Background and role
Sao Sarun testified as a witness before the Trial Chamber in Case 002/01
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and in Case 002/02,
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about the CPK party, communication structures, and his role as district and sector secretary. The Trial Chambers relied on his testimony in establishing facts about the historical background, the CPK party, and communication structure.
Early Involvement in the CPK in Mondulkiri
Sao Sarun was a farmer from Kaoh Moueleu Village in Mondolkiri Province. He was Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) district secretary for Pech Chenda and secretary of Sector 105. He was introduced to the “revolutionary movement” in the 1950s by Ta Laing, who later became Sector 105 secretary.
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In 1963, Sao Sarun formally joined the CPK.
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He received trainings and was tasked to educate the people “about building the economy and to fight the American imperialists.”
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After 1970, he became deputy commune secretary in Ou Boun in Mondulkiri and was responsible economic and security affairs of the commune.
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During this time, the region was exposed to heavy bombardments.
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District Secretary in Pech Chenda
Around 1971, Ta Laing appointed Sao Sarun as Pech Chenda District Secretary.
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Pech Chenda was one of the five districts of Sector 105.
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It comprised of four communes and around 3400 inhabitants.
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Sao Sarun´s task was “to manage and lead the people” in the district.
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He appointed party secretaries to the communes and chaired monthly district committee meetings.
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He received reports from the commune committees,
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reporting weekly to the sector secretary.
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He was part of the sector committee which met monthly or bimonthly.
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In 1971 and 1972, Sao Sarun participated in political education sessions in Kampong Thom, conducted by, among others, Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.
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Situation after 17 April 1975
Around ten days after 17 April 1975, Sao Sarun attended a 3-day-meeting in Phnom Penh to “understand the political situation after the liberation.”
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There were people from all over the country representing the sectors, as well as the military.
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Lectures were held by Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.
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Topics of the sessions were the rebuilding of the country after the liberation, the plans to build canals and dams, the closing of the markets, establishing of cooperatives, and the abolishment of private property and currency.
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It was also discussed that the population should be increased, and that male and female combatants were encouraged to get married.
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The instructions given in the meeting were later passed down to sector and district levels.
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In Mondulkiri, rice farming was done cooperatively since the late 1960s.
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From 1976 on, people were put into groups of 20 or 30 and told to eat communally.
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Sao Sarun claimed that there were “no such forced marriages.”
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Cadres “did not have any right to force them to get married” but they “had to ask for the consents from their parents.”
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Weddings were arranged when there was mutual consent between the groom and the bride.
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Work as Secretary of Sector 105
In 1977, several CPK cadres in Mondulkiri disappeared, died, or were caught fleeing.
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Sao Sarun was the only district secretary in the sector who was not arrested, killed, or disappeared in 1977.
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Also, many soldiers from the military division stationed in Mondulkiri Division 920 disappeared.
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In late 1977, Sector 105 Secretary Laing was killed.
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Sao Saron was asked to travel to Phnom Penh to attend a meeting at Pol Pot´s office, where, among others, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and Son Sen were present.
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He was told that he should replace Laing.
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Sao Sarun did not feel qualified for the position and protested, but that Pol Pot insisted and told him that he would be assisted by the Commander of Division 920, Ta San.
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Sao Sarun was formally appointed to the position only at the Party Congress in September 1978.
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Following the killing of Laing, many cadres from Mondulkiri were arrested
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by “order from the upper level,” which could not resist.
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From January 1978 on, Sao Sarun was responsible to report to the leaders in Phnom, and he sent regular telegrams to “Office M-870”.
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Some reports had to be sent daily, others weekly or monthly.
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Pol Pot or Nuon Chea responded to his telegrams and provided instructions.
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Many telegrams dealt with security matters and the arrest of people.
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In 1978, the population of Kaev Seima at the Vietnamese border was transferred to Kaoh Nheak in Pech Chenda District.
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Meetings in Phnom Penh
In mid 1977, Sao Sarun flew to Phnom Penh to attended another meeting with Pol Pol, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, together with six other cadres from Mondulkiri, including the military commanders in charge of Phnom Kraol prison.
