i>Brother</i> Vorn	
17	<i>Brother</i> Ân	
18	<i>Brother</i> Rît	
19	<i>Brother</i> Hok	
20	<i>Brother</i> Nat	
21	<i>Brother</i> Teanh	
22	Dăm (ដាំ)	He was a member of one of A Sè's cliques, and he was transferred to the Ministry of Railways after the liberation. Formerly, he was a cadre at the Sector 35 Office. End of Page 48.

23	<i>Choek SĒNG</i> <i>Ēng (ស៊ីង ស៊ីង)</i>	He was a Railway Engineer. Page 50.
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V. Observations:

1. Overall, his document is out of sequence chronologically, confusing, and hard to understand.
2. This document is not yet complete.
3. Regarding some people, he seemed to make inappropriate accusations because of his past anger.
4. However, we should also pay special attention to some issues such as the meeting on 13 April 1976. Page 28. He did not speak clearly about this meeting, but we asked some members of A Sok's cliques in Sector 25 in late 1975. We have also seen their meetings, but he said indirectly that there were frequent meetings in Sector 33. We believed that there were meetings in Sector 33, and A Chakrei and A On also attended those meetings. However, we could not draw conclusions about others. At that time, A On's office was located in Kat Phluk (កាត់ភ្លុក), whereas Office 305 was located in Champa Commune, District 55, Sector 33.