

Confession of MEAK Touch (ម៉ាក ទួច), Alias Kèm (កែម), Kampuchean

Ambassador to Laos

History of his Personal Traitorous Activities

[Annotation:

Respected Brother,



His activities in Laos were two, as follows:

1. For the imperialists, he associated with the HCR. He met with IN Tam (អ៊ិន តាំ) to resolve the removal of Khmer immigrants in Laos to Thailand to be deeply indoctrinated against the Revolution. HCR is part of the United Nations. HCR stands for the High Commissioner for Refugees.
2. With the Vietnamese, he worked closely with the Vietnamese Ambassador, DĨNH You Liem (ឌីញ យូលីម) and the Laotian Minister of Foreign Affairs, PHOUN Siphaseut (ហ្វួន ស៊ីផាស៊ីត), on the Indochina Federation strategy. The Vietnamese also needed to use the Khmer immigrants living in Laos.

With Respect,

9 February 1978

[Signature]

21 February 1978

He wrote about his activities in Laos from page 37 onwards.

End of annotation]

I request to report to Angkar the history of my traitorous Angkar

My name is MEAK Touch, alias Kèm. I am 42 years old. I am the Ambassador of Democratic Kampuchea to Laos. I was born in Kaoh Andaet (កោះអណ្តែត) Village, Kaoh Andaet Commune, Srei Santhor (ស្រីសង្កែវ) District, Kampong Cham (កំពង់ចាម) Province. My father's name is Peang (ពោង), and my mother's name is Sum (សុំ). They are currently living in Kaoh Andaet.

In 1976, I left my hometown to live at Botum Vattei (បូតុមវតី) Pagoda in Phnom Penh with my brother, whose name is MEAK Sèm (ម៉ាយ សែម), Chief of the Monks' Residence.

In 1953, I received my certificate, and I left the Francios Bauxdoin School, (ស្រះស្វាយប្រាំង) behind the Royal Palace, to study at Kampuch Botr (កម្ពុជបុត្រ) Private School until 1956. In 1957, I studied in grade 3 at Sihanouk High School in Kampong Cham.

I received a Secondary School Diploma in 1958. I passed the entrance exam for employment as a Labour Secretary at the Ministry of Labour in Phnom Penh in 1959. In the same year, I was linked to the Revolutionary Movement by having been instructed about the Revolution from Brother Vorn (វ៉ន) and Brother Yèm (យ៉ែម).

In 1961, I became a pillar person, and, on 16 April, 1962, I became a member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, introduced by Brother EB On (អែប អុន) and acknowledged by Brother Vorn.

In October, 1963, the State transferred me to work in Kampong Cham. Brother Vorn introduced me formally to KOY Thuon (កុយ ធ្នូន), who was in charge of the Kampong Cham region.

In early November, 1963, KOY Thuon held a meeting to make known my duties: maintaining the office and being a messenger from Kampong Cham to Phnom Penh.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*4 December 1977*

*Kèm*

I carried out those new duties after that. I delivered letters and documents from Angkar to KOY Thuon. Working with him, I observed that he looked gentle, smart and well-mannered.

KOY Thuon was very gentle and caring to me. He asked me about my wellbeing, and he sometimes gave me money or other things when I needed them. His attitude towards me helped make our relationship closer and more understanding.

In March, 1964, at noon, I delivered letters and documents from Phnom Penh to KOY Thuon.

I arrived at his place at lunch time. After having a meal, KOY Thuon asked me to sit down and have a chat.

KOY Thun talked about this and that, and then he said, "According to Angkar's line, revolutionaries have to live with a revolutionary economical spirit and have consideration for the hardship of the people and the Revolution." He continued, "This is Angkar's discipline. However, we are somewhat relaxed in practice. Do not be too strict. We are revolutionary cadre sometimes, and we make allowances sometimes so that we can have energy to work. We think about ourselves to some extent so that it will not be too dry." I did not dare reply to him. I just smiled. KOY Thuon continued, "Protecting our health is also important. Comrade, you should take care of your health because you are often sick." I did not dare react, and then I said goodbye to him and returned home.

I often went to KOY Thuon's house to deliver letters and documents to him, but sometimes I did not meet him. Whenever I met him, he chatted with me about this and that, and he continuously mentioned the issues similar to what he had said previously. KOY Thuon emphasized the world view of private life, saying that it was easy and comfortable, and that there was happiness in a private family.

[Annotation in the left margin]

4 December 1977

*Kèm*

I also thought that KOY Thuon's ideas were somewhat correct.

Later on, in the afternoon, I delivered letters from Angkar to KOY Thuon.

The situation of the Revolution at that time was extremely complicated and severe. Then, KOY Thuon said, "The enemy is clearly disrupting us. They have created a terribly strong campaign to arrest and kill us revolutionaries. Our Revolution, barehanded, talking up our stance of independence, mastery, and self-reliance, has been fighting against an enemy which has all manner and means to oppress the Revolutionary Movement. I do not know how it is going to be." KOY Thuon continued, "The situation in the city is tense and complicated. The countryside is also complicated. Many revolutionaries have been arrested, and a number of others have been killed."

At that time, I also saw the being worn down. I was worried about my own safety.

Later on, when he, KOY Thuon, met me, he mentioned similar issues to me. KOY Thuon particularly emphasized the situation by saying, "The enemy are constantly arresting our comrades here and there." In my mind, I was worried that I too would be arrested by the enemy.

KOY Thuon understood my weaknesses clearly: having an inaccurate view of life, being afraid of danger and death during Revolutionary activities, wanting to live with my family members, thinking only of family, desiring to build a happy and prosperous living standard for my family and to build private happiness. Being naive was another weakness of mine. KOY Thuon used these weaknesses as a basis to lure me. Finally, I believed him and decided to join up with the CIA to make revolution while protecting myself from danger and to earn fame for my family in the future.

On 20 December, 1964, KOY Thuon organized a ceremony to enrol me into the CIA. The ceremony took place at KOY Thuon's house, located in front of Rukha Reak (រុក្ខារក្ស) School in Kampong Cham.

During the induction ceremony, KOY Thuon planted the flag of the United States of America, which consisted of a blue and red surface and 7 stars. In the ceremony, Prang (ប្រាំង) (deceased in 1968) was the one who presented me, and KOY Thuon acknowledged me. During the ceremony, I vowed to serve the CIA forever. Then, KOY Thuon assigned me duties as follows:

1. To build forces,
2. To propagandize and agitate rumours to cause confusion among the masses
3. And to burrow inside the Revolution to destroy the Revolution and destroy the people.

After the ceremony, KOY Thuon threw a small party. At the end of the party, KOY Thuon ended the meeting, and everyone left.

Then, I started performing my duties. I contacted and built two forces as follows:

1. NHAOM San (ញ៉ាម សាន), Former Messenger in the Ministry of Labour in Kampong Cham. His weaknesses were favouring liberalism, having sexual affairs, gambling, and not loving the Revolution.
2. Phou (ភូ), former worker at the Ministry of Labour in Kampong Cham. His weaknesses were also favouring liberalism, having sexual affairs and not loving the Revolution.

The reasons I dared to lure NHAOM San and Phou were that they did not like the Revolution and they were in conflict with the Revolution in terms of daily life. Based on these weaknesses, I instructed them, "The Revolution is an extremely strict regime in terms of way of life and its ideas. It is totally opposite to our current regime. Our current regime meets our needs." Both of them agreed with me. I continued,

“There are only two choices—supporting the Revolution or fighting against it. There is no neutral way. We have to choose between Communism or Liberalism.”

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*11 December 1977*

*Kèm*

Then, NHAOM San and Phou agreed to join the CIA in October, 1965, by having KOY Thuon acknowledge them and me introduce them.

KOY Thuon assigned NHAOM San and Phou the same duties as mine.

The ceremony was followed by a party at which snacks and tea were served. KOY Thuon ended the ceremony, and everyone left.

Then I started to propagandize and spread various rumours at my workplace and among the teachers at the technical school and at the bowling courts. I propagandized, “How can the Revolution be achieved by those few Revolutionists? How can they serve the Revolution if they do not even have proper clothes? No one supports them I don’t know how much longer they can try.” I repeated this propaganda again and again in the above surroundings. I also reported the scattering of the Revolutionary forces, so they would think that the Revolution had no future.

In 1966, KOY Thuon introduced Doeun (ដឿន) and Chhoeun (ឈឿន) to me. He said, “You must accept instructions from Doeun and Chhoeun, because Angkar requires me to work a long distance from here.”

Since then, I have recruited the following forces:

1. Kung (កុង), Former Teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School. He had progressive political tendencies.
2. YOU Thán (យូ ថាន់), Former Teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School.

After Independence, he worked at Angkar’s Printing House. He also had progressive political tendencies.

3. SUOS Seam (ស្រួស ស៊ីម), Former Teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School. After Independence, he moved to the North Zone. He had progressive political tendencies.,
4. Chumnoeu (ជំនឿ), Former Teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School. After Independence, he moved to the North Zone. He had progressive political tendencies.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*11 December 1977*

*Kèm*

Regarding their weaknesses, Kung, YOU Thăn, SUOS Seam and Chumnoeu had similar beliefs. They were not yet decisive about life and death: they loved the revolution and wanted to make revolution, but they were afraid of hardship and sacrifice. Ideologically, they had thick private ownership. Kung, YOU Thăn, SUOS Seam and Chumnoeu had names as progressives. Thus, they were always worried that the enemy would arrest them.

Because of these weaknesses, I instructed them that living with their families was full of happiness. Next I said that there are only two paths: to stand absolutely on the side of the Revolution, the side of Communism, or to stand against the Revolution, meaning on the side of the Free World. There is no middle path to walk.”

- Later on, Kung and YOU Thăn decided to join the CIA in February, 1966, by having me introduce them and Doeun acknowledge them.
- SUOS Seam and Chumnoeu decided to join the CIA in May, 1966. Doeun assigned Kung, YOU Thăn, SUOS Seam and Chumnoeu the following duties:
  1. To recruit forces,
  2. To propagandize and spread rumours among the masses to cause confusion and suspicion and,
  3. To burrow inside the Revolution to destroy the Revolution and the people.

