

Minutes of the Meeting of Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Divisions and
Independent Regiments

9 October 1976, Time: 14.00



Agenda:

- I. Party anniversary to be held on 11 October 1976
- II. Study sessions
- III. The situation of the national defence and our defensive measures
- IV. Issues of agricultural production and foodstuff
- V. Issues of health of military personnel
- VI. Others

Bang (older brother/sister) 89:

I would like to introduce the request for the Party celebration and its supposed participants. We are holding our Party Festival a little off-schedule this year because *Angkar* (the Organization) has been busy, but what is important is the content. I would like to make clear that based on what the Party has stipulated, the Party Anniversary was previously dated from 1951, but now it is stipulated as dating from 30 September 1960 instead. It was then that we had proper Statutes and a correct line. Our Party has repeatedly changed its names. Initially, it was the Revolutionary People's Party, then the Labourers' Party and then it finally changed its name to the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

- This ceremonial festival is held in order to study our Party's history with a view to whipping up and giving an impetus to the movement to build up the country.

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There will be 300 military personnel to participate.

The important issues involved in the anniversary are:

1. To absolutely provide security protection 100 per cent.
2. To select our cadres, party members and army soldiers who are the core to encourage the involvement of the masses to defend and build the country and to lead the units of organization vigorously and who are able to comprehend the essence [of the anniversary].
3. Good Party and Youth League members guarantee political clarity.

Time: 5.30 a.m.

Place: Olympic Stadium

Dress code: Military uniform

Weapons or similar will not be allowed.

II. Study sessions

The studies this time are of greater importance than before in terms of their content in deepening the socialist revolution, building socialism and the task of defending the country. In principle, the studies are expected to last from 10 to 15 days in two sessions.

The trainees of each session will include military personnel from divisions, regiments and battalions. The participants must be:

1. Politically clean.
2. Able to comprehend the content.

They must be selected directly from the Battalion Permanent Committee.

Date of gathering: 18 October

Date of session: 19 October

Invite secretaries and members of the Regiment Committee as well as the Permanent Battalion Committee. Divide into two separate sessions with the same content.

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Participants who do not meet these criteria will not be accepted.

III. The situation of the national defence

Representatives of each unit of organization report as follows:

Comrade Suong (ស្នង់):

Nothing is posed with regard to external enemies. Internally, some phenomena have emerged: some battalion cadre behave disobediently and freely give things to various zones. Some company cadres behaved inappropriately in terms of eating and communication – such as surreptitiously cooking rice to eat at night and stealing poultry for food. Three combatants have fled to sleep in the forest, where they are getting ready to steal milled rice, chickens or weapons with an intention to continue their flight. Those cadres whose parents had been swept out by us have manifested an authoritarian attitude in relation to the masses. A company cadre named Soeun (ស៊ីន) stole a letter from his fellow company cadre and ran away. He was finally arrested by the authority in the base area. This person has done the Revolution twice and joined the enemy twice.

Ninety-nine per cent of the cadres and combatants in the unit of organization are good, although there are some battalion cadres who are not good, but there are only one or two of these.

The biographies of some battalion secretaries have not yet been clearly grasped, for example, those in Prey Veng.

Comrade San:

The external situation in September was that there were some arrests on the 502 front. There was Pring (ប្រឹង) who had fled from Prateah Lang (ប្រទះឡាង) Commune, and who said he was part of a group that was about to hold a demonstration when they were arrested by the grassroots.

- A few days ago, someone who was wearing both men's and women's clothes and long hair was shot dead at Wat Chumpou Voan (ជំពូក្រីន) Pagoda.

As for the unit of organization, there is desertion to the grassroot level and contact made with bandits. For example, there was the contemptible Sokha (សុខា), from whom we got a number of answers implicating certain individuals, but then he committed suicide by hanging.

- One from the company level in Regiment 51 said, "When we transplanted paddy during the national democratic revolution there was progress, but when we transplant in the socialist revolution we retrogress. Before we ate rice by the bushel, now we eat rice by the can."
- More than 80 elements with political tendencies have already been removed.

Comrade Mēt added: For the examination on the situation of enemy outside and within the unit of organization, from September to early October there have been major changes. For the target who was shot at Wat Chumpou Voan Pagoda, we surmise he was an enemy and not from within the unit of organization. One phenomenon was that a squad chief shot himself in the hand. He said it was because he did not feel like working.

