

FILENAME: DEUAN: ALL

DEUAN 18 February 1977

DEUAN says that he has learned via the Party and the Secret Police that KOY THUON met with HANG THUN HAK and the Americans and was a traitor who joined the CIA and served it for a long time.

He says that since he was under his leadership some of his activities inadvertently served the enemy.

He gives as his first example that he was appointed to a committee of liaison between the Zone and Viet Nam, saying this was the Organization's decision. He says in accepting this responsibility he sold food supplies to the Vietnamese and authorized them to transport rice through the Zone.

His second example is that he was appointed to convene a Zone monk's conference and carried out instructions to construct a large and impressive hall for it.

His third example is that in setting up the Zone Arts, he traveled around the Sectors for fun, asking the Sectors to give him good food and drink and nice places to stay, and that he was instructed to set up model villages with banana trees planted along the roads.

DEUAN says his stance was not firm, and he didn't dare to resist. The Zone members also didn't dare to resist. This is why some of the work that was done fell into his plans, which were those of a CIA agent.

DEUAN says he was never asked by KOY THUON to join the CIA, and that he was always well treated by him and kept materially well supplied by him. He disclaims ever having noticed any traitorous activities.

DEUAN says he did as he was told when he was Secretary of the KAMPUNG THOM Sector and in charge of Zone Economics, thinking this was the work of the revolution.

DEUAN says that when KOY THUON was in charge of Commerce and gathered DEUAN and YA to meet at KOY THUON's house when YA came to work with the Organization, KOY THUON was always sending them things from Commerce. Commerce didn't dare to send DEUAN anything at the Organization's office, but Commerce was told to send anything for the NORTHEAST to the 870 Office.

DEUAN says that when he was in charge of KAMPUNG THOM Sector, he set up a worksite at KBAL DAMREY to plant bananas, tubers and cotton because during several years of the war, this Sector lacked rain, and the people ran over to CHAMKAR LOE to look for food (bananas, tubers, corn). The Sector thought it would be a good thing if it had a worksite for strategic crops. However, the largescale gathering of forces to work there adversely affected the people, and so the Organization corrected the situation by putting a halt to this, seeing that it was at variance with Party directives. Subsequently, the Zone built fences and planted vegetables along the roads, and because DEUAN's stance was not firm, he also thought this was good, so he didn't try to stop this, and he admits this was a shortcoming.

At the end of 1973 when the enemy came up to round up the people, DEUAN was holding a Zone Women's Conference, which he adjourned when he learned of the problem, and went down to stay to the end on the battlefield. When the

enemy went on the rampage, he lost the initiative due to a lack of troops and weapons and in particular to limited fighting, so there was chaos on every fighting front, as a result of which the enemy was able to seize an important number of people. DEUAN says his deficiency was he lacked a stance of storming attack, underestimated the enemy, thinking they couldn't come out because they were already weak, and so in leading the fighting he only tried to bog them down.

DEUAN says a second deficiency was that he didn't dare so much to resist the traitorous Zone Secretary KHUON. He says he resisted him some in terms of stance, but didn't combat him forcefully. He says that for example he resisted him pretty strongly on the issue of womanizing, but not to the point where he capitulated. He gives as another example that at the Party School, not long before each time there was to be a life-view meeting, THUON would meet with him and POK and say that they should criticize each other only moderately because they had already studied. He and POK remained quiet, and THUON said they could wait and criticize each other back in the Zone, but back in the Zone he didn't take on board the criticisms of the Zone Members.

DEUAN says he never told THUON that the Organization knew what was going on and that he should try to escape.

DEUAN says that in the past with regard to the killing of the young person Lo~NG at Propaganda, the Organization wasn't around, but had gone out to the countryside. KHUON intervened a lot with DEUAN with the intention of hiding his treasonous face, and he also intervened at Propaganda. But DEUAN reports this matter to the Organization upon its return and researches it clearly in order that he could be arrested with evidence. DEUAN says that when he was brought in to be held secretly, he participated by setting up a guard to prevent his escape, that he worked this out with the Youth and PaNG under the direct instructions of the Organization, and that everything that was said back he reported to the Organization. DEUAN adds that it had been his personal opinion that if he were allowed to go abroad he would definitely run away and not stay with the Organization because of this morals matter and he had even stooped to the extent of committing a serious offence by calling a young person.

DEUAN says that after he came to live constantly with the Organization, the Organization taught him personally, and he dared to struggle more with KHUON than when he was in the Zone, so that in the end KHUON didn't have the influence over DEUAN he had had when in ~ e Zon~, and he was unhappy about this, whereas DEUAN didn't pay much attention to him.

Back in the Zone, he also was not happy with DEUAN because of the things he did which were not acceptable to the masses were reported to DEUAN who in turn reported them to the Organization. At the same time DEUAN had another worry because the Organization had appointed him to be in charge of Commerce, which KHUON always hoped the Organization would return to him after he had been ~constructed". KHUON always asked him who was administering the ministry and DEUAN answered him that it was the Organization. But later he heard a radio broadcast naming DEUAN as in charge of the Commerce ministry.

19 February 1977 (several documents)

DEUAN alias SEUA VASI

DEUAN affirms he has always served the revolution and never joined the CIA.

DEUAN says it is his understanding that the Party has brought him in for examination by the secret police as a measure to protect the Party, that it is because the Party has been facing problems that it was decided to do this. He says that since entering the secret police place he has clarified over and over again his deficiencies and shortcomings in implementation of the line, according to his own stance.

DEUAN says that with regard to his shortcomings, he is aware only of not having implemented the party line entirely in accordance with what was required, and that it was on this point that the Party had ~constructed" him again and again, but that due to a lack of firmness in his proletarian stance, shortcomings persisted.

DEUAN says that he would like to examine a number of his shortcomings.

First, he says that when he was working in ZONE 304, he went all out in accordance with the stance he possessed in staging stormy offensives to fulfill his duties. He says that ever since he started working with KHUON, who was then called Ko~EM, he never spoke at all about any CIA organization, but only of the revolution, and that therefore DEUAN and the other comrades strove to accelerate the work of the revolution according to their understanding and levels of competence. He says that starting in 1970 KHUON was mean with the cadres and combatants below him, and that he was very much feared. He says that also starting from that year KHUON organized the Zone like he was celebrating by having many different activities going on at the same time (thus creating a lot of noise) /kokreukkorkreng) and set himself up as a bigshot like an enemy mandarin, that is, he ate well every day, nurtured his own family, was accompanied by an entourage of young women and began having morals difficulties with a whole lot of young women. He says that because KHUON was smart and knew a lot of tricks, he and others did notice something, but but not very much, because KHUON always shielded himself behind the words of the Organization.

DEUAN says that as far as his own work was concerned, he pushed it forward during the political period, the civil war period and the period of the five year war, but that because of the immaturity of his stance, his political naivete and his petty bourgeois student background, his work was not deep, he didn't attack on target. Frankly, in spirit, he wanted to be a good expert at his work, but went up and down a lot. He says his life morals were always maintained well, that he never caused the Party any problems with regard to women, and that there was never anything major with regard to eating and drinking or disorderliness.

He says he can see that his shortcomings included a lack of courage to struggle with his superiors matched by leniency vis-a-vis those below him out of pity and softness. He says his stand vis-a-vis the people was like this.

He says that when he was in charge of KAMPUNG THOM, he did push forward a stormy attack, but didn't do so actively because of his personal lack of stance and experience in attacking. Therefore in the battlefield of KAMPUNG THOM, he attacked the enemy only to the extent of harassment, with the

result that the enemy was able to assault out and seize the people. He says that faced with this problem, he and others went down permanently to the battlefield to join in leading combat to reestablish defence of the liberated zone, but that given the circumstance that the enemy was already on the assault, initiative was constantly lost. He says that this is a lesson he'll never forget and which always causes him great pain. He says that in the KAMPUNG THOM Sector, he pushed forward the cleaning up of bad elements all the time in the army and state power, but that a shortcoming was not looking in every nook and cranny, with the result that a number of enemies were able to infiltrate. He says that when he was in charge of Zone Economics, he brought in some old technicians from the liberated zones to use in workshops and with cars, including some bad elements. He says once he knew he continuously removed them, but that a few remained.

DEUAN says that when he came to PHNUM PENH he brought with some some combatants, young women and craftsmen whom he had grasped to help him with the work. He says he didn't know these people well, but only that they could help as electricians and carpenters. He says that later the Organization had them removed and sent back to the rear, and that he didn't have any problem with this.

He says he also had asked Brother SAE of KAMPOT for TENG Lo~NG and his family, and that his intentions in this regard had resulted from the Organization's instruction that good young people and cadres be found to be nurtured to help with the work. It has been the Organization's opinion that if DEUAN knew some such people and how to contact them, that a number were requested, because it would be easy to grasp them if they were known to DEUAN. He says that when the Centre Organization (angkar mochchhoem) met, he made contact with all the Zones, and among the people he found was KENG LONG (spelling looks different), who Brother SAE of KAMPOT said was pretty good and was already working in a district office. That was why he had asked for him to work in Public Works(?) because they were weak in cadres and he couldn't work "inside"

DEUAN says that after coming to PHNUM PENH he came out sometimes to meet with KHUON about Commerce work, about such matters as the warehouses, medicines and foreign aid, as instructed by the Organization. He says that KHUON never called him to discuss anything but revolutionary work. He says that after coming to PHNUM PENH KHUON didn't really dare to talk about anything except the actual work of Commerce because he could see that DEUAN was always at the Organization's side, and therefore wasn't always rude and arrogant like he'd been at the Zone.

