

Division 801
Political Section

Report

This is to respectfully report to Uncle 89 on the situation of the enemy's activities and those of certain units during the period of October-November 1976 and measures as the following:

I. About the external enemy's activities at all points along the border

a) The enemy's activities

1. During the reporting period, we generally observed that the enemy performed a variety of activities. The enemy subsequently fired a series of shells from their 105mm, 80mm, 60mm and M-79 cannons and gunshots from October 1976 through November 1976 on a daily basis. Their firing was heavier in south of road number 19 to Au liev and in the north of road number 19 to Phum Muy village. In these incidents, they launched their shells along the border line;
2. There is nothing to notice at Kântuy Niek (dragon tail) area but we found footprints of 4-10 trespassers sneaking and entering into our territory at the Cambodian-Laotian border points. They were trespassing approximately three kilometres inside our territory;
3. At night, we went to the top of the mountain from 1.020 in its western side and we also saw the firing of all kinds of shells and gunshots at the Cambodian-Laotian border;
4. They continued to fire along road number 13 and they also fired a signal gunshot. At the same time, we have also seen their vehicles circulating on a frequent basis in that area;

Therefore, based on the assessment of these situations, the Committee of Division 801 concluded that they were the activities of both the Laotian and Vietnamese soldiers in their combat technique trainings.

In the meantime, during the month of November the enemy flew their jet fighters over our territorial space and they flew two planes in each incident. In the last incident, they flew their intercept jets from the south to the north along the border line. They entered into our territorial space and then turned into their territorial space while they were over the edge of Kântuy Niek.

In conclusion, the enemy has not yet caused any harm to us and they have simply conducted the activities as reported to uncle above.

b) Our activities

1. A constant patrol has been deployed at each target and the patrol mission was well connected within the division;

2. The divisions maintained their continuous cooperation for responding in case of any emergency;
3. They prepared the bases for deployment of frontline and reinforcement troops and we planted stakes, anti-personnel mines and traps on each open space at the frontline; and
4. We deployed the combat forces to a fair degree along roads 13 and 19 to prevent any incidents.

II. Situation within the entire unit

a) The enemy serving activities

1. After a desertion of a small number of soldiers, we found inside Regiment 83 other enemy infiltrators who were indoctrinated by the enemy;
2. The remaining infiltrators continued to implement their plan and acted to create chaos within the company on behalf of those who deserted the company;
3. The enemy's plan and activities within the army are as follows:
 - a) They indoctrinated the cadres and combatants not to trust our Revolution by their references to the insufficient food rations;
 - b) They induced the combatants to desert the army and in case of cooperative, to move out of the cooperative as it is difficult to live in;
 - c) In the unit, they induced people to steal everything and to throw away anything if they could not be eaten;
 - d) They induced people to act and speak freely in their movement and to address freedom issues in Vietnam and Laos;
 - e) They induced the people by referring to title/rank, salaries in Vietnam and Laos saying that in these countries people are happy at their wish and they also have salaries. They said life in Kampuchea Revolution is not happy and the longer you stay the more difficult it will be; and
 - f) They induced people to be lazy at work by an indication that insufficient food results in no energy for labour.

The enemy's plots are as follows:

1. They assigned supervisors to their separate roles to perform activities and to assume separate responsibilities. For instance, a particular network assigned for inducing on stealing issue would make any efforts to bring stealing into existence. A network in charge of inducing a conflict would use method to provoke disputes. A network inducing the combatants into a desertion or to work freely, to be

- tightened, to be in chaos or to act against the Party line etc. would perform their separate activities under the responsibility of each network;
2. The weapon stealers and those who condoned the deserters were noticed;
 3. The purposes of their plots were to mobilize as many forces and guns as possible and to launch an offensive on 15/1/77 with the support from outside forces and if they defeated us they will not move to anywhere but will retreat if they were defeated in the battle; and
 4. If the plan was failed or its secrecy was broken, all infiltrators must desert with weapons from their infiltrated units. Those infiltrators whose plot remains in secret shall continue their activities onwards.

These accounts are based on the statements of the combatants arrested from Division 83 and a confirmation as to whether these are true or untrue is subject to a further examination. However, based on their statements, they were the one who stealthily pulled off winter melon and sweet yam wines etc. in the previous incidents.

b) The remaining shortcomings in certain units are as follows:

- An incident of stealing rice and cassava;
- A stealing/killing of villager's dog and maize for food;
- An incident of loitering, laziness and foiling of the work; and
- An incident of homesick and a desire to be married.

These shortcomings were found among the company officers and combatants. Most of them are freely-acting people and some of related elements are 18 months in military service and the temporary correction measure was continuously imposed. In the meantime, some combatants, who used to be in a proper behaviour, have resembled the others.

In summary, there are not many of them. There are only a few of them.