A certain number of people who had fled to Sector 31 have had contact with the 1st Division and were subjected to purging measures by Comrade Soeung (សៀង).

In Chreav (ជ្រាវ) Commune, combatants who went to clear forest in the base became links of bandits who gave them wristwatches.

Comrade Dīm (ឌីម):

With regard to the enemy situation outside the border area, there were three military vessels which entered our territorial waters and we chased them, but we could not keep pace with them.

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On land, along the railway at Roluos (រលួស), we seized a boy who was the son of a soldier and had been kidnapped by bandits who took him to live with them and made him go and reconnoitre. This boy said the command post of these bandits was on the top of Mount Kandal (កណ្តាល), where there are five of them living in a camp where they have pitched tents and set up narrow canvas beds.

We seized a 13 year-old girl in the vicinity of the fresh water (Toek Sap) area. She confessed that she was among a group of three, who are probably staying at Ou Phos (អូរផុស) now.

We managed to arrest bandits one after another around Ream's Kang Keng (កងកែង). They were among those who had just gone into the forest recently.

On the night of 8 October, we arrested a milled rice thief at the Kampong Som port, who said he had come all the way from Veal Rinh (វាលរឹង).

The unit's situation

- One combatant who was ill pretended to be disoriented and took a grenade as if he was going to throw it into a meeting, saying that he was in love with a female media person. He pretended to be ill to be hospitalized and see this woman.
- Another combatant named San (សាន) tied five grenades under the bed of Comrade Roeun (រ៉ូន). He was arrested to be brought in, but escaped.

Comments by Bang 89:

I would like to inform you of the significance of this report with regard to our duty of defending the country.

- First, I would like to provide information about the certain number of traitors in the Party whom we have been able to arrest.
- Second, from the responses of these men, we knew of a certain number of their plans.
- Third, to inform you of our measures and a number of experiences we have had in relation to the task of defending the country.

The traitorous links we have arrested one after the other compromised three networks, but at the end of the day, there is but a single network. First, we arrested the traitorous links in Division 170. You must take note with regard to this problem to maintain secrecy and not to disseminate this to the lower levels.

At that time, our analysis with regard to the enemy to the West was that it was evolving toward becoming inconsequential. The victories of the Revolution were improving our capabilities. As for the enemy to the East, it was experiencing difficulties, and we said it was not yet able to do anything to us. However, we did not take much notice of the enemies who were conducting activities to attack us from within.

- The history of Chakrei (ចក្រី) is that he was originally in the North Zone, and when the struggle was in place and difficulties emerged, he fled and disappeared for a while, and then entered the East Zone's Sector 24.
- A while later, we learnt some information about the links of the contemptible Sokh in Sector 25. Next, there were clear responses about links in the city. We made a breakthrough in principle as we got information from the enemy that implicated Sophan (សុផាន់). We had the contemptible Chakrei followed up. Chakrei then informed the contemptible Sophan, breaking our secrecy.

Previously, there were the incidents of guns being fired near the Fine Arts School and leaflets being thrown near the [Royal] Palace. Then in early April 1976,

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they threw grenades and threw leaflets again. We felt that these were enemy activities. Those implicated in the answers from those we were able to arrest went right up to Chakrei. Before he was arrested, we had seen two pieces of evidence. First, the letter written to Sophan saying his wife was about to give birth and that he should find her a Khmer healer from the east, and then, Sophan's responding letter saying that he would respect everything his elder brother wanted.

Upon arrest, he responded clearly that he was a Khmer Serei link and that his boss was Chhouk (ឈ្មោះ), the Secretary of Sector 24. We arrested Chhouk, and he responded that he had contacts with a Vietnamese to make arrangements to attack our Party's leading apparatus. They would attack from the inside while Vietnam would attack from the outside. The Yuon was named BAI Map (បែរ ម៉ាប). Chhouk's responses ultimately implicated Ya (យ៉ា). We arrested Ya, and he responded that he had been a traitor since 1962 along with somebody else named KEO Meas (កែវ មាស). This network had created a new party back in 1962 and was linked with İM Ao Rai (អ៊ឹម ឱរ៉ៃ) and KİM Sèt (គឹម សែត). We could then see clearly what had been going on with the unrest in Koh Kong and the problem of contradictions between Sector 25 and Sector 33.

We have basically smashed the leadership links, but their henchmen still exist.