DEUAN says that as for the cadres grasped successively by KHUON, he had never grasped them and only knew them casually or seen them when going back and forth to meetings with the Zone, as most of them were from the Office, such as HaNG, NuCH(?) and TICH(?). As for HaK(?) and MaN, they had previously been grasped by KHUON, and DEUAN only grasped them after the Organization took KHUON off the job.

DEUAN says that therefore KHUON knew these people very well. He says that when the Organization sent him in to grasp things in its stead his only contact with them was about work, and that he never discussed anything else with them. He says he instructed them no longer to eat and drink and enjoy themselves like they did under KHUON.

DEUAN says he asked for the Organization's opinion about what should be done young people who had been with KHUON, and that the Organization said ~

good ones should be split off and split up and educated to help with the work and the bad ones sent to the secret police for education. This was because, the Organization said, there was nothing wrong with these poor young people, they were just doing as others were doing. DEUAN said that because this was a Party matter, it was up to PANG to resolve it, and that DEUAN never decided anything by himself, particularly as regards putting people into 870. DEUAN says he was always careful and that PaNG can confirm this. He says it was the same with those at Commerce telegrammes. They were turned over to PANG, and if they were good they were supposed to be used with education and "construction" because they were kids, and if they were bad they should go back to the ministry (?). DEUAN says he therefore had no opinion or tricks in favour of inserting bad people to grasp the work of the Organization's office. He says that he didn't really grasp the telegramme group, and that he asked CHHEUAN who had been at Commerce for a long time and grasped this problem. DEUAN relied upon his analysis to decide who was good, and didn't do this personally.

DEUAN says that with regard to the CHHEUAN matter, it was grasped by KHUON because he was responsible for the Zone, although when DEUAN was at KAMPUNG THOM he had administered him because he was a district secretary. DEUAN says his coming to commerce was decided by the Organization. DEUAN had never promoted him to do anything, and if the Organization asked his opinion DEUAN merely analyzed him according to his own stance for the Organization, and the Organization made the decision. DEUAN insists it wasn't him who kept CHHEUAN in order to grasp Commerce, that he didn't have the authority to do so, and it was all decided by the Organization.

DEUAN says that with regard to sending people accused of things to the secret police, he did sometimes delay it in order to examine them further, because this was what the Organization instructed him to do and so that's what he did. He cites the example of HAN(?), saying that he provided information to the Organization that the secret police files confused two different HANs, one from the NORTH and one at Commerce, and that as far as he knew the HAN at Commerce had never gone to fight at KAMPUNG CHAM, and that this was why there was a delay for clarification and decision. He says the Organization decided that HAN should be removed and brought to PHNUM PENH for the time being, and that DEUAN carried out this decision.

4 April 1977

DEUAN alias SEUA VASI

Describes his activities during the period of political study. In 1960 was in the second class at Lycee KAMPUNG CHAM. Had contact with professor KOY THUON, a progressive who did propaganda among youth and student to get them to despise the oppressive feudalism and capitalist regime and in favour of a democratic regime. Is very satisfied with this propaganda. Is KOY THUON's student and goes frequently to his home. They become as close as brothers, and he is given money and clothes.

In 1961 the revolutionary base at Lycee KAMPUNG CHAM is constantly expanded. KOY THUON educates a lot of young people.

DEUAN becomes one of three members of a committee of the Youth Kha Bâ, and they all go for two days of education at PREY TOTOENG at which they are told that this organization's role is to lead the people's struggle against oppression, especially as regards youth.

KOY THUON also tells them that there are two aspects to their current struggle, the work of revolution and the work of the Pracheachalana. He explains that in the struggle it is necessary to walk on two legs because the world situation is subject to change and uncertainty, and therefore walking only on one leg is dangerous, so another leg is needed as a fall back. He explains that the work of revolution is liberating the poor people and building up a democratic society, whereas the work of the Pracheachalana is to fight the feudalists and build up a regime of the free world type, with a high standard of living. He says revolutionary work has priority and should be done first, and that work for the Pracheachalana is not yet to be promoted.

Following the establishment of the Yuvakhaba, the movement in KAMPUNG CHAMville is very vigorous. DEUAN is appointed to membership of the Lycee branch committee and also given responsibility for the town. In 1963 KOY THUON appoints him to be responsible for the bases around KAMPUNG CHAMville. In 1964 or 1965 he's responsible for the textile mills. In 1966 he goes underground. That year the Organization calls KOY THUON for study, and so all the work of the Zone is handed over to DEUAN, who is told that he is Secretary ad interim, that KOY THUON is not appointing KaN (POK), the Deputy Secretary to take over because this would lead to problems about solidarity, since nobody likes him, and because with DEUAN in charge it will be easy for KOY THUON to instruct him about the work.

1966, the year DEUAN is on duty for the Zone, was when the enemy was really on a rampage. DEUAN doesn't really promote the work of storming attacks in accordance with the instructions of the Party. He says it was the same with demonstrations, rallies, and protest petitions: he was hesitant and even tried to hold them back. He says he also had important leading core cadres come out in the open to agitate and lead the movement, such as at Lycee KAMPUNG CHAM, the textile mill and in the bases at PREY CHHOR, and that as a result the enemy was able to destroy a number of forces.

Describes his activities in the period of political and armed struggle.

In 1968, there are strikes to seize weapons from the enemy throughout the country and set up armed propaganda teams. DEUAN remains on duty for the Zone as before. The Party instructs Zone 304 to harass and bog down the

enemy to prevent them from going on rampages against other Zones, but instead DEUAN gives instructions only to do propaganda, on the pretext of protecting the forces of the revolution and the bases, but the truth is that he was stance was not one of unity with the Party. This was an instance of opposing its instructions.

In 1969 ZONE 304 has four armed propaganda teams. DEUAN grasps one, POK one, SAT one and SoT one.

Describes his activities during the period of national liberation war.

At the end of 1970 KOY THUON returns from working with the Organization and calls in DEUAN for a report.

KOY THUON tells him that if he is to build up Pracheachalana forces, it must be done among the petty bourgeoisie and capitalists.

Immediately after the coup, the Vietnamese invade ZONE 304 on a large scale. DEUAN's stand is one of happiness at having friends come help with the fighting. So he instructs the bases to help support them with rice, pigs and vegetables. He goes to meet their leaders and set up a office nearby for them to live in. The Party's stance disappears entirely. Faith in one's own forces is lost. At the same time, he facilitates things for them by issuing travel passes to their leaders and providing them with the overt circulars of the Zone, which was contrary to the Party's secrecy principles.

DEUAN sets up state power in the villages and sub-districts and various leading organs in the bases. For the most part he appoints the upper strata as administrators, and in particular puts them in charge of economics. He also is lenient in allowing them to export certain kinds of produce, such as beans, corn, pigs, and rice, something which the Party had forbidden. This was therefore betrayal of the Party, opposition to the Party line. Appointing the upper strata as village and subdistrict chairmen resulted in their having the power to hold down the poor people. Moreover, in his united front policies he went too far in making contact with the upper strata, which was rightist and gave these types something to fall back on and even attack the poor people and look down on the organization of state power as well as cadres. They were able to surround upper level cadre and use them to protect their interests. The result was the creation of a carnival atmosphere with cars, motorbikes, eating and drinking and rallies. He didn't go down to stick with the masses, think of the forward battlefield, of production, or of grasping the people. He was submerged by these problems, and the Party's line deviated as a result of them, resulting in huge losses to the revolutionary movement.

At the end of 1970, KOY THUON arrives in the zone and convenes a broad conference lasting five days, after which he holds a meeting at which sectors are divided up and responsibilities for dividing them divided.

THUCH, Secretary of the Zone, is in general charge

POK, Deputy Secretary, is in charge of the SIEM REAP Sector

DEUAN, Member, is in charge of upper KAMPUNG CHAM

?ENG, Member, is in charge of lower KAMPUNG CHAM

LEAN, assistant, in charge of KAMPUNG CHAM city (killed in action)

SOT, assistant, in charge of upper KAMPUNG CHAM (arrested)

DEUAN says that after being made Secretary in charge of the upper KAMPUNG CHAM

Sector at the end of 1970, his plan to wreck the revolution comprised appointing a number of upper strata elements to be in charge of economics, so that these upper strata elements could export produce such as corn, rice, hogs and beans to the sectors controlled by the enemy. HG SQy~ he did this in direct opposition to the instructions of the Party.

In every Zone the Party instructed that a Kampuchean Committee for Liaison with Viet Nam be set up, and THUCH appoints DEUAN to be Chairman of this committee with TOEK KEUM UN as member. He says that in this liaison there was an element of laxness in his stance in that during work meetings about battlefield cooperation and purchase and barter for ammunition and guns he pleaded and begged, which was not correct according to the Party stance, that because of his desire to get ammunition he had a weak stance.

DEUAN describes party-building and cadre appointment.

He says his plan as sector secretary was to select veterans of the struggle who were opportunists to return to work because they were easy to educate and could be built up as strategic forces to protect his interests because their party stance was weak. He says that in 1970 he was able to appoint more than 60 such persons as (people?, Party members?), including Ha~K (arrested). They were kept for when there was a need to use them.

He says he created liberalism within the Party by never having convened sector life-meetings and because branches were in tatters and lacked education, and that this was an element of plans to wreck party-building. He mentions serious measures in terms of appointments.

DEUAN says that in 1970-71 when his role was that of sector secretary he lived a happy go lucky life of pleasure and fun, that wherever he went he went with cars and women, and that he acted like a "biggie" in form, mostly making contact with the upper strata. He says he became completely separated from the bases, liked employing the children of upper strata, went everywhere with great flourish and didn't keep the masses in mind. He says this was a betrayal of the Party's proletarian stance, and that his goal was to get (people?, party members?) to use him as a model.

