[Paragraph number refers to the the paragraph number in the Case 002 Closing Order (Indictment). For editorial purposes, footnote reference have been omitted from this web version]
Disclaimer: The paragraphs below from the Closing Order contain allegations of crimes. All allegations must be proven through adversial trial proceedings, and cannot be taken as facts unless these facts have been confirmed through a final judgement.
Movement of the Population from Phnom Penh (Phase 1)
[Paragraph number refers to the the paragraph number in the Case 002 Closing Order (Indictment). For editorial purposes, footnote reference have been omitted from this web version]
Pre-1975 Situation
221. Between 1970-1975 the population of Phnom Penh greatly increased to several million due to internally displaced people coming to the city from the countryside seeking protection from the conflict.
222. Health service personnel and facilities were of decreased capacity during this period and services were less available in the countryside than in the cities, largely due to the on-going conflict between CPK forces and the Lon Nol regime. Hospitals in the capital were overcrowded and of varying quality. Health represented under 3% of the national budget at the end of 1974, compared to 5.7% in 1968.
223. Although hunger and malnutrition were matters of concern during the conflict period prior to 1975, there are no reports of widespread famine or epidemic risks. This was largely due to foreign agencies supporting the population, although the ability to assist affected communities decreased as the insecurity grew.
Departure
224. With the entry of CPK troops in the capital, the population of Phnom Penh was made to depart the city, from the morning of 17 April 1975, continuing for several weeks, including during the evening hours.Persons generally departed from their family homes located throughout the city.
People Moved
225. The persons made to leave Phnom Penh were predominantly civilians801 including men, women, the elderly, children,802 and monks. Doctors and nurses were also made to leave; as well as hospital patients, wounded and sick people, and mothers who had just given birth. Entire families were made to leave Phnom Penh although frequently family members were separated from each other.
226. The precise number of persons who were made to leave Phnom Penh is unclear, although the total figure is likely to be 1.5 to 2.6 million people. Witnesses refer to seeing masses of people travelling in the streets and that the entire city was emptied of people. Before 17
April 1975, the CPK claimed that the population in Phnom Penh and other areas controlled by the enemy was around one million. After 17 April 1975, the CPK officially estimated that the total number of persons moved from Phnom Penh was two million. Later the CPK put
the number of persons moved from Phnom Penh and provincial capitals at around three million (although the same figure of three million was sometimes also cited for the population moved from Phnom Penh alone, including by Ieng Sary). In 1977, the CPK changed their estimation of total number of people moved to four million.
Initial Destination
227. The civilian population left Phnom Penh by the national roads in all directions: north, south, east and west of the city. In general, people were not provided with directions nor informed of the final destination other than to go to rural areas or to their birth place or
home village. On occasion CPK troops made people change their route. The evidence shows that the people left Phnom Penh for most of the zones in Cambodia. The local communities were often instructed to receive the newly arriving population and provide food and shelter, although it was generally not sufficient for the number of arrivals. In other cases, the civilian population from Phnom Penh was either housed in halls or had to establish their own accommodation. Some people became ill from the journey from Phnom Penh or from the conditions on arrival. People who had originated from Phnom Penh were identified as “new people” or “17 April people” or “depositee people” and were often targeted on arrival based on this identity.
Means and Method of the Movement
Means
228. The persons enforcing the movement of the population from Phnom Penh were identified bywitnesses as “Khmer Rouge” troops. They were described as wearing black or khaki clothes, some with scarves or kramas around their necks. The “Khmer Rouge” troops were often armed.
229. The troops made announcements generally over loudspeakers or megaphones that the population had a limited time period to leave Phnom Penh. In some instances the CPK troops were reported to have had lists of names and were allocated specific areas of the
capital to supervise the movement of the population.
230. Various contingents of the CPK army were identified as implementing the Phnom Penh population movement, namely the North Zone forces (including Division 1 under Commander Oeun), the Southwest Zone forces, the Special Zone forces, and the East Zone army; and witnesses report that the units had differing attitudes towards the population.
231. People did not resist the instruction to leave Phnom Penh. According to certain witnesses there was no particular violence on the part of certain CPK troops. However, most witnesses state that the CPK troops engaged in threats and the use of force to ensure people left their homes. Witnesses reported hearing gunshots.
232. Other witnesses state that the CPK troops shot people dead if they refused to leave their homes. Civilians were also shot in the cross-fire targeting Lon Nol soldiers. Some witnesses reported seeing dead bodies in the streets of Phnom Penh. Others stated that the
CPK troops were instructed to do whatever was needed to ensure people left Phnom Penh.
