

[ERN: 00029855-00029862]

I would like to respectfully submit to Respected and Beloved *Angkar!*

We would like to report honestly to *Angkar* as follows:



1. About my Revolutionary activities

In 1964, after a successful junior high school exit exam, I joined the Revolution under the direction of Comrade Thau (ថ្លៃ), and joined the Communist Youth League (យុវកិកក) that year. In 1965, Comrade Thau brought me to my workplace at Preaek Kàk (ព្រែកកក), and I worked there under the direct leadership of Brother Pork (or Pauk បងពក) until 1971. I joined the Party as a Candidate Party Member in mid-1965 and became a full-rights member in early 1966, acknowledged by Brother Pork.

2. About my betrayal of the Revolution

After Brother Pork's mandate as the Chairman of Sector 106 ended around March 1971, he was then transferred to the North Zone, and the Zone Committee assigned me to replace him as Secretary of Sector 106.

After Brother Pork had returned to control the Military in the North Zone, as a Sector Secretary I received such a heavy and unprecedented work load that I became very pessimistic. For on thing, there were no weapons, ammunition and aircraft. The Vietnamese had been at war for such a long time and they still had not won. How could we, who were novice Revolutionaries, defeat the imperialists? This issue was often discussed with the other cadres; I hinted that if we lost, I would not join the Vietnamese but would join the American imperialists instead, where happiness, money and aircraft were available. I made such statements to survey their minds, but they paid no attention. In 1971, the Party seriously lacked ammunition and encouraged the cadres to seek it by all means, buying from the enemy, buying from

the Yuon or stealing from it from the Yuon. Then Chea (ធី), Chairman of Commerce in Chi Kraeng (ជីក្រែង) District, and I organized a group of merchants to sell pork and dried fish in enemy-controlled areas in exchange for ammunition. The trade was carried out ten times. Each time we got 3,000 to 4,000 cartridges of all types, especially for AK47s and AR15s, to serve in the Siem Reap battlefield. An enemy element, Captain UM Ǝt (អ៊ុំ អ៊ុំត), and one of our merchants, Hok (ហុក), were very close friends. Through Hok the Captain regularly sent me 500 to 1,000 rounds ammunition separately and free of charge, as well as bread. He also gave me an Orient brand watch, but I gave it to the Zone Committee and told them it had come from a businessman, for fear of exposure by *Angkar* which would have been a personal risk. During the frequent communications for trade and barter, I began to believe that, with such a huge amount of ammunition, the enemy would surely be able to defeat the Revolution and capture the liberated areas any time they wished. One time when I asked merchant Hok to buy gun, the contemptible enemy (UM Ǝt) said he would not sell guns; he could give them for free, the important thing was that the Revolution and the Lon Nol government should be in agreement to expel all the Yuon from Cambodian territory and that fellow Khmers should stand in solidarity together. B anti-With my stance of hatred for the Yuon and thinking that in light of the economic sabotage by the Yuon and the bartering of milled and un-milled rice and some authorities being in the grip of Yuon control, without any solution so far, Cambodia would definitely fall into the hands of the Yuon in the future. Then it would be difficult to expel them back to their country, unless and until Cambodians joined hands to do so. Based on this stance, we asked to write a letter to UM Ǝt, telling him that we were in agreement with his previous proposal and would be in contact with him by letter later. In July 1971, the enemy requested further contact through Hok, asking for the preparation of a spy network to be known as “The Black Shadow” (ស្រមោលខ្មៅ). I was very worried, and I felt that this issue would become very

problematic. On the one hand, I wondered if I would be able to escape, and, on the other, whether *Angkar* would believe me. What would be the solution if I followed

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this path if, eventually, the enemy gained enough forces to capture the liberated areas? For these reasons, we wrote a letter to the enemy saying that we were not in agreement and asked for a postponement of the communication regarding exchanges of meat and fish and the organization of the network in the liberated areas for fear of exposure. One month later, the enemy sent another letter to me, warning that if there were no communication the economic transactions and trading activities between Kampong Khleang (កំពង់ក្បាង) and Moat Khla (មាត់ខ្លា) would be closed. At the same time, the trading would be suspended for a while by the enemy side to force us to make a decision on the issue of the spy network. If it were true, it would affect the trading activities, the provision of medicines, salt and clothing, and this would significantly affect the battlefield. For these reasons, I asked A Chea and A Thân (ថ័ន) to discuss this to arrive at a solution in case the economic channel would be closed. After discussion, it emerged that there was a need to reconnect with the enemy side for a compromise. Therefore, the Black Shadow Network was put in place, consisting of the following elements:

1. Myself, Soth.
2. A Chea.
3. A Thân.

I then reported to UM Ỉt, who said that once we gained independence, I (Sot) would become a Colonel, A Chea a Major, and A Thân a Captain.

How was the activity line set?

1. I had to keep silent and take no overt action and make no contact with any side and stay calm for fear Angkar would make arrests and subordinates would implicate me, which would be a major loss; but in addition I had to push the dissemination of the Revolutionary line to cover my tracks so Angkar would not know.

2. A Chea was responsible for contact with the area of Chi Kraeng and the dispatch of merchants to the enemy-controlled areas for purposes of trading and communication with them.
3. A Thân would be responsible for contact with the network members from Chi Kraeng to Soutr Nikom, especially between the commerce network and the merchants.