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They discussed the economic, political and military situation in the sector.
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Sao Sarun met Khieu Samphan for the first time on this occasion; they discussed economic issues, and he made requests for goods for the sector.
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In September 1978, Sao Sarun travelled again to Phnom Penh, where he attended a 10-day CPK congress.
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The congress was attended by hundreds of representatives from all districts and sectors, as well as military divisions.
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Sao Sarun sat at able with representatives from Mondulkiri, close to the stage.
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Party leaders, including Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, were called to the stage and presented as members of the Central Committee.
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Many gave presentations, but most sessions were held by Nuon Chea.
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During the congress, among others, the party policy regarding the treatment of internal enemies was handed out and discussed, and cadres were asked to disseminate the information in their respective sectors and districts.
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During this congress, Sao Sarun was officially appointed as secretary for sector 105.
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Before that, he was made to read confessions of Laing implicating him, Sao Sarun.
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Arrests of Sector 105 cadres
At the end of 1978, Sao Sarun again flew to Phnom Penh on Pol Pot´s orders, together with other cadres from Mondulkiri,
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including Ta Kim and Ta Sophea, who were taken away upon arrival and disappeared.
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:”Everybody was scared when he was called to Phnom Penh because when the person went to Phnom Penh, the person never returned. […] The order must come from Pol Pot. Those people were called to work, and they disappeared.”
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“[P]eople could not just be arrested without reason,” but only if there was “a clear analysis and judgement.”
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He personally never arrested or executed anyone; he did not have such authority.
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He was not aware of any cadre from his sector being arrested and brought to S-21.
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Phnom Kraol (K-11)
Sao Sarun confirmed that there was a detention center (K-11) in Phnom Kraol, close to the Sector office K-17,
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but that he had no responsibility there.
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At K-11 there were only three or four male prisoners and no children; Ta Laing was in charge.
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When Sao Sarun took over, he claimed to have released some prisoners that were charged with minor offences as breaking spoons, after interrogating them.
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K-11 was administered by soldiers, not police.
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Sao Sarun stated that he went only occasionally to the Sector office K-17, and that there were no prisoners kept in the Office K-17.
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Assessment by the Courts
The Case 002/01 Trial Chamber referred to Sao Sarun´s testimony when establishing facts about the general historical background and the situation in Mondulkiri before 1975,
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about the CPK party and communication structures on commune, district, and sector and national level,
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about the movement of people away from the Vietnamese border,
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and the roles of Nuon Chea
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and Khieu Samphan.
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The Case 002/02 Trial Chamber in some instances relied on Sao Sarun´s testimony when establishing facts on CPK party and communication structures,
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the political and military structure in Mondulkiri,
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including the Phnom Kroal Security center,
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and the roles of Nuon Chea.
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Nevertheless, the Chamber noted that Sao Sarun´s testimony was "characterised by poor recollections and outright denials” and found that he sought to “minimise his own role.”
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Therefore, the Chamber accorded “no weight to Sao Sarun’s testimony insofar as it relates to assertions uncorroborated by other witnesses or other relevant and reliable evidence before the Chamber.”
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The Case 002/02 Chamber explicitly rejected Sao Sarun´s “assertion that arrests were the result of a legitimate process” and that it was not within the authority of the Sector 105 Secretary to implement arrests.
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Assessing Sao Sarun´s testimony regarding prisoner numbers or conditions at Phnom Kraol Security Centre, the Case 002/02 Trial Chamber noted that his evidence was “internally inconsistent and in stark contrast to other accounts.”
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The Chamber attributed “inconsistencies in Sao Sarun’s testimony to a consciousness of guilt, motivation to lie and minimise his own responsibility,” and therefore accorded no weight to his evidence.
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Regarding the topic of forced marriages, the Chamber relied on the witness´s statement when establishing the fact that marriages were encouraged to increase the population, but rejected his assertion that marriages were only held with the consent of the respective couples.
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