233. Ill treatment and acts of violence, such as beating and shooting in the air, were also reported against the civilian population. There are reports that personal property was taken by the CPK troops from Phnom Penh inhabitants.
234. With respect to Lon Nol soldiers, some were reportedly disarmed by CPK troops and in some instances made to leave the city with the civilian population. On other occasions it is reported that Lol Nol soldiers were identified by questioning and taken away separately from
the people leaving the city. There was an announcement in advance that “Angkar” would forgive all the people from the former regime except seven high level officials and that the CPK soldiers requested former Lon Nol soldiers, governmental officials and police officers to
report for work for the Party, however these individuals were then taken away to an unknown location before disappearing.
235. Some Lon Nol soldiers were shot if they refused to lay down their arms or showed any resistance. In particular there is a written order signed by Comrade Pin ordering a list of Lon Nol officers be “smashed” and one witness states that Son Sen ordered the arrest of
high-ranking civil servants of the Lon Nol regime, including those in hospital. These people were later killed and thrown into a well in the Tuol Kork area. Witnesses refer to seeing executions of Lon Nol soldiers and seeing dead bodies of Lon Nol soldiers in the streets.
Methods
236. Witnesses do not refer to being provided with transport other than limited reference to the use of military trucks. Most people travelled on foot, others drove or pushed their cars or other vehicles, including scooters or motorbikes and bicycles or cyclos. In some
instances boats were used.
237. The CPK troops told people not to take many personal belongings in some cases specifying it was not necessary because they would be leaving for a short period of time, and in others specifying that it was not possible to take items with them since people had to leave
quickly. Most people left their personal belonging inside their houses. For people who were carrying their personal belongings, there was no evidence of assistance provided to them. People carried items on their heads or shoulders, in carts or in their vehicles. People took with them items such as rice, money, medicine, school books or clothing, and they were also assisting those who were sick and elderly.
238. There is some evidence that food or other forms of support were provided to the population during the journey from Phnom Penh. There is evidence that certain CPK troops provided some rice for the people to eat although some of these witnesses also report having to drink dirty water from ponds along the way and that the CPK cadre noted the names of those who received food and the names of those who did not want to continue travelling. Two witnesses state that they did not see people starving during the population movement from
Phnom Penh.
239. There is no evidence of CPK troops providing security or protection to the population along the way. People had no shelter along the way and slept on mattresses on the road, in empty houses or under trees. People were not provided with food or water. One witness
refers to being denied permission by the “Khmer Rouge” to obtain food.894 Otherwise, the only food available was steamed rice.895 Some people had to travel through the night with no rest for several days. People developed swollen limbs from the long walk and there are
reports of deaths attributable to the conditions. There is no evidence of the population receiving any medicine. Some CPK troops took property from people as they travelled from Phnom Penh.
240. Witnesses refer to seeing corpses along the road of people who had been shot dead. People were killed along the road for small things such as not wanting to abandon their bicycles. Although some witnesses state that they did not see any mistreatment by CPK
soldiers against civilians or that they did not see anyone die along the road, Ieng Sary states that 2,000 to 3,000 people died during the evacuation of Phnom Penh.
Return to Phnom Penh
241. One witness states the CPK would threaten people that they would be shot if they returned to Phnom Penh. Nuon Chea stated that the intention was to permit people to return to Phnom Penh and Ieng Sary stated in May 1977 that the cities were re-populated after the initial
population movement to the countryside, and that people could choose to return to the city if they wished or could remain in the countryside. However, although there was indication that in rare circumstances some people were sent back to Phnom Penh to work, the city was largely empty of people except for limited numbers of soldiers and cadres until the fall of the CPK regime. According a statement by Pol Pot at a meeting on 6 June 1976, the population of Phnom Penh was then “more than 100,000”. As of April 1977, this included 43,810 provided rations by the General Staff.
Reasons Given to the Population for the Movement
242. During the movement of the population from Phnom Penh, the people were often told by the CPK troops that they would only be away from their homes for a short time of two or three days, or up to a week or two.
243. In addition, several witnesses state that the CPK troops told them that it was necessary to leave Phnom Penh for their personal security and so that the troops could identify or eliminate Lon Nol soldiers, or otherwise find the enemy. There was also reference to the anticipated American bombing of the city, although there are also indications that some people present did not believe this. There is also reference to justifications for the movement of people from the city because CIA agents intended to deploy spies to launch a counterattack.