How were we embedded?

I (Soth) supervised two important cores, A Chea and Thân, and I trained them to communicate and to be in line with the Party policies and rules, but to twist the Party line to the left or the right. For example, cooperative battalions in some locations were leftist and collected trivial things and put them into the cooperatives and the people were in conflict with that. On the right, capitalists were involved in trading with the capitalists in enemy-controlled areas.

A Chea's networks were:

1. Hok	Assigned in 1971.
2. Vân , rice mill owner	Assigned in 1971.
3. Mi Nakry (មី ណាក់គី)	Assigned in 1972.
4. CHEN Tong (ចិនតុង)	Assigned in 1972.
5. Chhēng (ឃីង), Commune Chief	Assigned in 1972.

6. Ang (អាង), a civilian	Recruited in 1973.
7. Ean (អ៊ាន), Commune Chief	Recruited in 1973.
8. CHEN Mēng (ចិនម៉េង)	Recruited in 1973.

A Chea was one of our operatives we had assigned as Chairman of District Commerce [Committee].

A Thân's operatives were:

1. TONG Hort (តុង ហ៊ីត)	Recruited in 1971 and worked until 1974.
2. Hong, North Zone Commerce [Committee Member], attached to [Sector] 106	Recruited in 1971 and worked until 1974.
3. Yav (យ៉ាវ), North Zone Commerce [Committee Member], attached to [Sector] 106	Recruited in 1971 and worked until 1974.

A Thân was a [District Committee] Member in Chi Kraeng District.

In 1972, I stopped being in control of Chi Kraeng District: I was transferred to take control of Soutr Nikom District. In 1972, I encountered the Khmer Sa (White Khmer) twice, because they were embedded in the ranks of the Yuon army and the enemy network of the Black Shadow pushed the movement, but they were attacked and totally smashed by the Revolutionary authorities. These overt enemies totally swept clean. Then the setting-up of Revolutionary authority got better again. The secret embedded enemies had not all been smashed, just their henchmen.

In 1973, enemies embedded in the ranks of the authorities went in and out of the enemy-controlled areas, creating corruption, excessive drinking and immoral sexual affairs. This encouraged A Chhēng and A Ean, who were Commune Chairmen, to stir up contradictions and create cliques and bureaucracy and disrespect for the Party line, resulting in complications in Chi Kraeng District. However, the District Secretary dealt with this by using the Party line to actively indoctrinate the internal circle as well as the people and attacked and eradicated capitalist stances and enemy pacifist agent politics at every location, making the people become conscious. He was able to counter enemy manoeuvres well.

In 1974, I stopped being in control of the bases: I controlled the battlefield protecting the Angkor Wat complex. Subversive operatives in the rear made contact with the enemy and even reported to have the enemy to take the people to Kampong Khleang.

As for traitorous activities in the rear, the bases met and discussed solutions, and they then raised the idea of arresting of A Chea and A Thân. But I stopped Comrade Sēm (សឹម), telling him to wait and observe their activities for a while, so I could delay the arrests so that they could flee. Several days later, A Chea, A Hok, A Vân, Mi-Nakry, Chen Tong, Chen Mēng and A Chea's wife escaped to the enemy side taking 500,000 riel along with them. Seeing this exposure, in order to prevent the exposure from reaching me, I told the District Secretary to arrest and smash A Thân and A Tong Huot straightaway. In July 1974, I was transferred to work in North Zone Commerce, and espionage activities were delayed by the liquidation of many of the

network. When Brother Pork was once again assigned to govern Siem Reap, the smashing of more elements continued, such as A Chhēng, A Ean and A Ang. A Hong and A Yav were smashed by the North Zone Commerce Ministry in December 1974. Therefore, our entire Black Shadow traitor network had been smashed to bits. The remainder fled to join the enemy area and were never seen to return after the liberation.

[ERN: 00029871]

Request to report to Brother about the military as follows:

So far, I have had close contact and worked with with most military personnel in the whole division.

<p>1. Comrade Mut (មុត), Regiment Secretary</p>	<p>Past: Born in Takeo. His political affiliations during the war: a close friend of A Hoh (អារ៉ែម្នះ). Present: Oddar Meanchey.</p>
<p>2. Comrade Hean (ហ៊ីន), Regiment Deputy Secretary</p>	<p>Past: Born in Prey Chhor (ប្រៃស្រាវ) Village. A close friend of A Hoh during the war.</p>
<p>3. Comrade Nhim (ញីម), Regiment Logistics</p>	<p>Past: Born in Kampong Cham. A close friend of A Hoh during the war. Present: At the border.</p>
<p>4. Comrade Cheat (ជាតិ), Battalion</p>	<p>Past: Born in Kampong Thom. A close friend of A Hoh.</p>

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Secretary	Present: At the border.
5. Comrade Lanh (ឡាង), Battalion Secretary	Past: Born in Kampong Cham. A close friend of A Hoh during the war. Present: In Siem Reap and still a close friend of A Hoh.
6. Comrade Vorn (វ៉ុន), Regiment Logistics in Siem Reap	Past: Born in Siem Reap. Communicated with A Hoh during the war. Present: Lately, in frequent contact with A Hoh as well.