This presentation was followed by a small party. Then Doeun ended the meeting, and everyone left.

Meanwhile, I also advised NHAOM San and Phou to be take instructions from Doeun, the leader replacing KOY Thuon when he was away.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*11 December 1977*

*Kèm*

In July, 1966, Doeun called a meeting at Chàng's (ចង់) house. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. Kung,
3. YOU Thăn,
4. SUOS Sean,
5. Chumnoeu
6. And myself.

At the meeting, Deoun suggested, "We must work harder to accomplish well our duties. We must push our tasks with all of our capabilities and stick to the actual situation: Our goal is to obstruct and destroy the Revolution." There was no objection during the meeting. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

In addition to the above activities, I propagandized and spread some rumours at my workplace and the bowling courts. I propagandized, "People that distributed leaflets have been arrested. Now, policemen are strictly on guard to keep their eye on those who carry on Revolutionary activities."

In August, 1966, Doeun called for a meeting at my house. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. NHAOM San,
3. Phou



4. And myself.

At the meeting, Doeun raised the same agenda as at the previous one. He suggested we try our best in all our activities to ensure the strengthening and building of more forces. There was no objection. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

After that, I recruited,

Sây (សាយ), former teacher at the Technical School. After Independence, he moved to the North Zone. His political tendencies were unstable. His weaknesses were being influenced by high-ranking people, having unstable political tendencies, disliking the Revolution and being highly self-centred.

Based on these weaknesses, I told him about the capitalist view. I said, “The capitalist regime is wealthy and prosperous. We can do anything, and we can also earn position and gain reputation. Without the current regime, we would not have such prosperity and reputation. Therefore, this regime is the foundation of our sophisticated life.” Then, I continued, “There are only two choices—supporting the Revolution, or Communism, or keeping the status quo full of happiness and standing. There is no neutral way.”

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*12 December 1977*

*Kèm*

Sometime later, Sây agreed to join the CIA. The induction ceremony was held in February, 1967, by having me introduce him and Doeun acknowledge.

Then, Doeun assigned Sây the same duties as mine.

The appointment was followed by a small party. Doeun ended the ceremony, and everyone left.

In addition to the above activities, I also propagandized and spread rumours at my workplace and among the teachers at the bowling courts. I propagandized, “The Revolutionists nowadays find no shelter. They will surrender soon. Why are they struggling so hard when they have nothing at all? The fighters in the forest are

starving. They are skin and bones.. There is no future for them. Our country is prosperous, so no one wants to join Communism.” I kept spreading these fabrications among the above circles so they would be worried. No one dared to talk about politics. All they cared about was their individual work.

Aside from these activities, the atmosphere at the bowling courts was always merry. I met Kung and YOU Thăn there, and sometimes I met SUOS Seam, Chumnoeu, NHAOM San, Phou and Sây. On those occasions, I discussed the situation with them and individual activities.

In late 1967, Doeun called for a meeting at Kung’s house. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. Kung,
3. YOU Thăn,
4. SUOS Seam,
5. Chumnoeu,
6. Sây,
7. NHAOM San,
8. Phou
9. And myself.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December 1977*

*Kèm*

At the meeting, Doeun said, “In the recent past, our activities in every field have been very weak, not appropriate with the rapid development of the situation. Thus, we must actively strive to carry out all our activities in every field with our best effort according to the real situation.” There was no objection at the meeting. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

In 1968, the situation became very tense. There was a strike to seize weapons, followed by a civil war.

In this situation, I propagandized and spread rumours at my workplace and among the teachers of the technical school and at the bowling courts. I propagandized, “It is very hard to take over their weapons with empty hands. How can they struggle with empty hands? They are chasing down and arresting the resistance fighters the fighters like they are pursuing the rabbits. Not one of the guerrillas were able to escape, so why do they still continue the struggle?”

The situation changed a while later. In the city, gossip was spreading from one to another, “Soldiers were killed by guerrilla fighters here and there. Some got their stomachs pierced with spikes.”

I countered the situation by saying, “The guerrillas have run out of food supplies. There was no way for them to escape; there is only one path: surrender.” Actually, it was not true that some soldiers had been killed. The guerrilla fighters in the forest do not have the forces to resist the government’s attack.”

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December 1977*

*Kèm*

In late 1968, KOY Thuon stayed and worked at my house for around one month. During his stay, he recruited people to work with him constantly and continuously. They were:

1. KOY Thuon,
2. Brother Pork (ព័ក) (he was injured and gottreatment at my house),
3. Doeun,
4. Yun (យ៉ុន) (KOY Thuon’s wife),
5. Srēng (ស្រែង),
6. Chhean (ឈ័ន) (Ambassador to Hanoi),
7. Chètr (ចៃត្រ), Secretary of Sambour (សំបួរ) District, Kratie (ក្រចេះ),

8. Sēng (សេង), Committee of Agriculture,
9. Kâng (កង), Kratie Sector,
10. Chīt (ជិត), Working in Kampong Cham Hospital,
11. Sat (សាត), North Zone Rubber Plantation
12. CHEA Kimyeon (ជា គីមយ៉ាន), deceased.

During his stay, I was assigned to guard houses.

KOY Thuon suggested, "Please push all activities in every field strongly and actively. Do not act carelessly that will lead to leaks. You should do them cleverly with talent and according to reality. The CIA has never lost to anyone,; so it not lose in Cambodia. Some of the workers here are our members." At that time I did not have any objection to what he suggested.

After staying for a while, KOY Thuon left my house.

In March, 1969, Doeun called for a meeting at Kung's house. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. Kung,
3. YOU Thăn,
4. SUOS Seam,
5. Chumnoeu,
6. Sây,
7. NHAOM San,
8. Phou,
9. And myself.

At the meeting, Doeun said, “The situation has developed rapidly. To catch up with the situation, we must persistently try to push our activities with strong momentum to complete our work. Only by doing so can we grasp the opportunity. So far, our work has had no momentum. We have done it, but at a normal speed.” There was no objection at the meeting. Deoun ended the meeting, and everyone left.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December 1977*

*Kèm*

A while after the meeting, I propagandized and spread some rumours at my workplace and among the teachers at the bowling courts. I propagandized, “The government is arresting guerrillas every day. The remainder have not been able to stand it and have surrendered. How can make war without even a single weapon?”

In addition, I made up rumours continuously to deceive them about the truth about the strength of the revolutionary forces and those of the government.

I initiated fund-raising activities from house to house to throw a party. The party would take place, sometimes at Kung’s house, YOU Thăn’s and mine, or sometimes, we went to a restaurant after bowling. I launched the parties to create an atmosphere of joy at all times in order to dilute and paralyze the spirit of love<sup>3</sup> for the country and love of the people in the masses at all levels, so the atmosphere would be chaos.

In March, 1970, Doeun called a meeting at Kung’s house. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. Kung,
3. YOU Thăn,
4. SUOS Seam,
5. Chumnoeu,
6. Sây,
7. NHAOM San,

8. Phou
9. And myself.

At the meeting, Doeun said, “Now, the coup d’état has succeeded. However, the Revolution will not clasp its arms and be still while facing this situation. Thus, each of us must take control of this situation and strive to carry out all our activities strongly in every field in order to be brought up at the meeting. Then, Doeun ended the meeting, and everyone left.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December, 1977*

*Kèm*

After the coup d’état, the masses demonstrated the coup so strongly that nothing could impede this movement.

I tried to restrain the movement by propagandizing at my workplace and among the teachers at the bowling courts. I propagandized, “What do they wish to get when they organize the demonstration? It is better to stay at home and to care only about their work.”

I also initiated fun times like before. I started the parties to create an atmosphere of joy.

In mid-June, 1970, Lean (លាន) told me that Angkar had assigned me to leave for the liberated area. I arrived in Stueng Trang (ស្ទឹងត្រង់) District, where Brother Pork was waiting for me. Brother Pork took me and Nhèm (ញ៉ែម), who travelled along with me, from Kampong Cham, to wait at his office next to Samraong (សំរោង) (Bantong) (ប្រង) for a few nights. Then, he took me and Nhèm to Office K-1 (the North Zone), and we met Deoun there.  
Chairman.

Doeun also called for a meeting at Office K-1. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. Chhoeun
3. And myself (Kèm).

At the meeting, Doeun said, “We meet today to reorganize our networks. You can contact either Comrade Chhoeun or me. We must carry out these activities carefully strongly and hotly in order to keep up with the situation. We must push our CIA activities even better to firmly and strongly attack the Revolution. Therefore, our plan is to destroy the Revolution by any means.” All the participants agreed. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December 1977*

*Kèm*

After the meeting, I recruited three forces as follows:

1. Thun (ធួន), Former Cadre in Office K-1. He was a cadre in the Ministry of Logistics in 1972. His weaknesses were being liberal, cruel and having a high level of power ownership.
2. Pan (ប៉ាន), Former Cadre in Office K-1. He was a cadre in the North Zone Transportation in 1973 and 1974. His weaknesses were being very individualistic, cruel and having a high level of power ownership.
3. Yun (យុន), Former Cadre in Office K-1, deceased in 1973. His weaknesses were being opportunist and having rank and prestige views .

The content of instruction: First of all, I lured them with close friendship and gifts such as personal stuff and snacks, breaking Angkar’s regulations.

Then, I indoctrinated them with the life view of freedom, power, plenty of material things and happiness with one’s own family.

I mentioned that Angkar's line was extremely strict and limited individual freedom to sadness and loneliness. No honour would be gained by any individual in the future.

After being instructed continuously, Thun, Pan and Yun understood that, to live in dignity and happiness and to be empowered, they had to be backed by the CIA. They decided to join the CIA in October, 1970, by having me (Kèm) introduce them and Doeun acknowledge them. Doeun assigned Thun, Pan and Yun the same duties as mine.