III. Causes of shortcomings

1. The main causes of these shortcomings are the weakness of Party leaders at each level who failed to be strong, absolute and mastery. These include:
 - Weakness in education campaign;
 - Incapacity to grasp the situation of the unit;
 - Leadership stance is still peaceful;
 - Incorrect analysis of disputes;
2. It has also caused by the enemy's indoctrination since some of them have relatives in Laos and Vietnam; and
3. We sometimes suffered from a shortage of food.

IV. Certain corrective measures

1. To make every effort to strengthen the Party members and its branches and all sections of the Party's core organization to be strong so that they can be a master of their leadership;
2. To provide general education within the unit to disclose both the western and the eastern enemy's tricks aiming at destroying our Revolution;
3. To educate our combatants not to be duped by the enemy;
4. To appeal for those who were tricked by the enemy to cease their mistaken activities and recommend them to be loyal to our Revolutionary organization;
5. To ensure sufficient food rations with two milk cans of rice a day per person; and
6. To cooperate with the base to completely purge the enemy inside the unit and to try to search for all enemy networks within the unit.

Organizational measures

1. Anyone who is suspicious of being an enemy must absolutely be arrested;
2. To examine the document regarding a person implicated by the enemy and request for a temporary arrest;
3. To impose a measure to remove and put into a group for surveillance anyone who travelled freely or repeatedly violated the disciplines after education;
4. Any company or squad cadres who are inactive, deceitful or lazy must absolutely be removed; and
5. Those who affiliated to political tendency shall be gradually arrested. At the beginning, we examine these elements to determine their good or bad activities toward the Revolution. The good shall be temporarily kept. Anyone who is resisting or inactive shall be removed and put into a group.

In conclusion, anyone who violated the discipline and repeated the faults after three to four sessions of education shall be arrested or removed from the unit.

The organization of combat forces

1. Each battalion shall designate on company as a vigorous combat force and to absolutely maintain the politics, ideology and organization in good manner. We have sufficient weapons and ammunition;
2. The trenches shall be made available surrounding a military base;
3. The reserve weapon and ammunition must be guarded by a good person;
4. The strict patrol mission must cover every location in each target;
5. Border issues: the border must be protected and all locations/points must be acquainted and the stakes and mines must actively be planted and all enemy bases in each target must be acquainted;
6. A number of forces must be organized in collaboration with the bases in order to arrest the enemies;
7. The telecommunication radio shall be properly prepared and both the operator and radios shall be operational.

Report on rainy season rice:

1. Currently, the harvesting has gradually started; and

2. The self-reliance unit has achieved approximately 40% [of crops] because the rice was good in certain places but it was not good in other places. In certain places it produced no grain and there was insufficient water in some places.

Future measure:

1. To launch an active cultivation of maize, cassava and high land rice;
2. To launch an active cultivation of dry season rice. Based on our feasibility survey, we can cultivate 70 hectares of rice and we have a complete mastery over the irrigation. We completed a construction of irrigation dam and stores sufficient water as demanded.

V. Other matters

1. Now, the armed forces have gone to help the people with their farming activities. They have been doing these until today. They are prepared to help the people with their harvests. Harvesting is about to be completed in certain places.
2. So far such assistances made people feel confident in rice paddy yielding because it was obvious that the rice paddy produced more yields than the high land rice farming and the people felt more confident in the army.

For example, at the beginning the people misunderstood the help in cultivation by the troops. They thought the troops will take all the crops and leave nothing for them. Others said that people cultivated only high land rice for several generations but now it is clear that rice paddy yields are greater than the high land rice. High land rice farming produced less yields. They were happy to see good rice yields and they have confidence in the organization that sent the troops to assist them. Another group said that when the troops were helping, as we did not believe that it will produce good yields, we failed to mobilize as many labourers as possible to join the troops and if we had joined the troops from the beginning we would have had greater harvestings than these.

Another group came over and expressed their apologies to the troops for their unhappy feeling with the army's assistance during that time. They did not believe that it will yield. But when they saw long storks of rice all over the paddies they frequently visited paddies in the morning and in the afternoon. They said: "We were unhappy while comrades were cultivating and we almost tell you not to help as it will make us feel more daring. We did not wish to do rice paddies and we say sorry for that because all comrades gave us sincere assistances from the sowing until the harvesting. Finally, we believe in Angkar. Rice paddy cultivation brought more yields."

3. In all assigned areas, both on the frontline and at the rear, it is imperative to cooperate with the base. Wherever troops are, they must always go and help the people at all costs, i.e. harvesting and threshing rice. In short, they have to do their best.

This is a report of Committee 801 regarding enemy activities and measures as stated above and we request that Uncle make remarks and comments. We look forward to receiving the Party's recommendations.

Made on 25/11/1976
For the Party Committee of Division 801
Rooun (រ៉ូន)