Our analysis of the situation:

1. First: The enemy to the West: What are the possibilities for the American and their lackeys?

According to the CIA agents we have been able to arrest, they had plans to attack us starting from 1977. They would attack us by committing aggression against us at sea, taking islands, especially Koh Tang and Koh Wai islands, in addition to taking positions along the Koh Kong front using traitorous forces belonging to SON Ngoc Thanh (ស៊ីង ង៉ុកថាន់).

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Another plan was to attack along the Battambang frontier using the IN Tam-SEK Sàm Iet (អ៊ិន តាំ- សែក សំអឿត) groups. Another force would attack from within through bandit activities, incitement and stirring up unrest.

We have basically smashed the CIA agents on the inside. As for the problem of attacks from the outside by the traitorous Khmer in bases in America and Thailand, they would lose to our Revolution.

Now there is a coup in Thailand. This new coup in Thailand is being staged by the super-rightist reactionaries, who are being fought against by the people and are being more vigorously attacked by the Thai revolutionary force.

We previously won the fight, and now the internal enemy force has been smashed. We used to defeat the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.

Therefore, the Americans are now trying to make their plans look prominent in an attempt to encourage their followers inside [our country] to dare to carry out their activities.

2. Second: The enemy to the East: The key plan of the enemy of the East, the Vietnamese with the Soviets behind them, was to attack from the inside through the traitorous forces of Ya, KEO Meas, Chhouk and Chakrei. What they would have liked in terms of an attack from the outside was to attack in the Czechoslovakian and Angolan style, but this was merely a morale boost because given our situation, this was not something the enemy could do. Now the major traitorous forces belonging to them have been smashed by us, and this is one of the major victories in the history of our Party. Their links were big historical super-traitors to the nation and Party, and this was a major experience for us.

Comparing the Angolan situation to our situation, they are totally different. We have had a leading Communist Party for more than 20 years and are in possession of an army, a political administration, a tenaciously struggling people and an economy

with which to support ourselves. Our army is one that defeated American imperialism, having previously fought with its bare hands and has also fought experimentally with Vietnam, too.

In addition, comparing with Czechoslovakia at that time, the people revolted to take power. It was a sudden revolution and it was yet to be very strong.

Examining our post-liberation vigilance measures in the army, we have again and again strengthened it politically, ideologically and organizationally, but we have not yet paid attention to doing so powerfully in the infantry, which has been busy with production. However, the important thing is precisely that our army be clean and pure, and solid politically, ideologically and organizationally. Now it is requested that the following measures are adopted:

1. In terms of our prospective and standpoint, we must further heighten our spirit of revolutionary vigilance. Previously, we had raised this problem, but we did not have anything in terms of documentation that was as clear and alive as this new documentation. It is therefore imperative to have lofty revolutionary vigilance and to ensure defence of the Party and the Revolution.

Concretely operationalizing revolutionary vigilance means having a firm grip on our units of organization, ensuring that the enemy is unable to bore from within, and doing whatever needs to be done to make our army clean. Both the American imperialist CIA side and the Yuon-Soviet revisionist side have their plans for boring from within to create a new party to oppose us.

The important thing in revolutionary vigilance is to precisely grasp the political and ideological stance of a clean army.

Another thing is that it is absolutely necessary to maintain secrecy.

The third thing is that it is imperative to set up and give assignments to combat forces in order to fight and fend off enemy action that may arise unexpectedly.

2. It is imperative to have a firm grasp of the contradictions in Kampuchean society, because the contradiction between us and the exploiting classes is

more acute than before in the sense that they have lost state power, which we possess; we are on top of them.

It is imperative to grasp the external contradictions: that is, with American imperialism, about which we know already, and with the Vietnamese, which is becoming more acute. Before we said they [the Vietnamese] were friends with whom we had contradictions. Now, they are genuinely our enemies. We previously did not know clearly what their plans were, but now we know clearly that they have created a traitorous party obviously to attack our Party. They will do this again in the future. They will not be stopping.

Is this because we are making socialist revolution or what?

If we had left the people and had not evacuated them from cities and towns, we would not have the peace and tranquillity we enjoy today. If we had not been absolute about making cooperatives, and not been absolute about making socialism, we would not be victorious and live in peace. If we had not made cooperatives, the Yuon would still have attacked us.

These are contradictions between a correct revolution and a counterfeit revolution, contradictions between a revolution and American imperialism, contradictions between a stance of independence and a stance of where the people accept being lackeys. In fact, any revolution has such problems, although by comparison, we have had the most, but this road is the correct road.