The appointment was followed by a party. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

Then I called the members to have a meeting. The participants were:

1. Myself (Kèm),
2. Thun,
3. Pan
4. And Yun.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December 1977*

*Kèm*

At the meeting, I said, "We all now understand our CIA duties. Therefore, we must accomplish them successfully. These plans are luring dissident people who are in conflict with the Revolution, inquiring about the weaknesses of the Revolution to be used to attack the Revolution's influence and finding existing conflicts to escalate them." (The meeting took place in Office K-1.)

All participants agreed with this idea. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

After the meeting, Thun and Pan had to work in Tuol Sambuor (ត្បូងសំបួរ) Commune, Stueng Trang District. At that time, I suggested both of them carry out



anti-Angkar activities at their base. Specifically, I suggested they suppress people who run small businesses, confiscate their goods sometimes and unreasonably detain people who have had minor problems. These activities arouse anger among the masses. People become disappointed with the Revolution and lose their trust in and warmth for the Revolution.

I also protested against the revolutionary fund-raising. I convinced people that revolutionary fund-raising was like paying taxes in the previous regime. Hence, it was not different.

I suggested Yun conduct a similar activities, which was to use the authority of the Revolution to oppress the people to make them disappointed with the Revolution, and to make them lose trust in the Revolution.

I destroyed Angkar in Office K-1. I indoctrinated both male and female soldiers that the current life was not producing abundance and health was not assured. I injected unhappiness among them. I provoked conflict in the unit, leading to resentment and the breaking apart of the male and female combatants.

Furthermore, I destroyed some materials in the office: 20 looms of raw undyed cloth and 5 looms of hammock cloth, which were left in the warehouse to soak in the rain together with 3 cases of medicine. As a result, they were all destroyed and torn.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December 1977*

*Kèm*

In addition to the above activities, I acted to build forces at Office K-1:

1. Phai (ផៃ), Former Team Leader in Office K-1 in 1970. After 1970, he joined the army.
2. Daung (ដាង), Former Soldier in Office K-1 in 1970. After 1970, he joined the army.
3. Boeun (ប៊ែន), Former Soldier in Office K-1 in 1970. After 1970, he joined the army.

4. Kan (កែន), Former Soldier in Office K-1 in 1970. After 1970, he joined the army.

Weaknesses: these soldiers had similar weaknesses. Their views were liberal on every issue.

Instructive content: First of all, I used the same methods to lure them as I had done with the others. Then, I indoctrinated them with the view of life under a capitalist regime, which was to live for happiness, wealth, fame, power and liberty and to have the freedom to do whatever you wanted.

Moreover, I mentioned that Angkar's line was extremely strict without any relaxation and fun time.

After being initiated continuously, Phai, Daung, Boeun, and Kan decided to join the CIA in December, 1970, by having me (Kèm) introduce them and Doeun acknowledge.

Doeun assigned Phai, Daung, Boeun and Kan the same duties as my own.

The appointment was followed by a party at which snacks and tea were served. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

In early January, 1971, Doeun asked the members to meet at Office K-1 to give them a brief orientation before they started their trips. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. Chhoeun,
3. Thun,
4. Pan,
5. Yun,
6. Phai,
7. Daung,
8. Boeun,
9. Kan

## 10. And myself (Kèm)

Doeun said, “Angkar has dissolved Office K-1. The cadres, soldiers and female soldiers in Office K-1 will be dispersed. As CIA, we must carry out our activities wherever we work. You can contact either Comrade Chhoeun or me.” Then, everyone departed.

[Annotation in the left margin]

13 December 1977

Kèm

In January, 1971, Zone Angkar ordered me to study at the first Party School session at K-25 in Bangki Taingren (បង្កីតាំងធួន) Commune, Sector 130. The workshop lasted for over a month with Brother Number 1 and Brother Number 2 as the Education Committee.

After the workshop ended, Khuon (ក្មួន) organized a meeting to assign work to cadres in various sectors and districts. Khuon spoke to me, “You can ask Comrade Hon about your work.” The next day, Khuon told Nhèm and me to meet and said, “I introduced you to one another in the name of the CIA networks so that both of you can carry out our activities in Sector 31 easily together.” At that time, Khuon said to me, “You will also be instructed by Comrade Nhèm.”

Nhèm was a Member of Preaek Prasab (ព្រែកប្រសប់) District and Chairman of the District Military. I was an education cadre of Chamkar Leu District.

In June 1971, the Zone Education Committee was assigned and Saom (សោម) (TIV Ol) (ទីវ អុល) was the head. I (Kèm) and Vèn (វ៉ែន) were members. Khuon introduced assignments and said “I suggest you get to know one another in the name of the CIA networks to well facilitate the Committee’s work.” The Committee agreed to undertake an instructional workshop as an anti-Angkar activity, as possible under the actual situation—adopting the introduction of documents to counter the

documents and the line of Angkar. Saom, Vèn and I (Kèm) carried out this activity together with the purpose of:

- making the masses lose trust in the Revolution and the revolution's triumph
- and provoking conflicts between the Revolution and the masses.

We countered their line by contrasting the situation between the enemy and the Revolution. "The enemy is encountering political, military and economic complications, however, they still have forces. On the other hand, the Revolution has better politics and economics and a better military. However, the number of forces is still limited compared to their enemy's. Thus, we do not know how the war is going to develop. Moreover, Angkar has adopted a line of independence, self-mastery and self-reliance. This line is good in a war. However, ours is a small country with a small population, so implementing this line will bring numerous difficulties."

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*13 December 1977*

*Kèm*

"We have to make contributions to the Revolutionary fund all the time. We also have difficulties because we must support both our own livelihoods and the Revolution."

In the meantime, I built two forces as follows:

1. Kha (ខា), a merchant in Srae Veal (ស្រែវាល). I knew him in 1970. He was against the Revolution and always unhappy with revolutionary authority. He absolutely took the side of Capitalism. He fled to Vietnam at the end of 1974.
2. Hok (ហុក), a Chinese immigrant in Srae Veal and a middle-class person. He worked at the market in town. He was never involved with farming. He viewed revolutionary authority as an oppressor of his livelihood and freedom. He viewed revolutionary authority as a net entangling his body, so he was always unhappy and discontent with the Revolution.

I instructed both of them by saying, “Now it is different from the Old Society when we could do what we pleased when we had money. We must respect and follow the new state authority completely. We are capitalists, and we love and protect the capitalist regime. We would have nothing without the capitalist regime.”

After being informed thus continuously, Kha and Hok decided to join the CIA in November, 1971, by having me introduce them and Chhoeun acknowledge.

Chhoeun assigned Kha and Hok the same CIA duties as mine.

The appointment was followed by a party. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

Later, I met Kha and Hok in Srae Veal. I said, “We must carry out our activities more actively among the merchants and Chinese immigrants, and we must lure those who were against the Revolution into the anti-Revolutionary forces. Moreover, we must be practical and enthusiastic with each task in order to accomplish our duties.” Everyone left after the meeting ended.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*14 December 1977*

*Kèm*

In November, 1971, the Zone Angkar dissolved the Zone Education Committee. Angkar transferred Saom to another place.

In February, 1972, the Zone Angkar appointed me as a member of Chamkar Leu District. At that time, Doeun took the opportunity to instruct me to carry out CIA activities and to fulfil my duties even better.

Meanwhile, I conducted anti-Angkar and anti-revolutionary activities while performing my revolutionary duties:

- At Commerce, I encouraged trading, which was different from the direction Angkar set, without caring about the people’s livelihood. I traded unnecessary stuff for the people. The goods were for middle-class and upper-class people, and I made Commerce into a for-profit Commerce.
- I fomented the working and life view of the cadres to be disconnected from the masses, and indoctrinated them mandarin views of governing the

people. Specifically, I promoted the separation between office work and real practice, which meant that the cadres were occupied only with paper work, meetings and parties at one place or another, creating an atmosphere of weakness in order to reduce their fighting spirit and to loosen Angkar's influence and regulations.

Along with the above activities, I recruited two forces as follows:

1. Mean (ម៉ាន), Former Chairman of Speu (ស្ទើ) Commune, Chamkar Leu

(ចំការលើ). He was a cadre in the Naval Shipping Section (after the Independence).

His weaknesses were being an opportunist and having a highly materialistic outlook. Relatives of his spouse were in conflict with the Revolution.

2. Hạng (ហង់), Former Cadre in the Office of Social Affairs of Chamkar Leu

District. He died during an explosion in the office at the end of 1974.

His weaknesses were having an unclear background, being self-centred and having a highly materialistic outlook.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*14 December 1977*

*Kèm*

The content of my instruction: I lured them in the same way as I did the others. Then I spoke to Mean about the news that the Revolution had killed his wife's family. Mean remained disappointed and unhappy with this event. Then I reminded him about the prosperity during the previous regime, warm family life, high-ranking position, freedom and happiness in the family. "However, now we do not live as happily as before, and in the future, our freedom will be even more limited because Angkar's line is extremely strict. Therefore, we cannot have the same good future as before."

With Hạng, I instructed him the same way I did Mean, except for the violence.

After being instructed continuously, Mean and Hạng understood that the Revolution would not bring them any good future. To have freedom and fame in the future, they had to fight and win over the Revolution with the support of the CIA. Mean and Hạng decided to join the CIA in May, 1972, by having me introduce them and Doeun acknowledge.

Doeun assigned Mean and Hạng the same CIA duties as my own.

The appointment was followed by a party. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

Later, Doeun called a meeting at Kun's house in Chamkar Leu. The participants were:

1. Doeun,
2. Kun,
3. Mean,
4. Hạng
5. And myself (Kèm).

At the meeting, Doeun said, "To enable the work here, I would like to introduce Comrade Kun to all of you. If you have any problem, or need any instruction, please consult with Comrade Kun." Doeun continued, "We are CIA, so we must prioritize the CIA duties as the most important ones. We must work harder to carry out our common plan which is to resist against the demolition of markets and towns. We must work as hard as possible." The participants agreed with this idea. Everyone left after the meeting ended.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*15 December 1977*

*Kèm*

Meanwhile, I recruited three forces as follows:

1. Prīs (ព្រីស), Former Chief of Svay Teab (ស្វាយទាប) Commune, Chamkar Leu District. His weaknesses were being an opportunist and having a highly self-centred outlook,
2. Chhorn (ឈ័ន), Former Commercial Registrar of Chamkar Leu District Commerce. He died of illness at the end of 1974. His weakness was having an ambiguous background.
3. Duong (ដូង), Former Combatant in Chamkar Leu District Commerce. His weakness was having a bad class background. His father was killed by the Revolution.