[ERN: 00029920-00029922]

Responses of PA Phàl (ប៉ាល់ ផល់), alias Soth(សុត), [Sector] 106.

Summary of his Oral Confession

During the Evening of 25 February 1977.

Khuon called me through Yon (យ៉ុន), messenger of Khuon and Pork, to meet him at Boeng Thom (បឹងធំ) in 1968. S/Ng (សៀង) was not familiar with the location of Khuon's house. The content of the meeting was build Popular Movement forces, to eliminate the Prince and imperialist regime. The meeting was attended by two people only.

The aim of the meeting was to build the people; political, strategic and tactical issues would be left to him [Khuon].

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What label would be used? He said the aim was to burrow within the Party. The appearance would be communist, but, tactically, we followed the Party line to indoctrinate the people by completely legitimate ways. As for the issue of whether or not to become the Popular Movement, the important thing was the cadres. Wherever the cadres led, the people would follow. We would wait until we gained victory before transforming into the Popular Movement.

The process would be leftist and rightist. For example, if we worked in Cooperatives, we did whatever needed to be done to make them see we were communists. If we were following the rightist line, we encouraged playing with women, alcohol abuse, etc.

The newly built cadres had to be controlled by the upper echelons such as District Chairmen, Ministry Chairmen, or Military Chairmen. To avoid exposure to the Party, it was not necessary to talk about the popular movement in assemblies.

Building forces at the bases was completely controlled by the District Chairmen. The Ministry Chairmen did the same, and the Military Chairmen led the levels of the battalion and above.

The military structure was re-organized when the new Zone was changed. That is, the re-organization of forces began in 1974, but the organization had taken place gradually since 1971, when he (Sot) had directly controlled the military. At that time, Brother Pork only attended special meetings and study sessions.

The active forces in the military:

1. Hean	Brother Khuon made him a core member of the Popular Movement.
2. Paul	Brother Khuon made him a core member of the Popular Movement.
3. Chheang (ឈឿង)	Brother Khuon made him a core member of the Popular Movement.
4. Pēng (ប៉េង)	Arrested.
5. Buon (ប៊ួន)	Regiment Logistics.
6. Phea (ផា)	Regiment Logistics
7. Vorn	Regiment Logistics.
8. Huon (ហ្គួន)	Operative of Sreng.

The names of other Sections were unknown.

The Bases:

1. Vat	Secretary of Srei Snam (ស្រីស្នំ) [District].
2. Nau	Secretary of Chong Kal (ចុងកាល់) District.
3. Tèm (តែម)	Secretary of Ampil (អំពិល) District.
4. Tuy (ទុយ)	Secretary of Anlong Veang (អន្លង់វែង) District.
5. Hong (ហុង)	Secretary of Svay Leu (ស្វាយលើ).
6. Rân (រ៉ាន)	Secretary of Banteay Srei (បន្ទាយស្រី) District.
7. Da (ដា)	Secretary of Siem Reap (សៀមរាប).
8. Khoeun (ខ្មឺន)	Secretary of Sotr Nikom (សូត្រនិកម).
9. Bēng (បែង)	Secretary of Puok (ពួក) District, Kuon's operative.
10. Sun (ស៊ុន)	Secretary of Chi Kraeng (ជីក្រែង), Sreng's

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	operative.
11. The rest were the operatives of Brother Por. The lower members were directly controlled by the Secretaries.	

At the Ministries and Offices:

1. Chhan (ឆ័ន)	Chairman of Communication, [Sector] 106.
2. Chhân (ឆ័ន)	Deputy Chairman of Communication, [Sector] 106.
3. Peou (ពៅ)	Security Chairman.
4. Lot (ឡត)	Driver at the warehouse and also a Cadre managing Transport Works.
5. Thieb (ធៀប)	Agriculture Chairman, [Sector] 106.
6. Sean	Commerce Chairman

7. Oeum (អឿម)	Chairman of Fishing Lots.
8. Chhaom (គោម)	Office Chairman on the Office Committee with Lot.
9. Pràng (ប្រង់)	Manager of the Office Committee with Lot.
10. Hong	Commerce Committee with Sean.
11. Pāk (ប៉ាក់)	Commerce Committee with Sean.
12. An (អាន)	Commerce Committee with Sean.
13. Khon (ខុន), female	Medical Staff, but mentally ill.
14. Khoeun (ខ្មែន), male	Chairman of Hospital, [Sector] 106.
15. Hoeun (ខ្មែន), male	Medical Techniques, [Sector] 106.

Liaison networks with Thailand were the responsibility of Hean. Contacts were through the following border passes: Ampil (អំពិល), Kou (គូ), O Smach (អូស្មាច់), Anlong Veang (អន្លង់វែង) and Thkeam Romeas (ធ្មែរមាស). Besides these, it could be done anywhere.

The methods of contact included Khuon sending letters to Chea, and Hean managed it straight away. Most letters were addressed to Hean through legitimate procedures.

The contents of the communications were to seek support bases and medical assistance, clothing, ammunition and foodstuffs to support the plan to strike *Angkar* in January 1977. The aim of the assault was to undermine the economy and capture people as well as the Oddar Meanchey Base to be used as a stepping stone to capture other areas.

