David Chandler
Pseudonym: TCE-11
Cases: Case 002/01
Category: Expert
Background and Role
David Chandler, an History Professor at Monash University in Melbourne,
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testified as an expert in Case 002/01
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on the historical background, the structure of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), and the party policies. The Trial Chamber relied on his testimony in establishing, among other, facts about the historical background, and the CPK´s development, and party policies.
Education and Professional Experience
David Chandler holds degrees from Harvard, Yale, and Michigan Universities.
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In the early 1960s, he worked in the American Embassy in Cambodia.
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This experience led him to resign the diplomatic career and become an academic, specialising in Cambodian history.
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He researched about ancient Cambodian history since he started to work at the Monash University in 1972, and studied the Khmer Rouge period from the very start in 1975.
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Chandler published, among others, “Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea" (1988), "The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945” (1991), "Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot" (1999), and “Voices of S-21 “(2000).
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Development of the CPK
The CPK was genuinely founded in 1960 as Worker´s Party of Kampuchea (WPK), a party independent from Vietnam and the Indochina Communist Party.
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In 1962, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Ieng Sary, among others, were elected on the WPK´s central committee.
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In 1966, in light of international developments in Vietnam and Indonesia, the party changed its name to CPK.
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The most senior leaders fled to the jungle in Rattanakiri.
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In the following years, the CPK gained strength, often recruiting among rural minorities.
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In 1967, people who were upset by King Sihanouk´s government policies rioted in Samlaut. This rebellion has been studied extensively.
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There are no conclusive results, but the revolt was probably disconnected from the Khmer Rouge movement.
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Sihanouk´s reaction and the decision to “quash this rebellion with great force” resulted in Cambodian government forces going after their compatriots for the first time.
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This marked the beginning of the civil war and led to the CPK´s endorsement of an armed struggle.
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CPK Party Structure
The CPK Statute clearly expressed that it would not allow any other power in the country,
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that it was “the air that people breathe.”
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Decisions were made by a “collective leadership.”
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Pol Pot had the final word most of the time,
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but there is no evidence that Pol Pot made decisions on his own during the DK period.
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Office 870 was the “nerve centre” of the party, though the roles were not defined in the statutes.
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Sometimes Office 870 referred to Pol Pot or to a small group of people around him:
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“they were all mixed up, the Central Committee, the Standing Committee, 870, K-1, (…) Angkar, Angkar Leu.”
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All referred to “the handful of people at the top.”
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Structure of Democratic Kampuchea (DK)
The DK structure was based on a “democratic centralism.”
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There was no genuine distinction between the governing of the country and the political party in power.
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It was a “government by and for a ruling party.”
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The DK structures were a “continuing façade.”
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The Assembly was presided by Nuon Chea and convened once in April 1976 to approve the DK government,
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endorsing decisions taken CPK leadership.
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Khieu Samphan was the President of the DK´s State Presidium,
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but there were no accomplishments or documents emanating from it.
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The CPK oversaw all activities of the Revolutionary Army.
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Elections took place in some areas, but the reports published afterwards were inaccurate.
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The constitution was written for “oversea consumption.”
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Broadcasts were, to a large extent, attempts to convince people overseas that the DK was “a rational and friendly regime.”
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CPK Policies
Crucial CPK policies were the movement of people from towns to rural areas, the establishment of cooperatives, and the re-education of “bad elements” and killing of enemies inside and outside the party, the targeting of specific groups, and the regulation of marriages.
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These policies were not explained to the Cambodian population as CPK policies, there was no open discussion,
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though high-ranking cadre were briefed.
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Movement of People and Evacuation of Phnom Penh
In February 1975, the CPK Central Committee endorsed the movement of people as a national policy, and decided upon the final assault and subsequent evacuation of Phnom Penh.
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Several towns, among others, Oudoong and Kratie, had been evacuated before.
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The evacuation of cities was “a repetitive pattern.”
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Phnom Penh was evacuated to “clean out” Phnom Penh, to prevent forming a basis for “another set of angry anti-Khmer Rouge people.”
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The leaders at that time claimed that they expected American attacks and a food shortage.
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The conditions during the evacuation were harsh: “People were flung out of the city no matter what age they were, what health they had, without many possessions and without any sense of where they were going.”
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Establishment of Cooperatives
Cooperatives were first established in the so-called liberated zones in 1973,
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in particular the Southwest under Ta Mok.
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In 1976, the CPK party centre laid out a plan that rice production should reach three tons per hectare,
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which was not based on any knowledge, and “completely out of reach for most of the country.”
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The “3 tons per hectare slogan” was continuedly used and frightened those who were supposed to carry it out.
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Targeting enemies
In the early stages of the regime, the primary targets of arrests and killings were people who had anything to do with the preceding Khmer Republic regime or its army.
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These purges could be seen as revenge killings.
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Later, this animosity spread out against everyone who had lived in Phnom Penh and other cities; the so-called “New People” or “April 17 People” were evacuated and often became targets of CPK.
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In early 1976, a grenade explosion in Phnom Penh lead to a mistrust against the Khmer Rouge soldiers in Phnom Penh, which mostly came from Eastern Cambodia.
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This event marked a starting point for internal purges.
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A protocol of a Central Committee meeting in March 1976, served as “a blueprint for the way the country was to proceed from that moment on.”
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It laid out lines of authority and responsibility in the dealing with enemies, titled as "The right to smash inside and outside the ranks."
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In April 1976, S-21 was established with the main purpose of finding enemies within the party.
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The arrest of Koy Thoun in early 1977 and the subsequent arrests of many CPK intellectuals among the cadres was the “third wave of purges,”
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targeting regional CPK leaders throughout the country.
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Targeting Vietnamese and Cham
The Vietnamese were targeted from an early time on,
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and even more after the intensified military confrontation in 1977.
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By the end of 1978, the CPK had a policy of eliminating the Vietnamese.
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The Cham were initially not targeted as enemies.
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The Khmer Rouge became angered not by the attributes of their religion itself, but by their stubbornness at holding on to their religion.
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After an active Cham revolt against the Khmer Rouge in 1976, the Cham were considered to be inherently dangerous.
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This led to a systematic persecution, and by the end of 1978, the Khmer Rouge “certainly had a policy of exterminating the Cham.”
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Roles of Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea
Khieu Samphan was associated with the communist movement in France and Cambodia from a very early time on.
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In the pre-revolutionary time had a very good reputation “as a singularly uncorrupt member of the National Assembly, (and) as a conscientious cabinet minister.”
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In 1971, he became a candidate member, and in 1976 a full member of the Central Committee.
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After 1975, he took over responsibility in the commercial sector because of his experiences in the 1960s.
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Nuon Chea played a leading role in the early development of the CPK.
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During the DK period, he was known as “Brother Number Two” and he was “very much on top of and engaged in day-to-day policy matters on all parts of the Cambodian enterprise, including military affairs, including even sometimes foreign affairs.”
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Nuon Chea was a member of the Central and Standing Committee.
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He had a role in the education of cadres and the supervision of S-21.
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Trial Chamber´s Assessment
The Trial Chamber in several instances referred to David Chandler´s testimony when establishing facts about the historical background,
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the CPK policies
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about the evacuation of Phnom Penh and the justifications given for it,
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the structure of the DK,
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about the CPK party
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and communication
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structure, and about the roles of Khieu Samphan,
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and Nuon Chea.
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The Supreme Court Chamber upheld the findings in general but found that Chandler did not provide sufficient details concerning the incidents of executions of former Khmer Republic officials.
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