PRUM Sarat
Pseudonym: 2-TCW-1009
Cases: Case 002/02
Category: Witness
Background and role
Prum Sarat was Commander of Company 2 and later commanded a vessel during the Khmer Rouge regime.
1
In 1970, he joined the revolution and became a soldier in the Kampot military.
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In 1974, he joined the Southwest Zone military when Division 3 came into existence.
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In June 1975 or 1976, after Division 3 became Division 164 of the Navy, Prum Sarat was stationed at Ou Chheu Teal in Kampong Som as part of Company 2, Battalion 44, Regiment 140.
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After being promoted to Company 2, he was tasked with supervising vessels
5
and later put in charge of technical training as a naval commander.
6
Prum Sarat testified as a witness before the Trial Chamber in Case 002/02 about the communications methods and the treatment of the Vietnamese during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) period.
Communication methods
Both telephone lines and shortwave radios were used to receive information on the vessels in Regiment 140 of Division 164.
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Vessels were alerted about boats entering Cambodian territorial waters through the regiment’s command centre.
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Prum Sarat once received information that several Thai fishing boats encroached on Cambodian territorial waters
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and that Vietnamese troops or boats that entered would be arrested.
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He also received the “Revolutionary Flag” magazine monthly and had access to daily radio broadcasts.
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In 1977, he heard Khieu Samphan deliver a speech through the radio from a station located in Stung Meanchey,
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in which he told the soldiers to be ready to fight the enemy who was to “invade our territory.”
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Not all divisions were directly under the authority of the General Staff; for instance, Division 164 was commanded by Meas Muth before coming under command of the central army in June 1975.
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Orders came from the upper echelon to the division level, down to the soldiers.
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Information flowed from the General Staff to the division, and from the division to the lower levels.
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Prum Sarat received information at the regiment level.
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Each year the General Staff invited the level of company up – companies, battalions, divisions, and regiments – to attend annual study sessions in Phnom Penh.
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Prum Sarat attended two sessions with Ta Mok in 1976 and 1977.
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Son Sen was the instructor in the first session, and in the second, he gave the opening speech about how to save the military structure.
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The Trial Chamber cited Prum Sarat’s evidence in finding that: (i) some leaders, offices, and units of the Party Centre and the DK government communicated with each other by telephone;
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(ii) after the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) established a radio station at Stung Meanchey, which broadcast news, propaganda, music, recordings of speeches by the CPK senior leaders and recordings of interviews with CPK leaders;
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(iii) lines of communication within the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea mirrored the vertical reporting structure on the civilian side of the CPK;
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(iv) soldiers attended at least one large political study session conducted by the General Staff and instructed by Son Sen at the division, regiment, battalion, company, and platoon level;
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and (v) Autonomous Sector 505, the Northwest Zone, the Southwest Zone, the West Zone and the East Zone all had their own regional forces in the form of zone divisions, with Division 3 becoming part of the Centre Division 164.
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Treatment of the Vietnamese
Prum Sarat received information through the division that the upper echelon had to return Vietnamese to Vietnam, but that there was no clear indication as to the exact number or the date of return.
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In 1973, and again in 1975 or 1976, deportations of the Vietnamese were “made in the name of the government of Democratic Kampuchea.”
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Prum Sarat testified that a key policy in Pol Pot’s “one against 30” speech published in the “Revolutionary Flag” magazine, was that a Cambodian soldier had to smash 30 Vietnamese soldiers.
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He described the speech as a “road map” and understood it to be a comparison of military forces to encourage soldiers to find strategies to smash enemies
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and stir up fighting spirits.
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He also believed that the lower part of Cambodia was swallowed by Yuon and that there was a plan to swallow the whole.
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According to Prum Sarat, the Vietnamese ambushed and captured soldiers at Poulo Wai islands and banned soldiers from returning to Kaoh Thmei and Kaoh Seh islands.
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He also stated that there was no fighting on Kaoh Tral island (Phu Quoc island).
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The Trial Chamber cited Prum Sarat’s evidence in finding that: (i) a centrally-devised policy targeting the Vietnamese for adverse treatment existed in DK; (ii) Pol Pot’s “one against 30” policy was directed against the ethnic Vietnamese population as a whole;
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(iii) at least a significant number of Vietnamese were transported to Vietnam and were forced to cross the border;
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and (iv) the word “Yuon”, which had been used in Cambodia since long ago to refer to Vietnamese people, was used in a derogatory fashion in aggressive rhetoric and associated with both combatants and civilians.
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The Trial Chamber considered Prum Sarat’s claim that there was no fighting at Phu Quoc to be hearsay and approached his evidence with caution.
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However, it was satisfied that armed clashes commenced around the islands in the territorial waters of Cambodia and Vietnam in May 1975 at the earliest, and that Vietnamese troops occupied the Poulo Wai islands in early June 1975 at the latest.
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On appeal, Khieu Samphan argued that the Trial Chamber distorted the evidence regarding armed conflict between DK and Vietnam and that it erred in using its analysis of the CPK’s hostile political relations with Vietnam as a basis for establishing a policy targeting the Vietnamese people in general.
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Noting that Pol Pot’s “one against thirty” speech was examined both in light of Prum Sarat’s in-court testimony and other contemporaneous documentary evidence,
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the Supreme Court Chamber found that the sum of the evidence relied upon by the Trial Chamber was adequate to establish the existence of “a centrally-devised policy targeting the Vietnamese for adverse treatment.”
41
***
Videos
| Date | Written record of proceedings | Transcript number |
|---|---|---|
| 25 January 2016 | E1/381 | E1/381.1 |
| 26 January 2016 | E1/382 | E1/382.1 |
| 27 January 2016 | E1/383 | E1/383.1 |
| Document title Khmer | Document title English | Document title French | Document D number | Document E3 number |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| កំណត់ហេតុនៃការស្តាប់ចម្លើយសាក្សី ព្រំ សារ៉ាត | Written Record of Interview of Prum Sarat | Procès-verbal de l’audition de Prum Sarat | N/A | E3/9697 |
| កំណត់ហេតុនៃការស្តាប់ចម្លើយសាក្សី ព្រំ សារ៉ាត | Written Record of Interview of PRUM Sarat | Procès-verbal de l’audition de PRUM Sarat | D234/18 | E3/4606 |
| បទសម្ភាសន៍របស់ ព្រំ សារ៉ាត (ដោយមជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជា) | Statement of PRUM Sarat (DC-Cam) | Déclaration de PRUM Sarat (DC-Cam) | N/A | E3/9113 |