KAING Guek Eav, alias Duch
Pseudonym: TCW-281, 2-TCW-916
Cases: Case 002/01, Case 002/02
Category: Witness
Background and role
Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, was the Chairman of the S-21 Security Centre from mid-March 1976 to 7 January 1979,
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where he oversaw interrogations and executions.
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From 1971 until June 1975, he served as the head of the M-13 Security Centre.
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Duch was a long standing member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and secretary of a regiment.
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On 26 July 2010, he was convicted of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
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Duch testified as a witness in Case 002/01 and Case 002/02 about the policies, structure, communication, and security centres of the CPK.
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The Trial Chamber concluded that in general, Duch was a credible witness whose evidence was corroborated by other witnesses.
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CPK policies
The CPK policy to smash enemies in 1970 included spies, such as CIA, KGB, and the Vietnamese.
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Beginning in 1975, these included former soldiers and Lon Nol officers, as well as people in the Party from the North and Northwest Zones.
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At M-13, Duch received arrestees from the battlefields
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as part of the CPK policy to reeducate “bad elements”.
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Relying on Duch’s evidence, the Trial Chamber found that the CPK established a policy of reeducation and “smashing” enemies.
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Duch testified that that the CPK was trying to “eliminate Buddhism” and was successful because they made monks build dams and blend together with the popular masses,
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which the Trial Chamber accepted.
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CPK structure
The CPK had three statutes, issued in 1960, 1971, and in 1976.
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The first statute outlined seniority as a membership requirement, while the other two did not.
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However, the differences were minimal.
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The CPK statute outlined the tasks of the Central Committee, within the Standing Committee was the most powerful organ.
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The Trial Chambers cited to Duch’s testimony in finding that the various statutes were similar,
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and that the CPK Statute vested the highest level of operational authority in the Central Committee.
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CPK communications
The CPK used various communication methods, including mail, telephone, and magazines.
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While he was reporting to Son Sen, Duch communicated with him through letters and by telephone.
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The “Revolutionary Flag” magazine was the publication of the CPK, distributed monthly to the zones for Party members.
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While at S-21, Duch received and used the magazine for staff trainings.
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M-13 Security Centre
Beginning in 1971, Duch served as Chairman of security office M-13,
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which was divided into M-13A and M-13B.
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M-13A was supervised by Duch, who was responsible for interrogating and executing suspected spies.
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However, not everyone sent to M-13 were spies and some were released.
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M-13B was in a different location, under someone else’s supervision, and was for individuals who had committed minor offences.
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Duch’s supervisors, Vorn Vet and Son Sen,
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instructed Duch to “put pressure” on certain detainees, who were subjected to torture.
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The M-13 Security Centre model was later used at S-21, where M-13 interrogators were transferred along with Duch.
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S-21 Security Centre structure
S-21 Security Centre was created by the CPK statute and began its operations by at least October 1975.
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In April 1976, it moved its location to Phnom Penh.
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S-21 received orders and instructions from office “870” and Duch reported confessions only to his immediate supervisors.
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The Party Centre and General Staff made decisions on arrests.
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Specifically, was Son Sen, and later Nuon Chea, who had the authority to make arrests,
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which the Trial Chamber accepted.
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Prior to his appointment to Chairman by Son Sen in 1976,
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Duch was In Lorn’s deputy,
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assigned to collect documents to be used as sources for further investigation.
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Son Sen was his direct superior until 15 August 1977,
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when Duch was called into a meeting and told to report to Nuon Chea.
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As Chairman, Duch took personal charge of important detainees, interrogated certain prisoners personally, and was the immediate supervisor of deputy Hor.
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He gave instructions from Nuon Chea to his staff to implement.
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He also conducted political training sessions for staff,
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where cadres were told about the situation on the battlefield and how to carry out CPK policies.
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The Trial Chamber found that Duch, not Hor, had the ultimate authority and oversight over the operation of S-21.
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S-21 evidence authentication
Duch authenticated S-21 prisoner lists and the details contained within them, upon which the Trial Chamber relied.
