

D1791

12 September 1977 Working with the Committees of Every Unit of Organization

Ieng Sary

12 September 1977

12 September 1977

Working with the Committees of Every Unit of Organization

I. Summary of the Reports from All Units of Orgnaization

At our Ministry's conference, it was noted that we have basically smashed and sweep cleanly away the enemies who were CIA, KGB and Yuon territory-swallowers. Basically smahsed and swept cleanly away means that the major apparatuses belonging to the enemy who made the plans for and lead the desire for a coup d'état to seize state power back from our workers and poor peasants have been smashed and swept cleanly away by us. We achieved unity on this problem of sweeping the enemy cleanly away. In conjunction with this, we achieved unity that the enemy is not yet completely gone from our Ministry or from any of its units of organization. We must therefore continue sweeping cleanly to make our Ministry, like each and every one of its units of organization, immaculate.

For example, our comrades in Mo-64 have reported on the enemy situation and other comrades in this unit of organization feel in collective agreement with this report. Therefore, our comrades can clearly see by themselves that enemies remain and moreover that enemy phenomena will continue to exist one after the other into the future both in the provinces and inside the Ministry.

If we look inside the Ministry as a whole, we see that 98 per cent in the Ministry as a whole have achieved cleanliness, that is, 98 per cent are good and have an understanding of the problem of sweeping enemies cleanly away. However, another 2 per cent continue to exist who are in the process of conducting activities. We have not yet come to conclusions, despite the fact of what we can see. We will conduct further surveillance because the situation is not a normal

one. Are they the liberal elements who some of our comrades say are "thick individuals", or are they enemy elements? We have not yet concluded, but such activities are not normal. Each and every unit of organization must have a crystal-clear perspective and keep constant track of things. We must overcome everything and do whatever needs to be done to prevent this 2 per cent from laying eggs or expanding, because otherwise whenever there is any little problem, they will provoke contradictions and take the opportunity to break out of the nest and expand over and over from 2 to 3 or 4 or 5 per cent. Therefore, we must encircle, compress and enclose them down so that only 1.5 or 0.5 per cent remain.

Generally speaking, our Ministry is pretty highly awakened: whenever any little thing happens, the brothers and sisters know how to be concerned, raise high their revolutionary vigilance and report. For example, the enemy makes it heard that "in a little while, everybody will be arrested, and only Brother Khieu Samphan will be left." Our comrades know how to analyze this sort of thing and report it. Once we have effected the arrests and conducted the interrogation, we can see the enemy links clearly. Therefore, our Ministry is pretty good, although it is imperative to be on guard against the 2 per cent because these guys act in accordance with orders from their bosses. We must raise revolutionary vigilance really high, because our Ministry has really a lot of contact with foreigners. ...

We have lots of basic elements who are poor or lower-middle peasants. Therefore, in terms of composition, our Ministry is good because there are lots of basic elements. Middle middle-peasant and petty bourgeois elements also exist, and in some locations are the overwhelming majority because worker-peasants have as yet been unable to enter them. However, the Market does not need such elements, because we are capable of putting it into the hands of poor and lower-middle peasants. The Political, Protocol and Secretariat Sections have very few workers and peasants. In the future, it is imperative to put workers and peasants in charge because our comrades who are working in

these places nowadays are not yet reliable in terms of class-ness. We must therefore think in terms of basic classes. We already have a plan in that we are re-educating youngsters. It will be at least four or five years before we will be able to employ them, but we will do things step-by-step because in these Sections, it will require at least ten years or so to fashion them into cadre who think deeply politically.

In sum, 80 per cent in our Ministry are poor or lower-middle peasants, 10 per cent are middle-middle peasants and 10 per cent are petty bourgeois intellectuals. This composition is pretty good. Compared to other Ministries, it's not awful: it's pretty good.

Those elements whose activities are good comprise 95 per cent, of which 15 per cent are really good, and the other 80 per cent are medium. Elements whose activities are weak comprise 5 per cent. These evade work, [tumrun], finding this or that excuse to evade work, and are liberal. We will strive to further re-educate and refashion them, doing whatever can be done to reduce this percentage. Thus, generally speaking, the activities in our Ministry are good: 95 per cent are combat-active; 5 per cent can't keep up with the rest. ...

The history of our people's struggle clearly shows that without a leading Party, we can't do anything. ... From an assessment of the reports of our comrades from each and every unit of organization, it can be seen that the main reasons for shortcomings arise from leadership problems. Having conducted political and ideological re-education already, we must then make assignments if things are to be put into motion. Political and ideological problems are the most important problems, because in the absence of politics and ideology, after a period of organization, everything will fall back apart. However, with politics and ideology, but without assignment of correct leadership, things also cannot be put into motion. For this period now, the number in our Party has fallen. This is because our sweeping clean of the enemy has adversely affected a large number. However,

the quality of our Party has risen. All the brothers and sisters have been awakened and understand by themselves the enemy tricks and about undercover enemies burrowing from within. They previously did not understand things this way and imagined that we were all comrades all alike; now they know how to differentiate. We must further strengthen and expand the Party because Party leadership is lacking. Some units of organization still do not have any Party members, only masses, in the leading Committee. ...

... The Duty of Defending the Country, Defending the State Power, Army and Party

In a nutshell, this duty is to defend your own unit of organization. If we can defend our own units of organization, we are also participating in the defense of the country, and in this regard, there are three problems

- raising high the spirit of revolutionary vigilance
- fending off the activities of enemies coming from without
- fending off the activities of undercover enemies burrowing from within

This is an important duty. Some are able to fulfil core duties well, but this in itself is a bourgeois, petty bourgeois perspective and something we consider not good because they are unable to fulfil the duty of continuing to make socialist revolution well. Continuing to make socialist revolution means smashing private property rights; overcoming everything to do class struggle; an absolute stance vis-à-vis the enemy, making a clear differentiation between us and the enemy, without turmoil, with a crystal clear boundary; eliminating personal individuality ... A perspective and stance of not daring to criticize is an incorrect perspective and stance. The reasons why such comrades nod off might be that they don't have a political understanding, or that it's habitual, or that their perspective is like that of the enemy

... Doing ideological work is:

Overcoming everything to re-education and refashion
someone so that they have a correct political stance,
so that they know how to differentiate between us and
the enemy. ... [1]