DEUAN says that from 1972 to 1974 he was Secretary of KAMPUNG THOM, and that the Zone sent other cadres to KAMPUNG THOM to work with him.

He says that regard to work among the people, he paid attention to getting the masses to live organized into organizations with cadres administering them ideologically and in terms of their standard of living. He also organized the battlefield, state power, purging of bad elements, and education of cadres and people.

He says that he kept in mind some aspects of these five tasks, but that in other aspects he did things that made people dissatisfied with the instructions of the party, such as building fences and planting bananas along the roads, ~ttina up model villages and chopping up chamkar fields.

He says he appointed KHAEM as chairman of the battlefield. The Organization

proposed to the Zone the withdrawal of forces from the sector to go to be used in the offensive on PHNUM PENH. KHUON instructed him to withdraw two battalions, telling him there was nothing to worry about regarding the sector battlefield situation, and that it was imperative to take advantage of this to withdraw them immediately. DEUAN says he went along and ordered an immediate withdrawal, thinking that if anything happened on the battlefield like the enemy soldiers attacked, he would respond that this wouldn't present a problem and the forces should be withdrawn. He says that this was not taking a stance of responsibility. He would say that there was a lack of ammunition and of forces, as the Organization had not provided them.

He says that in late 1973 the enemy soldiers came up to round up the people around KAMPUNG THOM along northern Route 6. He says that the reason for this was that the Sector did not lead a storming offensive as the Party had instructed, and had given the enemy the chance to strike first, thus losing the initiative. His stance at the time was to respond that there was a shortage of weapons and weren't enough forces for defence, but that the truth was that he himself had betrayed the party's leadership line in which he had been instructed.

DEUAN says that when the enemy soldiers rounded up the people, KHUON instructed him to work hard at protecting them, but that such losses were nothing extraordinary, and that they occurred for both objective and subjective reasons. Objectively, the enemy in that place had had plans to come out for a long time, but had been unable to, and it was only because of that that we had had the weakpoint of withdrawing our forces allowing them to come out. KHUON says he had called SRENG to a meeting at TANG KRASANG in order to disseminate the Party's instructions for the KAMPUNG THOM battlefield and the PHNUM PENH situation. He said that we were attacking PHNUM PENH from every direction and that PHNUM PENH's liberation day was at hand. This situation facilitate attacks by us against the provinces (provincial capitals), and wherever we attacked we would be able to eat! But what was our plan? We didn't have to attack on the provincial capital battlefields, and if on any flank the enemy soldiers came out, it would be sufficient to harass them, bog them down to some extent. As for KAMPUNG THOM province, its instructions were to set up concentrated mobile units for intervention. KHUON said that given its lack of weapons and ammunition, KAMPUNG THOM should organize only as possible for the time being. He said the prime directive was to concentrate on the importance of attacking PHNUM PENH, and that whenever PHNUM PENH was liberated, we would come up with a new plan, but this was not a problem that needed our attention for the moment. We should go now go down to our sectors and he would inform us of any news according to the plan. If PHNUM PENH were liberated, DEUAN would go to help with work in PHNUM PENH and SRENG would stay working in the Zone as before.

DEUAN describes his implementation of the Party line when he was in KAMPUNG THOM.

He says he was liberal a lot, did what he pleased, according to his perception, according to what he wanted to get and thoughts that were not loyal to the Party, and that this had an adverse affect on a number of tasks. The Party's instructions were to set up cooperatives of 30 to 50 families, but he gave instructions for them to have 100 families. The Party gave instructions not to appoint petty bourgeois into the Party and organs of state power. He was still lenient and allowed some of them to be appointed without allowing them to do anything important or obvious. He

still found opportunities to convene conferences of monks and young women, zone cultural shows, and soirees. He says these were things that he did one after the other contrary to the Party's instructions.

In 1974 DEUAN comes to take charge of Zone Economy and Commerce. He is Committee Chair.

He says that KHUON pronounced and instructed that the Organization was transferring important comrades to this task in order, mostly importantly, to serve the battlefields and the people's standard of living.

He describes his implementation of the party line when in charge of economy and commerce.

In commerce, DEUAN makes contact with the French to buy and barter for material and medicines to serve the battlefield in exchange for raw rubber sold to them. He says that in his purchase and exchanges, he was very wasteful of the Party's budget, buying things no matter whether they were cheap or expensive, so long as they were procured. There was drinking and eating each time there was a work meeting. The purchase and bartering of things to be provided to the battlefield and for the people's standard of living was not according to the party's requirements. Therefore in late 1974 the people's standard of living and that of the battlefield encountered difficulties, which adversely affected the Party's work of attacking the enemy.

DEUAN and his deputy SOT who were in standing charge met frequently to examine the economic situation and agreed that it was not possible to do everything according to the Party's instructions, that there had to be some business in order to buy and barter with enemy zones. because given the price of goods, only in this way could they be purchased or bartered for in time to satisfy needs. DEUAN always instructs SOT to be lively and twist and turn according to the concrete situation, and SOT said this would means things could be done quickly and easily.

When he was in charge of the economy, DEUAN was always going to meet KHUON on the PHNUM PENH battlefield to take him good things to eat and material to provide the battlefield. KHUON explains what the traitorous plan is for once PHNUM PENH is liberated. At a meeting in early 1975 KHUON says the the day of PHNUM PENH's liberation is at hand, which was advantageous to us. We had to prepare to administer both ZONE 304 and PHNUM PENH. He points out that both the countryside and the city are significant. He says PHNUM PENH will be where the leading apparatus is, will involve new tasks in which we don't yet have any administrative experience. He says there will be a mixture of military units and cadres, which will make things difficult for us, unlike in the Zone. Moreover, the leading Organization will be right there as well. KHUON says it is important to have both political and military forces to be able to grasp it. Our traitorous plan for the immediate future is to enter and grasp the important leading organs where there are a lot of CENTRE forces. Once we have grasped them we can expand our forces and examine the situation. K ~ Nsaysthat if the new administration of state power was solid, we would have to accommodate for the time being by working hard and well to win the Party's trust in order to be able to infiltrate long term. He says that according to world experience, in newly liberated countries, administration is always strict, but after a period of administration, the flame of revolution grows weaker and weaker, the older leaders are no longer able to work and are replaced by youngsters, and the situation is then changed. Moreover, the standard of

living becomes less restrictive, with the result that the leadership stance is weakened. This would be our opportunity. KHUON says that he has always instructed that when the revolution is strong we should push it forward and when it is weak we should attack it legally, that is, we should add a step (bampphley) to the leadership line while taking the flavour out of (bânsap) the revolutionary stance. KHUON says he controls virtually all the forces of the zone, particularly at the sector and district levels, and that it's the same with the army and the forces around the office. He will leave SRENG in charge of the zone base.

DEUAN is pleased because he is able to supply the battlefield well according to the plan and there is victory on the battlefield. He agitates the people to be even more self-abnegatory in order to win quickly.

DEUAN says that after the liberation of PHNUM PENH, KHUON returned to the Zone and convened a meeting of the Zone Committee to inform it of the work of the zone and switching around of cadres. He holds a rally to welcome the victory and a soiree. He announces the appointment of POK as Secretary of ZONE 303, with SRENG as deputy, and To~L,NGiN, THOU, SI and SENG as members. SOT has goes to be Secretary of SECTOR 106, and the Organization has DEUAN come to work in PHNUM PENH. At that time KHUON also brings a number of cadres with him to PHNUM PENH, particularly from Arts, the Office of SECTOR 15 and those serving battlefield tasks.

DEUAN alias SEUA VASI, 16 April 1977 (dated 27 April 1977 on last page only)

He describes his treasonous plan to place traitorous forces in the Organization's Office from the Civil War to the Present

In 1969-70, during the civil war period, the Party had ZONE 304 select young men and women and petty bourgeois for political and technical study. At that time, THUCH was busy working directly with the Organization. DEUAN took charge of finding these forces and deploying them into place. These were traitorous forces. They include EUAN. He tells them they can oppose the revolution by being spendthrift, sexually promiscuous and creating all kinds of difficulties for the Organization. They go to study directly with the Organization.

In 1970 the Organization sent back only EUAN because he had studied military and was sent in a hurry to teach and nurture more young men. This was after the coup. The others were sent back gradually. THUCH decided to turn over a number to the Organization, with which he was still working directly. EUAN tells DEUAN that the 304 people sent to the Organization had demanded quite a lot of it as regards food, that there had been shortages of rice and salt, and they had all demanded salt and medicines, causing quite a bit of trouble to the Organization; and that some of them had demanded work positions and gotten into contradiction over their roles, competing for rank. This was legal opposition to the Party.

He describes the period of the war against US imperialism, from 1970 to 17 April 1975

During this period THUCH returned to ZONE 304. DEUAN gives the names of some traitorous forces that DEUAN presented to the Organization.

He describes the period from 17 April 1975 to the Present

DEUAN says that when he entered PHNUM PENH he went to work for the Organization's Office. He set aside a number of forces to be brought into the Organization's Office to help him and be infiltrators. Most of them were technicians: typists, drivers, auto mechanics, couriers and cooks, medics. But the Organization's Office had not plans to take in new people, so this failed entirely.