The main contacts were with the American CIA agents. Their names were unknown.

The code name of the CIA was “007”, while Soth’s group was known as “01.” These codes were also used for radio communication purposes.

(Note: A Chi had also said the liaison operative with Thailand was Bēng, code number “001”. Based on Sreng’s confirmation, Khuon’s operatives always used the preceding code “0”. The main substance of the plan was the [capture] of Phnom Penh, where the leadership apparatus and radio station were. Politically, it was to attack *Angkar*’s collective ownership rights.

[ERN: 00029932-00029938]

[...] okay or not? He gave a positive answer. So we set a meeting date through the existing Thai police at the border. I answered that I was in agreement regarding this matter.

We would like to clarify why I set the meeting date with the Thais in October 1976. It was that the Party had allowed us to attend the Party Congress from 20 August 1976 to 15 September 1976. *[Annotation: The responses of PA Phà made on 14 March 1977].*

The Party Congress raised the issue of the treason of Chakrei (ចក្រើរ), alias Mean (ម៉ែន), Chhouk (ឆ្នុក) and Ya (យ៉ា).

~~We were very concerned that this was not a good omen, that we would likely be tracked down by Angkar when Angkar learned about it, and that it would be better to stop activities. However, due to the fact that I had an egotistic stance, strong private ownership sentiments, rank orientation, and treachery against my own correct Party, I thought that it was fine and there would be no cases where Brother Khuon and Brother Ya would implicate their fellow partisans, that these things would have to be continued in order to achieve plan of treason and treachery against the Party without fail. And I said to myself that whenever the Party congress ended, I would expand and strengthen our traitorous networks to a greater extent.~~

After the Party Congress ended, we hurried to return to Siem Reap and called a meeting of the committee betraying the nation and betraying the Party to be attended by Comrades Hean, Bēng and Sean to inform them about the arrests of Ya, Chhouk and Chakrei, alias Mean. ~~When informed, our comrades' faces turned sour. They said Ya who used to come to Siem Reap would implicate us, and that it would be better for us to stop our activities. I then encouraged our fellow colleagues not to withdraw as we used to face more serious obstacles during the war and had managed to overcome them. "It is imperative go forward. We will win in the future. Comrades, do not worry. Therefore we must make great efforts to strengthen our networks, and we will have outright mastery when the situation is favourable."~~

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On 1 October, Comrade Hean and I went to the O Smach border crossing again to send a letter to Thailand. When we arrived there, we saw six Thai police officers standing guard, and we asked them about their well-being before sending the letter, asking Thai agents to come for tomorrow's work. The Thai police officers answered positively. We then returned to stay at Samraong (សំរោង). I said to Comrade Hean, "We will gain a big victory this time. When we meet the Thais, they will definitely help Brother Khuon, and if we have Brother Khuon, we will be successful."

On 2 October 1976, Hean and I went to O Smach again, and we arrived there at 8 o'clock in the morning. We sat and waited until 9 a.m., when we saw three Jeeps full of people, including ten Thai police officers, four Thai CIA agents and one American CIA agent. The American agent got out of the Jeep and so did the Thai police officers. The Thai, who had met us the previous time, came to shake hands with me and told me that his boss was coming. I then entered the area following the Thai agent, who went to tell his boss in advance. [The boss] shook hands with me and asked about our well-being during our trip there, and we then agreed to work under a tree. At the time, the American agent was constantly stealing glances at Comrade Hean and me. Maybe he was thinking we might not be KOY Thuon's men. We all sat on small portable chairs with a small table in front of us on which there were plenty of beers and bread. We ate, drank and talked about our respective trips there. ~~The American still gave me a suspicious glance. Knowing that, I turned to behave more intimately and brave to convince them that I was really KOY Thuon's man.~~

Then the American spoke Thai through an interpreter who interpreted into Khmer, asking me who I was. I replied that I was an agent of Mr KOY Thuon, Chairman of the Popular Movement in Phnom Penh, who had allowed me to meet him. He asked if I was a liar. I replied I was not. He continued to ask if I had had any codename. I said Mr KOY Thuon had told us that your codename was "007", and KOY Thuon's side's was "001." The American became somewhat happy, and he turned his eyes to the Thais and vice-versa. Then the American signalled three Thais to go 20 metres away from the meeting place, and we talked for a long time before they came back. He then said he was happy to meet the representatives of Mr KOY Thuon, and that he had not

received any letters through Paoy Paet (ប្រាស់ប៉ៃត) for a while (five months now). He continued to say that the meeting with the representatives of Mr KOY Thuon would revive his hopes. He asked me what my name was. I replied my name was Soth, Chairman of Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province. He also asked me about my colleague's name. I said his name was Hean, Deputy Chairman of the same province. I asked him his name. He said his name was Richard Messler (រីឡា មីស្ត័រ) of the American CIA. I also asked him about the Thai, who replied that he was CHHOUT Chhay Chhavan (ឈូត ឆាយ ឆាវ៉ាន), Thai CIA operative. ~~At this stage, we were so happy; we talked and ate the breads and drank beers in an intimate atmosphere. After~~ learning each other's names and status, we started work and declared our individual agendas.

