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S-637

SUN Ti (ស៊ុន ទី), alias Teanh (ទាញ),

Logistics, Military Staff

Arrested on 10 December 1978



I request to report my biography

I would like to report my background from birth to the date of enrolment in the Party and my activities to the date of detention.

My name at birth is SON Ti, and my Revolutionary name is Teanh. I am 40 years old. I was born in Kampuchea Krom (កម្ពុជាក្រោម) in Thmei (ថ្មី) Village, Thmei Commune, unknown district, Krâmuon Sâr (ក្រុងស្រីសរ) Province.

I lived with my parents until I was 12 or 13 years old. At that age, my cousin sent me from Kampuchea Krom to live with another cousin named THĂCH Khëtt (ថាច់ ខេត្ត). I lived with him and studied at Kampong Kântuot (កំពង់កន្ទួត) School from 1950 to 1954. In his house, there were photos of Prince Yuttevung (យុត្តិវង្ស) and SON Ngoc Thanh (សឹង ង៉ុកថាន់).

Almost every Sunday, a few teachers who were my cousin's friends visited him at home. I overheard their discussions, in which Prince Yuttevung and ON Ngoc Thanh were believed to be patriots, not subversives as accused by the King. They usually had meetings the whole morning. At that time, I did not understand as I was still young. All I understood was that it was not right to term all those who betrayed the King as subversives.

From 1954 to 1957, I lived with another cousin at Kilometer 6 (គីឡូម៉ែត្រ ៦).

This family also often said that SON Ngoc Thanh was a patriot and that he was accused of being a subversive because he worked against the King. Although I studied at Kilometer 6, I often visited THĂCH Khëtt's family at Tuek L'ak (ទឹកល្អក់) during holidays. In his house, there were also photos of Yuttevung and SON Ngoc Thanh on the wall. I sometimes met THĂCH Khëtt at home, but most of the time I chatted with his parents. Upon seeing us chatting, THĂCH Khët sometimes joined us and talked about the good points of Yuttevung. I did not remember the details, but it was all about the heroism of Yuttevung. Then he described SON Ngoc Thanh's background

in detail, but I do not remember it. It was repeatedly spoken of in his family. After I finished the primary school, I did not pursue my studies in a high school. From 1956 to 1967, I attended a vocational school. During that time, I learned more about the two patriots from my cousin's indoctrination. I believed that they were good people.

In late 1957 and early 1958, I was recruited as a mechanic in a train station where the anti-Sihanouk movement, the anti-imperialist movement and other politically developed movements were emerging. I was drawn toward the politically developed movement not the Sângkum Reastr Niyum (សង្គមរាស្ត្រនិយម) movement. I did not agree with those who accused SON Ngoc Thanh and the Khmer Rouge of treason. I spiritually supported the workers' politically developed movement, and I was physically involved in the protection of the movement. During my adolescence, I was afraid of nothing. I did what I was told among the workers, but I spoke fearlessly about spies and policemen. I supported the politically developed movement of the train workers until Tè (តៃ) enrolled me as a member of the Labour Party of

Kampuchea on 9 April 1962 after Moeun (ម៉ឺន) had introduced me to Vorn (វ៉ន) (alias Comrade Tè). One comrade whose name I do not remember read my biography and recommended me. Approximately a year later, when only one branch had been established, Tè, alias Vorn, told me, "You have to work at the train station, but you do not need to be involved in building the branch. What you have to do is to assist my work. You must arrive at my house every day at 7 p.m., whether or not you have other business. During the day, you must deliver letters or newspaper copy from me and Brother Lmut (ល្អិត), who is currently working in Foreign Commerce, to a female newsagent at a corner of Phsar Depo (ផ្សារដេប៉ូ). She has brown skin. To show her the pass code, you buy a newspaper and give her 500 riel. Then she will give you a pack of Parrot cigarettes. Doing so, you will get to know her before you meet her again at 11:30am tomorrow."

Vorn then explained why I had to go to his house at night, "At night, you will have to deliver letters from me to one who wears glasses." I asked, "What is his

name?” Vorn did not answer. He just said, “You will know him when you meet him.” Then he got a piece of paper and a pencil, and asked me, “Do you know the accommodations of the teachers?” I said yes. Vorn then draw a square indicating a house, and he told me the direction to the stairs and the door on which to knock. I had to wait on the first floor, and the door was right next to the stairs.

He also explained the symbols for the letters. A letter was not put in an envelope. It was folded as small as a chopstick or bigger, according to the size, but it was still small enough to fit in a cloth hem. Vorn advised, “There are two symbols. They are the single X and double X.” Vorn went on, “The double X indicates that a letter is urgent, so you must deliver it as soon as you get it. It is a letter concerning the work of the masses movement. A letter with the single X is not urgent. It is okay to deliver it one or two hours later because it is about domestic affairs.” I often delivered letters from Vorn and Khieu (ខៀវ) and vice-versa, and I also delivered letters to the newsagent during the day. The letters between Vorn and Khieu had double Xs, and, to the newsagent, only the single X. While I was doing that, I dared not express to anyone my doubts. I just thought to myself, “The Labour Party and the masses movement must be cooperating with one another. That’s why the high-ranking Cadres have dual duties.” In 1958 or 1959, I attended the vocational school on weekdays, and I visited THĂCH Khětt’s home on Sundays. At that time, he worked as a *Seriant* (សៀវភៅ) on the South Campus of the Institute of Pedagogy. He stayed in a wooden house on the west side of campus. One day, he was working in his house with all the windows closed. At lunch time, people left the house, and I saw the following people:

1. Brother SON Sēn (សុន សេន) (Khieu).
2. Brother THĂCH Khětt.
3. Brother KUNG Sophâl (គង់ សុផល).
4. Brother HUL Sēng Thai (ហ៊ុល សេងថៃ).
5. Another cadre whom I did not know.

They worked until the evening that day. They left during the night.

The second time, they worked at Brother THĂCH Khětt's house, which was located west of Phsar Tuek L'ak (ផ្សារទឹកល្អក់) (Phnom Penh). They also worked for the whole day. They left at dark. That time, I saw the four people above and the other whom I did not know. I do not remember how long I delivered the letters from Vorn and Khieu and vice-versa. I think I was late 1962 and early 1963.

In 1963 I stopped delivering the letters from Vorn to Khieu. That year, on 1 May, there was a celebration of International Labour Day. Days after we had visited Wat Svay Krăo (វត្តស្វាយក្រៅ) (I do not remember the exact date), Vorn told me to go to his house north of Sănthormok (សង្កាត់ថ្មី) School (in Tuek L'ak). There, he told me, "Your cousin belongs to the SON Ngoc Thanh group, which is the masses movement, so you should join. If you do not join, it's because you have already become a party member. You will be labelled a Khmer Rouge, and they will imprison or kill you." Vorn said he would not force me, and he gave me a few days to think it over.

A few days later, I met him. He asked, "What is your decision?" I answered, "It's up to you. I have no ideas." Vorn suggested, "As I have told you, you'd better join the masses movement for your own safety." Then he instructed me to stand up, face the wall, as there was no flag or symbol, and stand straight. I repeated a vow after him and bowed. After he explained, I did as I was told. He also stood straight and cited a vow for me to repeat. He ordered me [to pay] respects [to] the dead, and both of us bowed. Then we took a break.

Vorn actually had cited the complete vow of the Party, but he just replaced the words "Party" with "masses movement".

Above is my biography and political life. I was enrolled in the masses movement by Vorn, but I did not join the CIA.

Next, are my activities after joining the masses movement (the Free Khmer Movement). Vorn explained to me many times about republican society and socialism (so-called communism). Although I participated in the Party and the Free Khmer Organization, I did not understand the political content because I had studied very

little about it. However, I clearly remember how Vorn answered questions, “Why do we [place ourselves] underground in the Revolutionary movement, which is the Labour Party? Why don’t we openly stand up for our movement?” Vorn answered, “The masses movement organization or the Liberal Khmer are notorious. Now, people do not acknowledge us. All we can do is to gather the remaining forces throughout the country and go underground in the Revolutionary movement to learn more about the Party, so that, in the future, we will be able to convince those in the Revolutionary movement to join our movement.”

In 1963, I worked with two faces. I openly pretended to strive to recruit forces among the masses, and I covertly explained to them the difficulties and discomfort they were facing so as to convince them to join my movement. In 1963, after I had joined the Free Khmer Organization, I worked actively. However, as I had no experience, I did not inform people about the Free Khmer Organization, and, as a result, I did not recruit any Free Khmer forces. In the train station, there was the Khmer Sâ (ខ្មែរសា) movement, and the workers knew who the members were.

Members did not receive any negative reactions from the workers as they had a good relationship with the factory owners.

This team consisted of KIRI Phâlla (គីរី ផល្លា), THĂCH Saing (ថាច់ សាំង), ÈM Leang (ឯម លាង), NEAM Yîn Nat (នាម យិនណាត), CHHUN Kimsrēng (ឈុន គីមស្រេង) and etc.

As soon as I saw the team, I reported about them to Vorn asking for his advice whether I should associate with them. Vorn told me to wait. A week later, Vorn told me not to associate with them but only with my clique.

In 1964, Vorn assigned me to join the [party] branch at the train station. It had three members namely, NORNG Moeun (នង ម៉ឺន), Secretary, UNG Ka (ឃុំ កា) and me. We had a meeting at UNG Ka’s house in Tuek L’ak Village to set up the branch. After we had organized it, Tè (Vorn) announced the appointments. Then he instructed us how to do the party work and to lead the masses. Lastly, he suggested the branch

recruit at least 12 Liberal Khmer members. The meeting ended at 10 p.m. He told the participants to develop the Party as much as they could.