He gives the names of forces that he was able to bring into the Organization's Office when he entered PHNUM PENH and that THUCH was able to infiltrate, which he met at the Organization's Office

He describes the setting up of a Traitorous Committee to Take Charge of the Implementation of the Traitorous Plan at the Organization's Office in late 1976

He says he convened a meeting of the most important of these committees in order to review possibilities for destroying the leading apparatus of the Party and for wrecking the Party on a big or small scale, to figure out ways to oppose the Party in big ways and to create obstacles hindering the general work of the revolution. PRU-M, a member of the committee who was in charge of the office of the Organization's couriers, said there were a lot of opportunities for destroying the Party and hindering its work where he was. He said the zones were sending things to the Organization like bananas and other fruits and sweets, which were going bad, and like fresh fish,

which were going bad because although they should be distributed immediately he was keeping them for a long time, and cholera and small pox medications. Also material which the Zones were sending in to ask for the Organization's opinion and decision were not being properly filed, resulting in disappearance, and when the Organization asked about them, he would say that they'd never arrived. He could prevent the circulation of and even lose some documents, newspapers and magazines.

Letters from the Zones and Ministries marked urgent could be kept for a long time. Ways could be found to destroy cadres coming and going, such as by automobile accidents or by poisoning food. Sand could be put in the gas or electrical lines removed to sabotage travel, etc., and time bombs could be placed under the cars of the various Brothers. The person in charge of deploying cars for the Brothers agrees that it is easy to sabotage their cars because they are of foreign manufacture. There were also opportunities to cause crashes by fast driving.

He describes the traitorous networks in the EAST ZONE that was in contact with him and SRENG, naming those of:

CHuN, Secretary of MUK KAMPOUL district MEY PHAU, former Secretary of SECTOR 20 CHHEAN, member for ZONE 203 VAENG KI, chairman for Water Transport, te a , saying those of SOU and CHUN are the most active.

DEUAN 18 April 1977

During the period of the civil war from 1969 to 1970, the Party has ZONE 304 gather up a number of petty bourgeois & youth for political and technical study and they are then sent back to do dissemination work in the Zone. At that time THUCH was directly attached to the Organization, so DEUAN is assigned this work. He gathers traitorous forces.

They include YuN, THUCH's wife; YAEM, Ambassador to Korea; and EUAN, a youth sent for military training.

At the end of 1969, EUAN becomes the first one sent back to ZONE 304 by the Organization, and he is put in charge of military training. At that time the remnants of the Zone's armed forces were four armed propaganda groups (krom), and seeing this the organization "borrowed" EUANG to do training in the SOUTHWEST for the time being, because there were a lot of troops there and were already organized at the company level.

EUAN remains in the SOUTHWEST ZONE up through the coup. Then, in 1970, he returns to ZONE 304 and is at first put in charge of setting up the Zone office for a time, because he had had experience of this sort with the Organization in the uplands.

THUCH returns to ZONE 304 in September 1970. He says that some of the forces sent to study were successfully turned over to the Organization, such as SAEM, but that YUN wasn't accepted. The purpose of turning over these forces was to infiltrate them into the Organization's office. He says those that were turned over created some difficulties for the Organization by demanding enough salt to eat, medicines and status.

During the war from 1970 to 1975 the Organization was in constant need of forces and therefore constantly requested forces from ZONE 304. THUCH was responsible for providing these forces because he was now on permanent duty in ZONE 304.

DEUAN provides some traitorous forces to the Organization, but never sees them during the war, although he goes back and forth to work at the Organization's office. But he meets them later in PHNUM PENH, and is pleased to discover that they have responsible positions.

At the time of the victory over PHNUM PENH, THUCH tells DEUAN that DEUAN must go with him to help the Organization in PHNUM PENH. THUCH says that if DEUAN has any forces, DEUAN is to bring them along because the Organization suffers from a great lack of forces. DEUANG tells him he has some forces at the office and that if necessary he can bring some forces from the Zone, particularly important Sector and District-level cadre, along too, because they could help a lot with the Organization's work.

DEUAN provides traitorous forces both to work in the Organization's office and for the Organization to deploy elsewhere.

Most of the forces brought in to work in the Organization's office are described as working in "technical" fields, such as guarding the office and cadres, courier work (driving, vehicle repair), printing and working at the Party School.

Other forces were not brought into PHNUM PENH right away, because that would have left the Zone "hollow" and adversely affected its work, but

DEUAN requests THUCH that they be brought in gradually. They include:

MaN, Water Transport (arrested)
CHHuN, Energy (arrested)
HaNG, Energy (arrested)
S3V, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PHIN, Zone Office (arrested)

And also troops of Zone 304 that were turned over to the Organization:

EUAN (arrested)
VEUANG (arrested)
SUONG (arrested)
NAI (arrested)
CHHlN (arrested)
SaY (arrested)

DEUAN says he was holding some of his forces in reserve to chair ministries in the future, such as

MaN, LuN, SENG, KuN, HaK, and SAY,

because they had the competencies making them appropriate for such work.

DEUAN says he also intended to build up some of his forces into technicians or experts so that in the future they could be put in charge of energy, commerce, agriculture and storage. He says that his intention related to the general future of national construction, which would require some experts, and to serve the plan of treason. He identifies CHHuN, HaNG and PHIN in this regard, and says that they had studied technical subjects to some degree in the old society.

DEUAN is in direct charge of the Water Transport, Sewing, Mineral Exploration, Agriculture and Technical School "ministries", which he educates and guides.

DEUAN concentrates on building up the Water Transport Ministry, which is praised by the Organization and which DEUAN sees as his strongest base. He tries to keep it well supplied and expand its responsibilities into cutting timber for export and domestic use in order to build it up further, but the Organization rejects this proposal.

DEUAN also tried to build up the Sewing unit from a cottage industry to a fullfledged one and to expand its work force in order to build it up as a shield for his traitorous activities. The Organization uses it as a model for imitation by the Zones.

DEUAN also makes the Technical School into a model unit in order to spread his influence.

DEUAN doesn't pay that much attention to the Agriculture Ministry, but meets frequently with CHEY and SENG and advises them get it into shape in order to win the Organization's trust.

DEUAN says that if he had been able to build up these five "ministries", he would have immediate and long-term bases rich in masses and chairmen under his control, giving him the potential to carry out a lot of traitorous plans. He says in the future he could use these forces in strikes and

demonstrations against the state power. He says he could also use his control of these forces to prevent the state from deploying the economy as it wished. He gives the example of it being exclusively up to his decision what is done by the Water Transport Ministry.

DEUAN says his treason included instructing the ministries to make nuisances of themselves by constantly requesting material and personnel from the Organization, so that it was constantly busy dealing with such requests.

DEUAN says that he hoped that his control of these five ministries would give him a strong political voice during meetings big and small by providing support for his opinions, and that this is why he worked to make them successful quickly.

DEUAN says he has some contact with PHe~UN at Public Works and not very much with PHoAH at Information

DEUAN says CHEY (SUON) and M~N were in prison together in 1967-68.

CHEY tells DEUAN that it is easy for him to build up traitorous forces in Agriculture because the forces there are all his proteges from SECTOR 25.

DEUAN says he tried to gain control of the Social Action Ministry because it would be a good place to implement his traitorous plans. This is because it would be easy to use it to destroy the people's lives by producing medicines wrongly.

DEUAN says it was his aim to propose a number of people to the Organization as ambassadors.

He says he wanted CHHEUAN (arrested) to go to China because CHHEUAN was of the Chinese tendency and would keep the Chinese informed about Kampuchean internal affairs and secret information.

He says he prepared Sa~V to go to Yugoslavia, where both the imperialists and the revisionists were contending

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DEUAN alias SEUA VASI, 24 April 1977

Note from Po~N on attached to the cover says it is necessary the chiefs, the key persons, of the traitorous movement with absolute clarity. He says that KAEV MEAH had no influence on the traitorous movement. He says that it's necessary to talk about from the end of 1960 on.

DEUAN describes contacts with the chiefs of the traitorous movement He says he will describe things by period.

He gives the composition of the Committee for Nurturing the Leadership of the Traitorous Movement in 1970-71 as:

YA, Provisional Chairman
CHONG, of the SOUTHWEST, Deputy
THUCH, of the NORTH, member
MEY PHAU, from the north (Viet Nam), member
LEAV KAEV MUNI, from the north (Viet Nam), member
Th t t
e assls an s are.
DEUAN, NORTH
CHEY SUON, SOUTHWEST
RUOH SAMEUAN, from the north (Viet Nam)

YA is in charge of liaison with the Vietnamese along with MEY PHAU, and MEY PHAU and LEAV KAEV MUNI are in charge of grasping those from the North (Viet Nam). CHONG is in charge of contact with the Thai authorities, and THUCH in charge of contact with the CIA.

He gives the traitorous Leadership Committee for 1971 to 15 April 1975 as:
KAEV MEAH, Chairman and in charge of contact with Viet Nam
YA, Vice Chairman in charge of dependable bases
THUCH, member in charge of the ZONE 304 base and contact with the CIA

MEY PHAU, member in charge of grasping those from the North (of Viet Nam) and contact with Viet Nam

LEAV KAEV MUNI, member in charge of office tasks
DEUAN, member in charge of the bases of 304 and helping with office tasks
CHHOUK, member in charge of the bases in SECTOR 24

CHEY SUON, member in charge of the bases in SECTOR 25 and grasping the Pracheachun Group

SRENG, member in charge of bases in ZONE 304

DEUAN says that from 1971 to 14 April 1975 the leadership of the treasonous struggle of this committee did agitation and propaganda in favour of a cease-fire and the road of peaceful negotiations. He says aecret liaison with the Viet Nameese was easy because it included people grasped by the Vietnamese for a long time already, and moreover this was at a time when the Vietnamese had bases all over Kampuchea so that contact could be made anywhere., especially with the elements who had come from the North (of Viet Nam).