For example: It is imperative to educate the brothers and sisters so that they understand the state of contradictions arising from the enemies boring from within and from the enemies' tricks, and to do so in such a way that this permeates all the way to the bottom.

3. It is imperative to purge absolutely no-good elements, but not to be left or right politically.
4. In Phnom Penh, along the border and in the air, it is imperative to set up combat forces to fight the enemies if they throw caution to the wind and attack from the outside. Each division must set up an on-duty unit, especially of

infantry, that is armed in advance. This is the final measure, but the important thing is that the army is made clean through political and ideological measures first of all.

Comrade Dīm:

I would like to be in unity with *Angkar*'s presentation about the enemies' internal and external situations. Before, I had suspected some and not suspected some because all these individuals held important leadership posts. I have now therefore heightened vigilance even more.

In the past, the enemy conducted activities in the divisions, but there were shortcomings in attacking the enemy, to which not a lot of attention was paid. With regard to this problem, if you think about it, the activities of one or two enemies on the inside can wreck the strength of the Revolution. For example, they could burn down storage depots, for a start.

I had known something about this problem of the enemy creating a new party from the instructions that came one after another from the Party, but it did not go so deep as the information that I have now heard from the Party.

From an examination of my forces, some 90 to 95 per cent of them are reliable, those who are loyal to the Party. But if you want unsullied faith that the army is clean, it seems not yet to be clean, and it is imperative to follow up with more purges.

Comrade Sokh (សុខ):

According to what I have listened to and to previous examinations of enemy situations from outside and from within, some things were clear-cut and others not clear-cut because of some attachments of sentiment. It is only after having listened to the views of the Organization that I see clearly how systematic things are, and that I have a feeling of clarity.

Division 170 has purged 70 no-good elements and is keeping them in one place. All weapons have been taken away, except for a few that were kept.

I would like to be in unity with the Party.

Comrade Täl (តាល់):

I would like to be in total agreement with *Angkar*'s presentation, but examination shows that there are still a lot of elements remaining in the unit of organization. Company cadre manifested opposition activities by not disseminating the Party line within the unit of organization or by not distributing the *Banners* magazine to the unit of organization. A phenomenon of the theft of ration rice to set it aside and cook and eat it alone has emerged.

Ninety per cent of this unit of organization is reliable as regards defending the Party. The remaining 10 per cent are not yet enthusiastic. In the past, if we removed the no-good elements and concentrated them somewhere, we did not know where to keep them.

Additional Views of *Bang* 89:

Some concrete measures:

1. It is imperative for each division to set up forces of a battalion or a company as practicable as a combat force that is combat-ready.
2. To prepare weapons and ammunition in a masterly manner.
3. To well prepare combat radio communication.
4. To prepare on-duty trucks and not to use them for other purposes.

Comrade Pin (ពិន):

As regards the problem of traitors and the Party's measures, I agree completely. The reason for the treason is these men's contradictions about status and rank.

Our experience with these traitors is that they take an absolute stance, and even though we have arrested their bosses, they are continuing with their activities.

As for the problem of having a grasp on the unit of organization, after repeated study and purges, it is possible to guarantee the defence of the Party. Some

remain: diehards, those who rob and steal, and those making contradictions about status and rank, of whom 80 have been concentrated in one place. These people have no potential for continuing revolutionary activities with everybody else because they are not in line with the Revolution.

One company cadre contradicted his superiors, and then when the collective refashioned him, he pretended to go into convulsions.

Comrade Suong:

As regards the problem of traitors raised by the Party, I am more and more concerned about these enemies. They will clearly continue their activities, and these certainly are taking place within the unit of organization.

The enemies who have infiltrated the unit of organization are conducting activity after activity, attacking the Revolution in words.

For example: They are opposing the paddy-farming plan, taking combatants who are ill to lie in the paddy fields and compelling them to work although they are ill. As the revolutionary struggle becomes more and more profound, these enemies will certainly contradict the Revolution more and more strongly and sharply, and there can be no reconciliation with them.

The no-good elements have been rounded up, but not yet entirely purged. I have a grasp of those who are liberal to a certain degree. The no-goods have gone quiet for a while.

Comrade Oeun (អ៊ុន):

In the past, the Party gave repeated education about events taking place inside the Party and inside leading units of the organization, about the enemies boring from within. There was indoctrination about this problem inside the unit of organization and the core organizations, and this indoctrination was internalized by them to a degree. However, I had never previously imagined that there was treason at such an important level as in the information that the Organization has got today. Now, I am clearly and fully informed.