The content of my instruction: At first, I used the same method I used with the others to entice their minds.

Regarding the basic issue, it was similar to the previous one. I mentioned this contradiction when I lured Duong.

After being indoctrinated continuously, Prīs, Chhorn and Duong decided to join the CIA in June, 1972, by having me introduce them and Kun acknowledge them.

Kun assigned Prīs, Chhorn, and Duong the same CIA duties as mine.

The presentation was followed by a party. Everyone left after the ceremony ended.

In July, 1972, the Zone Angkar assigned me to study at the Zone Convention that took place in a forest in Tuol Sambuor Commune, Stueng Trang District. The convention lasted for over half a month at which Brother Number 1 was the Education Committee (Chairman).

After the convention ended, the Zonel Angkar removed me from the position of Chamkar Leu district Member to work at the Ministry of Economics. The new Economics Committee consisted of:



1. Hon (ឃុំ), Chairman,
2. Myself (Kèm), Member and
3. Kung, Member.

Khuon, who introduced this assignment, said:

1. Comrade Kun was an Assistant Cadre in the Ministry of Economy.
2. Comrade Hāk (ឃុំ) was an Assistant Cadre in the Ministry of Economy.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*15 December 1977*

*Kèm*

Then Khuon added, “I would like all of you, including Comrade Kun and Comrade Hāk, to get to know one another in the name of CIA networks in order to enable the work of the new Economics Committees.

After returning from the meeting on October, 1972, I began making necessary arrangements to carry out the new strategy.

While performing my revolutionary duties, I also conducted the following counter-revolutionary activities:

- I promoted free trade, which was inconsistent with Angkar’s policy of utilizing trade to support the front line and the home front. In other words, I promoted the trade in unnecessary goods and products that obstructed the supply of materials and equipment for the front line and home front.
- I directed combatants to work intensively day and night. As a consequence, their health deteriorated which seriously affected their daily work performance and feelings.
- I encouraged people to adopt a free lifestyle and to disobey Angkar, its discipline and chain of command. This led to laxity and disorganization in the unit. I encouraged people to eat as much as they wanted without complying with the food rationing set out by Angkar. Young combatants were allowed to look for their own food, and, as a consequence, many of them could find food, while others could not.

Some complied with the food rationing laid down by Angkar while others did not. This led to confusion and the loss of solidarity.

- I frequently gathered cadres in my unit to organize parties and various entertaining activities which caused a wild atmosphere and a fall into pacifism

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*16 December 1977*

*Kèm*

On November, 1972, Hon (ហ៊ុន) convened a meeting of CIA agents in his office

behind Srae Veal (ស្រែវាល). The participants included:

- |               |                   |
|---------------|-------------------|
| 1. Hon        | 4. Kun (គុណ)      |
| 2. Sath (សាធ) | 5. Hāk (ហាក់)     |
| 3. Kung (គង់) | 6. Me (Kèm) (កែម) |

At the meeting, Hon stated, “The purpose of our meeting is to review and adjust the direction of our future activities. There were many different working units and sections under our ministry, so our activities had to be flexible, enthusiastic and practical so that we can strengthen and expand rapidly. In other words, we had to keep carrying out our plans and be flexible and in step with the situation in order to obstruct and undermine the party’s plan to eliminate markets and urban areas. All the participants agreed with this and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

Later, I convened another meeting of CIA agents in Mean’s (ម៉ាន) office in Chamkar

Leu (ចំការលើ) district. The participants included:

- |                 |                 |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Me (Kèm)     | 6. Mean         |
| 2. Thun (ធ្មន់) | 7. Hâng (ហង់)   |
| 3. Yun (យុន)    | 8. Prīs (ព្រីស) |

- |              |                   |
|--------------|-------------------|
| 4. Kha (ខា)  | 9. Chhorn (ឆ្មារ) |
| 5. Hok (ហុក) | 10. Duong (ឌួង)   |

The essence of this meeting was the same as that of the previous meeting convened by Hon. All the participants agreed on the plan and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*16 December 1977*

*Kèm*

Later, I built two persons:

1. Ouch (អូច), a former commerce cadre in the North Zone, who was dogmatic and materialistic and
2. Yin (យ៉ិន), a former commerce cadre in the North Zone, who was opportunistic and dogmatic and whose family members had disagreements with the revolution and were, thus, forbidden by Angkar from traveling and communicating with the masses.

To lure them, I treated them at first with respect by inviting them for lunch and dinner frequently in order to develop close and friendly relations and a mutual understanding. Then, I indoctrinated them about feudalism and capitalism.

At last, Ouch and Yin realized that the best way to achieve a bright future was to work for the CIA to attack the revolution. Then they both joined the CIA in April, 1973, with me (Kèm) to introduce and Hon to acknowledge them.

Hon assigned Ouch and Yin to carry out the same tasks as mine.

Later, we arranged a small reception, and we dispersed after the meeting concluded.

In July, 1973, Khuon (ក្នុង) removed me from the commerce section, and I did not have any work to do for a while. However, later Khuon appointed me a member of the Ministry of Economy in the North Zone in charge of the economic office.

The economic office consisted of two sections:

1. Warehouses and
2. Ministerial hospitals and textile factories

The hospitals were divided into two types: the central hospitals at the Ministry of Economy and the hospitals at rubber plantations.

When I took on the new position, Chhoeun (ឃ្លីង) was appointed chief of the Ministry of Economy as a replacement for Hon, who had been removed.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*16 December 1977*

*Kèm*

Later, Chhoeun convened a meeting of CIA agents in his office at Au 5 (អូ ៥) at the Prèk Kàk rubber plantation. The participants included:

- |            |             |
|------------|-------------|
| 1: Chhoeun | 4: Kun      |
| 2: Sath    | 5: Hăk      |
| 3: Kung    | 6: Me (Kèm) |

At the meeting, Chhoeun stated, “We all had to actively keep up our activities and be flexible. Specific strategies should be adopted in order to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of our undertakings. Our main strategy is to cause chaos on the home front with the aim to undermine the revolutionary forces’ offensive plans at the front line. To achieve this goal, all of us at the ministry had to do our best to put into practice our respective plans and activities. We have had ample opportunity to realize our goal. We should not be lax in carrying out our respective

responsibilities to reach that goal.” All the participants agreed and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

After the meeting, I conducted the following traitorous activities:

- Anti-Angkar activities concealed behind revolutionary tasks:

I promoted feudalism among medical staff. At the hospitals, I encouraged medical staff to disobey Angkar’s policies and discipline, to be lax in performing their responsibilities and inattentive and rude to patients. I also encouraged staff members to be lax in performing their technical work such as medical treatment, administering medicine and medicine production, all of which led to many consequences. The quality of medical treatment declined dramatically. Medicine production was frequently disrupted. The medicine produced was of poor quality. Injections were carried out without complying with hygiene regulations causing abscesses for many patients. This created a state of total chaos in hospitals. Many complaints were received from different sources, and the atmosphere at the ministry was tense. Due to this chaotic situation, young combatants were frustrated and showed no solidarity with one another. This not only disrupted the work of the hospitals but also negatively affected the feelings of the patients, who became frustrated and lost complete confidence in the medical staff.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*16 December 1977*

*Kèm*

- Destruction of Angkar’s equipment and supplies: I also destroyed a lot of materials such as cloth and hammock-making cloth which were left unattended in warehouses along with a box of medicine.

At the same time, I recruited two persons:

1: Kim (គឹម), the former chief of the Ministry of Economy hospital and, later, a cadre at the Ministry of Agriculture in the North Zone. He had joined the enemy army for 18 months and was stubborn.

2: Phi (ផ្កី), the chief of Au 5 hospital at Prèk Kàk rubber plantation, who was opportunistic and did not have a clear political stance.

I enticed them by using the same methods. To lure Kĩm, I told him that Angkar would neither trust nor forgive him because he had served in the enemy army. Later, I drew his attention to the differences between the lifestyle under the previous regime, where individuals could live a luxurious life, enjoy complete freedom, enjoy high social status and have a bright future and the revolutionary lifestyle, where individuals had to work very hard and comply with strict discipline, enjoyed no freedom and had no chance to have a bright future. After being indoctrinated, Kĩm and Phi agreed to join the CIA in August, 1974, with me (Kèm) introducing them and Choeun (ចៀន) acknowledging them..

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*20 January 1978*

*Kèm*

Choeun assigned them to do the same CIA tasks as mine.

Then a small reception was organized. After the ceremony concluded, we dispersed. Later, I held a meeting of all my members in my office behind Srae Veal. The participants included:

- 1: Me (Kèm)
- 2: Pan (ប៉ាន) (a former transportation cadre in the North Zone)
- 3: Kan (កាន) (a former transportation combatant in Sector 31)
- 4: Kha (ខា)
- 5: Hok
- 6: Mean
- 7: Hâng
- 8: Prís
- 9: Chhorn

10: Duong

11: Ouch

12: Yin

13: Kim

14: Phi

I conveyed Chhoeun's messages from the previous meeting to all the participants encouraging them to actively carry out traitorous activities in order to achieve the main goal by causing chaos on the home front in order to obstruct and undermine the offensive plans of the revolutionary forces on the front line. I added that the actions had to be concrete and flexible. I further stated, "We all are responsible for achieving this common goal, so we have to do our best to conduct these activities and create chaos in our respective work units. The harder we strive to carry out these activities, the more likely it is that we achieve our goal." All the participants agreed and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*20 January 1978*

*Kèm*

Then I organized the following traitorous activities:

In late August, 1974, the zone leadership set up a committee charged with constructing a war memorial to honor cadres and combatants who died on the battle field. The committee was composed of:

- 1: Srēng (ស្រែង), the chief
- 2: Tol (តុល), the deputy chief
- 3: Buon (ប្លួន), a member
- 4: Ms. Moeun (ម៉ៃន), a member
- 5: Say (សាយ), a member

6: *Ta But* (ប៊ុត) (a former monk at Srae Veal Pagoda), a member

7: *San* (សាន) (from Sector 30), a member

8: *Me* (Kèm)

I was a member of the technical committee and, at the worksite, was charged with decorating the memorial.