The Cambodian side:

Soth, Chairman of Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province.

Hean, Deputy Chairman of Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province.

The foreign side:

Richard Messler American CIA

CHHOUT Chhay Chhavan, Thai CIA

The other three Thai agents did not introduce themselves.

~~The American said: "I am very happy to meet the representatives of Mr KOY Thuon. I have not been receiving communication letters for five months now through Pao Paet border gate. But with regard to the previous letters regarding the request for Military assistance and the strengthening of support bases in Oddar Meanchey, I am very pleased to sign them. You had confirmed that you would start staging a coup d'état either in December 1976 or November 1977, and it is very close now."~~

[ERN: 00029941]

~~“I am very happy to have met the representatives of Mr KOY Thuon this time. Please report more precisely about the plan of KOY Thuon, and where it’s status now.”~~

[Annotation: (3) The report and request of PA Phàl on behalf of his party]

We replied: “We come to meet you today, 2 October 1976, to report about the situation of Mr KOY Thuon and to request your comments and solutions. I would like to honestly inform you that KOY Thuon has been detained as of this October 1976. He cannot move. He has allegedly committed numerous moral offences by having sexual relations with women. Accordingly, I haven’t met him recently, but you have done some work through Mr Doeun (Đỗ), who is your prime agent. So, without ...”

[ERN: 00029948]

“[...] most detailed comments in this regard. According comments by Mr KOY Thuon and Mr Doeun, they have requested your urgent help. Any delay will give more strength to the Revolution, and, as a result, our embedded forces will definitely be destroyed.” *[Annotation: (PA Phàl’s responses made on 16 March 1977)].*

[Annotation: (4) The American view on this situation and the pleading of PA Phàl].

The American replied: “This matter is more difficult than easy. Drawing on America’s successful experience in staging coups d’état in many places, the main factors are strong forces burrowing from within and no revelation of secrets. The fact that the coup d’état leaders have substantial forces to hand, they must be more influential than our own and other forces. Now, many of the core forces of Mr KOY Thuon and Mr Doeun have been tracked down, and the leader himself has been arrested, in addition to other revelations. Therefore, the Revolutionary forces are aware and have taken precautionary measures.”

[ERN: 00029955-00029962]

[...] on behalf of Mr KOY Thuon

“5. The date set for the general coup d’état is 10 January 1977, and, according to the plan, Phnom Penh is the first target [of the coup d’état] to be followed by the Zones and Sectors. In case there are obstacles, the plan can be flexible. *[Annotation: The responses of PA Phàl made on 17 March 1977].*

[Annotation: (5) [The conclusion of the meeting and the essential atmosphere of the meeting.]

The meeting ended at 3 p.m. with a small party with bread and beers. We then shook hands to say goodbye in an intimate atmosphere. The American conveyed his courtesy message to Mr Doeun and Mr KOY Thuon through me. We returned to our respective places. Comrade Hean and I returned to Samraong District feeling happy and hopeful of definite success in staging the coup d’état with the official acknowledgement of the American and the Thai.

On 5 October 1976, I made a long report sent to Brother Khuon and Brother Doeun on the result of our communications with the Thai and the American. ~~detailing what I had mentioned above to Angkar.~~ Following that, Brother Doeun wrote back to me, saying Brother Khuon and himself wanted constant contact and communications with the Thai and American for support and military assistance and asked us to prepare strong military forces in Oddar Meanchey and Siem Reap and to secure the District Secretaries firmly to avoid Forces as well as Cadres in various Ministries being scattered in order to gain victory in January 1977 without fail.

Brother Khuon and Brother Doeun replied: “The American shared his comments that he is satisfied and happy with the immediate implementation of the plan because I have restored many forces both in the Military and the Commerce Ministry after *Angkar*’s permission for me (Comrade Doeun) to go down and secure the Commerce Section to replace Brother Khuon. That is, there is enough time to set up contacts and work. Thus, the planned stratagem of attacking the Party Leadership

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Apparatus and capturing the radio station shall be my responsibility as I am in Phnom Penh, and I am already with *Angkar* and in a good position [to do the work] following comments from Brother Khuon. . . But I have the impression, on your side comrade, you are very far from us. Please do whatever needs to be done to gain ultimate mastery in terms of external contacts as I am in a difficult position to offer a direct help, as you are already aware. I cannot go to Siem Reap unless there is a mission to receive guests or special duty assigned by *Angkar*. Therefore, the instructions in letters are not exhaustive. However, comrades, please expend every effort to find solutions and, especially, prepare the support Base in Oddar Meanchey. Successful preparation will produce huge confidence. But, at the same time, you should try hard to keep in constant contact with Comrade Srēng as he has had more experience in preparing military forces than you do. Do whatever needs to be done to make sure contacts are constantly linked and whatever needs to be done to produce a concerted plan.”