244. Witnesses were further told that it was necessary to remove people from Phnom Penh to organise and clean up the city such as clearing away the ammunition.
245. Certain political justifications were also provided: some witnesses state that they were told that “Angkar” was waiting for them; that they were needed to build the rural economy, to build dams, canals, and work in the rice fields; and that the only persons authorised to
remain in the city were members of the military working there. Others have also referred to the food shortage in Phnom Penh as a reason for the population movement and that food was supposedly more plentiful in the countryside.
246. These justifications referred to in the evidence of witnesses have been echoed in statements made by the Charged Persons. Ieng Thirith has referred generally in an interview she gave to a journalist in 1980 to the economic, political and military reasons for the movement of
people from Phnom Penh.
247. Ieng Sary has stated in an interview with a journalist in 1975, as reiterated at a conference in 1978, that the primary reason for the population movement was food. He states that initially it was thought that there were two million people in Phnom Penh, however it was later discovered that the population of the city was actually three million. He states that prior to the CPK regime, Cambodia had received between 30 to 40,000 tons of food a month from the United States and that the CPK did not wish to ask the international community for aid, but that the CPK would have been unable to transport food from the countryside into the cities. Khieu Samphan has also stated in a radio interview in 2007 that the population was starving at the time, but conceded that there was not enough food in the countryside either; so people ate bananas with rice or manioc and only limited food aid was delivered from the allies of the CPK. However, in a prior statement, Khieu Samphan asserted that any government recently out of war would have faced the problem of starvation and he asserted that after
moving people out of Phnom Penh, people had enough food in cooperatives.
248. The Charged Persons have also referred to the ideology of the regime as a justification for the population movement. In the face of the food crisis, Nuon Chea has asserted that the objective of the regime was to remain independent and sovereign. Khieu Samphan has also stated that Pol Pot did not want to live under the control of foreigners. The movement of people from the cities into the countryside has also been referred to by Nuon Chea as a component of the socialist revolution. Ieng Sary has stated that the objective was to transform the uninhabited quarters of the city into industrial sites. He also stated that it was necessary to train the people from the cities to endure moral and physical sufferings through hard labour. One witness refers to Ta Mok stating that it was viewed as not necessary to have markets or cities and that all the city population were to go to rural areas to build the rural economy. Duch states in interview that the CPK objectives were to turn the whole country into peasants, abolish privatisation, and to force the technicians to do farming so as to make them powerless and dependent on peasants. CPK-era documents state that reeducation was not deemed possible on a large scale and so it was necessary to “evacuate” people to the rural areas to stop “uncontrollable ideological contamination of the revolutionary ranks”; and to participate in the movement to increase production, sustain the population, and contribute to defending and building the country.
249. Finally, with respect to security concerns, Nuon Chea has stated that it was necessary to move the people from Phnom Penh to facilitate the military defence of the country from Vietnam to protect the people from war. Ieng Sary referred to a secret document allegedly obtained from the CIA concerning plans to infiltrate the city. Khieu Samphan referred to the perceived need to make the country strong to fight the enemy. CPK-era documents state that if the population had not left the cities, the enemies might have been able to launch surprise attacks from behind.
Planning
250. Prior to 1975, the CPK had implemented a policy of removing people from the towns and cities that came under their control: people were moved totally or partially from urban areas in Steung Treng, Kratie, Banam and Udong.
251. According to some witnesses, the decision to move the population from Phnom Penh was made in February 1975 and was a deliberate plan of the CPK senior leaders. According to a former East Zone cadre, this decision was followed in February 1975 by orders from Pol
Pot that all districts and sectors should prepare by building houses to receive people from Phnom Penh.
252. One witness explained that in early April 1975 a meeting took place at Pol Pot’s office in Tang Poun Village, Kampong Tralach (Leu) District, Kampong Chhnang Province which was focused on the plan to move the population from Phnom Penh. Although there was no
official record taken of the meeting, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan each participated in the meeting and took their own notes. The commanders were told to “set up meetings when they returned to their sectors and make plans to evacuate the people from the cities
under their responsibilities. This information was subsequently published in the Revolutionary Flag and the [Kampuchean] Front Flag and was issued to all Party members” (although there is no known existing record of such publications).