I believe, with regard to the enemies' plans to attack the Revolution, that they will not be able to attack as they have intended, because the Party has a firm grip on the situation and is able to maintain mastery in every circumstance.

The unit of organization is reliable to a considerable degree vis-à-vis the Party, but a number of cadre's biographies are not yet clearly grasped, and it is not known whether they are clean, reliable or enthusiastic, nor not clean. There is the phenomenon of those who are concealing their biographies, all the way up to the company cadre level, those who originally were White Khmer or who have lived with the Vietnamese. In total, we have got 36 no-goods. Their action was to incite the brothers and sisters to drink insecticide, and a whole platoon was poisoned.

I would like to be in agreement with the Party's preparatory measures in terms of forces.

Comrade Pheap (ភីង):

I would like to be in unity with *Angkar's* presentation.

I have an impression on the enemies burrowing within the Party and units of organization.

My analysis on the enemy's plan to attack the Revolution shows it is impossible for the enemy to do so, because the Party is clever and has mastery of the enemy situation.

In the units of organization there are inferior persons: those who believe in the enemy's tricks, those who are lazy, those who pretend to be ill and those who are discontented with this regime.

Comrade Nai (ណៃ):

As for the traitors, my perspective and standpoint is that I am happy about the measures of the Party in discovering and arresting them. I have more and more confidence in the Party, in the socialist revolution and in building socialism.

As for shortcomings, there is still an ideology of pacifism within the unit of organization, negligence in patrolling and the phenomenon of stealing fruit and even, material from guests. After re-education, the stolen things were surreptitiously returned.

The bad elements have been rounded up into one group. One blurted out that he wanted to flee to Thailand. The phenomena of contradictions over status and rank and wanting to have pistols have appeared.

Comrade Mēt (ម៉ែត៍):

After the Party revealed the upper traitorous links belonging to American imperialism and the revisionists, I was happy and had more faith in the Party. This experience proves that our Party has a solid grip on things and a stance of constant vigilance. If there are contradictions, it [the Party] grasps them clearly, and this is a victory for our Party.

With regard to this problem, it can be said that the enemies have been basically eliminated, but it is imperative to take further measures to prevent this from happening a second, a third, a fourth or more times.

The enemy will not be able to do anything to us so long as our military is politically hard and clean. It is imperative to strengthen the Party politically, ideologically and organizationally. It is imperative to dare absolutely to conduct purges.

Comrade Mut (មុត៍):

I would like to speak about the concern shown with the activities of the traitors within the Party, that this has been a great victory for our Party. This lesson has strengthened, to a further degree, the standpoint of revolutionary vigilance.

We have been indoctrinated with the Party's standpoint that a correct standpoint analyses these enemies as being American imperialists and revisionists with plans to attack our Revolution.

As for the problem of the grasp on the unit of organization, cadre and combatants, it is not yet firm. No-good elements or enemies are still camouflaged and infiltrated in the rank and file. The most important factor is the grasp of the everyday ideology of the core organizations.

It is imperative to make arrangements to take measures so as to seize the initiative in advance. On this I would like to be in total agreement and unity with the Party. Do whatever needs to be done in not allowing the situation to get out of hand and not to let them strengthen or expand themselves at all.

Comrade Nat (ណាត):

I would like to express my happiness about the Party's victory in smashing traitorous links. The Party has discovered and dug out this treason by its very roots. Before, I was well aware of all this, but only theoretically, not yet in any concrete way. As regards these revisionists, I am now fully enlightened through these living documents that the Party has spread out before me.

[...] the enemy to the West, despite the coup d'état in Thailand, is unable to attack us. The enemy to the East, the revisionists, is our absolute enemy and very dangerous, but we have dug it out by the very roots, and even if a few remain, it would be quite difficult for them to attack us.

I would like to be in agreement with all the Party's measures.

Comrade Vin (វីន):

We are happy that the party has been able to arrest these traitors. We are proud, have a clear will and have the morale to make socialist revolution even more powerfully.

Comrade Săo (ស្រី):

Upon having heard the presentation by the older brother representative of the Organization, I was happy because before, I was never concerned that there was

treason among the higher-ups as is now the case. It is only now that my perspective and standpoint have been strengthened to another degree.