The zone leadership declared that the construction of this memorial was to honor cadres and combatants who died on the battle field and to boost the morale of their parents.

After that, Cheoun invited me to a meeting with him in Sath's office in Stueng Trang (ស្ទឹងត្រង់), and he told me that the construction of this memorial was also a

CIA plot:

- 1: to obstruct and undermine crop growing and farming on the home front;
- 2: to destroy Angkar's and people's property;
- 3: to stir up people's anger and frustration stressing conflict between the revolution and the people.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*22 January 1978*

*Kèm*

Choeun added that the large scope of the construction project demanded a lot of labor, materials and time. Thus, he advised me to intensify construction activities in order to gain more workers. With a large number of people, the construction site would become a chaotic place, and conflicts both at the site and on the home front would emerge. Finally, he reminded me to conduct the activities well. I agreed with his instructions, and the meeting concluded.

Returning from the meeting, I traveled directly to the construction site. The memorial was constructed on an empty square in front of Stueng Trang Secondary School. Around 3,000 to 5,000 workers were occupied at the construction site every day. This created a crowded and noisy atmosphere.



In September, 1974, Cheoun convened a meeting in Sath's office in Stueng Trang.

The participants included:

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| 1: Chooun | 4: Buon  |
| 2: Srēng  | 5: San (the chief of Sector 30 economic committee) |
| 3: Tol    | 6: Me (Kèm)  |

Chooun began the meeting by introducing me to other CIA agents, namely, Srēng, Tol, Buon and San in order to facilitate work at the construction site. After the introduction, Chooun left early and assigned Srēng to chair the meeting. Srēng stated, "We have to regard this construction project as an important opportunity as it will help us to further CIA goals to stir up chaos on the home front in order to obstruct and undermine the offensive plans of the revolutionary forces on the front line. In addition, we have to create a joyful and pacifist atmosphere in order to obstruct and undermine the farming and crop growing activities on the home front. In other words, we have to do our best to carry out our respective assignments." All the participants agreed with the instructions and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*22 January 1978*

*Kèm*

After the meeting, while I was in charge of decorating the memorial, I also conducted traitorous activities by destroying hundreds of pineapple plants and dozens of coconut trees which were destined for the compound of the memorial. The plants and the trees, which had been transported from the home front, were left unattended, and thus decayed. As a member of the construction committee, I also schemed directing workers to remove and rebuild some parts of the memorial frequently, arguing that these parts were inappropriately, or poorly, constructed.

At the same time, I also destroyed *tectona grandis* and *hopea ferrea* forests. Angkar directed me to cut down big *tectona grandis* trees for use at the construction site. However, I encouraged workers to cut down hundreds of small *tectona grandis* trees, explaining that small *tectona grandis* trees were more appropriate for the construction. As a consequence, hundreds of small *tectona grandis* trees were cut down.

In November, 1974, Srēng convened another meeting in Sath's office in Stueng Trang. The participants were the CIA agents on the construction committee, namely, Tol, Buon, San and myself (Kèm).

Srēng stated, "The construction of the memorial was a key factor in achieving the main goal of the CIA. The CIA was plotting to bomb the construction site:

1. To lower people's morale and stir up people's anger and frustration with the revolution,
2. To kill innocent people at the construction site and
3. To destroy the memorial and other materials at the site.

Srēng added that the bombing could be carried out by telegraphing Brother Khuon, who was working on the front line in Phnom Penh, to bomb the construction site.

The date and time of the bombing had not been specifically set, but it could be done in December, 1974. All the participants scattered after the meeting concluded.

In late December, 1974, two bombers dropped five or six bombs on the construction site in the morning and a few more bombs in the afternoon. This damaged several buildings but caused no human casualties.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*23 January 1978*

*Kèm*

After the bombing, activities at the construction site were scaled down, and the labor force was cut back. The construction site was closed down around one month later, and materials at the site were transported back to the home front.

These were all my CIA activities at the construction site. Later, I was transferred to the Ministry of Economy in the North Zone.

In February, 1975, while I was working at the economic office in the North Zone, I conducted the following anti-Angkar activities:

- In the textile factory of the Ministry of Economy, I encouraged workers to disobey Angkar's discipline and assignments. The textile factory was charged with producing clothing for the staff members, both new and old, of the Ministry of Economy who were in need of new clothing. However, female workers at the textile

factory were lax in carrying out the tasks assigned by Angkar. Some of them worked normally but slowly, and some others took rests and chatted with one another. In other words, the work at the factory was done at a normal rate. The workers did not do their best to carry out the tasks assigned by Angkar.

I also destroyed the following materials and equipment of Angkar:

- thirty sets of clothing which were left unattended in a warehouse and thus worn out and
- five sewing machines by dismantling them.

In May, 1975, before I left for Phnom Penh, I met with Sath and Kung and introduced the following persons to them:

- |          |         |
|----------|---------|
| 1: Pan   | 6: Ouch |
| 2: Hok   | 7: Yin  |
| 3: Mean  | 8: Kim  |
| 4: Pris  | 9: Phi  |
| 5: Duong | 10: Kan |

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*27 January 1978*

*Kem*

Sath agreed to accept these people, and Kim was then transferred to Kung. Later, I invited all the above-mentioned persons to a meeting in my office behind Srae Veal in order to explain the leadership change. I told them that I had been transferred to Phnom Penh, and I requested them to recognize their new leaders, Sath and Kung. They all agreed with my advice, and we dispersed after the meeting concluded.

After the liberation on 17 April, 1975, Khuon transferred me to Phnom Penh. I arrived in Phnom Penh in May, 1975, and in late May, 1975, Khuon assigned me to be deputy chief of the state market in Phnom Penh, of which Chhoeun was the chief. In mid June, 1975, Chhoeun was transferred to do other work, and then the commerce committee appointed me as the chief of the state market in Phnom Penh.

When I started my work, I tried to learn about the overall situation in my workplace, that is, the strengths and weaknesses, challenges and biographies of cadres to be enticed in the future.

In early July, 1975, Chhoeun convened a meeting in the commerce office near the riverside. The participants included:

- 1: Chhoeun, chief of the commerce office
- 2: Kun, chief of the textile factory
- 3: Hāk, chief of Phnom Penh Technical School
- 4: Han, a commerce cadre
- 5: Me (Kèm)

At the meeting, Chhoeun stated, “We all are invited to receive our new assignments. We have to learn about the overall situation in our respective workplaces, including the strengths and weaknesses, and challenges and opportunities so that it would be easy for us to conduct our traitorous activities. Only when we understand the situation clearly, can we carry out our activities effectively and efficiently. At our respective workplaces, we have to be well prepared and stay alert at all times. Thus, we have to make proper arrangements at our respective workplaces to achieve effectively the best outcome of the duties laid down by each work place.”

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*27 January 1978*

*Kèm*

Chhoeun added, “The current situation requires all members from all units to actively and enthusiastically carry out these activities in order to achieve the overall goal, that is, to stage armed uprisings inside the country. All the participants agreed on the instructions, and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

After the meeting, I conducted the following counter-revolutionary activities:

- 1: Stirring up conflict: I continuously stirred up discord with the military unit stationed there. I made even a small misunderstanding with the military unit more

complicated and chaotic to destroy the solidarity and good relations between the military unit and the state market.

I also stirred up discord within my workplace. I stirred up conflict between one section and another and between one team and another by praising the performance of one team and criticizing the performance of another, encouraging one team and discouraging another and promoting those I liked and sacking those I did not. Moreover, I made small problems among different teams more complicated. The working relations among different sections and teams were terrible, and the working environment was tense and unfriendly.

2: Encouraging moral offences: I allowed free interactions among different team members. This encouraged free movement from one team to another. This created opportunities for men to have affairs and caused chaos in the workplace.

3: Encouraging a luxurious lifestyle: I encouraged staff members to use their private materials freely. They were also allowed to exchange supplies when they collected materials and equipment to be stored in the warehouse. This situation made cadres materialistic and obsessed with a luxurious and free lifestyle. This created disorder and chaos in the whole workplace.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

28 January 1978

*Kèm*

Besides this, I also built three persons:

1: Chhēng (ឃីង), the transportation chief of the state market, who had changed jobs frequently until he joined the revolution and

2: Oeun (អ៊ឺន), chief of the platoon in charge of state market security, who used to be high class and, who did not like the revolutionary lifestyle, but liked a luxurious one. He also was unfriendly and frustrated, liked free contact and whose peasant parents did not like the revolution and

3: Rēn, a cadre in the administrative office of the state market, whose background was not good and who used to be a playboy.

I enticed them by providing them with material goods and treating them in a warm and friendly manner to develop close relations and mutual trust. I also promoted Chhēng to chief of the porter committee of the state market.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

28 January 1978

*Kèm*

Later, I indoctrinated them in capitalism, explaining that the capitalist regime provided individuals with happiness, a bright future, high social status and reputation. The revolution, in contrast, was a tight network eliminating all kinds of freedom, personal reputation, private property and an individual future.

As a result of my continuous indoctrination, Chhēng, Oeun and Rēn were convinced that the revolution provided them with nothing and that the CIA would provide them with a bright future.

Chhēng, Oeun, and Rēn agreed to join the CIA in early September, 1975, with me introducing them and Chhoeun acknowledging.

Chhoeun assigned Chhēng, Oeun, and Rēn to do the same CIA tasks as mine.

A small reception was held to conclude the admission ceremony, and then all the participants dispersed.