After leaving the meeting, each of us divided up targets for indoctrination. During that period, we could not indoctrinate people during the day, only in the evening after working hours and on Sunday. As far as I remember, at that time, we recruited two party members, a few union members and 10 Free Khmer members. The party members were Comrade Prang (ប្រាង) and, later, KUN Kimleang (គុណ គីមណាំង), who was both a party member and a Free Khmer member. *Angkar*, please forgive me for not remembering the names of all the people I recruited each year because it was years ago. I can only recall an approximate number. Next, in 1964, I stopped living with my cousin because Vorn suggested I rent a house and use it as an Office. At the time, I was living with LEANG Kimhuot (លាង គីមហ្គុត), a young man from Kampong Cham.

After the Committee in the train station had been appointed, the number of members constantly increased. The members included MÈN Yim (ម៉ែន យឹម), PREAP Soeun (ប្រាប សៀន), alias Saing (សាំង), and some other people. The number of Free Khmer members constantly increased from year to year due to Free Khmer Committee organizing. Enrolment was done phase by phase. In some phases, there were 10 people each, and in others, there were 8 or 9 people each. Four or five members were enrolled per night. If I am not wrong, people who joined in the last phase were SOK Pon (សុក ប៉ុន), IV Chhun (អ៊ីវ ឈុន) and some others.

This lasted from 1963 to late August 1968.

The reason I quit doing Free Khmer work was that the enemy was arresting Khmer Rouge Members, and the enemy arrested our people. Everybody knew the residences of KĂK Sim (កាក់ ស៊ីម), Vorn and myself and some of our Offices, so

Vorn ordered us to stop everything. After the leak, Sè (សៃ) gave me nearly 100,000

riel to evacuate the Free Khmer activists that had been uncovered. Husbands were sent to the countryside, and wives were compensated with money based on the number of children they had. Some families received 4,000 to 5,000 each; some received less. I spent all the money I had been given on this. From September 1968 to September 1969, after I had quit the job, I stayed in Phnom Penh. I did not do carry out any Liberal Khmer movement activities. All I did was purchase guns from my uncle, who was the soldier responsible for gun purchases for the Party. Following Vorn's order, I bought 20 carbines and 10 to 20 baskets of ammunition in one or two weeks.

In late September 1969, Vorn assigned me to travel to the Northeast Zone to learn how to make bombs from defective 60 mm or 90 mm ammunition. He told me to stay there and return to Sector 304 after half a year of study. I went to the Northeast Zone for one year, and then I returned to Kampuchea Krom in September 1970. I met Vorn in mid-December 1970. At that time, I was appointed a Member of a Special Office in the North Zone, in charge of livelihood. In the Zone Office, I recruited 3 or 4 teenagers and indoctrinated them to love Vorn, admire Vorn and respect him.

I lived in the special Office in the North Zone until mid-January 1971. I was promoted to Political Commissar of Battalion 12 with Comrade Nat (ណាត). Ten days before our departure, Vorn told me to meet him concerning my new position. Vorn talked to me for the whole morning. I would like to mention only the important parts. He said, "There are two types of political work. One is the Party's and the other is the Free Khmer's. When you meet Comrade Nat and take up your position, I will give you some more suggestions." I asked, "Is Comrade Nat a Free Khmer member like me?" Vorn answered, "No. He is a CIA man. Not only him but also Lay (ឡាយ) from the North Zone and some Company Cadres are CIA agents. I do not know the exact number, but the Sector will give us some." I asked, "You have enrolled me in the Free Khmer force, and now you are telling me to work with the CIA. Do you have a different appointment for me?" Vorn answered, "Do not get so agitated. Just agree to be a CIA agent if you are appointed." Then he instructed me on other assignments until 11am. I returned and thought to myself, "I have been appointed a Liberal Khmer

operative, and now I have to carry out CIA assignments. I had become a person with two faces.”

On 20 December 1972, I went to Sector 25. On 21 December 1972, I met Comrade Nat at Damrei Chhlâng (ដំរីឆ្លង). In the beginning, I did not know Comrade Nat or Comrade Lay. I asked someone to guide me to the Sector Office. As soon as I arrived there, I met Chey (ជ័យ), but I did not know him either at the time. I handed a letter from Vorn to him. After reading it, he told a messenger to take me to meet Comrade Nat, who lived east of A Chey’s house. I gave Comrade Nat the letter. He shook my hand and greeted me after reading it. Then Comrade Lay, who was also there, shook my hand.

Next morning, there was a meeting of the Battalion Committee regarding work follow-up and the new direction of Party work in all Sections. In the evening, there was a secret CIA meeting. The participants were Comrade Nat, Comrade Lay and myself. Comrade Nat explained the CIA situation. There were four new members in the Battalion, namely Song Li (ស៊ុងលី), Somali (សុំម៉ាលី), Kea (គី) and Sâ (ស័ន).

I asked Comrade Nat, “How did you recruit them?” Comrade Nat laughed and pointed at me and said, “It’s up to you.” After the discussion, we agreed we should support the existing CIA forces rather than increase the numbers. Regarding this point, I would like to clarify that I did not join the CIA, but Vorn had ordered me to recruit new forces for the CIA.

I worked as the Battalion Political Commissar for 6 or 7 months. I remember because it was when Comrade Rît (រិត) travelled from the North Zone to set up a special Military Office in the South Zone. I held two meetings with the seven CIA operatives during that period. Each meeting lasted an evening. At the first meeting, we updated the situation and prepared to recruit more operatives. At the second meeting, participants approved a request to recruit Comrade Run (រុន) and Comrade Son (សុន) into Comrade Nat’s Company as CIA members as suggested by the

battalion committee. In late 1972, the special South Zone [Office] set up a Zone Military Office, and then the Zone transferred me and Comrade Nat from our unit to the Zone Military Office.

At the Zone Military Office, I was in charge of Economics and the food supply to the Army. 10 days after it opened, I met Vorn. I asked him, “When I was working with Comrade Nat, you told me to take care of CIA assignments secretly. Now, my identity has been revealed, so what is my responsibility?” Vorn replied, “Continue the work that you have been doing with Comrade Nat.” This year, Comrade Rīt is responsible for recruiting CIA agents at the Zone Military Office, while I should do so at the rear lines. During that year, I recruited only 3 operatives, namely Comrade Kuor (គួរ), Comrade Nim (នីម) and Comrade Launh (ឡួញ).

In April 1974, Vorn told me to meet him at his house on the river bank near the Military Office. He told me that I was appointed Political Commissar of one of the two units consisting of a Regiment and some Battalions from the Sector. He confirmed that cadres in the unit included Comrade Roeun (រ៉េន), Comrade Saom (ស៊ាម) and myself. He told me further, “Comrade Tha (ថា) and Comrade Saom, who are veterans in the Regiment, have reported to me that they have recruited quite a number of CIA partisans in both the Companies and Battalions. Comrade Chey has told me that there are plenty of CIA people in the Sector’s Battalions.”

The units were established in May 1974. After everything was ready, Vorn told me and Saom to meet him at his house and introduced us to each other. Vorn introduced Saom as a CIA agent and me as a Liberal Khmer operative and prospective CIA member. Vorn assigned us as follows:

- “Comrade Saom is in charge of politics near the rear line, which includes schools and pagodas. Comrade Teanh should assist in Comrade Saom’s activities.”
- “Comrade Teanh is responsible for the front line because it is a battlefield. You will work more efficiently if you have separate areas. Actually, the

Cadres of both the old and new Regiments and Battalions in the Sector are all CIA members.”

Vorn asked Saom, “Has Comrade Roeun recruited some people?” Saom answered, “The cadres he has indoctrinated trust him about 80%. They are still reluctant.”

After the two units had been organized, we were to attack the enemy on both sides of the river. When we fought at Châmpuh K’aek (ចំពុះក្អែក) and overran Wat Srè Âmpel (វត្តស្រែអំពិល), *Angkar* ordered two Regiments in my Brigade to help north of Phnom Penh along National Road 5. While I was in the South, I held a meeting with several Regiment and Battalion cadres, and I urged them to expand CIA forces. We did not have a chance because they were transferred to the north of Phnom Penh. The first two Battalions of my unit arrived there followed by some other Soldiers. Two days after I had arrived there, I met Comrade Khieu. During a meeting break, I remained inside the hall while the Cadres went outside. I asked Comrade Khieu, “Do you still remember me?” He thought a bit and answered, “Your face is quite familiar.” I told him, “When you worked in Phnom Penh, I delivered letters from you to Brother Vorn and vice-versa.” Comrade Khieu nodded and said, “Just try to work hard for now. Comrade Vorn had already told me, but I forgot.” During their three month stay north of Phnom Penh, I held a meeting with CIA cadres and urged them to recruit some partisans as requested by the Battalions. However, some participants had died north of Phnom Penh. My army was ordered to return south of Phnom Penh in September 1974. I then had a meeting with Saom, and I reported on my aforementioned work. Saom informed me of the secret that there were not many Military Forces, at that time, and it was revealed to the enemy via TOC 25 conversations by people in the South. As a result, the enemy started an attack west of National Road 2 and penetrated far into liberated territory to Phsar Sdän (ផ្សារស្នាម) causing the people there to run for their lives and lose trust in the Revolution. He also said that there was no problem with recruiting CIA partisans as he had many cadres. He just had to organize them and take charge of them. Then I asked him how the female Cadres in my Battalion were doing. Saom had recruited female cadres in two

Battalions in the Regiment and he was recruiting more. After updating one another, I and Saom divided our responsibilities because there were only two of us in the unit. One would be in charge at the front line, and other in the rear. The latter was responsible for branch establishment and CIA force recruitment. I, at the front line, was responsible for the battlefield and tried to recruit partisans according to the actual situation. According to this plan, the one on the front line would achieve less than the one at the rear line. We were obliged to report CIA force recruitment in the unit every month or two to Vorn. We had to recruit CIA forces every month, or else we would nothing to report. When the Comrade Nat's unit went to fight at the Mekong, as planned, my unit traveled from National Road 2 to replace the unit on the battlefield at the Bassac River. I commanded the unit there. After we had overrun Tuol 12 (ត្បូងឃ្មុំ ១២), I pretended to be careless so the enemy could retake the area. Saom, at the rear line, purposely showed weakness to the enemy, so the enemy fought to Chhoung Leab (ស្រែចម្ការ). That's what my team did. When I was at the Bassac River, and Comrade Nat was at the Mekong River, we sent letters to one another a few times, updating each other about our well-being, victory and the buildup of secret CIA forces. After Comrade Nat had completed his work successfully at the Mekong River, he came to the Bassac River to fight the enemy alongside [us] from Set Tbau (សិបត្បូង) on. At that time, I and Comrade Nat said the current situation was very fluid, so we had to fight harder. If the enemy entered Phnom Penh before us, the enemy would notice our poor fighting skills, and the Party would check on us. I and Comrade Nat agreed to spread a rumor that it was hard fighting at Ta Khmao (តាកែវ) because it was near the capital city. Above are my activities as a Liberal Khmer and involvement with the CIA, under Vorn, before the liberation.

