LONG Sat
Pseudonym: 2-TCW-1065
Cases: Case 002/02
Category: Witness
Background and role
Long Sat is a distant relative of Sao Phim, the Khmer Rouge East Zone secretary.
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He joined the revolution upon the late King Sihanouk’s appeal and became a Khmer Rouge soldier in March 1970 in Svay Rieng province.
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In 1971, he attended medical trainings and became a medic in the district level in the East Zone.
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From 1976, he was the chief of the military hospital 156 under Division 4 of the East Zone army.
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In late 1977, Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and Vietnam started to become hostile and had conflicts and he was sent to work at the front line.
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From 25 May 1978, due to the internal purges in the East Zone, he “split from being a medic” and started to mobilise troops to attack Pol Pot.
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Long Sat fled to Vietnam in November 1978.
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He returned to Cambodia in January 1979, when Vietnamese forces took effective control of the greater part of Cambodian territory, and was nominated as the deputy chief of police in Zone 7 of Vietnam.
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He was imprisoned in 1980 for one year and eight months because he had disputes with the Vietnamese about their policies.
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He testified as a witness before the Case 002/02 Trial Chamber on the armed conflict and the internal purges in the East Zone.
Armed conflict with Vietnam
There were two root causes of the conflict with Vietnam.
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The first root cause was that in 1973, the Cambodian side was disappointed with Vietnam, which kept some Chinese aid – including materials including vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and uniforms etc. – that were to be given to Cambodia.
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Those materials were supplied through Vietnam, but Cambodia did not receive all of it.
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That led to a stop in cross-border collaboration and all Vietnamese experts had to return to their country.
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The second root cause of the conflict was that later during the DK regime, there was a border issue in the East Zone that was not properly demarcated – some Khmer villages ended up in Vietnamese territory.
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Both sides failed to find solutions after negotiations, with Long Sat claiming that “the only thing we could do was to result to armed conflict.”
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After a meeting, the armed conflict started spontaneously from both sides in the East Zone and moved onward.
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Sam Niet and Chhoeun commanded Regiment 156 of the East Zone Division 4, which had over 1,000 soldiers.
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Upon their return from a meeting at the zone level, Sam Niet and Chhoeun directed their forces to attack the Vietnamese,
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particularly Barrack 27 in Vietnamese territory that was located directly opposite to the regiment 156 spearhead.
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They both explained that the purpose of the launched campaign was to warn the Vietnamese side to respect the demarcated border.
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At the time, Long Sat was sent to the battlefront as a medic in the medical unit composed of six people in Regiment 156, and did not engage in the combat.
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Toward late 1977, the Vietnamese troops attacked the Cambodian side from Road 7 and penetrated about 20 kilometres deep inside Cambodian territory, reaching Khmer villages in Tboung Khmum district.
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During the counterattack, due to their superior strength that was supported by heavy artilleries, tanks, and planes,
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the Vietnamese troops penetrated the Cambodian territory through Regiment 155 and attacked Regiment 156 from behind.
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Both DK forces and Vietnamese forces suffered many casualties at the time.
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Chhoeun was wounded and sent for treatment at the P2 zone hospital.
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Long Sat testified that although the Central forces were in the East Zone, they were only there to contain the Vietnamese forces.
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The DK forces did not have any force to push them back.
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This was due to the “internal rift” in DK and the internal purges of East Zone cadres that weakened its defences.
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Internal purges in the East Zone
Long Sat did not know the details about Sao Phim’s work at the zone level.
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Sao Phim is his distant uncle, who he met three to four times a year when he went to visit his wife and other family members who worked at the agriculture office in the zone headquarters.
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The East Zone office was located at Tuol Samraong or Tuol Kokir in Sector 20.
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There were houses and a hospital in that area.
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Sao Phim’s daughter married Ruos Nhim’s son.
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At the time, Ruos Nhim was the Northwest Zone secretary.
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There were three divisions in the East Zone army: Division 3 based in Svay Rieng, Division 4 based at National Road Number 7, and Division 5, which was newly formed after the Vietnamese attack in December 1977.