(document incomplete)

2 February 1977: DEUAN meets SI at the West Zone Office to arrange for 100 people from among the masses to cut timber for export

SI tells DEUAN that the entire zone had been purging leading forces which were brought to the offices of the Zone, its Sectors and Districts to "rest", so that the cooperatives would not be disrupted. He says that in addition a number have been arrested, such as KAEV of Sector 15, and that HaM has been transferred to the Organization to be a diplomat.

SI says it was because of KAEV's treason that there were constant conflicts between his base areas and the NORTH. He says HaM does not have the Party's stance and was always implementing a line different from that of the Party, no matter what the zone's instructions were. SI says HaM therefore should not be allowed to go abroad, because if he does, he'll never come back, that he's also a traitor.

SI says that the people purged so far were bad people who were dissatisfied with the Party line and therefore had constant contradictions with it. DEUAN is advised to grasp these counter-revolutionary forces.

12 February 1977: DEUAN is appointed by the Organization to sign an agreement with Yugoslavia. He meets HaM before the signing ceremony and tells him that the purged people resting at the Zone, Sector and District levels are furious at the Zone because they have been given no reason why they were purged

Later HaM tells DEUAN that previously HaM's old Sector 15 had set up a worksite for growing dry season rice along the border of Sector 41 in Zone 303 and Sector 22 in Zone 203. He says that this site was chosen because its border location was advantageous to treasonous activities and that all the forces working there were infiltrators or were upper class evacuees from PHNUM PENH. He says that it was because this work site was a place for treasonous activities that there had been constant contradictions with neighboring sectors. HaM says he had plans to expand this base by putting in more traitorous forces.

16 February 1977: DEUAN is detained by the Organization.

DEUAN alias SEUA VASI 3 May 1977 (document incomplete)

(Note from PON says this is just a rehash and must be rewritten.)

DEUAN writes about the meeting between NHEUM and PHEUM in late 1975.

DEUAN says that when PHEUM come to be on permanent duty replacing the Standing (Committee?) he took advantage of the time to work with leaders of the traitorous movement.

PHEUM meets NHEUM. NHEUM says he will do whatever PHEUM tells him to do. They discuss the CIA work of past years, as they have not previously been able to meet.

NHEUM says he hasn't been able to put his mind to CIA work because he's been busy with revolutionary work, accelerating the construction of paddy dikes and feeder canals and shelter and food for the people, and that he had therefore been running all over. He says now he's going to do things like the EAST, that is to accelerate whatever he wants to, because if you go along with the top it certainly won't be practical.

For example, there are a lot of tractors in the NORTHWEST, and they have to be used if the work is to get done in time, but the Organization won't let us use them. And if we don't use them, where will the forces that we can replace them with come from?

On the current leading apparatus of the NORTHWEST, he said there were a lot of difficulties. It's as if there are two different nationalities who are unwilling to compromise with each other at all. The north and the south are completely separated from each other.

In the south were KOEU, VANH, Sc~T and Sa~V. In the north were NHEUM, KaNT~L, SAN and Ho~ENG.

Beginning in the five-year war, NHEUM educated them to unite, but these two units just couldn't get along at all. They are like oil and water. In particular KOEU and NHEUM can't get along. In form, there is nothing, but in work we don't get along at all. It's been this way for many years.

Therefore NHEUM is completely unable to build up a leading apparatus at the top. Things are not easy in the NORTHWEST like they are in the EAST, because in the manner of organizational things from the past two sections have emerged, and it is therefore impossible to centralize things.

NHEUM says that the NORTHWEST has just now been able to reestablish a leading apparatus, that is, one bringing together the south and the north into a single unit of organization, and its elements are not yet clear; that's why things are difficult, not like in the EAST.

NHEUM says that after 17 April 1975 he brought SOT, SECTOR 7 Secretary; VANH, SECTOR 1 Secretary; and SAN, in charge of the Military, into the CIA. He says that all of them fear him and do whatever he says.

NHEUM says SOT has already been removed and sent to the Organization because there was no gain in his work in the bases. He didn't comprehend the work. He had therefore been sent to the Organization as a help to the traitorous forces in PHNUM PENH.

VANH and SAN were kept to help with the work of the Zone because they were persons with a good comprehension of the work and were also "one of us", and were therefore easy. There were a lot of new people in the NORTHWEST, and it was therefore necessary for us to build up our cores quickly for use in the days to come. Building up among the masses and the lower level cadres was not difficult.

PHEUM says the NORTHWEST is very important because it borders on Thailand and will be a reliable base in the future. The attention of this Zone must be drawn to deploying cadres to go down and grasp and build up solid underground forces. The new people are easy to deal with according to the EAST's experience.

NHEUM agrees and says that if in the past purges had been carried out according to the Organization's instructions, there certainly wouldn't be anybody left we could use because the NORTHWEST was new people already, and then the Organization had sent in more from PHNUM PENH. So they were all new. So far, there hadn't been any problems with these elements. We had been able to administer them well and make good use of them, and they have a future. if we know how to make use of these forces in our traitorous movement, they will be our strategic forces. They have the potential to facilitate things for us in days to come. In the past the leadership of the Zone has not been strict. That's why there's been no mutual irritation. Everybody's happy to work. But if we'd played the game according to the Organization's instructions, things might go wrong, because this Zone both bordered directly on Thailand, so there would definitely be confusion and chaos and the people would undoubtedly run away to Thailand. The Organization is always saying that the NORTHWEST is lax and lenient, but I'm leading practically, according to my stand.

PHEUM says that if necessary the EAST will help with base cadres to come help grasp the people, because the EAST has cadres left over. In particular the EAST would like to remove those who've had moral affairs and liberal troubles and have lost their influence of leadership come over and work there for once. He says he'll figure out a way to send in as many as NHEUM needs. Only with such help can the NORTHWEST move quickly and play its role. NHEUM says to have 50 come for the time being, and if that's not sufficient he'll request more. PHEUM said to go ahead and liaise with LIN.

(document incomplete)

DEUAN alias SEUA VASI 2 June 1977

Note from illegible cadre dated 1 June 1977 asks DEUAN to write about his contacts with PHIN of S-8_

DEUAN says that in August 1976 the Ministry of Commerce made a plan for annual importation in 1977 of machines, machinery, raw materials and various goods by the state and for the standard of living of the people throughout the country.

All ministries sent back plans of their own proposing what they needed.

The Ministry of Commerce was responsible for examining the lists of goods proposed for purchase and checking on their names, technical specifications, size and numbers needed. This was done in order to avoid buying things of the wrong size, that could not be used, so that there wouldn't be any waste of money or effort.

(also written as PHe~UN) DEUAN arranges a meeting with PHiN of S-8 (Ministry of Public Works). At that time, DEUAN is not yet in charge of the Commerce Ministry, but is merely the person who carries the opinions of the Organization for dissemination and then takes proposals gotten in response back to report to the Organization.

After the meeting with PHEUN, DEUAN meets him again and tells him that the evolution of the situation in June, July and August 1976 has not been so good for their movement, unlike in early 1976. He says that a number of their forces in the ministries have been arrested and the clean-up continues, such as in Commerce. Therefore the situation is not as favourable as it was from mid-1975 through June 1976.

He says the plan to carry out a coup to seize state power keeps getting postponed because the leadership has not yet been unified and contact has not yet been reestablished with the CIA.

He tells PHEUN to concentrate on building up forces.

He tells PHEUN that the duty of his ministry is to give thought to doing sabotage to wreck the revolution with bad politics and bad economics. Politically, he should interrupt water and electricity to adversely affect the embassies in PHNUM PENH. Economically, there should be bad effects on the national plans of each ministry, such as industry, public health, railways, offices, etc. Each ministry has its stipulated plans, but if water and electricity are not running, these plans will not succeed. Cores must be built up to implement such plans. DEUAN tells PHIN that he must build up forces quickly, because the Organization is methodically increasing the number of combatants, and it is necessary to have forces to grasp them, so that whenever they arrive, we will be able to grasp them.

He instructs PHIN to do his work for the Party well and achieve everything in order to win the Party's trust and be able to infiltrate long term.

PHEUN asks DEUAN whether there is any news about KHUON, what the Organization has decided, and what we are doing about him.

DEUAN responds that the Organization is keeping KHUON somewhere and not letting him do anything because he's lost his influence. The Organization's keeping KHUON so that he's not free to walk around as he pleases. DEUAN says that since the Organization has taken KHUON somewhere and left him

with nothing to do the work of their movement has been stymied to a large extent because he grasped both ministries and the troops of the NORTH. DEUAN explains that he has temporarily been charged with KHUON's work, while waiting for the upper levels to reorganize things, which the upper levels has already put its mind to.

PHEUN says they must do whatever they can to make their plan succeed quickly so that they can set things up in their way, so that things won't be strict like they are now. The Organization is tightening up too much, such as not letting children meet their parents, and relatives who have been separated from each other for a long time and are just waiting to find out how each other are getting along are not allowed to meet, saying they are still stuck with private propertyism, etc.

DEUAN asks PHEUN whether he's ever met TAUCH KHAM DEUAN and AOK SAKUN, who just returned from abroad (France)? PHEUN says he's not meet them, that he'd proposed it to the Organization many times, but the Organization never let him meet them. PHEUN says talking about this makes him furious. He says that all these relatives of his were making revolution, and then when they get to the country, the Organization won't even agree to let them have a single meal together. PHEUN says DEUAN knows all this already because he stays right there with the Organization.