Next, I would like to report my detailed activities after the liberation to *Angkar*, which have not yet been mentioned above.

More than 10 days after the liberation, Vorn called me to his house and indoctrinated me for the whole morning. Yet, before doing that, Vorn asked me to

report on the general activities in the unit and the secret situation of CIA. I informed Vorn that the Cadres in the Battalions and Regiments were CIA, and there were even CIA in some Battalions, Companies and Platoons. Vorn said, "I already know. Some of them were sent from the Sector. Now, we have to try our best to keep them because it will be difficult to recruit forces after the liberation." He said so much that morning. Vorn reassured me, "You do not need to worry. You must understand all kinds of situations at all times, and this will not lead you from danger. We will remove those whose identity has been mostly revealed." Before ending the meeting, Vorn told me to prepare a house at Chamkar Daung (ចំការដូង) for hosting a meeting with Comrade Nat's unit. About 200 Cadres and villagers attended that meeting. From what I understood, Vorn held the meeting to show his face, his purpose, element and personality, to survey the number of operatives in the unit and to motivate the CIA people.

As I have already reported to *Angkar*, at that time, the screening of CIA operatives in my unit was the slowest, giving them time to do whatever they wanted to do because I was backed by Vorn, whose rank was higher than mine, and because I was working in the unit. Before my unit was dispersed, the Ministry of Industry needed people to work in factories. At that time, I was commanded by Vorn to send 100 or 200 soldiers each time to the factories. In the selection process, I did not care whether these soldiers had good or bad personalities. I simply selected one Battalion Member from each Regiment each time and handed them over. Therefore, bad people turned up at every factory. After the liberation, my unit was expanded to 10 people. When I was working in the u unit, I often went out to visit other military units including the armor units, the artillery units and Comrade Nat's. My main purpose was to be updated on the discovery of subversives in each u unit.

Before the u unit was dispersed, Vorn called me to meet him again. He told me the u unit would be handed over in the next few days, and that I was to work at Military Logistics. Vorn asked me, "What did Comrade Khieu talk to you about when you met him north of Phnom Penh?" I replied, "At first, he seemed to not recognize me. But, when I reminded him that I was the messenger delivering letters to him when he was in Phnom Penh, he recognized me. Then he only told me to try to work hard and that you had also told him about me. He also said that, when I moved to work at

Logistics, I still was to continue my existing assignments, and he was not the only one who was protecting me.”

After I had worked at Military Logistics for a month, Vorn told me to give him a report at the end of every month. Vorn told me that there were 2 CIA operatives in Logistics, namely Comrade Maut (ម៉ូត) and Comrade Phon (ផ្អែន). Vorn always encouraged me to get in contact with the cadres in each Section whenever I met him. After I had worked at Logistics for 3 or 4 months, I called a meeting of 40 Brigade and Regiment cadres in mid May 1976. During the meeting break, Comrade Khieu took me to a house located west of the meeting place. There, Comrade Khieu said, “I already know you. We are both Liberal Khmer members, so you should work hard.” He continued, “Unlike A Ya (យ៉ា), I will continue when the country is at peace. I think you understand what I am saying. You must keep all your equipment and ammunition. They belong to us today, and they are still ours in the future. Let’s finish the conversation here. We will talk more when we meet again.” We resumed the meeting at 10:30am. It took all day. The main meeting agenda was to monitor the situation in all the Sections in each Brigade and to increase production for self-sufficiency.

In early June 1976, Comrade Khieu phoned me and told me to come to his house north of [the office of] Military Logistics. Comrade Khieu indoctrinated me for the whole morning. I will raise only the points I remember. Comrade Khieu said, “Last time, I said that I wouldn’t be like A Ya. It has a broad meaning. It is impossible to segregate the forces like A Ya. We have to be flexible according to the situation. Don’t be stumped. Most importantly, we should use the Party forces with flexibility and fulfill the Party work well. We should do so because the Revolution is gaining popularity rapidly, and we should let it be. We will restart our activities when it is calm. It is like we cannot stop the flowing water in a river unless there is a detour. In addition, as our country has just been liberated recently, imperialist America, the Soviet Union or Vietnam will be invading us. Hence, we have to protect and develop our own country quickly for the Cambodian people to lead stable lives, have houses and enough food. Although there is a political conflict, it will be fluid. We also need to keep the ammunition safe and check authorization letters carefully before transporting ammunition. Comrade Vorn, who is on the Permanent Committee, works

closely with *Angkar*. Ammunition can be checked out only with authorization letters from him. He issues them only when *Angkar* gives him the order.”

During the first 4 or 5 months, CIA recruitment was stalled. I recruited only a few women working in the ammunition warehouse, namely Ms. Khom (ខ្ញុំ) and Ms. Sokha (សុខា). One day, after I had reported to Vorn as I was supposed to do, he asked me if Brother Khieu had told me anything. I answered, “Brother Khieu told me that, during his absence, I can check out ammunition when I receive an authorization letter from you because you are working closely with *Angkar*.”

Recruitment of CIA partisans at Military Logistics targeted the cadres. Only at the end of the year did I accomplish it. At first, I recruited only 2 CIA partisans, namely Comrade Nang (ណង) and Comrade Thim (ធំ). As I remember, in 1976, I visited A Oeun’s (អឿន) Office once and A Suong’s (ស្ងួង) to better understand the situation. The number of CIA partisans constantly increased from month to month. These included Comrade Long (ឡុង), Comrade Pong (ប៉ុង), Comrade Nhân (ញ៉ាន), Chau (ច្វៃ), Phan (ផាន), Kēt (កេត), Yun (យុន) and Ruon (រួន). That year, I visited a state glass factory, and I managed to meet Comrade Kuor (គួរ), who was responsible for the factory. From our discussion, I learned he still carried out the same activities. After meeting A Oeun and A Suong, Vorn told me to meet him. He instructed me intensively on how to maintain secrecy because leaks were wider. Comrade Nhâ (ញ៉ៃ) took over A Oeun’s Brigade. One night, I visited Comrade Nhâ. Comrade Nat was also there. I asked Comrade Nat, “What should we do in this kind of situation?” Comrade Nat suggested, “We have to carefully screen [people] because things have been uncovered widely.”

There seemed to be no developments in CIA recruiting of cadres at Military Logistics those days. During that time, I invited Comrade Maut, Comrade Thim and Comrade Phon to a meeting to flesh out a recruitment strategy as requested by high

ranking members. After the meeting, each of us worked on our individual responsibilities. I then reported to Vorn that there had been progress in recruitment, but it later slowed down. CIA partisans recruited later were Comrade Ni (នី), Khèm (ខែម), Sarom (សារ៉ុំ), Thau (ថៅ), Pănh (ប៉ាញ់), Saroeun (សារឿន), Săn (សាន់), Ms. Koeun (គឿន), Sokha (សុខា) and Choeun (ចឿន).

In approximately November 1977, Brother Khieu had to go to Svay Rieng. He called me to meet him again, but this time, he only spent less than half an hour advising me. Khieu reminded me of my responsibilities and messages he had mentioned in the second meeting. He said, “Ours is a long-term task. We must strive to overcome. We must be knowledgeable and independent. According to my experience, I have used a number of Party Cadres, Youth League members and the masses without enrolling them in the Free Khmer Movement, and they, including Thim and Nhân, follow what I say.

Comrade Khieu continued, “The equipment, especially the bullets and guns, cannot be transported out of the warehouses unless I give my permission. However, when I am absent, *Angkar* or Comrade Vorn can grant permission. For other equipment, Comrade Rèn (រ៉ែន) can give permission. In case of urgency, you need to tell me directly or secretly phone the Military Staff Office.”

The next day at 3 p.m. Vorn phoned me to meet him at the Economics Office. When I arrived, Vorn asked me about the amount of ammunition left in the warehouse. Vorn also asked for the inventory list. I showed him the inventory list of ammunition and guns. After reading it, he gave it back to me. Vorn asked, “Did Comrade Khieu send any message? Has he told you any secrets?” After thinking for a minute, I told Vorn what Comrade Khieu had told me the first and second meetings. Vorn commented, “Comrade Khieu deceived you. He and I are on the same team. We have always worked together. You do not need to worry about it. What you have to do is work hard, and Comrade Khieu and I will definitely support you.” As I remember, in late 1976 and early 1977, while Production Unit of S-21 was harvesting dry-season and rainy-season rice, the Military Staff Office ordered Logistics to stage a

distribution. So, I assigned Comrade Huy (ហ៊ុយ) to go to the Tuol Kouk (ទួលក្បែក) Logistics Office a few times. Whenever I met him, I asked about the screening in S-21. One time, Brother 89 ordered me to send *Ta Chay* (តាថៃ) to Comrade Huy. When I met Comrade Huy, I asked him if he had seen *Ta Chay* there. Huy replied that Brother Duch (ឌុច) kept *Ta Chay* working in Phnom Penh. The external CIA agents Comrade Prang (ប្រាំង), Comrade Ân (អ៊ិន), Comrade Nat, Comrade Chen (ចិន) and Comrade Pheap (ហ៊ែប) were introduced to me by Vorn. He often traveled back and forth.