In September, 1975, Chhoeun held another meeting at the commerce office near the riverside. The participants included:

- 1: Chhoeun
- 2: Nhèm (អ៊ែម), the chief of the commerce committee
- 3: Kun
- 4: Hāk
- 5: Han
- 6: Ms. Phum (ផុំ), working in the state textile factory
- 7: Ms. Kèv (កែវ), working in the state textile factory
- 8: Me (Kèm)

At the meeting, Chhoeun stated, “We have been carrying out these activities for a while, and we should understand the general situation in our respective workplaces and have gained a lot of experience in boosting our effectiveness. The recent situation demands that we do this at our respective workplaces enthusiastically and flexibly to realize the overall goal to destroy key economic bases inside the city such as major factories, power plants and warehouses.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*28 January 1978*

*Kèm*

At the same time, we have another task to do, that is, to prepare food stocks in our respective workplaces. Thus, in each workplace, we have to enthusiastically prepare food stocks. Members from each unit have to make ready sufficient food stocks for major actions in April and May, 1976. If we can achieve this goal, we can make a significant contribution to the plot to destroy the critical apparatus of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in order to seize power in the upcoming years.”

All the participants agreed on the instructions and dispersed after the meeting concluded. I called Chhēng, Oeun and Rēn to a meeting in my office in Phsar Thmei (ផ្សារថ្មី) market in September, 1975. I told them that one of their most important tasks was to collect and hide food supplies in preparation for the attack against the revolution. I asked them to check the amounts of milled rice, salt, fish paste, dried fish and other secondary materials such as medicine, sugar, milk and etc. I told them to clean warehouses so that these food supplies can be stored for a long time. I also reminded them to carry out this task cautiously in order to prevent any possible secrets leaks. The amount of food to be stored would not be specifically limited and would depend on its availability and the actual situation.

At the same time, I directed them to destroy the supplies of Angkar such as milled rice, salt, fish paste and other materials. I told them to seek opportunities to destroy all these supplies. However, I reminded them to do this task wisely, practically and cautiously.

They all agreed on these instructions and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

[Annotation in the left margin]

28 January 1978

*Kèm*

In October, 1975, the Commerce Committee assigned me to attend the first educational session organized by the Party in 1975. The educational sessions were held at Olympic Stadium in Phnom Penh for over one month, and Brother Number 2 was the chair of the educational training committee.

In November, 1975, shortly after I left the educational sessions, I was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Angkar.

After working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a while, I was appointed by Angkar as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs chief of diplomatic protocol.

Later, I met with Chhoeun, who told me to attend a meeting to be held the following month in the commerce office near the riverside.

In late December, 1975, Choeun (ជឿន) convened a meeting in the commerce office near the riverside to circulate the plans to be implemented during the national festival celebrations in April, 1976. The participants included:

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1: Choeun                                     | 7: Hâng, chief of the energy committee |
| 2: Chhoeun                                    | 8: Han                                 |
| 3: Nhèm (ញ៉ែម)                                | 9: Ms. Phum (ភុំ)                      |
| 4: Kun  | 10: Ms. Kèv (កែវ)                      |
| 5: Hāk  | 11: Me (Kèm)                           |
| 6: Chhon (ឆ័ន), chief of the energy committee |  |

At the meeting, Choeun stated, “We all have to put our CIA assignments above all other activities. The current situation demands every unit develop robust human resources and material capacity. All members from every unit have to pay a lot of attention to this issue. The situation requires all of us to carry out our activities



further in our respective workplaces. Right now, we have a new assignment, that is, to prepare food stocks.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*29 January 1978*

*Kèm*

Thus, all members from every unit have the responsibility to boost these activities to achieve the maximum results of all these schemes. At the same time, each unit should enthusiastically participate in carrying out our comprehensive plan to destroy the critical apparatus of the Communist Party of Kampuchea by seizing power during the upcoming national festival celebrations in April, 1976. The plot has been thoroughly deliberated and awaits merely its implementation. The scheme will be put into operation by the combatants of Oeun's brigade, who were charged with providing security for the celebrations. Thus, the security guards who will be armed with AK-47 rifles will shoot the leadership of Angkar on the stage. All of you can expect good results from this plot. Do your best to promote these activities in your respective workplaces." All the participants agreed on the instructions and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

In February, 1976, before I left for Laos, I met with Chhoeun at his request at the commerce office near the riverside. At the time, Chhoeun told me to continue conducting traitorous activities.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*4 February 1978*

*Kèm*

***[Annotation: The counter-revolutionary and anti-Communist Party of Kampuchea activities assigned by Chhoeun included the mobilization and transformation of exiled Khmer citizens in Laos into hard-core forces to fight against the Kampuchean Revolution.]***

Chhoeun stated, "Many Khmer citizens who used to live under the previous regime are currently living in Laos, and they still maintain their old political stance, which is conducive to our traitorous activities. You have to gather these exiled Khmer citizens and transform them into counter-revolutionary and anti-communist

forces. Then you have to send these forces back into Cambodia legally, and I will be in charge of receiving these forces. These forces will be assigned to carry out subversive activities in local cooperatives and work as underground agents in various work units awaiting the opportunity to achieve the long-term strategic goal of seizing power from the Communist Party of Kampuchea.”

Furthermore, he advised me to consider sending these Khmer citizens in Laos to refugee camps in Thailand to realize the long-term goal of building up hard-core forces to attack the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Kampuchean Revolution. After the meeting concluded, I returned to my office.

On 22 February, 1976, Angkar allowed me to depart Phnom Penh to work as the ambassador of Democratic Kampuchea to Laos. I started my work in Laos in March, 1976.

### **My traitorous activities in Laos**

Upon arriving in Laos, I started to link up with exiled Khmer citizens after the national festival celebrations in April, 1976. I made contact with a female Khmer citizen named Grandmother Têb (តែប) (Tep) (តែប), whose house was located around 300 meters in front of the embassy of Democratic Kampuchea. I asked Têp who could help me purchase necessary supplies for the embassy. Têp recommended Proeung (ព្រឿង), who visited the embassy during the national festival celebrations, and drew a map showing the location of her house.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*4 February 1978*

*Kèm*

Later, I went to meet Proeung and discussed the purchase of necessary supplies for the embassy such as sofa covers, chair covers, Roneos (mimeographs), paper, Roneo ink and etc. Then Proeung took me to purchase these materials at my request.

Ever since, I have conversed with Proeung in a friendly, gentle and close manner. I also asked him about his living conditions and provided him with some

supplies. I visited Proeung's house frequently. The regular communication created close relations and mutual trust between Proeung and me.

Later, I instructed Proeung to attack the Kampuchean Revolution. I told him that, after the liberation, Cambodia faced many challenges such as food and shelter shortages and widespread human suffering. This was the content of my initial instruction.

I asked Proeung to bring other exiled Khmer citizens to meet me to establish more connections. I also asked to use his house as a venue for my meetings with Khmer citizens in Laos. Proeung agreed to my request.

Later, Proeung introduced me to Yēn (យ៉ែន) and Koy (កូយ), and I conversed with them in a friendly and warm manner as I had done before. I met with them frequently in order to teach them and entice them. In June, 1976, I invited Proeung to work in the embassy. This also served my traitorous activities as I assigned him to be my courier to communicate with foreigners with whom I was connected to further my traitorous work and to facilitate the mobilization and build-up of the forces of exiled Khmer citizens in Laos. He disguised himself as a translator and ordinary office worker at the embassy.

I also invited Yēn to work at the embassy. Yēn was charged with cleaning the buildings and the embassy compound during daytime and guarding the embassy compound at night. The recruitment of Yēn was also served my traitorous activities as this would facilitate my contact with other exiled Khmer citizens in Laos.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*4 February 1978*

*Kèm*

In order to build up the forces of exiled Khmer nationals in Laos, I instructed Proeung, Yēn and Koy to become the core in charge of transforming the militia of exiled Khmer nationals into hard-core forces to fight against the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people. I used Proeung's house as a venue for various activities to herd and drive and round up and build exiled Khmer nationals in the future.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*He educated A Proeung to grasp all exiled Khmer citizens in Laos.*

I also conducted traitorous activities with foreigners. In June, 1976, I met the Vietnamese ambassador, Dĩnh Nhau Liem (ឌីងញ៉ូលីម), at the Vietnamese embassy in an exchange of visits. After a short courtesy talk, Dĩnh Nhau Liem stated, “Our two countries used to cooperate with Laos to fight against the French colonizers, the American imperialists, and they all later gained their independence. Our three countries, with this history of joint liberation struggle, should cooperate closely with one another to develop our countries both in the present and in the future. Dĩnh Nhau Liem added, “The Vietnamese party and government regard the solidarity among the three countries as a key strategic issue.”

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*Vietnamese ambassador tried to learn about A Touch’s position.*

I responded, “I agreed that we have to cooperate with one another closely because of our history of joint liberation struggle.”

Dĩnh Dau Liem added, “The relations and solidarity between our two embassies will be improved and strengthened.”

After the discussion, I said farewell to the host and returned to the Cambodian embassy.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*Vietnamese ambassador became aware of A Touch’s position.*

*PHOUN Sipaseut tried to learn about A Touch’s position.*

Later, Dĩnh Dau Liem requested meetings with me several times. During these later meetings, Dĩnh Nhau Liem was well aware of my position, and we developed close mutual relations.

Later, I requested paying a courtesy call on PHOUN Sipaseut (ភ្នំ ស៊ីប៉ាស៊ីត), Laotian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. After a brief exchange of courtesies, Mr. PHOUN informed me that he was concerned about the tense relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, and he wanted to see improved relations between the two nations. Then Mr. PHOUN raised similar points as did Dính Nhau Liem.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*4 February 1978*

*Kèm*

I responded that I agreed with him. After a brief informal talk, I said farewell to him and returned to the Cambodian embassy.

In late June, 1976, Mr. PHOUN sent me a letter inviting me to a dinner. I accepted the invitation and went to the dinner. Dính Nhau Liem also attended the dinner.

After finishing the meal, Mr. PHOUN said, “Today, I have invited both comrades to dinner to take this opportunity to discuss issues related to our three countries.” He then added,

- “We have to work together to realize the goal of establishing the Indochinese Federation. Laos totally agrees with the creation of the Indochinese Federation. Thus, we have to persuade Cambodia to join this federation. Working in Vientiane, you will have ample opportunity to mobilize exiled Khmer nationals and build up forces to attack the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Kampuchean Revolution. Some of the forces will be sent to carry out subversive activities inside Cambodia, and the rest will be prepared for future operations.”