253. An additional witness refers to a coordination meeting prior to 17 April 1975 to which all CPK commanders of his unit (then the North Zone Division 1, later Centre Division 310) were invited as reported to him by Et, the commander of his Battalion. Another witness
states that about one month before the entry into Phnom Penh, a meeting was held in Phnom Sar (the headquarters of the CPK military command of Kampot). Sek, the Chief of Staff of Southwest Zone Sector 35, chaired the meeting. Southwest Zone Secretary Ta Mok stated that it was not necessary to have markets or cities and that all people must be evacuated from the cities to the rural areas in order to build the rural economy in two days after occupying the city.
254. Some witnesses state that Sam Bit, Commander of Division 2 of the Southwest Zone, attended a meeting with upper-echelon CPK members where it was said that Phnom Penh had to be evacuated to find Lon Nol elements. This information was then disseminated from
this meeting down to regimental and battalion levels.
255. Former low-level CPK cadres also state that they were informed in advance of the plan to remove the people from Phnom Penh. One CPK soldier was told that “Angkar” had a plan to evacuate the people to their birth districts. Another witness states that North Zone Division
1 Secretary Oeun made an order to his group regarding the movement of the population about three days before “liberation”, whereas another former soldier also refers to being informed by [REDACTED] three days before the attack on Phnom Penh.
256. However, other low-level CPK cadres also state that there were no prior instructions.Furthermore, some soldiers were only told to commence moving the population after being in the city for several days.
257. CPK soldiers also received instructions from their superiors to move people from Phnom Penh through the military chain of command.971 Division 310 (North Zone Division 1) 2nd regiment (later 723rd) received the order to evacuate people from the Commander named Chheang and also from the Commander Oeun.9CPK soldiers also referred to the “upperechelon” or “Angkar” as issuing the instruction to leave the city.
258. With respect to the involvement of the Charged Persons in the decision-making process, Nuon Chea was involved in the military planning of the CPK regarding the attack on Phnom Penh as witnessed by his participation in meetings with military leaders. In a statement to a journalist Nuon Chea stated that the decision to evacuate people from cities was made by “the Party Centre… At the time, individuals each helped a little to originate ideas, it was combining this with that”.Nuon Chea further stated that “we attacked and we took military bases inside. So by 17 April 75, liberation, the army went in and completely liberated Phnom Penh”. Ieng Sary stated in a written statement in 1996 that the decision was made by Pol Pot without his knowledge9 although he states he attempted to dissuade Pol Pot, stating that “in 1974 I talked with Pol Pot that taking people out of Stung Treng and Kratie was easy because there weren’t many people, but evacuating people out of Phnom Penh would not be so easy, everything must be thoroughly arranged because there were millions of people”. Ieng Sary has also stated that “all decisions were made by the committee of the four [including himself and Nuon Chea]. The evacuation of people from the cities did not involve my participation in the decision … [upon return from Peking on 23 of April] I saw that the town had already been deserted of its inhabitants”. According to Ieng Sary, the authoritative decision to “evacuate” Phnom Penh was made in late March or early April 1975. Khieu Samphan stated in a radio interview that he was against the population movement but that it had to be done for the good of the city dwellers, and he stated in another interview that such steps were “thought and planned by the Standing Committee”. Ieng Thirith stated in an interview with Elizabeth Becker in 1980 that she did not knowwhen the Phonm Penh evacuation decision was made because she was elsewhere at the time.
259. With respect to the presence of the Charged Persons in Phnom Penh, Nuon Chea left the former CPK headquarters on 17th April and arrived at Phnom Penh on or around 20th April. Ieng Sary stated that he arrived in Phnom Penh on 23 April 1975 from Peking, Ieng
Thirith stated in an interview with Elizabeth Becker that she arrived in Phnom Penh around June, but that she knew of the evacuation before she arrived, and Khieu Samphan stated that he entered Phnom Penh 7-10 days after 17 April 1975.
260. Based on the foregoing evidence, the decision to move people from Phnom Penh was made largely by Pol Pot in February 1975 with plans already disseminated to prepare the reception of persons from Phnom Penh that same month. Further involvement in the development of this plan by members of the Party Centre also took place through meetings in late March or early April 1975, including the participation of Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary. Although Ieng Sary was out of the country at the time, there is evidence that he received communications of decisions and that he had already discussed the matter with Pol Pot in 1974. There were then meetings with lower level cadre to disseminate this decision and some CPK troops were told in advance of the attack on Phnom Penh, however others were not informed until they received the order to remove people from the city.