

[ERN: 00013660]

CHOU Chet (ជូនចិត្ត) alias Sy (ស៊ី),

Secretary of the West Zone



[ERN: 00013662]

*[Handwritten note: Reported on 14 April 1978. (Signed) Duch]*

### **History of the Traitorous Activities of CHOU Chet alias Sy, former Secretary of the West Zone**

Original name: CHOU Chet      Revolutionary name: Sy

Age: 52

Address: Ta Kret (តាក្រីត) Village, Samraong (សំរោង) Commune, Prey Chhor

(ព្រៃឈរ) District, Kampong Cham (កំពង់ចាម) Province

Father's name: YOU Chou (យូ ជូ)      Age: 72 (deceased)

Mother's name: ǪN Bou (អ៊ិន ប៊ូ) (deceased)

Address: Ta Kret Village, Samraong Commune, Prey Chhor District, Kampong Cham Province

Sibling: Elder brother CHOU Chea, 20 years old (deceased)

Original KH: 00013660-13990

1/134

Translated: [00013660, 00013662, 00013682, 00013717, 00013886-966]

Spouse's name: Nēn (ណែន), Revolutionary name: Li (លី), 40, secretary of Odongk  
(ឧត្តុង្គ) District, Sector 32, West Zone

### I. Personal background from 1938 to 1 March 1963

At the age of seven, I was taken by my parents to live in Wat Banteay Thmei Pagoda in Samraong Commune, Prey Chhor District, Kampong Cham under the care of Teacher Non (គ្រូណុន). When I was 15, I became a Buddhist novice monk under the supervision of Ieng (អៀង).

In 1938, I moved to a *pali* school at Wat Roka Kaong (វត្តរកាកោង) Pagoda under the supervision of *Achar* (Buddhist layman) KĀN Èl (កាន់ ឈល).

In 1940, I moved to Wat Keo Preh Phleung (វត្តកែវព្រះភ្លើង) Pagoda in Sangkat Lekhbuon (សង្កាត់លេខ៤), Phnom Penh. I studied *pali* under *Achar* Lām (ឡាម) in Grade 3 in the *pali* senior school. I had been taught *pali* by *Achar* Īn (អាចារ្យ ឥន្ទ) before the coup and used to live with the head monk of Wat Keo Preah Phleung Pagoda.

In 1941, due to the bombardments on Phnom Penh, I escaped to Wat Tang Kouk (តាំងគោក) Pagoda in Sou Young (ស្វយ័ត) Commune, Baray District (បារាយណ៍), Kampong Thom Province until graduation from a *pali* junior high school there. I returned to Phnom Penh, staying in Wat Mohamontrei (មហាមន្ត្រី) Pagoda in Sangkat Lekhbuon, Phnom Penh in preparation for the *pali* high school entry examination, but failed. Then I returned to Wat Tang Kouk Pagoda to teach *pali*.

In 1949, I moved to Wat Seihakrottanaram (វត្តសីហរតនាម) Pagoda in Takeo Province for self-study and teaching Buddhist monks. During a dry season break, I travelled to neighbouring Kampot for hired preaching. I then was offered a woman to marry.

In 1950, I returned to my birthplace for excommunication. After leaving the monkhood, I wished to marry a wife. To fulfil my dream, I brought Chinese cloth from my hometown for retail sale. I earned 5,000 to 6,000 riel. When the cloth was sold out, I used a significant amount of the money earned for prostitution and alcohol consumption. I felt nervous in light of the small amount money left. In order to restore the status quo, I gambled in casinos.

[ERN: 00013682]

## **II. Personal background from 1 March 1963 to 18 March 1970**

After being released from prison, on 31 January 1963, I set up my spouse's duties smoothly. More importantly, she was assigned to a newspaper office for the purpose of communication with me, after she had become a CIA member. I would like to emphasise that before joining the newspaper, my wife Li had not had any work to do except that she contacted the wife of Chim (ជឹម) in search of information about the whereabouts of the Party leaders. Chim had been a parliamentarian of the Pracheachon Group who was living in Arab (អាហ្គាប់) Village.

