Nayan CHANDA
Pseudonym: KW-26
Cases: Case 001
Category: Expert
Background
Nayan Chanda testified as an expert before the Trial Chamber in Case 001. At the time of his testimony, he was the Director of Publications at the Yale Center for Globalisation.
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In the 1970s and 1980s, he was the Indochina correspondent and editor for the Far Eastern Economic Review, who conducted extensive interviews with officials of countries of Indochina, China, and other states.
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In Cases 001 and 002/02, the Trial Chamber relied on his testimony in establishing the content of the Black Book, the armed conflict between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam,
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the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand, and in finding about civilian casualties in the East Zone.
The “Black Book” (also the “Black Papers”)
Nayan Chanda described the 1978 Democratic Kampuchea’s (DK’s) Black Book as “a mixture of facts and fantasy”, and openly racist toward the Vietnamese, who were deemed aggressive and expansionists.
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In a 1979 interview between Chanda and Ieng Sary, Ieng Sary confirmed that Vietnam was aggressive, and that Cambodia was trying to defend itself from Vietnam.
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Chanda testified that there are Cambodian folk stories that explain the Vietnamese cruelty towards the Khmers: “that was the common sort of perception of the Vietnamese”,
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which Chanda found wanting as a justification for the Khmer Rouge attacks against the Vietnamese.
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The Vietnamese army was far more superior compared to DK’s army, and the claim that one Cambodian can actually kill 30 Vietnamese and that only 2 million Cambodians would be sacrificed in the process of killing all Vietnamese, was not “a rational statement but … a statement designed to boost morale”.
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In Case 002/02, the Trial Chamber relied on Chanda’s assessment in finding that the Black Book was a propagandistic mixture of facts and fantasy.
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The Vietnam-Cambodia conflict
According to Chanda, the Khmer Rouge regime was concerned over Vietnam’s ambition to establish a special relationship with the Indochina countries which they perceived to be “a disguise for Vietnamese attempt to control Cambodia and take over its land and resources”.
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He testified of “continuous skirmishes along [Vietnam-Cambodia] the border” and Vietnam’s “bombing and strafing inside Cambodia by using their air force”, which was not reported in the media.
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Cambodia fought to prevent being “swallowed” by Vietnam, while Vietnam fought against being dominated by Cambodia’s backer, China.
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In 1973, after “the Paris peace talks concluded the war in Vietnam, American Air Force turned its might against Cambodia”, who suffered massive bombing by the United States. Khmer Rouge held Vietnam responsible for those attacks because they signed a separate peace deal with the United States.
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Between 1975 and 1976, more than 150,000 Cambodian refugees of Vietnamese and Chinese origin flooded into the Vietnamese provinces.
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The UNHCR provided help for the refugees in South Vietnam.
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In 1977, the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia intensified with two major attacks: on 30 April and 24 September.
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On 24 September, Phnom Penh radio openly denounced Vietnam for the very first time and announced the break of relations.
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This was followed by the first major unpublicized military attack on Democratic Kampuchea by Vietnam in October.
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Until the end of 1977, there was not much known about the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict;
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the information was based on the US intelligence.
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By the end of 1977, Khmer Rouge publicly denounced the relationship with Vietnam,
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and Vietnam launched a massive attack on Cambodia from half a dozen points along the border with two principal prongs heading towards the capital.
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Vietnam maintained their presence inside Cambodia up to 15-20 miles inside as a buffer.
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According to Chanda, Vietnam’s major offensive followed the Khmer Rouge attacks; it did not precede them.
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The Vietnamese attacks deep inside Cambodian territories took place all along Vietnam’s southwest border.
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However, according to Chanda, these attacks were more of a show of force, sending in tanks rather than actually destroying many of the places they came across.
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In contrast, Khmer Rouge attacks along the Vietnamese border were surprise attacks that resulted in the death of many civilians.
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In mid-1978, there were continuous skirmishes along the border, with Vietnamese air force starting to bomb Cambodia.
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The Khmer Rouge attacked Vietnam on 20 and 21 December 1978, bringing closer the date of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia on 23 December 1978.
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In Cases 001 and 002/02, the Trial Chamber relied on Chanda’s testimony in outlining the centuries-long conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia, and that the secret hostilities between them culminated in Vietnamese military offensive and the fall of Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979.
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In Case 001, the Trial Chamber relied on his testimony in establishing that in 1977 “DK increasingly conducted raids into Vietnamese territory” that resulted in Vietnam’s retaliation.
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On 6 January 1978, Cambodia perceived the Vietnamese withdrawal as a victory and began broadcasting confessions of the Vietnamese prisoners of war given at the S-21 security centre.
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Civilian casualties
The purges of civilians living along the border in the Eastern Zone were because they were considered to be either sympathetic to the Vietnamese or collaborators.
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The Khmer Rouge attacked Tin Bienh township in Vietnam, leaving about 100 civilians dead.
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Chanda also recollected the massacre at the village Ha Tien, in the Tay Ninh province, on the border with Cambodia:
“[t]he village that I visited looked like it has been hit by a storm … houses were destroyed, a lot of debris still lying around and people are still trying to build new homes … I have never seen in my reporting career as many bodies of civilians killed most brutally and left there.”
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| Date | Written record of proceedings | Transcript number |
|---|---|---|
| 25 May 2009 | E1/24 | E1/24.1 |
| 26 May 2009 | E1/25 | E1/25.1 |
| Document title Khmer | Document title English | Document title French | Document D number | Document E3 number |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| សៀវភៅដែលបាននិពន្ធដោយអ្នកជំនាញ ដែលមានចំណងជើងថា “សត្រូវបងប្អូនឯង: សង្គ្រាមនៅក្រោយសង្គ្រាម” | Book by Expert Nayan Chanda entitled “Brother Enemy: The War after the War” | Œuvre de l’expert Nayan Chanda intitulée « Brother Enemy: The War after the War » (frère ennemi : la guerre après la guerre) | D9/1 | E3/193 |