Comrade Sim (ស៊ីម):

My feeling about the arrest of these traitors is that this should be considered a great victory for the Party, and in my heart I am happy. I believe the enemy can do nothing to us, because the Party is quick-witted and has mastery over the situation. In the unit of organization, there was a phenomenon of words being spoken that if [they] have got back-up, [they] would not make revolution. One battalion cadre who had studied with LY Phèl (លី ផែល) made conducted repeated trouble-making activities within the unit of organization. When he was in the East Zone hospital, he stirred up trouble in the hospital. In the paddy-farming place in Prey Sa (ព្រៃសា), an M-79 round exploded while rice was being cooked, destroying the cooking pan.

Bang 89's summary views:

I. General points

1. The meeting is in agreement with the reports of the General Staff and the points raised by the Party.
2. Those present at the meeting are in unity with the Party in considering that the arrest of these traitors is a great victory over the revisionists who were following the secret road and had been infiltrating for more than ten years already.
3. These events have heightened our spirit of vigilance.
4. These experiences have further heightened our concerns about those elements with no-good biographies, whose ideology is highly status- and rank-oriented, and whose entry into the Party was not in a proper state, such as Chakrei, Ya and KÈV Meas. This is an important lesson as regards a standpoint of lofty

revolutionary vigilance, in particular as regards being on guard against status- and rank-conscious elements.

Another lesson results in our realizing that trivial activities attacking the Revolution, such as stealing and speaking in hints that attack the Revolution, are all issues that stem from such traitorous links.

II. The problem of analysing enemy situations

1. Our enemies are both internal and external. But the determining factor is an attack from within. Now, we have smashed to smithereens these internal stratagems, and smashed them to smithereens strategically. The external attack stratagem is that of aggression merely used as activities to boost the morale of those on the inside so that they will have the courage to conduct activities. The wish of the American imperialists and the revisionists in doing this is to attack the Kampuchean Revolution by saying it enjoys no security. They attack it politically on the international stage in order to prevent us from building up the country, and they also take up opportunities to launch incursions; if they had something on the inside, they could do this. Now, we have smashed to smithereens their contemptible traitorous commanders. The enemy plans are in chaos, but they are more furious with us than ever because they have lost all their [political] capital.

Our perspective is that we must not be subjective. The enemy will continue to conduct minor activities in the sea and along the border. As for the trivial enemies within, it is imperative to pay attention to them and to prevent them from conducting activities, so as to defend the Party and the fruits of the Revolution, as well as the precious blood of the almost one million people, combatants and cadre who died in the war.

In summary, we have defeated the enemy and defeated him fundamentally and strategically so that he no longer has any [political] capital, but the enemy will attack us again; the enemy is extremely furious with us.

III. Our measures

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1. In terms of perspective and standpoint, it is imperative to further heighten the spirit of revolutionary vigilance and, most importantly, vigilance with regard to concrete operationalization: concretely, to have a solid grasp on the army.
2. It is imperative to have a solid grasp on the contradictions in our national society, on both antagonistic and secondary contradictions. Do not be a pacifist or constructionist. It is imperative to grasp contradictions in the world, where there are also antagonistic and secondary contradictions. In our status as an army, we must know the subjects that we must attack, namely American imperialism, and the Vietnam revisionists and their traitorous henchmen. This is an antagonistic contradiction between a genuinely revolutionary line and a counterfeit revolutionary line. The contradictions within the domestic exploiting classes are not on account of the Party's line being wrong or on account of our making socialist revolution.
3. We must solidly grasp our duties. Our duties are to defend the Party, the Revolution, the Party's line on socialist revolution, the Party Statues and the Party's leading Organization, which is the progenitor of the Party line.

At the same time, we must consider the duty of building up the country as duty number two. We must participate in the building up of the country and make sure we support ourselves [illegible] the Party, but if a problem arises in terms of defending the country, we must have the courage to reduce and slacken what we are doing in terms of this duty of building up the country.

4. It is imperative to have units of organization firmly in hand. What is meant by grasping? Grasping what? Grasping the Party, grasping core organizations, grasping male and female combatants, grasping their biographies clearly, and grasping their standpoints and ideology clearly. This is the main problem, the core problem, the key link in measures to defend our country.