With such comments and instructions from Brother Khuon and Brother Doeun on 10 October 1976, I sent a letter to Comrade Srēng, reporting on the successful contact with the Thai and the American and on their positive pledge of absolute assistance. But, importantly, they have requested us to prepare our base forces as soon as possible in the most covert manner to avoid revelation. The first target of attack is to be Phnom Penh, to be followed by the Zones and Sectors. The exact date of the planned attack is to be 10 January 1977. Then Comrade Srēng reported back to me that he was so happy that I had made successful contact with the Thai and American. He continued to say, “I am in total agreement with all your comrade’s external contacts and preparatory measures and those they have proposed to us. I am in significant control of the task, especially in the old Sector I was in charge of for so long. I have managed to secure all elements, ranging from the new Sector Secretary, the District Secretaries and the ministries. I was also able to be in contact with and grasp the forces I had built since the period of political struggle and as well as some Military forces I had handed to the Zone. Generally speaking, it is just a matter of time for Brother Khuon and Comrade Doeun to set the exact date, and any date will do. Do not worry. But importantly, you, comrade and I have to be in

constant contact to avoid imperilling our plan. So, therefore, it is necessary for us to keep in constant contact from now on.”

As for the Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Sector, after contact with the Thai and the American, in October 1976, I have invited the following people [to a meeting]:

The Sector Committee consisted of:

Soth (myself)	Sector Chairman.
Comrade Hean	Sector Deputy Chairman and Chairman of Samraong District.
Comrade Bēng	Sector Member and Chairman of Puok District.
Comrade Sean	Sector Member.

The District Chairmen were:

Comrade Khoeun	Chairman of Soutr Nikom District.
Comrade Da	Chairman of Siem Reap District.
Comrade Sun	Chairman of Chi Kraeng District.
Comrade Chiem (ជ័រ) ម	Chairman of Kralanh District.

Comrade Vat	Chairman of Srei Snam District.
Comrade Nau	Chairman of Chong Kal District.
Comrade Tèm	Chairman of Ampil District.
Comrade Tuy	Chairman of Anlong Veang District.
Comrade Rân	Chairman of Banteay Srei District.
Comrade Hong	Chairman of Svay Leu District.

The Chairmen of Ministries were:

Chhan	Chairman of Sector Communications.
Theab	Chairman of Sector Agriculture.
Yat	Chairman of Sector Handicraft.
Khoeun	Deputy Chairman of Sector Hospital
Chhaom	Chairman of the Sector Office.
Oeum	Chairman of Sector [Fishing] Lots.

Ban	Chairman of Sector Military Logistics.
An	Deputy Chairman of Sector Commerce.
Khoeun	Deputy Director of the Sector Hospital.
Comrade Hean	Chairman of Division Politics.
Comrade Pôl (ប៉ុល)	Deputy Chairman of the Division.
Comrade Huon	Division Logistics and Siem Reap Regimental Political Chairman.
Comrade Chheang	Oddar Meanchey Regiment Political Chairman.
Comrade Lim	Oddar Meanchey Regiment Political Chairman.
Comrade Srân (ស្រាន់)	Regiment Deputy Chairman.
Comrade Han	Deputy Chairman of Regiment.
Comrade Buon	Regiment Logistics
Comrade Phea	Deputy Chairman of Regiment.
Comrade Vorn	Regiment Logistics

The aim of the meeting was to raise awareness about the situation of the planned coup d'état against the Party. The meeting this time was more covert than last time as keeping secrets was a main focus. *[Annotation: The responses of PA Phâl made on 17 March 1977].*

I reported on the successful contact with the Thai and the American in October 1976 and their recognition of the military assistance sought and the proper preparation of our support bases in Oddar Meanchey vis-à-vis Thailand. So our external base was strong. In case we lacked forces, the Thais would help provide more military reinforcements. I asked the comrades attending the meeting not to worry and said we would definitely win if we were well prepared.

In the Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Sector, we had strengthened our military forces at the Bases in many Districts, and we did the same for the Ministries and Offices. So far, we had managed to keep it secret.

[ERN: 00029968-00029970]

“[...] your own District and Road Number 6 without fail, by boosting good cooperation with the Sector army. As for the exact date for combat, I will inform you 15 days in advance. But, for now, if the external situation changes, I will inform you further. Now, please keep it strictly confidential to avoid exposure.”

At the end of the meeting, our comrades made comments, agreed and resolved absolutely to implement the plan. From 25 October to 23 November 1976, the Nationwide Party held a Party Centre Congress, involving both training sessions and visits to all the Zones and Sectors, and all our District cadres, especially the Sector Committee and District Secretaries, came to the Party School in Phnom Penh for training.

On 5 November 1976, we went to the O'smach border crossing again and met with Comrade Hean, Deputy Secretary of the Regiment on guard there. I told him, “Today I am sending a letter to Thailand, and, tomorrow (6 November 1976), I will have more consultations with the Thais, so you, comrade, must help protect and to not allow the

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combatants see us. You are not to attend the meeting.” Then I sent a letter to Mr Richard Messler and CHOUT Chhay Chavan inviting them to meet me at the border for discussion of a number of matters.

I would to clarify that the reason for my further consultations with the Thai and the American was that, on 1 November 1976, we had received a letter from Brother Doeun, instructing me about the coup d'état plan. I totally agreed with the clarifications from Mr Richard Messler, and I discussed them after receiving the letter. After frequent discussions, it was agreed the planned coup d'état was wide, and, if it were not carried out properly, it would be defeated by the Revolution and, as a consequence, all of us would be killed. We had enough forces, but the most important thing was the time: that seemed not so cordial at all. They said the coup d'état could be staged on 10 January 1977, but they needed to propose it to CIA Headquarters and their government. What were their government's instructions? *[Annotation: The responses of PA Phâl completed on 18 March 1977].* I was waiting for their response with great concern, fearing that, when the day arrived, we would all be killed in case they had changed their mind. So I requested them to process it without delay and inform us as soon as possible.