In early 1978, *Angkar* appointed Vorn to manage the Logistics Ammunition Section. One morning, Vorn asked me and Maut to tour with him around the warehouses. We spent the whole morning there. He went to see all the warehouses except the ones in small houses. Communication between me and Vorn was often. In mid June 1968, Vorn called me to the Economics Office. It was then that Vorn assigned me to prepare ammunition for an attack on the Party in dry season. Vorn's instructions were as follows:

- At first, he asked about how the ammunition was kept and its and the weapons' condition.
- He asked about transport.
- He asked about the work force.

I informed him there was no problem with the first two issues. However, we had a problem with the last because we did not have enough laborers in the weapons warehouses. Vorn continued, "I would like to assign you the following tasks. I would like you to get it ready before January 1978 and to pass the following instructions to Comrade Maut, Comrade Phon and Comrade Thim."

- He requested the careful preparation of all kinds of ammunition in each warehouse.
- All the guns should be categorized based on their kinds.

- Transportation vehicles, particularly automobiles, should be readied.
- Forces were allocated for use when there was an entrance and exit.

Vorn also asked me to report when everything was ready. Three days later, I reported to Vorn it was done.

Next, I would like to offer additional information. After Comrade Khieu had told me the first secret, he asked me not to tell Comrade Saom about it. When Comrade Nat moved to the Military Staff Office, Comrade Khieu called me and Comrade Nat to a meeting, at which he suggested we cooperate in all kinds of work, and, when he was not in the Office, Comrade Nat could make decisions instead of him because Comrade Nat and I had known each other for a long time. When Comrade Nat went to Svay Rieng, Comrade Rèn came to work at the Military Staff Office. At 9 p.m. Comrade Khieu phoned me secretly at the Military Staff Office, telling me that Comrade Rèn, who was coming to work there, was his operative, so I should work with him just like I did with Comrade Nat. When Comrade Rèn had to return to his place, Comrade Roeung (រ៉េង) took over his position. Comrade Khieu advised me over the phone secretly at 10 p.m. to work cooperatively with Comrade Roeung, just like with Comrade Nat and Comrade Rèn. He stressed that Comrade Roeung was also his trusted operative.

My contacts with Comrade Nat when he was at the General Staff were as follows:

Because Comrade Nat and I were familiar with each other's work, we met once or twice a month. Each time we met, I received a lot of information from Comrade Nat because he had more opportunities than I. After updating each other, I said to Comrade Nat, "I often report on the CIA buildup to Comrade Vorn. What about you? Where are you going now?" "I also go to meet him, but not every month," replied Comrade Nat. I then asked, "I haven't visited the armor units or the artillery units for a long time. How is recruitment there? As far as I know, you've been appointed to work on the Military Staff. You have the right to go there at any time." Comrade Nat commented, "Comrade Chen and Comrade Pheap have recruited quite a number of partisans. If we compare the two Brigades, Comrade Pheap has recruited more than Comrade Chen. Recruitment has been fast in the Artillery Brigade because

there are many of his own people in the Brigade.” I continued asking, “How is the Marine unit, according to your visit there?” Comrade Nat replied, “Comrade Dim (ឌីម) worked very actively, and we were hopeful. However, after Dim and [other] people who had been introduced to me were arrested, we lost contact with his unit. Brother Khieu was directly in charge, so I dare not become involved that deeply as Brother Khieu might raise an eyebrow due to his high-tempered personality. But working at the Military Staff Office, I often see Brother Khieu call Comrade Mēt (ម៉េត), Comrade Lvey (ល្បៃ) and Comrade Mut (មុត) to work with him on different tasks. Usually, I help him doing the Party work or technical work, but sometimes I do not join him. He only works with Comrade Mēt and Comrade Lvey. Sometimes, they work [together] for the whole day. He sometimes works with Comrade Mut only. At the Military Staff Office, I have seen him meet Physician Soeung (ស៊ីង), from Veal Renh (វាលរឹង), twice. Once, they worked for almost a whole day. They worked from morning until 1.30pm, and then Physician Soeung returned to Viel Rinh at 4pm.

“In Comrade Mēt’s Brigade now, only my old operatives that Chèm (ចែម) is controlling have remained. I do not know about the other partisans of Comrade Mēt. I do not meet Chèm. I occasionally receive his letters.”

In February 1978, I made a report to Brother Khieu at Kampong Trabaek (កំពង់ត្របែក) as he had commanded. After working with Brother Khieu for one evening, I saw Comrade Nat arrive with Comrade Pin (ពីន). He had a meeting with Comrade Nat and Comrade Pin until 9pm, and they had dinner together there. After Comrade Nat had left, I asked permission from Brother Khieu to visit the battlefield with Comrade Nat for a day. He granted permission. When the next morning arrived, Comrade Nat and I met and updated each other about CIA partisan recruiting. I said, “It has been quite a long time since we last met. Are there any changes?” Comrade Nat said, “During these last two months, I have seen Khieu meet Comrade Mēt twice. He has met Comrade Mut once at Kampong Trabaek. Another time, Brother Khieu

went to meet him at Neak Loeng (អ្នកលៀង).” I, in turn, told Comrade Nat, “I have recruited some operatives from Logistics, but they are not sufficient. Brother Vorn is pushing me very hard these days.” Next, I asked Comrade Nat, “How is the Infantry unit in the Brigade of the Party Centre?” Comrade Nat confirmed, “Now, the units are away from each other. Unlike other units, only Comrade Pin’s unit has remained hidden. The CIA agents in other units have been widely uncovered. However, the situation is not yet quiet. In May or June 1977, I went to Kampong Som. While watching newly arriving ships, I noticed a Soldier in one ship was throwing two balloons into the sea. I tried to recognize him, but, because there were too many people, I couldn’t manage to meet him. In addition, I have lost contact with Comrade San (សាន) in Mondulkiri, whom I had known since 1975. Now, I also know nothing about Comrade Roeun’s unit.”

My association with Comrade Rèn: A few days after I received instructions from Brother Khieu, I went to meet Comrade Rèn. I asked Comrade Rèn, “Has Brother Khieu told you anything about the interaction between the Military Staff Office and Logistics?” I informed him, “I have received instructions from Brother Khieu, and he has told me to contact you. I had known Comrade San since 1975. He is a CIA member. Do you know him?” At first, he was reluctant to say. A moment later, he said that he also knew Comrade San. I continued asking, “Who took over Comrade San’s position after he left.” Comrade Ren answered, “When I was there, I and Brother Roeun, but, now, Brother Roeun has replaced him. I asked Comrade Rèn about his plan of recruiting operatives at the Military Staff Office. Comrade Rèn replied, “Most importantly, I have noticed a gap in the Medicine Section. I’ll have more opport unities in this Section according to my preliminary observation. The other units under the management of the Military Staff Office such as the Armor unit and the Cannon unit are self-sufficient.”

In February, after I had met Comrade Rèn, he informed me that he had recruited Ms. Yon (យ៉ុន), who was Thās’s (ថាស) spouse, through Thās, at the Military Hospital. At Military Foreign Affairs, they wanted to walk their own path, so they were dispersed. Sēng (សេង) and Chhang (ឆាង) have been handed over to Comrade

Mēt, and Hour (ហ៊ុំ) at Logistics. Now, I had to recruit new partisans, and I just recruited Ms. Mak (ម៉ាក).”

My association with Comrade Roeung: Comrade Khieu advised us to work cooperatively. Three or four days later, I went to meet Comrade Roeung. When I met him, I told him, “Since Comrade Rèn has given you his job at the Military Staff Office, I am here to meet you as recommended by Brother 89. Here, at the Military Staff Office, you work with the armor unit, and this charge might be heavier than mine. I have more people to work with, so it is a bit easier than your job.” Two months later, we met again. The meeting between me and Comrade Roeung occurred often, but we did not talk about secrets. Only two months after the first meeting did I dare ask him about any secret. I asked him what he would do after he left the unit as there was another person replacing him. He said that Comrade Vĩn (វីន) had also made a similar arrangement. I then asked him which one, between Comrade Vĩn and himself, had joined the CIA first. He answered that Comrade Chen joined before he did. Comrade Vĩn joined after him. I questioned him about recruitment at the hospital. Comrade Roeung replied, “At the hospital, progress is very slow. I have just recruited another operative, Ms. Li (លី). The armor units in Phnom Penh contain few of our partisans.”

My association with Comrade Prang:

Comrade Prang and I never hid anything from one another because we have known each other for so long. When I met him, I asked, “At this unit, they should be getting on with better development than before, right?” Comrade Prang said that the normal work was progressing, but, during 1964 and 1965, it was not so. It was broken down before it was even finished. “These days, I’m only with Comrade Sǎng (សាំង) in the upper level. In the lower levels, there are a lot of workers, but they seem inactive.” I (Teanh) answered that, at my place, there was not much progress either. In the past, there was the story of the contemptible Ya, and, as a consequence, I did some things by the seat of my pants. However, I worked hard as

recommended by our upper echelons. I asked Comrade Prang, “You have been on the Foreign Trade Board, have you ever met Brother Lmut (ល្អិត)? How has he been doing? Comrade Prang told me that he had met him twice, and Lmut told him he had never forgotten his old job. He used to be a CIA Member, and, he added, that of the old people of his generation, two were still working at the same place, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were AOK Sokun (ឱក សុគុន) and CHUON Prasith (ជួន ប្រាសិទ្ធ). He never saw any others. He continued to say that he had a friend, KEAT Chhon, who also worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and used to be Minister of Public Works during the A-Nol (អា ណុល) regime.