DEUAN tells PHEUN with regard to KHUON that previously there had been a plan to evacuate him from detention by having EUAN of the NORTH brigade evacuate him using military force, but after repeated examinations of the situation it was decided it wouldn't work because the place where the Organization had KHUON was too strongly defended and very difficult to enter or leave. Moreover, their army forces are now grasped by the General Staff, and EUAN doesn't have the right to order troops here and there as he pleases.

DEUAN alias SEUA VASI, 7 June 1977

(document incomplete)

DEUAN notes that in late 1972 the Organization provided the news that BAY Yo~EN had ceased being the Chairman of the Vietnamese Committee for liaison with ZONE 304 and had been transferred back to south Viet Nam. The replacement Viet Nameese liaison Committee was:

1. BA ToENG, Chairman
2. SaV TROENG, Vice Chairman

DEUAN's policy is one of soirees when they first come to ZONE 304. He says at a soiree he says that everyone is happy that BA TOENG has come to work with ZONE 304, and that both sides have the responsibility for building up friendship and solidarity. BA TOENG says that there have never been any serious problems with ZONE 304, none since the Vietnamese troops have come. He says DEUAN is personally responsible for the good relations.

They agree to meet monthly to report to one another. Extraordinary meetings can be arranged through the Office of STEUNG TRANG District.

Fifteen days later, BA TOENG invites DEUAN to a meeting. BA TOENG requests the Kampuchean Liaison Committee to help provide his side with homes, land and letters of contact for purchases in the bases, and also to assist Overseas Vietnamese who are returning home.. BA TOENG says his unit of organization has a number of combatants serving it for which he wants land on which to do production in their free time, adding that they have seed rice which they would like to experiment with in ZONE 304, and if its good, they will provide it to Kampuchea.

BA TOENG says that his Party has decided that Overseas Vietnamese in Kampuchea should return home in order to participate in the revolution there because the Vietnamese have to organize the countryside as a reliable base for the revolution and needs its compatriots in Kampuchea to do production, to grow paddy to feed the army. He also says that it is the request of these compatriots to return home to join in his Party's revolution. He says he is informing ZONE 304 and will stipulate tasks in such a way that these compatriots can prepare travel conveniently, relying importantly on the assistance of ZONE 304.

DEUAN says he is happy to provide the homes and that he can provide as much land as needed. He says they would like some of the seed rice to experiment with because it's the famous 7 toek seed rice which is supposed to provide a good yield.

DEUAN says his Party has issued a circular about the return of Overseas Vietnamese instructing all the bases in every sector to pay attention to helping all of them to return home easily, helping them to solve every difficulty they encounter, giving them food supplies, oxcarts, bicycles, trailers and passes. If there are any obstacles, it is obligatory to report to the upper levels so that the upper levels can provide further help to resolve things. He says the upper levels had consistently given instructions that attention must be paid to making things easy for the Overseas Vietnamese who are returning home. He says meetings have been held of all the sector and district chairs about this problem, and everything is agreed as regards implementation. DEUAN says he is waiting for the decision of the Vietnamese side that the time for travel has come.

When they are resting after the formal meeting, SAV TROENG tells DEUAN that before coming to ZONE 304 he and BA TOENG had been working in ZONE 203.

He says that they had been there for nearly three years since the coup, and then the upper levels had transferred them over to ZONE 304 for a change. He says that in ZONE 203 they had had close contact with PHEUM, PHUONG and CHAN, and that whenever they had had problems they had meet with them, asked for their advised, and had no major problems. He says that they had always had attention paid to them, and had been told that if ever there was anything they couldn't handle themselves, to write to them or find the time to meet with them personally, to meet with PHEUM or PHUONG. He says that they followed this advice, and that in their three years in ZONE 203 they had never had any significant difficulties. DEUAN says he told SAV TROENG that he suggested they do things the same way in ZONE 304, that if there was anything wrong, they should meet DEUAN or the Secretary or write them letters, do whatever was necessary to prevent any hindrance to the work of either side. SAV TROENG tells DEUAN that he has heard good thins about him from Vietnamese cadres who had come from ZONE 304 to ZONE 203. BA TOENG says DEUAN is well known for his unity with the Vietnamese Party, and that he has been told by his upper levels that as long as DEUAN is in charge of the liaison committee, there won't be any problems. SAV TROENG says he is under instructions from his higher levels to help DEUAN with whatever he wants, just as was the case with PHEUM and PHUONG in ZONE 203.

Upon his return DEUAN calls a meeting of Sector secretaries SOT, SRENG and KOL (TOL?) at the ZONE 304 Office. He tells them that Viet Nam wants to take the Vietnamese in Kampuchea to the liberated zones of south Viet Nam adjacent to the EAST ZONE. He says they need them to produce to support their army and to build them up into reliable base people. We must make it easy for them to return and to do so quickly. He says the instructions of the Party are that this plan is to be supported and to be pushed forward so that it moves quickly by providing food supplies like rice and salt, and if it's necessary for them to buy some draft animals, carts and bicycles, ways must be figured out to sell some. They are allowed to take their draft animals, bicycles and motorbikes, and we shouldn't be narrow-minded about such things. The major requirement of the Party is to do whatever can be done so that they can leave quickly from our Zone. He says that their cadres will come to consult with us so that we can agree on t date when their departure will begin, and that every district with a lot of Vietnamese should set up liaison committees for this purpose so that the district and sub-district secretaries won't be tied up with it.

DEUAN then writes a letter to BA TOENG ans SAV TROENG explaining what he has done and asking them to inform him of the date set for the Vietnamese to leave so that he can instruct the bases in time. He stresses that the Vietnamese can take everything they own with them and at the same time some draft animals, carts and bicycles will be sold to them. He says the Zone has prepared some rice and salt and cars to help wherever things are difficult, so that the plan of the two upper levels will succeed according to the directions stipulated.

BA TOENG responds by letter that his upper level is formulating a detailed plan. He thanks DEUAN for taking account of preparations for the move at a time when ZONE 304 is suffering from a food shortage. He says the date may be known by the Vietnamese new year.

DEUAN says that every time he had a work meeting with the Vietnamese he

made a report to THUCH in the latter's capacity as Zone Secretary. THUCH always agreed with his views and decisions.

THUCH says that on the Vietnamese new year the policy must be to present sticky rice, prok, beans and fruits, and gives instruction that DEUAN should take this opportunity to request weapons and artillery ammunition for our dry season plan. Two days before new year, DEUAN assigns CHHEUAN to take presents to the Vietnamese.

Two days later DEUAN participates in the Vietnamese new year celebrations at PREK SANGKE office, in PEAM TREI SNA subdistrict of STEUNG TRANG district. DEUAN is again praised for how well he is maintaining friendship and solidarity with the Vietnamese. DEUAN effusively toasts the Vietnamese. The festivities proceed in an intimate atmosphere. DEUAN and the Vietnamese invite the guests to eat a lot.

D~UAN and HoN then meet for a work session with BA TOENG and SAV TROENG. DEUAN asks the Vietnamese side for artillery ammunition to be used by ZONE 304 during it. 1973 dry season offensive, as the Zone no longer has any artillery ammunitoon at all. ~A LOENG says he's under instructions from his upper level to resolve any request DEUAN makes, and to pass on to it for resolution anything he can't resolve himself. He says that in principle he agrees to DEUAN's request, but concretely he'll have to ask the logistics ministry. BA TOENG went immediately to ask a representative of logistics who was present, and returns to say that ten tonnes are available whenever the Zone need them. He says this ammunition belongs to the upper level, not to the Zone, but since DEUAN had requested it, he would provide it and report to the upper levels later, because these were the instructions of the upper level. DEUAN says he would like to meet sometime with Brother MOEUY for an exchange of political views. BA TOENG says Brother MOEUY also would like to meet DEUAN.

DEUAN asks BA TOENG about when the Vietnamese will be removed, but BA TOENG says the upper levels haven't decided yet. BA TOENG asks for the land he had previously requested and DEUAN says he can have whatever he wants. DEUAN agrees to give them five hectares of good land on which they can grow to rice crops annually, and two hectares of chamkar land. Sector Secretary TOL is instructed to provide this immediately. BA TOENG says they are very pleased with their houses, and that they are bigs and chickens and plants all around. BA TOENG asks whether it might be possible to get more chamkar land, and DEUAN says just tell him what is needed, as there is a lot left.

Five days later DEUAN gets a letter from BA TOENG calling him to a special meeting at TANG KRASANG. Upon arrival there DEUAN is told that MOEUY wants to see him in three days.

(document incomplete)

14-18 July 1977 DEUAN alias SEUA VASI (different dates on early and later pages)

(document incomplete)

.... were ravaging the entire Zone, creating contradictions everywhere. The people, state power and leading Organizations in the bases were furious and taking offence everywhere. The Vietnamese felt that by harassing the Kampuchean state power they could get Kampuchea to capitulate. Thinking this, the Vietnamese stopped paying any heed or giving any respect to the state power and the leading Organization, and did whatever they pleased. Seeing the Vietnamese behaving this way, DEUAN and his group felt that they could not succeed in resolving things through negotiations in the liaison committee. At that time there were major matters, such as at the BOENG KET rubber plantation, where the Vietnamese grasped everything on the plantation, such as cars, tractors, electrical generators, workshops with all kinds of material, oil and petrol, clinics, medicines, surgical tools, office equipment, money and items for use in making an everyday living. The Kampuchean state power and leading Organization didn't have the right to take any of this! So DEUAN made contact with a Khmer named SIVOTTHA, who had been the director of a rubber plantation in STEUNG TRANG and had gone to PHNUM PENH as a refugee after the coup and asked to make contact with the revolutionary state power to ask to buy raw rubber and the right to hire labour in the liberated zones to protect and maintain his rubber plantation so it wouldn't be damaged. At that time the NORTH ZONE agreed, and so SIVOTTHA travelled back and forth in an ordinary way between the liberated and enemy zones (legally), because this was authorized by ZONE 304. In 1970, particularly from May on, he SIVOTTHA went back and forth every month via the MEKONG in order to transport raw rubber and pay his workers' salaries.