[Anotation: (2). Negotiations and the results of the negotiations.]

On the morning of 6 November 1977, I met with the Thai and the American as before. After asking about our well-being, we went to our old workplace. The American asked me, “What is the purpose of meeting me?” “On Mr Oeun's instructions, I come here to confirm with you whether the date for the planned coup d'état can remain the same, 10 January 1977,” I asked. The American smiled and replied, “These issues...]

[ERN: 00029972-00029985]

[...] Could you meet me again on this issue? I said yes and told Comrade Hean to come here on 20 November 1976 for security protection as I was busy

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working. *[Annotations: The responses of PA Phàl on 15 March 1977]. [Annotation: IV. The third meeting with the Thai and the American CIA agent]. [Annotation: (1) during the period between the two meetings].*

On 8 November 1976, I reported to Brother Doeun to inform Brother Khuon that the date to stage the coup d'état (to be 10 January 1977) had not yet been finally decided because the CIA Ministry, and the government had not yet replied to Mr Richard Messler in Thailand, and he had asked to meet one more time on 20 November 1976. Brother Doeun suggested that I keep in constant contact with the Thai to be on top of the situation. **[Annotation: The responses of PA Phàl on 18 March 1977]. [Annotation (2) The initial atmosphere at the meeting].**

On 20 November 1977, I went to the O'Smach border gate one more time without the presence of Comrade Hean, who was being busy with the conference in Phnom Penh and tours of the whole country under the direction of Angkar. After arriving at O'Smach, I met Comrade Hean, who had then arranged security protection as usual. I met the Thai and the American as previously planned. After sitting for a while, I saw four Thais and the American in a Jeep, and the Thai police were in a separate car. They stopped in front of me, and they came to shake hands before we proceeded to our discussions. The American asked me about the current situation in Phnom Penh. I said: "The current situation is normal, no major exposure has occurred despite a series of successive arrests of our forces." He asked me if there were revelations recently. I replied, "According to Doeun's report, nothing is unusual. It remains normal, but it is not known whether Angkar knows or not. I have no idea." He continued to ask: "How about your forces?" "Mine are okay," I replied. He continued, saying, "If your forces are fine, then maybe there has been no revelation of this matter, so we should continue with our efforts to achieve victory." I asked him about the time of staging the planned coup d'état which was to be on 10 January 1977, and whether he could confirm it as Mr Doeun and Mr KOY Thuon were waiting. *[Annotations: (The responses of PA Phàl on 18 March) (3) The view of the Americans on the setting of the date for the planned coup d'état].*

The American laughed and said: “Do not panic. The information [about it] is sufficient now, do not worry.” He continued, “Based on a report from my government and the CIA, I would like inform you and Mr KOY Thuon of the following:

With regard to the planned coup d'état, the government and the CIA have agreed on the general plan of the coup d'état against the Cambodian Revolution. If it were to be achieved, it would be very fruitful as it is of a strategic nature indicating a zero-sum game in the future. But we cannot take a risk. With respect to our remaining forces, we may definitely face a major defeat. It is imperative to draw from the experience of the Soviets and the Yuon. This year (1976) we have lost many of our total forces, and now we cannot do anything. ~~The forces of Mr Chhouk, Ya, and mean have all been arrested. The forces of Mr KOY Thuon have been destroyed significantly, and he himself is under detention. This is a major defeat.~~ However, the America still has some remaining forces for use, without which it would be the same case as with the Soviets and the Yuon, which had proceeded toward failure. Therefore, strategically, we must absolutely keep our forces intact. Looking back to the months of January to May 1976, the forces of the Soviets and the Yuon were numerous, so had been the forces of KOY Thuon. However, now these forces are not useful, and they have been reduced significantly in addition to KOY Thuon being detained from May to October 1976. The situation of the planned coup d'état may also have been revealed, so the Revolutionary forces will be aware. Thus, it will not be easy to stage a coup d'état. If we take the risk, we must fail. As a matter of principle, we must now preserve our forces to stage a successful coup d'état later. If we want to stage a coup d'état, it is imperative to keep it strictly secret and wait until the Khmer Rouge have forgotten themselves. So our temporary plan to stage a coup d'état on 10 January 1977 must be postponed, and it has been decided officially by the government and the CIA to take place on 15 March 1977 instead, when more persistently strong forces can be organized in Phnom Penh as they are key to our prominent victory.” He continued to say: “Now, we are seriously responsible for staging the coup d'état alone, without the involvement of the Soviets or the Yuon, which have reported that they have no forces left to do it at all, but that they will help the U.S. along the border and on the maritime boundary in case full-scale war breaks

out. That's why we have to be cautious at this time. Thus, there is a need to change some tactics to defeat the Revolution and delay until 15 March 1977."