About my contact with Comrade Ân (អ៊ិន)

I had known of the CIA Comrade since 1971. When I was at the Office of the Northern Special Zone, I still had not yet met him or made contact with him, and then Comrade Vorn (វ៉ិន) introduced him to me. At that time, he was the Secretary of Sector 15, North of Phnom Penh. After the liberation, *Angkar* created the Ministry of Industry, and Comrade Ân was appointed to take overall responsibility at the Ministry. Later, I was in contact him every time *Angkar* asked some Cadres be transferred to Industry myself, who was in charge of a unit. When I was at General Staff Logistics (ភ្នាក់ងារសេនាធិការ), I [often] went to meet Ân to observe the old forces that I had sent him and to observe the situation. He was a mid-level Cadre with quite a lot of responsibility. One day, I went to the Industry headquarters, and I asked Ân: “There was a common list and a list of secret operatives given to you while I was bringing you Cadres. How about the CIA partisans now? Are they still there?” Comrade Ân said, “There is only a small number of operatives still there. A large number has already left. As for the partisans that I had spent so much time to recruit and took from the Sector, now, they are also gone. The partisans you handed over to me are gone, and those from Comrade Nat (ណាត) are also gone. The

Comrades who came from the office of Brother Vorn in the South, they are still in place as CIA operatives such as Mei (ម៉ី), Rin (រីន), Sănh (សាំង), Sâh (សាំង) and Sarou (សារូ). We are in contact one another to share the situation and pass [messages] to each other.” One day, I came to meet Comrade Ân to prepare and sort out military equipment. Comrade Teanh (ទាញ) then said that, “Now, at the Industry Section, the situation is getting more serious with huge revelations and Say has already been arrested. On my side, it is also serious. Brother Vorn tried to protect them as well, but he did not succeed.” He told me when he was walking to his work desk.

My contacts with Comrade Chen (ចិន) (the tank unit)

I got to know Chen in the middle of 1975, and we’ve been in touch since the first time I met him at Vorn’s house. When the tank unit was organized by the General Staff Office, they asked for some cadres from my unit. They asked for a regiment-level cadre to take command of the tank unit with Comrade Chen. Because I knew Comrade Chen, I decided to provide a regiment-level cadre named Hin (ហ៊ិន). He was also a CIA operative since he had first come to the Regiment. I regularly kept in touch with Comrades Chen and Hin. These operatives did not report directly to me but to the General Staff, but Comrade Chen and Hin never hid anything from me. Comrade Chen told me that the old cadres of former Unit 39, such as himself, Comrade Pheap and Comrade San had already joined the CIA.

My contact with Comrade Pheap (ភាព) (the artillery unit)

I had known Comrade Pheap of the artillery unit since the middle of 1975 along with Comrade Chen. As with Comrade Chen’s unit, after *Angkar* organized the artillery unit the General Staff asked me to provide regiment-level cadre to the artillery unit. I appointed TAU Nim (នីម), who had been with the CIA since he had been in an Independent Regiment [assigned] to that unit. I was in regular contact with this unit as

well, which also reported to the General Staff. Nothing was ever hidden from me about their secrets.

My contact with Division 502

Before my old unit's Cadres were arrested, I was in contact with them to report on the situation and the expansion of the CIA as well as networking with already known elements. These cliques reported to the division level, and, at that time, a person named Mǎo (ម៉ៅ) was the Division Assistant. However, after they all were arrested, I had no clarity about the situation.

I would like to report, in addition, that, when I was called by Comrade Khieu the first time and the second time, it was probably in the year 1976. He called me to accompany him to Kampong Som (កំពង់សោម). On the road, he told me a lot, but he just talked about and encouraged me toward normal work. After he had arrived in Kampong Som in the evening, he rested and did not work. The next morning, he went to Koh Rong Sanloem (កង់សន្លឹម) Island by military ship. On the island, there was a port built from wood, and there was a cement house. He went to the island and walked around there a few minutes. Then he went to take a rest. I was still with him while Comrade Mut (ម៉ុត) and the other Comrades were preparing dinner. He told me that, "I brought you here because I want you to start getting to know them gradually. Next time, if we have the opportunity, we will go to another place." In the evening, we left Koh Rong Sanloem Island. After having a meal, Comrade Khieu told me that, "Tonight Comrade, you should return home by train, and, when you get there, tell the General Staff Office (មន្ទីរសេនាធិការ) immediately that I will return in two days." I had been to the naval unit just once. I understood the unit was under the command of Comrade Khieu (ខៀវ). Four or five days after my return, Comrade Khieu called me to meet him at the General Staff Office. He asked me, "What is your impression of Comrade Mut's new port? I ordered him to work there over a long period, but now it still has not yet been completely finished. Moreover, if he asks for

help, he must sort it out on time himself. I would like to tell you that Comrade Mut is one of my people. I trust him, and he is helpful. After you're back in Kampong Som and you want his help, you can ask him to assist you if it is necessary. But, if there is no problem, you can go to the office of Comrade Krin (គ្រីន) because it is near your work place. There should not be any strangers going in and out of this house to avoid being spotted by the Revolution. The unit of Comrade Mut and the unit of Comrade Met (ម៉ែត) are not so different from one another. Yet Comrade Mut's unit is more important because they go to combat directly. I (Khieu) am never careless with these two units, and I never leave them behind for long. I hadn't worked with these cadres [before] because it was my habit to work alone. Even if they are a bit tired but are able to protect their forces, they should be left mobilized as long as we haven't used them.

I got to know Comrade Met (ម៉ែត) and Doctor Soeun (ស៊ីន) through their associate, Comrade San. After they had contacted each other, they came to report to me during the first phase of striking Udongk (ឧតុងក) and Longveack (លង់វ៉ែក). When I was north of Phnom Penh, I met him very often. Until he moved to the Centre Unit, I was responsible for overall supervision, I brought him to order. Comrade Met and Comrade Mut were also old CIA operatives as well. When Comrade Mut was in Phnom Penh, he was known as *Achar Nēt* (នេត), and he stayed at Wat Langka Pagoda. Have you ever heard his name before?" I had worked with Comrade Khieu for only 15 minutes before *Angkar* phoned [me] up.

I would like to report on my activities with Comrade Vorn

I had been in contact with Comrade Vorn since he was appointed to be in control of ammunition. Whenever I met him, he indoctrinated me and encouraged me to work hard on carrying out the CIA plan particularly with respect to recruiting Cadres, without any worries, because there were he and Comrade Khieu ready to sort out any problems.

Maybe in mid-June 1978, Vorn called me urgently to Economics Office. At the Office, Vorn first gave me a permission card to get all kinds of ammunition particularly the Chinese type. This card was stamped by Committee 870, and there was Vorn's signature beside the stamp. I took 100 truckloads of ammunition and two trips to Comrade Khieu in Svay Rieng. After I got that card, Vorn indoctrinated me and reminded me time and again to trust him and Comrade Khieu. He took such a long time talking with me, maybe around one hour. Then he told me that there was a new assignment for me besides delivering ammunition. "Comrade Khieu was far away from us, and he asked me to make you feel comfortable. As for our secret assignment, it is not so good as well. This assignment is mine and Comrade Khieu's." He added that, "Comrade Khieu and I have a plan to strike at the Party this dry season. Your duty is of secondary importance. You are to supply the ammunition to us, and, if you can do it well, we will be successful. We have enough ammunition, but the problem is transportation. Logistics has worked hard and tried their best moving this from the sea and on land. This transport should pose no problems if the situation remains unchanged, but, if we face a problem, we need to overcome it. This would be a real success.

The first idea, "Ammunition was put in categories at arsenals, and there were clear labels. We need to have the arsenals' lists of what kinds of ammunition were put in which arsenals. We should not depend on memory because, when we are in an urgent situation, we can]become confused. We cannot lose even a half an hour. We must be organized. When you return, you should have a meeting with Comrades Maut (ម៉ូត), Thoem (ធ័ម), and Phon (ផុន) (to discuss this plan clearly)."

The second idea, "We are not lacking trucks for transport to the outside, and we also have some ships. Therefore, we only need prepare them.

The third idea, "We have to separate and put them into categories such as bullets and weapons. Focus on the problem of bullets and that of weapons' is a common problem. We need to prepare as expressed above. In January 1979, or, at least by the middle of December 1978, we are going to complete all of this."

The fourth idea, "Forces are not the problem. When we need them, we can gather [them] later, and we would no longer need to keep it secret. But we must prepare a

force to protect our arsenal's zone. So no matter what day it might be, the arsenal still belongs to us."

Fifth idea, "We wait until the middle of December 1978, when I will give you a special card for use in transporting supplies from Office 870 because it is used throughout the country." Maybe around 10 o'clock, I returned to office to prepare ammunition transportation."

Maybe three days later, I invited Comrade Maut, Comrade Phon and Comrade Thoem to a meeting. I brought Vorn's ideas that I managed to grasp and introduced them to the meeting. After discussion, everyone agreed to follow the plan set out by Vorn. I did not conduct a meeting for three days and thought a lot about this. Now, they were apparently betraying the Party. Should I report it to *Angkar*? I thought that, if I report to them, they would not believe me because Vorn was a Member of the Standing Committee and Khieu was a Member of the Central Committee and was in charge of the whole Military. Because of this, I dared not report it to *Angkar*, and I did what Vorn and Khieu had ordered me. Two days later, Vorn called me to meet him at the Economics Office. He asked me to report on the preparation of ammunition and weapons as he had ordered me to do. I reported the result after the meeting, and I also explained the arrangement of the bullets and weapons in any [of the] big arsenals. The situation was not 100% stable yet, so, if they rushed things, they would get confused. Now, Comrade Maut and Comrade Thoem went on December 1978 to recheck progress and the date the work would be completed. Vorn said that, no matter how hard it was, he had to complete it successfully. Whenever I met Vorn, he encouraged me. Before I returned to the office, he asked me to go to the Economics Office and to take Comrade Maut with me. I don't remember the exact date, it might have been on the 26th or 27th in 1978. Maut and I went to meet Vorn, and talked to me as usual. There were many bodyguards, so he asked me to go downstairs. Then Vorn asked me to report more on the ammunition and weapons. But this time, I passed it to Comrade Maut and let him report. The report this time was not so different from the previous one. Vorn asked if Comrade Maut could handle the work if I were not available. I (Teanh) said there was no problem because there were other Comrades that would work with him. Vorn said: "Comrade Teanh no longer works in the Logistics Section, so Comrade Maut, you have to take on all the responsibilities that were raised during the previous meeting,

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but Comrade Thoem and Comrade Phon will also share in these.” Maut and I met Vorn for around 2 hours that morning. Before finishing the meeting, Vorn asked Maut to come back first. Then he said that I should come to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 29 June 1978, at around 1:30 p.m., to meet “Upper Brothers.” On 29 June 1978, I arrived there, and then I saw Comrade Hok (ហុក) and Comrade Nat (ណាត) were there too. Maybe around 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Vorn came and called me upstairs. Brother Number 2 arrived at a few minutes past two, and, at the meeting, Brother Number 2 talked for almost an hour. Comrade Vorn also spoke. After that, Brother Number 2 asked everyone to share their individual comments. No one really made any comments because they agreed with Party’s policies. That meeting was finished around 4 o’clock, and then Brother Number 2 left. Vorn asked me to stay there until 5 o’clock. Then Vorn asked me again and again about the ammunition and about whether Comrade Maut could take on the assignment. He also kept reminding me about the need for secrecy. Vorn said that, if I could keep it secret, he still could meet me. But, if it were revealed, he would push it even harder.

