Stephen Heder
Pseudonym: TCE-33
Cases: Case 002/01
Category: Expert
Background and role
Stephen Heder is a political historian
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who conducted research on the Khmer Rouge regime while in power.
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From the Court’s inception until 2006, Heder was employed in the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges and in the Office of the Co-Prosecutors where he drafted the blueprint for the Introductory Submissions in March 2004.
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He testified as a fact witness in Case 002/01 regarding features of the government of Democratic Kampuchea and the roles of the Accused.
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His testimony mainly consisted of confirming the accuracy of interviews he had conducted or evidence he had accumulated in research, which formed the basis for his books and articles.
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Heder also testified about his personal accounts of Oudong, Kampong Cham, and Phnom Penh between May 1973 from April 1975.
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The Trial Chamber found his testimony to be generally credible.
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The Defence argued before the Supreme Court Chamber in Case 002/01 that its rights to confront evidence and to equality of arms were violated by permitting the Co-Prosecutors to seek Heder’s opinion by framing questions as factual inquiries into his primary research but disallowing the same by the Defence and further, that his testimony would have been more neutral and objective had he been called as an expert, instead of fact witness.
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The Supreme Court Chamber considered that while Heder’s designation as a fact witness rather than an expert was a confused approach, the Defence failed to demonstrate prejudice and found that there was no indication that his testimony would have been more neutral and objective had he testified as an expert.
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Oudong and Kampong Cham
Heder travelled to Oudong in the aftermath of an attack by the Khmer Rouge in March 1973.
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The dozens of locals who remained had managed to evade evacuations by the Khmer Republic military.
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Those Heder interviewed said that the population was removed to the countryside and that Khmer Rouge troops had executed categories of people on the spot.
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He was taken to see about half a dozen bodies, including women dressed as Buddhist nuns.
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Heder described the town as deserted and largely destroyed, with serious damage to a pagoda on a hilltop.
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He also heard about executions of Khmer Republic civil servants and military personnel.
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In Kampong Cham, interviews revealed that Khmer Rouge marine forces came upriver and reasserted military control in September 1973.
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Khmer Rouge forces evacuated people West from parts of town under their control.
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Some were killed on the spot.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/01 relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to find that a Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) policy targeting Khmer Republic soldiers and officials existed prior to 1975,
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and that Oudong was captured by the Khmer Rouge.
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The Supreme Court Chamber relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to find that violence and deadly force were used in evacuations prior to the evacuation of Phnom Penh.
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It noted that the Trial Chamber did not give undue weight to Heder’s account, since it found only that Khmer Republic soldiers in Kampong Cham were “targeted”, not executed.
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The Supreme Court Chamber in Case 002/02 relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to find that Kampong Cham and Oudong were evacuated between 1970-1975.
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Phnom Penh
Heder witnessed rockets fired while living in Phnom Penh in 1975.
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Bombings by the U.S. Air Force had ended by 1973, but Khmer Republic air forces and ground troops continued bombing and shelling.
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The Japanese military attaché informed Heder that East and Special Zone troops were the ones shelling the city with rockets.
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The Khmer Rouge also blockaded the supply of food and ammunition up the Mekong from Southern Vietnam to Phnom Penh, which were crucial to its survival.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/01 relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to find that some post-1973 bombing raids were attributed to the Americans but were more likely Khmer Republic soldiers,
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and starting in 1973 and increasing in 1974-1975, Khmer Rouge forces shelled Phnom Penh with rockets.
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Finally, it found that the U.S. was providing aid to the Lon Nol government-held areas via the Mekong River.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/02 relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to establish that the Khmer Rouge advanced upon Phnom Penh on January 1, 1975.
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Broadcasts and Publications
According to Heder, U.S. government personnel in Thailand monitored, recorded, and translated public radio broadcasts from Cambodia and transmitted them through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).
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Some were compiled into daily reports,
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which Heder would read in Phnom Penh,
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noting that some of the events described either never occurred or included highly inflated numbers.
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Heder also saw a collection of Revolutionary Flag and Revolutionary Youth magazines in 1980, given to him by archivists at Toul Sleng Genocide Museum,
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from which he made a chronological file.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/02 held that it would only rely on FBIS compilations when sufficiently corroborated by other evidence.
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It also confirmed the provenance and authenticity of each publication of Revolutionary Flag and Revolutionary Youth before the Trial Chamber.
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Research regarding CPK policies on enemies
According to Heder, Nuon Chea spoke in meetings of the need to “smash” and “eliminate” former Khmer Republic soldiers and officials between May and June of 1975.
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Ke Pauk’s biography stated that Pol Pot told the political and military cadre at a meeting to carry out a “dogged struggle against CIA spies belonging to Americans and KGB spies belonging to the Soviets”.
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Refugees told of Khmers from Hanoi called back to Cambodia and gotten rid of beginning at the end of 1971.
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An Angk Snuol soldier revealed that about 500 Lon Nol soldiers were executed in 1972.
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In his book, Heder wrote that in 1976, the security services received signals from Party leadership that they must augment their efforts to identify former Khmer Republic officials who had escaped execution.
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He recalled from a historian that Cambodian intellectuals were lulled into a false sense of security about the CPK by Khieu Samphan’s contrived prominence.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/01 relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to find that the CPK held meetings concerning the need to build and defend the country
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and established a policy of “smashing” enemies.
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It further found that a policy to target former Khmer Republic officials was expressly ordered and affirmed by the Party leadership
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and that the radicalisation of CPK policy targeting groups of individuals considered to be enemies was consistent with the increasing use of revolutionary violence against enemies.
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The Supreme Court Chamber found Heder’s testimony reliable in supporting that Khmer Republic soldiers and officials were lured into identifying themselves.
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However, it considered Heder’s evidence regarding augmenting efforts to identify former Khmer Republic officials to be “weak”.
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Research regarding CPK Structures
Every structure in the CPK contained a Party Committee led by a secretary, deputy, and members.
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S-71, an administrative office of Office 870, oversaw sub-offices coded with prefix ‘K’.
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By 1971, code ‘870’ was used to refer to the centre echelon of the party
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and “Committee 870” could mean both the committee or top person in that committee.
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According to Heder, the phrase ‘Party Centre’ is somewhat ambiguous, referring to a level within the party hierarchy and not necessarily to any specific body.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/01 and Case 002/02 relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to find that code ‘870’ was used ambiguously to refer to persons and entities connected with the Party Centre, and some aspect of the CPK leadership,
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consistent with the CPK’s emphasis on secrecy.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/02 found that all levels of hierarchy were governed by Party committees, comprising a secretary, deputy, and at least one other member.
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It also found the term ‘Party Centre’ to be nebulous
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and that the CPK maintained an administrative office, S-71,
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which oversaw sub-offices
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.
Research regarding Khieu Samphan
The Khmer Rouge was believed to be led by Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Youn, known as the “Three Ghosts” as they initially were thought by the intelligence community to be dead.
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In January 1976, Khieu Samphan was elevated from alternate to full member of the Central Committee at a Party Congress, according to the magazine Revolutionary Youth.
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Heder also was told by Ieng Sary that, in 1975, Khieu Samphan was already de facto involved in Central Committee affairs as chairman of 870.
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The Trial Chamber in Case 002/01 relied on Heder’s evidence, and others, to establish that the “Three Ghosts”, a reference to rumours of their deaths circulated while they were in hiding, became the public face of the opposition movement in the early 1970s.
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The Supreme Court Chamber in Case 002/02 relied on Heder’s testimony, and others, to find that Khieu Samphan was elevated to full member of the Central Committee at a Party Congress in January 1976.
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