When DEUAN met SIVOTTHA at the STEUNG TRANG market, he tells him that there are a lot of Viet Cong at the BOENG KET rubber plantation who look down on our state power and won't let us in to inspect or even onto the plantation, as if it were their territory. They were taking everything belonging to the French themselves, and were currently maintaining all this stuff on the spot. DEUAN asks whether SIVOTTHA can arrange for planes to come bomb the place to pieces. SIVOTTHA says it can be arranged immediately as long as the information is correct. DEUAN says the bombing has got to be done soon so that it happens before they pull out. SIVOTTHA asks whether or not having the PHNUM PENH side do the bombing will adversely affect the policy vis-a-vis the French. DEUAN says that it would be OK if the Americans of the Thieus did it, as long as somebody does it, that we'll resolve the political aspect later. They agree to maintain contact by letter.

Five days later the planes come and bomb the designated points, and the Viet Cong suffer serious losses.

A week later, DEUAN writes a letter asking for the factories at Chamkar Andoung to be bombed, because there are the same kind of troubles there, and also PReK KaK (BOENG KET). The people say the Vietnamese are making serious accusations, and not allowing them into the plantations to see the factories and warehouses. They are detaining the people and combatants who walk into these areas. The people say there are a lot of cars, spare parts and oil and petrol in these places, but the Viet Cong are not willing to give any of it. DEUAN says that he therefore called the bombers in again. This bombing was in around May 1970.

In early 1971, DEUAN has them bomb STEUNG TRANG market again because it had become a lively place as the people, fearing the bombing, had gathered there because there was propaganda that as there were a lot of people there, the planes wouldn't dare to bomb it. Therefore, the people were concentrating there more and more, contrary to the instruction that they should go and produce and reduce the amount of trade. This directive could not be implemented. The people in the paddy and chamkar fields accumulated in the markets and along the banks of the MEKONG. The bombing is supposed to scare the people to go back down to the paddy and chamkar fields in the countryside, as well as to create insecurity in the liberated zone.

After the bombing of the two rubber plantations, the Viet Cong withdrew entirely and distributed the booty that survived the destruction. The people panicked and left the STEUNG TRANG market after the bombing, and the Chinese and the ~ the paddy and chamkar fields and set up little villages from then on. only enough forces to maintain things were left at the market.

In 1971, when he was Secretary of SECTOR 31, DEUAN authorizes businessmen to go in and out of KAMPUNG CHAM town, contrary to the instructions of the Party, which prohibited the people from going into enemy zones. He was also lenient in allowing the state power along the river banks to plant corn and beans and raise pigs and poultry and fruit for sale in KAMPUNG CHAM city. Sometimes he organized the transport of boatloads of beans, corn and tobacco into enemy zones, using as his pretext that these things were being bartered for medicines, cloth and machinery, etc. This was organized systematically from the districts down to the subdistricts and with instructions to keep it quiet. Things were done in this way until 1973. At that time, it was done in disguised form, as the Organization had stipulated the sale of tobacco to the enemy zones, but instead corn, peanuts and sesame were sold continuously. Sometimes it was even rice.

In 1972, when the war had been going on for more than a year, middle-strata businessmen were going freely back and forth into the enemy zones, bringing goods to sell in the liberated zones, particularly to the Viet Cong and the Kampuchean Revolutionary Organization. This movement pushed the upper strata into abandoning production and turning instead to make their living by bringing goods from the enemy zones for sale in the liberated zones. Markets were expanding everywhere, and transportation of goods was seen daily. Despite seeing the developments in this direction, DEUAN remains quiet and doesn't do any education, give any instructions, or do anything to stop it. He just lets them do this as they please, contrary to the instructions and political principles of the Party. This was an anti-Party movement resulting in damage to the revolution.

In 1971, when the Organization in KAMPUNG CHAM town proposed exfiltration of young people to the liberated zones, DEUAN instead gives instructions that they are to remain underground in the towns and shouldn't come out, the excuse being that forces should be built up in the towns for protracted struggle. A number of these forces were destroyed by the enemy because they were already exposed and were not exfiltrated to the liberated zones. Due to the rampages committed in the town, the movement there was adversely affected to a certain extent. People's moral collapsed and they were scared. They hunkered down and didn't dare to carry out any activities. They sought peace and quiet in order to save themselves.

In 1972 the Organization sends DEUAN to KAMPUNG THOM province. The Zone assigns him as Secretary of the KAMPUNG THOM Sector, which is designated

SECTOR 32. Upon taking charge of this Sector, DEUAN authorizes businessmen in the liberated zone to go make contact with the enemy in KAMPUNG THOM town and PHNUM PENH in order to negotiate the sale of wood and bamboo from the liberated zones. They go routinely back and forth between the liberated and enemy zones in order to figure out how to get wood from the liberated zones to PHNUM PENH. Two shipments of wood are traded for salt and cloth. This trading is done on the proposal of the enemy zones, where there is a shortage of wood for construction, particularly of housing for refugees and of army camps, and for burning. But it was also done in order to obtain salt and cloth.

Upon their return, the two businessmen involved carried out psychological warfare to the effect that C-123s and C-130s of the Americans were very good at aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, and could see anything. Their propaganda provoked a lot of fear among the people, who were told they could not hide anywhere and not be seen. They also said that things were really nice on the other side, where you could buy and sell anything you wanted, unlike in the liberated zones.

That same year, DEUAN authorized businessmen to go to STAUNG who had gone back and forth to the enemy zones before they were liberated, when they had moved boatloads full of goods. STAUNG market became a town in the liberated zones. Everything was for sale there. People were coming from all over to trade there. DEUAN says his intention was to do whatever he could so that there would be markets with private trading, in opposition to the Party's plan for decreasing markets. Moreover, having businessmen go back and forth facilitated the quick doing of psychological warfare in the liberated zones, such as their propaganda at that time that the Khmer Rouge and the Sihanoukists actually got along with the Lon Nolites, and they were currently pretending to oppose them in order to fool the Americans so that they would provide a lot of aid to Lon Nol, at which time Lon Nol would proclaim that he was a Sihanoukist and on the side of the National United Front. Such propaganda lead a lot among the upper strata to vacillate and not designate Lon Nol as their enemy. Another aspect was that it ruined cadres whose duty was inspection of goods going in and out, who were bribed by the businessmen with money and expensive goods such as wristwatches, tape recorders, radios, alcohol, cigarettes, etc. The businessmen were able to ruin with food a number of good cadres both in the bases and among the military who were on guard to prevent businessmen from secretly sending goods out to the other side. Because of their bribery, goods kept going out to the other side.

In late 1972, the Vietnamese launched a lot of offensives in the directions of KAMPUNG THOM and SIEM REAP because in these areas there was a lot of paddy, fish, pigs and oxen, all of which were cheap. The Vietnamese took advantage of the facts that our grasp of the bases was not yet solid, state power was still new and the people didn't yet understand politics to carry out propaganda and openly set up state power in every village. They also had a policy of creating clinics in which to treat the people and of distributing medicines to them. Seeing this the people thought the Vietnamese were better than the Organization, than their own Khmer friends, and therefore took up the stand of defending the Vietnamese and opposing the Organization. In 1972 the Vietnamese engaged in strong harassment in KAMPUNG THOM and SIEM REAP provinces, with the intention of making these two provinces their economic bases. At that time the Vietnamese did not respect the Kampuchean state power or Organization. Seeing this, DEUAN tells the businessmen who are going back and forth to report to the government side about these Vietnamese activities, who were carrying out a

policy of colonialism over us, and to ask the government to bomb them so that they wouldn't be able to carry out activities.

DEUAN pinpoints places to bomb, particularly stockpiles of rice and lines of communication used to transport rice and foodstuffs to Viet Nam and Laos. All of the places he designates are indeed bombed with heavy damage.

In late 1972 Zone Secretary KHUON instructs DEUAN to make contact with the CIA network in PHNUM PENH, with which contact had been lost. DEUAN proposes trying to make contact through the businessmen first, and then go once they've made contact. KHUON agrees, and it is decided that DEUAN will go first. KHUON writes a letter to HANG THUN HAK proposing that he meet him in KAMPUNG CHAM town. A businessman delivers the letter and brings one back from HANG THUN HAK saying he is busy and proposing to send KEUM NGUON TRACH instead. DEUAN is sent to the meeting, to which he is taken by SIVOTTHA.

NGUON TRACH tells DEUAN that the Communists are very active in PHNUM PENH: distributing leaflets exposing corruption, appealing on the people to rise up and oppose the republican regime, to conduct strikes to seize state power. In addition, there were continuous worker and student demonstrations opposing the Lon Nol policies, which severely isolated the republican regime from the people. Sometimes things went so far as demonstrations to seize rice from shops. This state of affairs continued to obtain despite the measures taken by the government side. This was the reason for 24-hour and 12-hour curfews and the extensive use of martial law, which nevertheless remained ineffective. It was currently quieter than it had been in previous months, but the authorities were still restricting travel. Politically, the people were just waiting for the day when the liberation army would arrive.