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

***PHOUN Sipaseut and Vietnamese ambassador cooperated with A following the principle of the Indochinese Federation.***

- “At the same time, you have to propagandize to reduce the influence of the Kampuchean Revolution and convince the world community that the Kampuchean Revolution is unjust, unclean and oppressive and that the Cambodian people are experiencing intolerable suffering.”

Mr. PHOUN added, "You have to do this enthusiastically. As regards communication with exiled Khmer nationals in Laos, you can contact them directly without necessarily following legal procedures as our main objective is to effectively build up the forces of exiled Khmer nationals."

Mr. PHOUN added, "When carrying out your activities, you should seek help from others immediately if you encounter any problems so these should not be delayed or obstructed."

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*4 February 1978*

*Kèm*

I then responded, "I agreed with the issues raised, and the simplification of contact with exiled Khmer nationals in Laos would facilitate our activities. I added, "I cannot establish a connection between Vientiane and Phnom Penh, so I would like your help with this."

Then Mr. PHOUN requested Dính Nhau Liem to consider assisting me with these contacts because Laos could not help with the other.

Dính Nhau Liem stated, "I agree with the issues and activities Comrade Deputy Prime Minister has raised. I can help resolve the problems of contact between Vientiane and Phnom Penh by requesting my government allow your associates to link up with you through the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh. However, your cells have to assign specific people to communicate with the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh."

"As regards the mobilization of exiled Khmer nationals in Laos," Dính Nhau Liem added, "I can help by organizing sports teams to bring together Khmer nationals in Laos. I will start doing this from now. In the future, the forces I have built up will be transferred to you, so that you can send them into Cambodia." Then Dính Nhau Liem concluded his speech.

I then responded, "As regards the assignment of people to make contact with the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh, I will request the Vietnamese embassy recognize the people to be assigned by Choeun."

At the same time, the chief of the HCR office, a French national named Rauland, confirmed that the HCR would facilitate the evacuation of exiled Khmer nationals in Laos into Thailand and the preparation of legal documents for them.”

In July, 1976, Angkar directed me to attend educational sessions in Cambodia and work with Angkar for a while. I left Vientiane in July, 1976, and arrived in Phnom Penh in early August, 1976.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*5 February 1978*

*Kèm*

After being in Phnom Penh for a while, I requested permission from Comrade Hong, the deputy secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to meet with Chhoeun to arrange necessary supplies to be brought to the Cambodian embassy in Laos.

Comrade Hong granted permission and told me to request cloth and other supplies for the ministry from Chhoeun. Using this request as cover, I met with Chhoeun and reported to him on various matters. I met with Chhoeun in the commerce office near the riverside and reported to him on the following issues:

- The Vietnamese ambassador, Đinh Nhau Liem, has agreed to facilitate contact between Vientiane and Phnom Penh. The communication would be made through the Vietnamese embassies in Vientiane and in Phnom Penh. However, we have to assign a comrade to make contact with the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh. I had already requested Đinh Nhau Liem inform the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh to work with the comrade to be assigned by Comrade Choeun.

- As regards the evacuation of exiled Khmer nationals to Thailand, I have met with the chief of the HCR in Vientiane, Rauland, who has informed me that the HCR is also stationed in Thailand. This organization has connections with the refugee camp at Aranh, Thaliand. Rauland has confirmed that the HCR will be in charge of evacuating exiled Khmer nationals in Laos to the Cambodian refugee camp in Thailand.

- Mr. PHOUN stated, “We have discussed and reached agreement on many issues. I expect that our cooperation will further improve, and our goal will be achieved rapidly.” Then Mr. PHOUN asked to conclude the meeting. I then said

goodbye to Mr. PHOUN and Dính Nhau Liem and returned to the Cambodian embassy.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*6 February 1978*

*Kèm*

Later, Dính Nhau Liem asked to meet me again. At this meeting, Dính Nhau Liem told me that the Vietnamese party and government regarded the creation of the Indochinese Federation as a key strategy. If that plan could not be achieved now, the Vietnamese government would try to achieve it in the future, be it 10 years, 20 years or 30 years later. The idea of the Indochinese Federation would be instilled in all Vietnamese citizens. The Vietnamese communist party and government would never give up its effort to bring Cambodia into the federation. All generations of the Vietnamese government would try their best to achieve this goal.

Dính Nhau Liem added that after the Indochinese Federation is successfully established, Vietnam's policy would be to transform all the people of the three countries into Vietnamese.

Dính Nhau Liem added the Vietnamese communist party and government had sufficient capacity and would use all means to realize this strategic goal. The goal would be achieved in the future, if not now. Vietnam had the capacity to achieve this goal because Vietnam had the full support of friends in the socialist bloc such as the Soviet Union.

At that time, I did not make any comments but only smiled. Later, Dính Nhau Liem left.

In July, 1976, I, together with Proeung, met the chief of the HCR. I asked him about the evacuation of Khmer citizens in Laos to Thailand, relevant legal procedures and the contact between the Cambodian refugee camp and the HCR in Thailand. Later, I received his answers to these questions.

I also reported briefly on the possibility of mobilizing exiled Khmer nationals in Laos, explaining that it is more convenient to carry out the activities in Laos because the host (Laos) helped with the work. I told him that there was no serious problem right now.



[Annotation in the left margin]

5 February 1978

*Kèm*

After I concluded my report, Chhoeun told me to meet with him again in the same location in the next three days because he had to report to Brother Choeun on these issues and get his comments first.

*Note: Based on his clarification, the HCR is the UNHCR (The United Nations High Commissioners for Refugees)*

Later, Chhoeun told me that the plot to be carried out during the national festival celebrations in April, 1976, had failed. Chhoeun added he regretted deeply that the plot had been uncovered. The main reason for its failure was that Angkar changed its security procedures on the morning of the day of the celebrations by banning weapons from being brought into the ceremony hall. Thus, our combatants, who were charged with shooting the leadership of Angkar, were disarmed and ordered to remain in one place. After Chhoeun finished, I did not make any comment and returned to my office.

Three days later, I met with Chhoeun at the commerce office again. Chhoeun told me that:

- He agreed with the plan to make contact with me in Vientiane, which I had discussed with Dính Nhau Liem. He would assign someone to communicate with the Vietnamese embassy in Phnom Penh.
- As regards the evacuation of exiled Khmer nationals in Laos to Thailand, which would be coordinated by the HCR, he would make contact with the refugee camp in Aranh to inform the camp leadership to receive these Khmer nationals, the ones who were being transferred from Laos through the HCR. This refugee camp was under the control of IN Tam (អ៊ិន តាំ).

Chhoeun added this evacuation was also aimed at undermining the policy of the government of Democratic Kampuchea on the international stage. In other words, this evacuation was meant to convince the world community that the government of Democratic Kampuchea is unjust and oppressive. This was why the exiled Khmer nationals did not agree to return to the country. Furthermore, the evacuation would also isolate the government of Democratic Kampuchea from the world community.

[Annotation in the left margin]

6 February 1978

*Kèm*

The evacuation was also a component of the strategy of mobilizing and transforming exiled Khmer nationals into hard-core forces to attack the Kampuchean Revolution, the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Cambodian people. Some of these hard-core forces would be assigned to carry out subversive activities, causing chaos and instability inside Cambodian villages along the border, and the rest would be prepared to launch military offensives against Democratic Kampuchea in the future, cooperating with other traitorous forces inside the country. After receiving the instruction about the strategy, I returned to my office.

After finishing my work with Angkar in Cambodia, I was allowed by Angkar to return to Laos. I arrived in Vientiane in September, 1976. Then I started evacuating exiled Khmer nationals in Laos to Thailand. Proeung told me that four Khmer families wanted to flee to Thailand, but they remained reluctant to do so. The heads of the four families were

- 1: Nai (ណៃ), a former military major under the LON Nol (លន់ នល) regime, who is currently a businessman with one child;
- 2: Yun (យុន), a former business man, who currently remains a businessman with three children;
- 3: On (អុន), a former freelance worker, who is currently a construction worker with two children and
- 4: Yoeun (យ៉ែន), a former goldsmith, who is currently a construction worker with three children.

After learning about this, I directed Proeung to convince them by drawing their attention to their hardships and uncertain future in Laos and the more convenient lives they would enjoy in Thailand. I also directed Proeung to tell them that I would persuade the HCR to cover all of their travel costs.

After Proeung enticed them by following what I had directed, the four exiled Khmer families in Loas agreed to move to Thailand. Then Proeung contacted the HCR to prepare relevant legal documents for their travel.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*7 February 1978*

*Kèm*

In late September, via Proeung, the HCR transferred the four Khmer families to Thailand. The heads of the four families were

1: Nai                      3: On  
2: Yun                      4: Yoeun

The HCR in Thailand transferred those Khmer families to the refugee camp at Aranh (អារាំង), which was under the direct control of MUT Savoeun (មុត សាវ៉ឺន).

Later, the UNHCR informed me that the Khmer families had arrived at the refugee camp.

Subsequently, I met with Lim (លីម), Un (ឃុន), Koy's father, and the driver of the former Cambodian ambassador under the previous regime (whom I could not identify) at Proeung's house. During the meeting, I asked them about their daily lives. During the conversation, I tried to create a warm and friendly atmosphere, and I raised a variety of topics in order to make the meeting more enjoyable. I did not raise political issues yet, and the atmosphere was very good. Before leaving, I told them I was very happy to meet with our fellow Khmer citizens abroad. They all agreed with me and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*He met with IN Tam through HCR's coordination.*

*8 February 1978*

*Kèm*

In October, 1976, through the HCR's coordination, IN Tam visited Vientiane and met with me. Rauland covered all the travel expenses for IN Tam and coordinated my meeting with him.