24 December 1978

Teanh

To the Respected Party

I had known Vorn and Khieu for a long time and had not just met them. I didn’t understand them clearly until Vietnam invaded as far as Svay Rieng in around November 1977. It was the time that Comrade Khieu was [involved] in the war, and it was also the time that Comrade Vorn let me know that they both were in the same clique.

After I was appointed to supply weapons and ammunition, set out in the subversive plan to strike the Party this dry season, I was so worried because, if we compared the Party Movement and reflected on the Party line and the betrayal, there was no way that the Party would lose. At first, I wanted to report it to the Party, but, after

reconsidering again and again, I thought that the Party would not believe me because Vorn was a Member of the Standing Committee and Khieu was a Member of the Central Committee. They were important people in the Party. They handled the Military. I saw they were of high rank, and they promised to protect me.

Respected Party, even I stayed with the “Upper Brothers” for a short time, maybe for just a year, I was both a Party Member and a Member of the Free Khmer. In reality I understood little about the Free Khmer unlike about Party. If I compared [them], I was in favour of the Party rather than the Free Khmer. In the Northeast this year, I developed a better relationship with Brother Vãn (វ៉ាន់) than with the Brother

Secretary. At that time, I felt strong respect for Brother Van. After I had returned to the lowlands with Brother Secretary, my respect for them grew significantly. I saw the brothers work hard and endure hardship. They regularly walked day and night through the forests and across mountainous areas to guide citizens to carry out the Revolution to free themselves, the nation and the poor. At that time, my initial determination was that I had to give up all wrongdoings. Yet, after I stayed with Vorn, my will varnished due to Vorn’s persuasion and enticement. His influence on me was stronger than that of my father or my mother. Under Vorn’s supervision, I began to betray the Party. Moreover, after that, there was the other one, Khieu.

24 December 1978

Teanh

I would like to report my feeling when I was arrested by the Party

I was arrested by the Party on 10 December 1978. Immediately when I reached the education school, I thought that, if I said I was an operative of Vorn’s, they might not believe me. They might think that I said this because I was here. At first, I said that I was honest with the Party and the first Comrade Interrogator. I kept saying the same the second time. The third time, I agreed to answer. The Comrade Interrogator asked me to respond about:

1. The plan to strike the Party in the dry season.
2. The year I joined the CIA.

3. To whom would the plan, that of striking the Party, be passed after Vorn.

At first, the Comrade Interrogator asked me to write down the subversive plan of striking the Party. My feeling, at the time, was I thought it was my personal plan. I had no knowledge of the common plan to strike the Party. I only knew that I was assigned to supply ammunition, so the report written at the time was both accurate and inaccurate. The Comrade Interrogator should have asked me again. This time my responses were completely untruthful.

Comrade Interrogator asked me to write down my subversive plan and its history from the beginning until the time of my arrest by *Angkar*. When I was writing, Comrade Interrogator asked me about the people to whom the plan was passed after Vorn. At first, he asked me normally. Then I said that I did not know because I was afraid that Comrade Interrogator would carry out more interrogations. Comrade Interrogator questioned me for a while, but he not only questioned me but also instructed me and raised the examples of some Comrades who had agreed to tell the truth to the Party. They were honest with the Party, so even though they were here, the Party still could forgive and free them. With such considerations, I was no longer afraid. I said I would tell the Party what I had done and say who should be reported to the Party. Even though I was determined to [cooperate with] the Party, I still had doubts in my mind. I had not been so clear about this and was very complicated and suspicious, but when I saw that Comrade Dăm (ដាំ), whom I had known since I was in the Northeast, had been forgiven and freed by the Party when the Comrade Interrogator educated me when he came to clean my wound. After that, I determined I had to report and tell everything. I have done so because I obviously saw the Party's compassion. I was determined, in my heart, and waiting for your clarifications on some points, and I am willing to give clear answers.

Then I would like to report my betrayal history and the chain of command as follows:

24 December 1978

SUN Ti, *alias* Teanh

[ERN: 00026602]

[Annotation: Already reported]

I would like to report my contacts with Kân

In late November 1978, I went to Kân's room. Kân told me about Comrade Khieu's plan, which had been set for implementation. The plan was to poison and kill Brother Number 1, secretly shoot and kill Brother Vãn, and poison and shoot the Chinese guests, the delegation of TOENG Yong Kouy (តឹង យ៉ុងកុយ), and then to contact the Lao Embassy.

I would like to report the following statements made by Kân:

- About the plan to poison Brother Number 1.

About the plan to kill Brother Number 1 with poison, obtained from Lady Nat (ណាត), Chây's (ឆាយ) wife. This poison was to be used [with the help of] Comrade Khieu's wife (named At អត). Kân said that Brother Khieu had asked Brother Ath to put the poison [in a drink or food as she] sometimes could enter the *Angkar* office. But we could not do it because everything Brother Number 1 ate was so well taken care of, especially the rice and water. They would bring it to him only when he asked. The Security Guards took care of the food and drink and waited until he finished, and then they would leave. It was the same with the cooking. It was all cooked by the security guards, and brought to him directly without letting anyone get close to it. Therefore, this plan did not succeed.

- About the secret shooting of Brother Vann
- Kân said that, so far, Brother Vann and Brother Vorn got along well with one another. They were both waiting to spot out Brother Khieu's mistakes, and they would, together, attack and break Brother Khieu. Kân also said there was one day Brother Khieu was very furious. He sent one of his messengers to shoot and kill Brother Vann from hiding, but that failed because Brother Vann departed without a clear schedule or certain route.

- About the killing of the Chinese guests, the delegation led by Comrade TOENG Yong Kouy. Kân said, according to the plan Brother Khieu set out for him, he (Kân) was to do two things:
- Use poison and secretly shoot.
- The poison was Brother Kân's responsibility
- About the shooting, use the female Sin (ស៊ីន) and three other females who cleaned the room. Administering the poison was Kân's responsibility because, at the time, he was the Chairman of Protocol. He could go in and out of the guests' rooms. Kân said that, on the first day, he had no plan how to administer the poison. He was waiting to see how to do it, putting it on the rice he ate or in the water he drank. Kân said, it would not be possible to put it in the water, because *Ta* TOENG Yong Kuy's security guards were very careful. They took care even from the bottle to the glass of water from which he drank. They observed even the cork. If it was loose, they would taste it first and keep it for themselves, and then they would open a new one. If they found it was fine, they would let him drink, still, they drank it first.

Kân said that, given the impossibility of putting the poison in the drinking water, he switched to the meal. He added that, regarding the food, they were also very careful. Those who prepared the meals (from the Cambodian side) tasted all the food before bringing it to the dining table for guests, and they would wait there until the guests finished their meal. Kân said that, once he went close to the table to carry rice and [other] dishes and to put in the poison, but he could not do it because the Security Guards were always watching him. From the time the guests began their stay in Phnom Penh, until the time they left, he could not do it.

As for the shooting, it was the responsibility of the female Sim (Kân's sister-in-law) and another girl, who was a bit fat and short with curly hair. These two females were responsible for the shooting. The other two were there to observe whenever the guests went out without security protection, [and then] they would report to the two to come and shoot. Kân said that the shooting was also not

successful because, when the guests left, they did not go without [Security]. They wouldn't even come [downstairs] if they did not have a mission to complete. As for *Ta TOENG Yong Kuy*, he never emerged from the house [alone].

- About the contact with the Ambassador of Laos in Phnom Penh:

Kân said that, according to Brother Khieu's instructions, he asked us to try to contact the Ambassador of Laos because we had the ability to do so. We contacted Laos to connect with the *Yuon*. Kân said that it was difficult to make contact with the Ambassador even though he was a Protocol Official. If we were asked to go to the Embassy, Brother Vann said two people needed to go. Also, at the Embassy, they spoke French or English, and he could not speak either. He needed to bring an interpreter with him. Because it was Brother Khieu's plan and he had ordered it, we had to find a way to contact them. Kân said that, since he had been at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he had been to the Laos Embassy two times. He brought Delegates from the Ministry there. Kân said it was not easy to enter the Embassy. Our security guards who worked there observed all entries and exits and reported daily to *Angkar*. Kân said that, having been there twice, he was able to contact them both times. The first time, when he had finished discussions at the Laos Embassy, he (Kân) had a stomach ache and requested to go to the toilet. In the toilet, he wrote a letter of about two or three lines. "I could not stay in the toilet long since I was afraid the Comrades who were outside would question my action." I only remember the main content of the letter but not everything he wrote. In the first part of the letter, Kân wrote,

"Through me, NI Kân, my Brother SON Sen (សុំន សែន), would like to request contact with the Laos Embassy in Vietnam for support and would like to ask how to link Vietnam with Cambodia." Kân said that, after finishing writing, he put the letter into a small envelop, left it in the kitchen, at the D side, and got out of the room. The second time, Kân said he did the same thing. He went into the same toilet, and he found the letter where he had placed it the first time. He took it and read it. The content of the letter was, Kân said, the Vietnamese side recognized SON Sen and agreed to make contact through the Laos Embassy. And the Vietnamese side would always support Comrade SON Sen. Kân said that, this second time, he did not write much except, "I, NI Kân, have received the letter from the Vietnamese side and will report the matter

to Comrade SON Sen. Any comments from Comrade SON Sen will be reported back at a later date.