With regard to the problem of cease-fire talks, NGUON TRACH says the republican regime has daily political and military difficulties. Politically it's isolated domestically and internationally. Domestically, everybody already knows how ugly Lon Nol's face is, and he is supported only by his personal clique. It's the same externally, only the Americans and their personal clique are supporting Lon Nol. So Lon Nol is in a state of severe isolation. Militarily, Lon Nol has been defeated on every battlefield and at every important strategic position, all of which have fallen into the hands of the communists. Seeing this concrete situation, the Americans had put forward the question of a cease-fire as a solution. The Americans have seen that there's no way to defeat the communists in Kampuchea. They are therefore using a new tactic, namely negotiations for a ceasefire and discussions, using as their propaganda that they don't want to have a war with continuing bloodshed, that they want peace in Kampuchea. This is why the Americans want an urgent cease-fire, and for the revolutionary and republican sides to get together for talks.

NGUON TRACH says we must do propaganda so that the masses all know, particularly the people in the battlefields, of this, we must organize propaganda well so that they people voice their support for this American tactic. Only this solution will allow Lon Nol to continue to survive. The requirement is for widespread propaganda because putting things forward in this manner will hit the mark with our people, because they want peace and don't want compatriots spilling each others' blood.

DEUAN says he agrees because he can't think of any other solution, and that the people want a quick end to the war. At the same time, the American's are threatening that if Kampuchea is unwilling to cease firing, they will

concentrate all their planes, in particular all their B-52s, to bomb Kampuchea to smithereens. Such propaganda must also be done in order to push the people who are struggling to demand an urgent cease-fire.

DEUAN returns immediately to STEUNG TRANG and reports to KHUON, stressing to him the importance of the problem of negotiations for a ceasefire on the battlefield and the urgent need to disseminate this. DEUAN then returns to KAMPUNG THOM for a meeting of the cadres who are members for the Sector, District Secretaries, and ministry chairmen to educate them about negotiations for a ceasefire. They are to make sure this permeates the bases and military units, particularly among the masses in the rear bases. At the same time, they should listen to the opinions of the masses to get their reaction.

Reports say that after this propaganda began, there had been no adverse reaction among the people. The people received it happily because they desired a quick end to the war.

The instructions were to continue disseminating this propaganda until the day the cease-fire was announced. However, this was a shameful defeat for the Americans and Lon Nol, because the revolutionary side paid no heed to the American announcement. On the contrary, it carried out ever more forceful storming attacks. Therefore the announcement of a cease-fire was an isolated act by the American-Lon Nol side alone. Seeing this, DEUAN orders an urgent halt to the propaganda.

DEUAN says that in late March 1973 he meets the American "Claude(?)" for the first time on the Kampuchea-Thai border in order to arrange to prevent communist activities on the Kampuchea-Thai border. SOT also attends this meeting, among others.

At the end of 1973, there is a storming offensive on every battlefield, particularly the important strategic battlefields, roads connecting provinces with PHNUM PENH, positions all around PHNUM PENH defending it. These are brought under pressure and liberated one after the other, and the Lon Nol army breaks and runs en masse.

Seeing this unfavourable situation, DEUAN - on the KAMPUNG THOM battlefield instructs a radio operator in SECTOR 32 to tell the Lon Nol soldiers to come out into the liberated zones and round up the people, because the Organization had already withdrawn all the troops defending it, and the troops currently guarding it are new and small in number and will be unable to hold them off. Hearing this, the soldiers in KAMPUNG THOM town come out on a rampage north and east of the town. Knowing that the revolutionary army cannot put up a defence, they break up their forces into small groups to round up the people from the villages and subdistricts, and take tens of thousands with them. Because they see that the revolutionary forces cannot defend the liberated zone or the people, the people lose a lot of faith in the revolution.

DEUAN says the purpose of letting the enemy come out and round up the people was to make the people lose faith in the revolution, see that the revolution could not defend them, in order to create adverse affects for the PHNUM PENH battlefield, which was the Party's common battlefield. The Party had stipulated that every Zone should attack to bog down the enemy in the provinces, so that the enemy could not move out, and in particular could not transfer troops to help on the PHNUM PENH battlefield. When the soldiers were able to round up the people around KAMPUNG THOM town it

encompassed both these goals: the people lost faith in the revolution and saw the the revolution was unable to prevent enemy rampages; it had an adverse effect on the PHNUM PENH battlefield to an important extent because the enemy in KAMPUNG THOM was able to withdraw a number of its forces to help the PHNUM PENH side. And back on the KAMPUNG THOM battlefield, the enemy committed on rampage after another because he was able to expand by a number of new forces, giving him the forces with which to both defend the town and come out on rampages.

In early 1974, santisampoan (pacificism?, friendliness and peace?) and psychological warfare broke out in every sector of ZONE 304. At this time DEUAN instructs the bases along the national highway to force the people to grow bananas and build fences, tasks which were of no use to the people at all. This was done in order to give the people grievances against the revolution, make them disappointed with the revolution and lose faith in the revolution. He instructs that these tasks be done on a fairly large scale, which made the people dissatisfied with the revolution. Moreover, DEUAN gives instructions that there should be boisterous soirees whenever things are busy, such as when opening and closing education sessions, holding work meetings in the districts, on holidays or when meeting with "friends". Liberal use is made of such luxury items as wristwatches, cars, motorcycles and boats, without any clear rationing. The cadres at the upper and lower levels were ecstatic with this lifestyle, which separated them a great distance from the base people. They did not go down deep among the bases and the people, but thought only of having a good time, eating and drinking and material things. They didn't try to figure out how to resolve the people's standard of living in any serious way.

In mid 974, the revolutionary forces launched storming attacks all around PHNUM PENH, which were more forceful than before and made Lon Nol's army break and run en masse. The daily news from the battlefields was that at the important strategic positions, the revolutionary forces had the absolute advantage over Lon Nol on every flank, and PHNUM PENH would certainly fall into the hands of the revolutionary army very soon. At this time DEUAN writes a letter to the American in Thailand drawing his attention to the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need to build reliable bases along the Kampuchea-Thai border and a route of strategic communications to them. He reports that he and his group are going all out to build up such reliable bases in strategic areas along the Kampuchea-Thai border. He asks the Americans to build strategic roads right up to the Thai border.

When DEUAN comes to be in charge of Economy and Commerce for ZONE 304 starting in August 1974, he arranges with SOT to send out some food supplies to KAMPUNG CHAM town because in this town there is a severe food shortage due to its being completely surrounded and cut off by the revolutionary army, and is left with only contact by air. SIVOTTHA suggests trying to send the food in in the former of barter for oil and petrol, medicines, cloth and machinery, etc. DEUAN discusses this with SOT, who works concretely in this field and is exclusively responsible for commerce. They agree to send out corn, beans, sesame and fruit, because they can be eaten as substitutes for rice, and because there is also a rice shortage in the bases. DEUAN writes to SIVOTTHA about this, and SOT implements it continuously by assigning rubber traders to conduct the trade. SIVOTTHA soon writes that the situation is much alleviated and to continue sending things until the Americans can come up the river. This letter was written in August 1974 when the river was rising and the government side hoped the Americans would come up the river from PHNUM PENH to help KAMPUNG CHAM. But

this hope is not fulfilled as the dry season arrives but the Americans do not. The shortage of food in KAMPUNG CHAM town results in a lot of chaos, especially among the people who are workers, labourers and lower level petty bourgeois, who suffer most from the shortages. On the other hand, the upper strata don't yet have a strong adverse reaction.

In late 1974 the people lived in misery because of the corn, sesame and rice that was sent out of the liberated zones. At that time in the liberated zones some of the new rice had arrived. So DEUAN promoted the collection of all the corn, beans and sesamen in the bases for trade with the other side. Using this format, a lot of such produce was gathered. The people of KAMPUNG CHAM town had the hope of being able to survive by relying entirely on foodstuffs from the liberated zone, particularly the base people. They lost faith in the Americans and said now there was a possibility that they would be supplied with rice. This was because they could clearly see the situation on the battlefield from day to day, that the revolutionary forces were launching ever more forceful storming attacks without let up, and that the Mekong would not be usable at all during the dry season, and that there was no hope of using it even in the rainy season.

DEUAN says it was because he could see that this was the situation that he went all out to export a lot of produce to help the other side. The plan to export corn, beans, sesame and rice was implemented continuously. At that time the liberated zones in ZONE 304 lacked salt and cloth, and this was the form that was used for proceeding with the trade.

In February 1975 DEUAN writes a letter to SIVOTTHA saying that the military situation around PHNUM PENH is hopeless, and the only way is to ask to be allowed to surrender by laying down arms, ceasing to fight and coming out into the liberated zones. SIVOTTHA writes back that Lon Nol will not surrender and moreover has an orderly plan to organize his forces before the defeat, because these forces must be kept to continue the struggle further after the Revolutionary Army liberates PHNUM PENH and is administering the city. They will fight to seize the victory back. The plan is a detailed one which the Americans have helped to formulate.

Therefore the current surrender will only be a temporary one. SIVOTTHA says the people in general don't want the war to continue, and that the plan has been cooked up by the Americans and their henchmen. This is why they are continuing to fight so stubbornly on the battlefield, in order to buy time to have meetings to set up their organizational network before the defeat.

Two months later PHNUM PENH is completely liberated and DEUAN loses all contact with SIVOTTHA.

In late 1975, DEUAN meets the American "Claude" again at the border. They discuss the strategic significance of the bases along the Kampuchea-Thai border, Thai-Kampuchean cooperation to expand them, preparations to defend them against the communists and prevent the communists from taking them and using them to cross over into Thailand.

(document incomplete)