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He gave evidence as to the handwriting, format, and the practices of S-21 cadres and staff in keeping records during the regular course of business.
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In one instance, Duch recognized a prisoner on a list shown to him, recalling that he was a soldier.
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The Trial Chamber found that the evidence demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability to serve as a basis for findings regarding the prisoners,
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specifically finding the monthly entry lists, execution lists, and biographical information in the interrogation lists to be reliable.
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Duch spent most of his time as S-21 Chairman reading confessions and putting annotations on them for his superiors.
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According to the Trial Chamber, “even if the underlying confession was tainted by torture, the Chamber is satisfied that it may safely rely on these annotations to determine the approach taken to obtaining confessions, how these confessions were used, who was involved in the interrogation process and to whom the confessions were passed.”
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Duch also authenticated notebooks of former S-21 personnel, one of which he identified as belonging to Pou Phally and confirmed that he gave instructions consistent with those found in the notebook, and another belonging to Comrade Oeun.
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The Trial Chamber relied on the contents of these notebooks with respect to the content of training sessions and the approach taken to interrogations and obtaining confessions.
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S-21 interrogations
The core mandate of S-21 was to extract prisoner confessions for submission to the Upper Echelon.
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Those arrested and brought to S-21 were labelled “enemies” and had to be interrogated and “smashed”.
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Initially, the interrogation unit consisted of 33 interrogators.
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Different groups of interrogators comprised the “cold”, “hot”, and “chewing” units, each a different method of interrogation.
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Duch used the “cold” method first to extract information about prisoners’ backgrounds using psychological pressure by making prisoners think of their families’ welfare.
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The “hot” method involved torture and was used to grill for more answers,
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and the “chewing” method was used to “chew” prisoners for more information after they had been tortured exhaustively.
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At times, Duch instructed interrogators to use torture when a prisoner did not confess.
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The torture methods used including beatings, electric shocks, suffocation using plastic bags, and covering mouth and nose with a towel and pouring cold water from a kettle.
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Once a confession was obtained, Duch was under order of Son Sen or Nuon Chea to have the prisoner taken out and killed.
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The Trial Chamber found that in regards to torture, Duch was credible as he was intimately involved in monitoring interrogations.
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S-21 prisoners
Duch estimated that the number of prisoners could exceed 1,000 in a day.
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Duch was instructed to remove big groups of prisoners to make room for large numbers of incoming prisoners.
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At times he would monitor incoming prisoners by keeping lists of names and reviewing the daily log.
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On one occasion, about 200-300 prisoners were brought in from the East Zone and Duch was ordered by the Upper Echelon to send them out for execution without interrogations.
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Duch also would be notified by his superiors about the arrival of important prisoners,
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some of whom were arrested at his home.
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All Vietnamese prisoners were labelled agents or spies.
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Vietnamese civilians were forced to confess being spies
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and Duch was ordered to do what was needed for “Yuon” soldiers to confess that they had invaded Kampuchea.
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Four western prisoners were treated as spies for entering Kampuchea illegally, then interrogated and “smashed” at S-21.
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Prisoners were arrested along with their families and interrogated, although most spouses were executed without interrogation.
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Children were “smashed” due to the Party’s fear that they would take revenge.
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The Supreme Court Chamber relied on Duch’s testimony regarding this policy, among other evidence, to find that Khieu Samphan was well aware of and intended the crimes committed at the S-21.
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Nuon Chea’s role in S-21
Duch testified that Nuon Chea’s involvement with S-21 increased after Son Sen was transferred to the Vietnam border in August 1977.
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He reported to Nuon Chea every three to five days about confessions and the overall situation at S-21.
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Nuon Chea provided orders to Duch regarding photographing prisoners and ceasing the use of audio recordings,
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and instructed him to temporarily remove names of certain individuals from confessions.
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Before the arrival of Vietnamese forces in early January 1979, Nuon Chea instructed Duch to “smash” all remaining prisoners.
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While Nuon Chea denied involvement in S-21 operations, the Trial Chamber relied on Duch’s evidence to find to the contrary.
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