Operational methods

1. Continuous education is imperative.
2. It is imperative to purge no-good elements absolutely in the sense of an absolute class struggle. The purge is premised on three principles:

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- Category 1: The dangerous category: they must be absolutely purged.
- Category 2: The ordinary liberal category: they must be educated again and again in our education schools.
- Category 3: The category of those who have merely been incited by the enemy, merely believing in the enemy incitement. As a first step, they should undergo refashioning to get them to no longer believe the enemy.

5. Military arrangement for protection

During and after the preparation for political, ideological and organizational sessions, intervention forces must be prepared to fend off the enemy's possible attack. On-duty forces must be ready for intervention. Transportation of forces must be in mastery control.

6. Miscellaneous problems

1. a. The problem of analysing or discovering the enemy: if phenomena already exist, you must find the reason, the source, where they come from.
- b. Wherever an incident takes place, you must look there.
- c. If there is evidence, then you must follow up.

2. All units must be reorganized, and all biographies must be grasped again.

- In Division 170 it is imperative to examine links from Sector 24, Sector 25, Sector 33 and those from the rubber plantations.

- In Division 290 there are problems, too. We have taken a certain number of cadres, and they have confessed already.

- Logistics must also be purged.

3. Summing up the stipulations: The problem arises of the names of all these traitors: we do not disseminate them. It is imperative to maintain absolute secrecy. In educating the brothers and sisters, educate them only in terms of perspective and standpoint.

4. - As for agricultural production, medium-term rice continues.

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- Good hygienic conditions for the brothers and sisters must be created.

Comrade Nat's additional comments on agricultural production:

1. Short-term rice has almost been completed 100 per cent as planned.
2. Long-term rice yield increases, regardless of that from 801 and 920.
3. Water shortage and floods are no longer a problem.
4. The problem is that we failed to harvest all the cultivated rice due to the facts that we harvested in the water, had no land to dry it on, the long distance of transportation, and the failure to thresh it or dry it.

Bang 89's added:

- For the floating rice, the Neak Loeng (អ្នកល្បី) and Boeng Cheung Ek (បឹងជើងឯក) areas need to do this without fail.
- Ready to do the same at [illegible].
- 290, 170 and [illegible] must cultivate corn in the river-recess season without fail.
- Food [illegible] the brothers and sisters should be nourished.

Statistics on paddy already transplanted

| Unit | Short-term rice | | | | | Long-term rice | | | | |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|----------------|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | Plan | Transplanted as of | | | | Plan | Transplanted as of | | | |
| | | 30 Aug | 19 Sep | 30 Sep | 10 Oct | | 30 Aug | 19 Sep | 30 Sep | 10 Oct |
| 1. S-21 | 90 | 77 | 113 | 113 | 113 | 330 | 107 | 262 | 391 | 391 |
| 2. Mor-62 | 40 | 33 | 57 | 97 | 57 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3. Mor-63 | 100 | 75 | 105 | 110 | 110 | 390 | 107 | 169 | 169 | 169 |
| 4. 152 | 125 | 93 | 110 | 125 | 125 | 345 | 161 | 310 | 310 | 335 |
| 5. 164 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 | 900 |
| 6. 170 | 400 | 324 | 340 | 351 | 381 | 1000 | 395 | 669 | 965 | 1225 |
| 7. 250 | 150 | 175 | 160 | 160 | 160 | 700 | 250 | 250 | 600 | 687 |
| 8. 310 | 400 | 268 | 278 | 305 | 305 | 1550 | 564 | 937 | 1068 | 1142 |
| 9. 377 | 30 | 32 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 170 | 60 | 79 | 97 | 105 |
| 10. 450 | 350 | 312 | 352 | 380 | 390 | 1350 | 528 | 600 | 672 | 802 |
| 11. 488 | 74 | 74 | 66 | 66 | 66 | 200 | 67 | 91 | 135 | 139 |
| 12. 502 | 410 | 340 | 375 | 378 | 378 | 1156 | 450 | 688 | 804 | 900 |
| 13. 703 | 300 | 231 | 301 | 306 | 309 | 1000 | 377 | 529 | 670 | 716 |
| 14. 801 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1350 | 550 | 550 | 770 | 800 |

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| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------|------|------|------|------|--------|--|-------|------|------|------|------|
| 15. 920 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 1000 | 615 | 615 | 800 | 800 |
| Total | 2569 | 2140 | 2364 | 2481 | 2594 | | 10226 | 5126 | 6649 | 8221 | 9108 |
| Percentage | | 80% | 92% | 96% | 100.9% | | | 50% | 65% | 80% | 89% |

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