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Each division had over 7,000 soldiers.
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Division 4 initially was commanded by Pon, who was arrested in 1976 and then was replaced by Heng Samrin.
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Division 4 was headquartered in Kraek.
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Division 4 of the East Zone army was divided into three regiments: Regiment 154 positioned at Memot, Regiment 155 stationed at Sa’am, Ampuk, and Regiment 156 at National Road 7.
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Prior to 1977, there was no centre army in the East Zone, but only the East Zone divisions.
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Toward the end of 1977, after Vietnamese troops attacked into Cambodia, Division 2 from the centre army including the Central Zone and the Southwest Zone forces came to assist them, which coincided with the internal purge in the East Zone.
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Initially, Ke Pauk’s force came in the zone in order to assist in fighting against the Vietnamese troops, but instead they arrested cadres in the zone and attacked Long Sat’s regiment.
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Cadres and staff members in the zone were arrested, while others “ran and scattered all over the place to their survival.”
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Long Sat was not aware of any contact between Sao Phim or anyone from the East Zone and Vietnamese authorities, or of any plans by Sao Phim to overthrow Pol Pot.
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In late 1977, Long Sat came to visit his family at the zone office and met with Sao Phim in the rear during which they discussed Pol Pot’s plan.
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He considered Pol Pot as a traitor who initiated the coup d’état against Sao Phim by sending Central Zone forces to purge the East Zone.
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Long Sat claimed that “[f]rom this point onwards, we realised that Pol Pot was hostile to both Cambodian people and Vietnam.”
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He denied that Sao Phim or Heng Samrin betrayed and planned to overthrow Pol Pot.
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Long Sat also described the situation that led Sao Phim to kill himself.
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Before committing suicide, Sao Phim sought a meeting with Pol Pot in Phnom Penh for clarification on the arrests and killings of East zone cadres by Son Sen and the Central Zone forces.
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The Central Zone forces arrested both the soldiers and civilians who had to flee from the East Zone at the time.
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Meanwhile, gunfire erupted at every office and ministries.
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All departments and sections fled in dispersion.
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He recalled that commanders of Division 4 had been called from the battlefield to a meeting in Kraek.
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Later, he was told by a regiment commander named Sok, who managed to escape from the event, that the Division deputies named Kim and Kri and various others had been arrested by the Central Zone’s army.
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Some soldiers fled to the south or to the north and those who could not escape were captured.
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Long Sat fled into the jungle with some forces and had to fight two fronts: DK Central Zone forces and Vietnamese forces.
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He had to engage in the fighting against Pol Pot in order to survive.
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In November 1978, a group of Vietnamese and Khmers – including Long Sat, Heng Samrin and others – hold a meeting in Ho Chi Minh City to form a resistance movement named “Kampuchean National Salvation Front” in order to launch “an assault campaign to liberate Kampuchea.”
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Another meeting was held on 2 December 1978 in Snuol in the East Zone with hundreds or thousands of participants including military and civilians in order to inform them about the creation of the front.
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Long Sat said that to defeat Pol Pot’s forces, they needed to cooperate with Vietnamese troops who had forces and weapons.
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Upon his return to Tboung Khmum district after January 1979, Long Sat saw graves at a district security office which had been filled with human remains.
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He was told that his wife and children were transferred to Pursat province and killed.
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The Trial Chamber found Long Sat’s testimony credible in light of the details given in his testimony, particularly concerning the death of Sao Phim.
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The Trial Chamber relied on his testimony to establish that: (i) Son Sen and Ke Pauk came to the East Zone and were joined by Central Zone and Southwest Zone cadres, and then executed the East Zone purges;
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(ii) even when informed of the danger of purges in the East Zone, Sao Phim took no steps to fight against the Central Zone and Southwest Zone cadres who were executing the arrests;
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and (iii) Sao Phim was ordering attacks against the Vietnamese pursuant to Pol Pot’s orders while at the same time purges were ongoing in the East Zone.
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