



**អង្គជំនុំជម្រះវិសាមញ្ញក្នុងតុលាការកម្ពុជា**

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia  
Chambres Extraordinaires au sein des Tribunaux Cambodgiens

**Request for Correction**

**ឯកសារដើម**  
ORIGINAL/ORIGINAL  
រៀបចំ (Date): 06-Jan-2015, 15:16  
CMS/CFO: Sann Rada

**Case :** 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC

To Document No(s):	ERN(s):	Request Date:	Correction Type:
E1/14.1	00755776-00755910	18/12/2014	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Change to Original <input type="checkbox"/> Change to Translation <input type="checkbox"/> Reclassification

**Reason for changes:**  
Error in interpretation.

**Details:**  
The correction is made on the English version:  
- ERN 00756158, P. 94, L. 21-22  
- ERN 00756167, P. 103, L.24-25  
- ERN 00756174, P. 110, L. 22-25  
The following footer is added to this transcript:  
"Corrected transcript: Text occurring between less than (<) and greater than (>) signs has been corrected to ensure consistency among the three language versions of the transcript."

**Filed by:** Reath Panhean

**Signature:**

**Approved by Greffier (for originals):**

**Signature:**

**Approved by ITU (for translations):**

**Signature:**

1 process of welcoming the King was not interrupted. The CPK, the national united  
2 government, had sufficient ability to provide security to the King during his night on top of  
3 the mountain until he went back to China to continue his activities to liberate the nation.  
4 From February 1973 until mid-August 1973, the United States bombarded B-52 bombs for  
5 20 days and 20 nights continuously in the Cambodian territory and that was never  
6 happened before. We could not calculate the number of tons of these bombs due to the  
7 sheer size of this bombardment by the United States.

8 How could we estimate the damages caused to the Khmer people, the villages, pagodas,  
9 schools, Kampuchean economics. Although we could not estimate the damages,  
10 Kampuchean people still held on to their solidarity, rose up to continue their struggle  
11 bravely until they subsequently gained the victories from one battle to the next.

12 [14.53.01]

13 At that time, the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army was advancing toward the Phnom Penh  
14 centre. They were about 60 kilometres from the Pochentong Airport to the

15 <northwestsouthwest.>

16 In late 1974, the Central Committee held an extraordinary meeting. The purpose <wasis>  
17 to decide on the day to attack <and liberate> Phnom Penh in 1975. The meeting adopted  
18 the 1st of January 1975 as the day of commencing its final attack.

19 Pol Pot and Nuon Chea were determined by the party to negotiate with Nguyen Van Linh  
20 to tell them about the plan to attack to liberate Phnom Penh in 1975, and asked that the  
21 Communist Party of Vietnam help transport the 13 truckloads of weapons by Tong Phen  
22 (phonetic), a Chinese aide, as soon as possible since the weapons were docked in  
23 Vietnam and the Communist Party of Vietnam had not delivered them to us.

24 [14.54.35]

25 Unfortunately, the enemy aircraft dropped bombs on those tracks and annihilated the

1 principle of the socialist economy.”

2 [15.12.36]

3 “For that reason, your party expelled and stopped you from leading your party and the  
4 government. They did this to you to make you realize that you deserve to be treated as  
5 such.

6 For that mistake, I now declare that you remain to live here but with no rights and freedom  
7 for the rest of your life.”

8 The reasons why the Communist Party of Kampuchea had to evacuate people from  
9 Phnom Penh and other provincial cities.

10 May 1973, the Upper House of the American Congress with majority opinion asked that  
11 American government stop dropping bombs on Cambodia commencing from mid-August  
12 1973.

13 [15.13.45]

14 The Standing Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea noted very clearly that  
15 without military support or air support from the American government, the fight to liberate  
16 Cambodia would be nearing -- would be successful in the very near future because Lon  
17 Nol soldiers had been very weak already.

18 The conflicts within the government of Lon Nol have not been resolved internally.

19 Cambodian people who lived during Lon Nol started to act against the Republican  
20 government more and more each day.

21 The Standing Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea followed cautiously the  
22 situation ~~<. An during the >~~ extraordinary session of the Standing Committee ~~<was held >~~ in  
23 mid-1974.

24 [15.14.55]

25 The meeting raised several important issues for discussion in order to take measures to

1 population, because farmers did not need money.

2 As mentioned above, the meeting made the following decision unanimously: one, in case  
3 Phnom Penh is liberated, we have to evacuate the people from Phnom Penh and from city  
4 centres temporarily in order to analyze the situation for a period of time; in particular to  
5 analyze the actual attitude of Vietnam.

6 [15.30.10]

7 Two, hold the use of currency and wait to see what happen with the crop productions or  
8 the production in general; rice transplanting, whether it is good or not. When this  
9 production is good, then we can look on to producing currency.

10 Three, all matters in the agenda shall be explained, educated and mainstreamed during  
11 study sessions, so that people and our cadres could be well informed.

12 In particular, we need to increase the sense of solidarity among the old people or the base  
13 people and the new people and we need to educate them not to discriminate against the  
14 old or the new people. And that people at all levels, district or commune levels, had to go  
15 down to meet their people to educate them on this, personally.

16 Final item of the agenda ~~< was for other matters. The meeting asked is that the meeting~~  
17 ~~ask that members who are~~ ~~— were >~~ members of the Central Committee ~~< who attended~~  
18 ~~the meeting to go and discuss need to conduct meetings >~~ with the Zone Committee  
19 secretaries or Sector secretaries or District secretaries ~~< under their respective leadership~~  
20 ~~in order to see how many evacuees each zone could receive, to see >~~ how many people  
21 will be evacuated and in each co-operative, how many peoples are needed to manage  
22 those people or how many people can be accommodated in one co-operative.

23 [15.32.12]

24 From now on, we have to enforce the co-operatives by encouraging production, to grow  
25 more crops for food, and the meeting notes that we will face several difficulties for the