I met IN Tam for around an hour at Rauland's house in Sangkat Sokpalueng (ស្រុកប៉ាលួង), Vientiane. After a brief exchange of courtesies, IN Tam told me that traveling to Vientiane would make the work more convenient. The large number of exiled Khmer nationals in Laos would serve as a good source of forces which could be mobilized and trained to conduct operations when needed. He added he was mobilizing and transforming Khmer citizens in the refugee camp into anti-communist forces. In other words, these forces would serve as hard-core soldiers to fight against the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Cambodian Revolution and the Cambodian people. These forces would also be assigned to carry out all types of actions to weaken and destroy the Cambodian Revolution and Democratic Kampuchea by cooperating with the forces inside the country to seize power.

He added, the evacuation of Khmer citizens to Thailand was conducted smoothly because the HCR helped prepare relevant documents and transported them to the refugee camp. Major challenges to the evacuation had been addressed, and future evacuations would be smooth.

IN Tam added he was happy to meet with me at this time because the many challenges to the evacuation had been addressed, and, again, that would make future evacuations more successful.

I responded I was happy to meet him at this time because we had worked together to address these several challenges. After finishing the discussion, I returned to my workplace.

Later, I assigned Proeung to convince exiled Khmer citizens in Laos to flee to Thailand.

In November and December, 1976 and January, 1977, I conducted the following activities with exiled Khmer citizens in Laos:

- I instructed Yēn and Koy to attack the Cambodian Revolution, as I had done with Proeung. At the same time, I strived to persuade Proeung, Yēn and Koy to join the core group for mobilizing exiled Khmer citizens in Laos. I directed Proeung, Yēn and Koy to mobilize exiled Khmer nationals, targeting those with bad backgrounds, to visit their houses directly to more easily entice them. I told Proeung to lure them

by first appealing to their sympathy and develop close mutual relations before carrying out any political instruction.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*8 February 1978*

*Kèm*

- I instructed two Khmer citizens, Lim and Un, at Proeung's house. I drew their attention to the people's suffering, the oppression and executions of the people by the revolution. At last, I told them that the situation in Cambodia was too complicated to be resolved. After receiving such education, Lim and Un did not make any comment but listened attentively to my points and took them into consideration.

- Later, I met with Koy's father and the chauffer. I enticed them by using the same technique as I had done before. Neither showed any reaction, but they were considering what I had told them.

Later, I met with the above-mentioned people several times and attacked the Cambodian Revolution by criticizing and defaming Cambodia in order to convince exiled Khmer citizens to fight against the government of Democratic Kampuchea. After meeting with me and receiving my instruction several times, Lim, Un, Koy's father and the chauffer told me that, at first, they tended to trust the new regime. However, after they learned about the situation, they lost faith in the new regime. Later, I discussed the mobilization of Khmer nationals in Laos with Proeung and decided to recruit more Khmer nationals by targeting those with bad backgrounds. I told him to continue mobilizing and building up the forces of exiled Khmer citizens. Besides carrying out the above-mentioned activities, I also cooperated with foreigners.

In early January, 1977, I met with PHOUN Sipaseut at his invitation. Dính Nhau Liem also attended the meeting.

Mr. PHOUN told me that this meeting was actually requested by Dính Nhau Liem, and then he asked Dính Nhau Liem to speak first. Dính Nhau Liem stated, "We discussed several concerns at the previous meeting. At this meeting, I proposed discussing some issues related to Cambodia, that is, the policy toward Cambodia. As regards the issue of Khmer nationals in Laos, after they have been mobilized, they would be transferred into Cambodia.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*8 February 1978*

*Kèm*

- Some of the forces would be assigned to carry out subversive activities in the short-term destroying the solidarity of the masses, demolishing all kinds of supplies and equipment and creating chaos and insecurity in the cooperatives, factories and other workplaces.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

***Vietnam plotted to send exiled Khmer citizens and Vietnamese agents into Cambodia.***

- Some of the forces would blend in among the masses to secretly recruit forces from the masses to carry out operations in the long-term and take control of cooperatives, factories and various work units. By then, we would have the capacity to manipulate the party line and defame revolutionary power, or even seize power from Angkar.

The other forces of Khmer citizens who remained overseas would carry out other traitorous activities such as destabilizing the area along the border. We had to create nervousness along the Cambodia-Laos border by causing chaos and insecurity to fuel border tension between Cambodia and Laos.

Dính Nhau Liem added, "This is my proposed policy toward Cambodia. I would like Comrade Deputy Prime Minister and Comrade Ambassador to be informed of that."

Mr. PHOUN responded, "I do not have any comment on this plan, but we have to do our best to realize it." Then he told me that I had a lot of work to do in order to help implement the plan, and the work had to be done more actively in order to achieve success quickly. After Mr. PHOUN finished, I told them that I did not have any comment on this plan and totally agreed with it.

After discussion of the plan, I had an informal talk with them and then returned to the embassy.

In late January, 1977, Angkar ordered me to return to Cambodia because Angkar had to discuss some issues with me.

At that time, I met with Proeung, Yēn and Koy at Proeung's house. I told them that Angkar had ordered me to return to Cambodia, and I did not know how long I would stay there. They had to continue contacting and instructing exiled Khmer citizens in Laos according to the plan. They all agreed with my instructions and dispersed after the meeting concluded.

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*9 February 1978*

*Kèm*

I left Vientiane on 28 January, 1977, and arrived in Phnom Penh on 4 February, 1977.

After arriving in Cambodia, I stayed at B-1 office until 22 July, 1977.

On 23 July, 1977, Angkar transferred me to a house in Comrade Meas's (ម៉ាស) unit.

On 2 August, 1977, Angkar transferred my family members to live with me. On 20 November, 1977, Angkar transferred me to the security center until today. This is all about my traitorous activities that I have reported to the great, bright, clear-sighted Communist Party of Kampuchea.

9 February, 1978

*[signature]* Meakh Touch, alias Kèm,

*[thumbprint]*

9 February, 1978

Team "A"(អី)

Interrogator

Li

*[signature]*

List of the People Who Had Conducted Traitorous Activities with Me

1. KOY Thuon (កុយ ធ្នូន), the former secretary of the North Zone (who has already been arrested)
2. Choeun, the former chief of the North Zone committee (who has already been arrested)
3. Brang (ប្រាង), a former teacher (deceased)
4. NHAOM San (ញ៉ាម សាន), a former assistant to the Ministry of Labor in Kampong Cham
5. Phou (ភូ), a former worker at the Ministry of Labor in Kampong Cham
6. Kung, a former teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School
7. YOU Thăn (យូ ថាន់), working in Angkar's printing house
8. SUOS Seam (ស្នួស ស៊ីម), a former teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School
9. CHUM Noeu (ជំនឿ), a former teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School
10. Sây (ស័យ), a former teacher at Kampong Cham Technical School

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*9 February 1978*

*Kèm*



11. Chhoeun, the chief of the Office of Commerce (who has already been arrested)
12. Thun (ធួន), a former cadre of the Ministry of Logistics in the North Zone
13. Pan, a former transportation cadre in the North Zone
14. Yun, a former cadre at “K-1” Office (deceased)
15. Phai (ផៃ), a former team leader at “K-1” Office
16. Daung (ដួង), a former combatant at “K-1” Office
17. Boeun (បៀន), a former combatant at “K-1” Office
18. Kan, a former combatant at “K-1” Office
19. Saom (សោម) (TIV Ol) (ទីវុល), a cadre of Angkar
20. Vèn (វ៉ែន), a former cadre of the North Zone
21. Kha, a businessman in Srè Veal (who fled to Vietnam in 1974)
22. Hok, a Chinese-Cambodian citizen in Srè Veal
23. Mean, a naval transportation cadre in Phnom Penh
24. Hàng (ហង់), a former social affairs cadre of Chamkar Leu district (deceased)
25. Prïs (ព្រិស), the former chief of Sangkat Svay Teab, Chamkar Leu district
26. Chhorn, a former bookkeeper of Chamkar Leu district commerce committee (deceased)
27. Duong (ដួង), a former combatant of Chamkar Leu district commerce committee
28. Hon (ហុន), the former chief of the cultural committee of the former North Zone

*[Annotation in the left margin]*

*9 February 1978*

*Kèm*

29. Sath, the former chief of the rubber production unit of the former North Zone (who has already been arrested)
30. Kung, a former cadre of the Ministry of Agriculture in the former North Zone
31. Kun, the chief of the state textile factory in Phnom Penh (who has already been arrested)
32. Hāk, the chief of Phnom Penh Technical School
33. Ouch, a former commerce cadre of the former North Zone
34. Yīn, a former commerce cadre of the former North Zone
35. Kim, a staff member of the Ministry of Agriculture in the former North Zone
36. Phi, the chief of AU 5 hospital at Prèk Kâk (វិទ្យាស្ថាន) rubber plantation
37. Srēng, the deputy secretary of the former North Zone (who has already been arrested)
38. Tol, a member of the former North Zone committee (who has already been arrested)
39. Buon, the former chief of Chamkar Leu district
40. San, the former chief of Sector 30 economic committee
41. Han, a former cadre of the Ministry of Commerce (who has already been arrested)
42. Nhèm, a member of the state commerce committee (who has already been arrested)
43. Ms. Phum, a worker at the state textile factory
44. Ms. Keèv, a worker at the state textile factory
45. Chhēng, a cadre of the state market
46. Oeun, a cadre of the state market
47. Rēn, a cadre of the state market
48. Chhorn, the chief of the energy committee (who has already been arrested)
49. Hâng, the chief of the energy committee (who has already been arrested)

[Annotation in the left margin]

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*Kèm*

50. Proeung, a Khmer citizen living in Laos
51. Yēn, a Khmer citizen living in Laos
52. Koy, a Khmer citizen living in Laos
53. PHOUN Sipaseut, the deputy prime minister of Laos
54. Dĩnh Nhau Liem, the Vietnamese ambassador to Laos
55. IN Tam
56. Lim, a Khmer citizen living in Laos
57. Un, a Khmer citizen living in Laos
58. Koy's father, a Khmer citizen living in Laos
59. The chauffeur of the former Cambodian ambassador to Laos, a Khmer citizen living in Laos
60. Oeun, a brigade chairman

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Signature: Meakh Touch, alias Kèm

[thumbprint]