When the Americans delayed like this, I begged him to stage it by 10 January 1977 instead, because our forces were being gradually exposed, and to not delay beyond this proposed date for fear of drained forces. He replied: "I really want to meet your request, but the government and the CIA have already determined this before their decision on the date. So please do not worry and follow the plan, and we will win." [*Annotation: The responses of PA Phâl on 18 March 1977*].

[Annotation: V. Final effects]

Angkar allowed us to attend study sessions from 25 November 1976 to 6 December 1977. On 25 November 1977, I met Comrade Srēng, who asked me about the situation at the border. I said we had been in normal contact and faced no difficulties, and I told him about the new situation in which the planned coup d'état has been delayed to 15 March 1977 by the American government ~~and the CIA~~. Comrade Srēng said: "It's a painfully long time from now. I have been preparing forces, and there may be revelations to Angkar, which will arrest them all. ~~we cannot escape~~. Why didn't you negotiate with them to help stage the coup d'état before 10 January 1977?" My answer was that it was the decision by their government and the CIA and ~~that although Richard Messler had agreed with us about our proposed date, he did not dare refuse~~. "So comrade please do not be sad, just follow their decision [~~to carry the coup d'état~~] on 15 March 1977; ~~do not be complicated so that our forces can be organized most quickly~~," I said.

Comrade Srēng confirmed: "If so, I am also in agreement with it as they have equipment and if they do not give us, we cannot get it, so it is better to follow them. I ~~agreed on this issue in order to have well prepared forces~~."

On 28 November 1976, Brother Doeun met with me and asked me along the way the results of the liaison with the Thais. I said: "There is no problem. They just want to wait to help us, and their government has decided to delay the planned coup d'état until 15 March 1977. Their reasons are that, if the coup d'état is to be staged

too soon, there will be no time for preparation of forces and the recent revelations posed a serious possibility of failure. In addition, this time, the Soviets and the Yuon will not join us as they have no more forces available. ~~Their reasons to delay the plan for more the preparation of stronger and more forces seem to be acceptable.~~ Brother Doeun asked me why I had not asked them to help implement the plan sooner. I said it was impossible since it had been the decision made by their government ~~and that Mr Richard Messler dared not refuse as well.~~ Brother Doeun went on to say: "Sot, do you know that I haven't met Brother Khuon since mid-October 1976, and ~~up to now~~ I have no idea to where he has been removed by Angkar. Maybe Angkar has already arrested him. ~~who will more likely implicated us.~~ So it's not a simple issue here." I replied: "There may be no problem. No leader would implicate us." He continued, "It may be true. ~~You are right. And nowadays I find it difficult to work without his comments. And it will be much more difficult when the time to stage the coup d'état arrives.~~ But this is my responsibility, which cannot be shirked, and it must be carried out absolutely."

On 5 January 1977, Brother Doeun reported to me, saying: "Up to now, I still have not met with Brother Khuon. Nothing has been heard of him. I have had no advice from him. It must be that Angkar has already arrested him. He may have confessed many more issues as Khuon's operatives continue to lose their Cadres one after another, both in the ministries and the military. Or, maybe, he has been removed by Angkar. This has cut off some of my contacts, and I am now in a very complicated situation having not met Brother Khuon and having to shoulder the burden of the Commerce with almost daily foreign communications as well as the ministerial work. I have failed to recruit more forces and now have to recruit more new operatives as the time to stage the coup d'état is a bit far off (March 1977), but we still have more time."

I had already reported the above to Comrade Srēng, so that he would know the situation on my side. He responded, "Any struggle always faces obstacles, but it depends significantly on Brother Khuon, whether or not he has implicated us, and if that is the case, there must be a huge failure resulting from revelations. But if he has not implicated us, we will be able to proceed without him. I don't think he, as a

leader, would implicate us, because he would receive the same fate even if he does so. He must not do so because, if he does, my side will face some arrests as a result of exposure. But the situation on my side has not changed significantly. It remains normal.”

On 8 January 1977, I replied to Brother Doeun: “The situation on my side remains unchanged. Nothing has yet become problematic, and there has been no exposure. But, on your side, there are some complex issues. I’m guessing, if there has not been any major exposure, we can proceed normally until the date of the planned coup d’état. However, in case of change, keep me informed.”

Based on my subjective stance, being overjoyed with rank, credit and prestige, betraying our Party, portraying its value as lower than an animal, we had not thought about possible revelations of our secrets, and we acted as if nothing had happened, still trying to recruit traitorous forces, contacting cadres who were District Secretaries, military regiments, and Ministry Chairmen and urging them to carry out our traitorous assignments against our own righteous Party which had eliminated the imperialists, feudalists and capitalists *[Annotation: The responses of PA Phâl done on 18 and 19 March 1977]* in the very difficult struggle movement until it eventually liberated its territory and people, while I turned to kneel down and pay homage to the feet of the imperialists to oppress my own people.

This was an extremely cheap act.

~~These are the reasons why Angkar arrested me after having been well aware of my treason. They arrested me on 21 February 1977 and brought me to detain me at the security office in Phnom Penh up until now.~~

~~We have reported to the highly respected Angkar these extremely cheap treasonous acts, and request Angkar to spare my life so that I can refashion myself to become a person who is loyal to the Party and who follows the Party without wavering forever.~~

19 March 1977

[Signature]

Soth