- I would like to report about my stay in New York from 12 to 16 September 1978:

I would like to honestly report to *Angkar* that, at the end of June 1978, after receiving the advice from Brother Number 2 regarding the new mission, I had reported it previously in my personal background. After Brother Number 2 went back, Vorn recommended that, if I travelled I should contact others such as the Thais, Laos or Vietnam. I told Vorn that, if he asked me to contact them right away, I could not do it because I cannot speak French, or, even worse, English. If I were there for long, I probably could [learn to] speak. Vorn told me I could do it whenever it was possible, no matter how late. He continued that he knew from Comrade Vann that this year there would be a UN General Assembly Session, and Comrade Nat and Comrade Hok would go. We had to work hard to contact people there. I would like to confirm with *Angkar* that, when Vorn talked to me about this matter, Comrade Vorn and Comrade Nat were not there. They had already returned. At the time I (Teanh) said that, “If *Bang* asks me to do this, I would do it. But I do not speak French or English. If we need to contact them, we have to ask the interpreter to help, and, if the interpreter is not one of our people, what should we do?” Then Vorn replied, “These are just my recommendations, and the solutions will come later.” Vorn said that he would ask Comrade Hok (ហ៊ុក) and Comrade Nat to help, but that I needed to wait.

I also would like to honestly report to *Angkar* that, during my 15-day trip to the united Nation, I made secret contacts with foreign embassies, but I did not have any important ones because I do not speak French or English. Then Comrade Nat and Hok arrived on 9 October 1978. They had come with the delegation headed by Brother Vann.

About 2 or 3 days later, I met Comrade Nat, but I did not meet Comrade Hok. I (Teanh) told him that Brother Vorn asked us, whenever we had the chance to travel out of the country, we should contact countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. I

was there for 1 month, but I could not do anything. It was because I do not speak any foreign languages. Therefore, as I learned from Comrade Nat and Comrade Hok, Brother Vorn had told me that they both were waiting for advice from him. I (Teanh) told Comrade Nat that two Comrades had been there two times already. They still had time to go to the United Nations again, as I observed during that month. Comrade Nat said, "It is fine. I can speak fair French, and I can understand a lot. As for Comrade Hok, he can speak both languages. Therefore, let me and Comrade Hok do it. As for the result, let's discuss it in our country."

I would like to honestly report to *Angkar* about my activities and the group that Vorn had formed during the time we were outside the country. I had to leave Comrade Nat and Comrade Hok on 16 October 1978 and would return with *Bang Vann* after his visit to the Philippines and Indonesia.

All Brother Vorn's assignments had been carried out, as mentioned above. As for the result, I did not know to what extent it succeeded because I was arrested by *Angkar* on 10 December 1978.

Teanh

I request to report on the plan to assassinate Brother, the Party's guests and the State Delegates who visited Kampuchea (I learned about it from Kân).

- About the plan to kill Brother Number 1
- I got to know Kân, who was Khieu's brother, through Khieu, after I had left the Logistics Office.

When I first went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I did not have any contact with Brother Kân because, after I had been there for only a few days, I had to go with Brother Vann. I came back in around mid-August 1978. While I was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before 9 September 1978, I had to go to New York. I still did not have any contacts. I arrived in Phnom Penh in early November 1978. In the evening, after dinner, I came to Comrade Kân's room. Kân told me that, so far, we had failed to carry out our plans. I asked him how and what the plans were. First, we talked about the plan to poison Brother Number 1 with the help of Brother Ath. Kân said that, at the *Angkar* office, Brother Ath could go in and out, but she was not allowed to eat there. She could sometimes stay there, so she tried to put the poison in the food. In the talks, Kân said that he got it [the poison] from Lady Nan, Chây's wife (Chây was from the Propaganda and Education Section). Kân said that he got the poison from a Hong Kong operative through Sok's wife. Kân said the reason he was not able to administer the poison was that everything Brother Number 1 ate was closely observed by his Security Guards. They cooked and took the food to him themselves. They brought the food in to be served right after they finished cooking it, and they waited until he finished eating, then they would leave and take everything away with them.

- About the plan to kill Chinese Delegate, TOENG Yong Kuy

With regard to the plan to kill TOENG Yong Kuy, Brother Kân said that Brother Khieu assigned him to kill the guests. There were two ways: one was to poison, and the other was to secretly shoot them.

The poisoning was Kân's responsibility, and the shooting was the lady's responsibility. Kân said that the reason he took the assignment to dispense the poison was he was a Protocol Official, and he could enter and exit the house where the guests stayed. Thus, he had more of a chance to do it. Administering the poison needed only one person to put it in the water [he drank] or rice he ate. Kân said that, at first, he had

wanted to put it in the bottle of water, but he saw that the guests' security guards were so careful and always checked his activities. If they opened it and found it was a little bit loose, they would get a new one. And, even if the bottle was okay, they still tasted it, and they would wait 2 or 3 minutes before they let him drink it. Seeing that, he had no chance to do it. As for the food, he said that it was also difficult to put in because, after the cook had finished cooking, they gave it [right] to the preparer. After it was prepared, they all had to wait there. If they didn't have any [particular] duties, no one was allowed to get close to the guests. There were always Security Guards by the table. They would bring the food to the guest only when he was ready to eat. Kân said that he sometimes went close to the food, but he was carefully observed.

As for the shooting, Kân said that he gave the responsibility to Lady Sin and three other females. Sin was Kân's sister-in-law. The reason he chose them was the three of them were stationed there permanently during the official stay of the Delegates in Phnom Penh. Kân said that Sin was the first shooter, and the other girl was the second one. Kân said that, after Sin, the second person to shoot was the second lady. The other two girls were the observers to see whether the guests went out without any security protection.

Kân said that the girl, after Sin, was the room maid. She was a bit overweight and short, but she was friendly. The second girl was also a room maid. I would like to frankly report to Comrade about these three girls. Kân did not mention their names. If I did know, I would report them to you without hiding any secret. Kân said that the shooting plan was also not successful as *Ta TOENG Yong Kuy* did not go out [without security]. As for the other guests, they sometimes went out to the veranda but only for a short time.

- About the plan to kill Brother Vann

Kân said that there was one time when Brother Khieu was so furious with Brother Vann, he once ordered his messenger named Noeun (នៃន) to shoot the latter, but he could not do it. The reason was that Brother Vann and Brother Vorn got along well, and they were looking for a time to topple Brother Khieu.

Date: 25 December 1978

Teanh

Original KH: 00025572-00025620

37/46

Translated: [00025572-5609], [00025613-620]

[ERN: 00025613-20]

[Annotation: 17 December 1978. Extracted Po Eun (ព័ត៌មាន) and Minh (មិញ)].

Report on the Plan to strike the Party this Dry Season

After *Angkar* decided to appoint Comrade Vorn (វ៉ុន) to control and distribute ammunition at the Logistics Section, I met him more often, and, particularly, when I went to pick up the ammunition distribution receipt. At the end of May or June in the year 1978, I came and went often because it was such a large quantity of ammunition to go to the battlefield. In the middle of June in the year 1978, I received the common plan to stage a coup d'état this dry season. When I had just arrived there, he gave me a piece of paper. It was a receipt for ammunition delivered to the battlefield. Then Comrade Vorn assigned me the following duties:

- Take control of the satisfactory amount of ammunition.
- Prepare transportation (by truck) with sufficient gasoline.
- Prepare 1,000 partisans for Comrade Pon (ប៉ុន). Those partisans were mostly ladies, but there were some youths included. They were for taking control of the radio station in Phnom Penh.
- Prepare the force for “Season Farm” to take control of the radio station.

There were technical problems that were be raised for discussion and to inform the Committee. For now, I would like to introduce some operatives. In short, I was totally in charge of all the forces which were under the Ministry of Economy. Labor forces and Industry were controlled by Comrade Ân (អ័ន). The forces with the Ministry of Agriculture were controlled by Comrade Savat (សាវាត់). Those from Electric Sector were commanded by Comrade Chhorn (ជ័ន) and Comrade Yi (យី). The Public Works Sector was controlled by Comrade Chè (ចៃ). Railway workers were under the control of Prang (ព្រាំង) and Comrade Săng. Those forces had been involved in war for more

than 5 years, so we just gave them the guns they would know how to properly use. As for the forces of the tank and artillery units, who were close to or in Phnom Penh, we could use some of them by ordering through Headquarters. For the Comrade's Section, there were two duties, serving the battlefield and serving our own plans, and to be careful they are not discovered. Those were the forces in Phnom Penh. They had to be organized from the beginning of August 1978. The forces at sea and the infantry could also be ordered.

Internal forces were for serving the four essential spearheads:

- The first spearhead was the radio station in Phnom Penh.
- The second spearhead was the radio station in Mean Chey.
- The third was the attack on Pôchentong (ព្រៃចិនតុង).
- The fourth spearhead was *Angkar's* Office.

Concerning the duties of *Angkar*, which were close to or at any spearhead, the forces of the Ministry of Agriculture, who were governed by Comrade Savat, were coming from west of Pôchentong. Those Squads brought ammunition from the Arsenal in Kampong Speu, and then they went directly to Pôchentong to take control of it. There was a force fired back to us from the east. They brought ammunition from Tuek L'ak, Phnom Penh or Boeng Traback, Phnom Penh. The assault force, at the radio station in Stueng Mean Chey, Phnom Penh, and the forces of Logistics at Chamkar Daung brought weapons from Ou Baek K'am. Another force from the east brought weapons from south of Russian Hospital. At the radio station spearhead in Phnom Penh there were 100 forces from Logistics, and they already had weapons. Other forces were workers from the north, and they brought weapons from Tuol Kouk. The other remaining forces came to Phnom Penh and walked along National Road 1 to meet up with the forces from the south. The spearheads that entered *Angkar's* Office were all from the north and the workers from the south, besides the forces that protected Kbal Thnàl (ក្បាលថ្នល់) Bridge. These soldiers walked along National Road 1 as well to

meet up with the units from the north. They brought weapons from Russian Hospital. After they joined, Comrade Ân (អ័ន) commanded all the forces to besiege *Angkar's*

Office. I was commanded to go to Headquarters to get a tank and arrest Brother Number 1 and the Deputy Secretary by commanding the General Staff to give me the

tanks to protect *Angkar*. As for artillery, we got them ready to use for beating back the enemy who would come to fight us.

External Forces

The forces of the Central Zone under Comrade Pork (ព័ក) came by truck or by ship. It depended on the actual situation.

- The old operatives of Comrade Sè (ស៊ែ) were now controlled by Comrade Pin (ពិន). They were used for contact and were transported by train.
- The Squad in the north was now replaced by Comrade Sè. Those forces were weakened much more than the others.
- The forces of Comrade Chăn (ចាន់), in the east, were scattered as the best forces had been merged into the units of the Centre, but he still had a contact for land transport which was under the responsibility of the Transport Sector.

The District forces of the old Special Zone could gather only strategic forces, and they placed a lot of hope in those forces.

And about the fore of Comrade San (សាន), Comrade Koem (គីម) and Comrade Roem (រ៉ូម), Comrade Vorn said only that those two units were too far away to come, so let

them do their job there. I had never heard Comrade Vorn talking about these external forces before. Just now, and it was the first I learned of it. I, “Vorn”, will introduce only these names due to time constraints, and it is a bit late today. I want to go to continue my work. Please come to meet me again tomorrow, and, then I, “Vorn,” will continue introducing the names.” The next morning, I went to the Economics Office at the time that had been set, and Comrade Vorn told me about the international political situation. As an example, Comrade Vorn said that the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, and there was no problem. Everything was finished as well, and, at the same time, the aggression was totally successful. No foreign countries could take

[any action]. Our current situation was not like Czechoslovakia. The invasion from the outside was also serious. There were no joint efforts, but, what was important, was the internal forces. In the near future, the *Yuon* would create a front called the Revolutionary Organization of Cambodia. It invaded Cambodia under the pretext of helping the Cambodian Revolution. This was another problem.

What about the situation of the Cambodian Military? It improved, but it was new, and the situation was also not brilliant. Therefore, if they worked hard to understand our weak points, they could invade us successfully. Still, there were weak points. We would not be successful.

About the Command Committee

Now, it was June 1978, normally, Brother Secretary rarely went to work regularly. This was a big problem. He would stay only during some celebrations. We determined the day of the Commemoration of the Revolutionary Army's creation on 17 January 1979. This job was important, so we needed to appoint a Command Committee to conduct it efficiently. Then it would work well.

The Composition of the General Command Committee:

No.	Name	Position
1.	Comrade Vorn	Chairman.
2.	Comrade Ân	Deputy Chairman.
3.	Comrade Prang	Member.
4.	Comrade Savat	Member.
5	Comrade Nat (ណាត)	Member.
6	Comrade Teanh (ទាញ)	Member.
7	Comrade Maut (ម៉ូត)	Member of the Command Committee in charge of spearheads,

8	Comrade Prang and Comrade Nat	Organized the assault on <i>Angkar's</i> Office.
9	Comrade Savat	Assembled the spearheads from Pôchentong because they were important.
10	Comrade Maut	Assembled the spearhead at the radio station in Phnom Penh.
11	Comrade Teanh	Assembled the assault on the radio station in Stueng Mean Chey.

Comrade Vorn asked me, should there be a Committee in each warehouse or what? How to organize them? About the hospital and the Warehouse in Kampong Speu, Comrades did not need to care about them because the Warehouse was under *Angkar*, and a group of doctors was also controlled by *Angkar*. Let me, (Vorn) do it.

I (Teanh) (ទាញ) reported on the situation of the Cadres' accountability at any

Logistics Warehouse. The force was replaced again and again because most of them were ladies. Until there was a decision to take out ammunition, a cadre in the Warehouse Office was appointed, and he ordered the ammunition.

There were:

- The Warehouses in Tuek L'ak and Ou Baek K'am, Phnom Penh, and they were near each other. Two cadres were appointed to take charge: Comrade Female Thoeun (ផ្កើន), who was a Warehouse Committee [Member], and Comrade Female Khên (ខែន), a platoon cadre.
- The Warehouse south of Russian Hospital:
- Comrade Female Sokha (សុខា) and Comrade Female Choeun (ផ្កើន).
- The Warehouse at Tuol Kork.
- Comrade Born (ប័ន).

About the new administration's regime

Comrade Vorn added that we needed to change the current regime to be like others.

- Lower the status of cooperatives.
- Create markets, money and monthly salaries.

Around 9 a.m. *Angkar's* Office called Comrade Vorn, and then he went there. I went back home. The next morning I called the Committee to join a meeting to implement the plan. The meeting participants were myself, Comrade Maut (ម៉ូត), Comrade

Thoem (តឹម) and Comrade Phon (ផុន). Everyone analysed the situation to see whether it would be good or bad to go ahead with the plan because, if there were an obstacle, the plan would go slowly. After analysing the situation, we appointed some comrades to take responsibilities at the spearheads:

- I went to organize the forces at the Chamkar Daung.
- Comrade Maut went to prepare the car and gasoline,
- Comrade Thoem controlled the Arsenals and checked the types of ammunition to be distributed to any of the spearheads as necessary.
- Comrade Phon prepared his force of 100 people to play their part in the plan already determined as above.

Two days later, I went to report to Comrade on what we'd done following the above-mentioned assignments.

- Comrade Thoeb (តឹប), Comrade Maut and the female Koeun (កឹន) transported and shared out ammunition to any arsenals, particularly the light and the medium sized cannons. The ammunition was prepared and arranged by category of weapon. This job took four or five days to finish using just enough operatives to keeping it confidential.
- Comrade Nhân (នាំន) and Comrade Thau (ថៃ), the operative at Coconut Farm controlled around 100 forces. There were fewer girls and youths because there were a lot of children and adolescents.

- There were around 200 vehicles, the cars used daily of for Logistics purposes. And there were hundreds of newly arrived vehicles. The problem was the drivers, not the gasoline.
- The 100 combatants of Comrade Phon had no problem because he had prepared and selected them starting yesterday. In short, the Logistics situation was favourable for implementation [of the plan]. When I finished my report, comrade told us about his job situation. He said the situation at all the units was still not yet revealed. Based on the details that were continuously reported, (by Vorn and I) this project was huge, and we would work hard to protect it. We were used to seeing many failed experiences in previous fighting against the Party. What was the cause of the failure? The important point was to pay attention. It was also easier for us to have a lot of contacts outside, such as in the North and the Central [Zones], and they reported on time because they paid attention to it. Vorn and I wanted to set out a plan to fire and bomb, but the previous plan was given to A Hok (ហុក) and A Say (សាយ), and they revealed the plan and failed. The secret shooting was difficult to achieve. The cooperatives might know, but youths did not. Yet, if the cooperatives dared to hold the gun, there would be doubt about this. Therefore, did we have another way or plan? I was contacted to go outside via telegram. The message said that they still continued their job like returning back. The meeting that time was not long because there were many guests continuously coming and going.

Four or five days later, Comrade Vorn called me to meet again. It might have been on the 26th or the 27th of June 1978. Comrade Vorn told me that *Angkar* asked me to be removed from Logistics to go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; ‘What do you think about this plan?’ We could not be negligent about this. Wherever you go, you should not forget the plan. I replied, ‘No problem, Brother, as long as I live, following your suggestion, I will work hard to achieve it.’ Comrade Vorn clarified, if you do not go, can Comrade Maut assume the responsibility alone? How does it work?’ I said that there was no problem because you were here to supervise, and the people under you

always follow you. Comrade Vorn said that, wherever he wanted me (Teanh) to go, I should try to [carry on our] work there because there would be work for me to do. I asked him what he thought about the forces as there were so few. What he thought about the forces whether they would succeed or fail. Even, before they had many Squads, they still could not succeed. How about now? I could see that it was hard because the forces were still scattered.

He (Vorn) looked down for a while. Then he said we had only this smaller amount of forces, so if we organize them carelessly, we will fail.

14 December 1978

SUN Ti, *alias* Teanh

*[Annotation: This is the content from Bang Van, who had educated me
at the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]*

[Annotation: Request that Comrade not tear this up and it throw away. These are my last words.

15 December 1978]

To Brother *Party* Secretary (via Comrade Duch, a friend)

I would like to express my highest respect above my life to the Party. I would like to pay respects to Comrade. I would like to confess that I was wrong. I did not betray the Party. At first I did not answer, but after being seriously clubbed, I responded with fabrications. I offer up in sacrifice my life for the Party. Please do not arrest all the people whose names I have wrongly reported. They are all good Comrades. I am not a CIA agent or a Free Khmer. I have decided at last that I must die. I ask the Party and Comrade to save my life. I am a communist. I have sacrificed all my life for the Party. (It's because A Vorn, A Keth and A KONG Sophal have implicated me, accused me of being part of the CIA – the Free Khmer). I did not join them.

Phnom Penh: 15/12/1978

My wife and Comrade Nat's wife do not know anything, Brother!

SUN Ti

(*Alias* Teanh)

[Signature]

Long live the CPK, glorious and magnificent!

Long live the Kampuchean Revolution, great and magnificent!

Love live the Kampuchean people, strong and magnificent!

Victory to the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, strong, skilled, and magnificent!