She reported that one day she saw a "Brother" in a cyclo going from Phsar Thmei Market to the Chinese Hospital, while she was on the way from the south of Phsar Thmei Market to her home. It was almost at dawn. Sometimes she slept at CHEA Chim's house for one night and the next morning went to market, ate Chinese noodles with CHEA Chim's wife, and continued to travel from one place to another. At another time, both of them posed as Chinese leaves pickle sellers at Phsar Tuek L'ak Market (ផ្សារទឹកល្អក់). She said that they once even walked to the vicinity of Brother

SALOTH Sar's (សាត់សារ ឈ្មោះ) place (name unrecalled), and that sometimes, to near

*Brother Ya's* (យ៉ា) house, for reporting and receiving work plans, before finally coming to *Teacher Thai's* (គ្រូថៃ) house. The work she had done was reported to Ya and KEO Meas (កែវ មាស), but there had not been any detailed plans learnt of.

On 1 March 1963, guided by Comrade Sè (ស៊ែ), I had to depart from Phnom Penh to the countryside. When reaching the crossroad in Kampong Speu, we entered an isolated small shop and bought two cups of coffee. During that trip, Comrade Sè said, "As you have been living in the countryside long before me, I request that you recruit as many new forces as possible and as quickly as possible since the situation in the countryside is more favourable than in Phnom Penh. For the purpose of having a purified authority, it is better to use our own people from the very beginning." He continued to say, "We are running out of our forces in the countryside, but communication is still in place. I will go there very soon, too." I replied that it was fine and asked that he make frequent visits to see me.

Then Comrade Săo (សៅ) walked in. Sè introduced Comrade Săo to me, saying that he was also one of our networks (CIA). I had just recruited Run (រ៉ុន) one month ago. We caught a bus to Phnom Penh at 5 p.m. and arrived at Chhuk (ឈូក) at around 7 p.m. To the west of Phsar Chhuk Market, Comrade Săo took me to a house where we had dinner and spent the whole night there.

*[Handwritten note: Already reported to Angkar. 19 April 1978.]*

*[Additional handwritten note: What did Sè do by that time?]*

[ERN: 00013717]

### III. Personal background from 18 March 1970 to 1 April 1975

On 2 January 1971, I met with Yoeung (យ៉ែង) to the north of Phnum Sory (ភ្នំស៊ីរី) to discuss the issue of contacting Major Thon (ថុង) in Kampot. We reached an agreement after discussion. Before leaving, we said we were going to meet the Major to get acquainted and to discuss some work. We met on 5 January 1970 on Sory Mountain, northeast of Kampot.

On the given date, at 3 p.m. I climbed up the mountain first, waiting for the Major's arrival. At 4 p.m., I saw a military jeep being driven up, followed by several fully loaded mini-trucks. Major Thon and Comrade Yoeng got out of the jeep along with a clerk. His soldiers then carried some gifts to me, including a wide assortment of whiskies, cigarettes and biscuits.

After shaking hands and saying hello, the Major said he had only read my name on the letters sent to him but he had never met me in person like today. I replied I had heard his name through Yoeng, but today I had the opportunity to meet him in person. I then asked how the cooperation between the inside and the outside forces was and asked him to give reasons if the cooperation was not good. Thon replied, "For the outside forces, we have so far helped the Steang (ethnic) group a lot, especially reporting on the guerrilla forces in Aoral, etc.. For the inside forces, they have provided a small quantity of materials to the outside forces." He asked about the situation in the jungle as to whether it was difficult or not. I replied that it was rather difficult but I was patient as it was an assigned duty.

Thon promised to provide a large quantity of materials to the front. Then he poured whisky into glasses and passed them to me and Yoeng. We drank and talked. The materials Thon promised to provide would include more medicine and clothing. Messenger duty was assigned to three military chiefs based at the mountain. They were tasked with taking letters to Kampot. Chief Tun (តុង) was one of them.

On 10 February 1970, Major Thon had told Chief Tun at the mountain to inform me, I being stationed north of the area, that Major Thon wanted to meet me for an urgent job. I met him on 12 February 1970 at 3 p.m..

On 12 February 1970, I, Yoeung, Saom (ស្រី) and Dân (ដំ) came to...

[ERN: 00013886-00013996]

...importantly because I and my partisans were lax in carrying out the Party line—the line of the Vietnamese Workers' Party and were CIA agents.

I would like to humbly beg the Communist Party of Kampuchea to forgive me for the above-mentioned mistakes and to spare my life so that I can see the brilliant future of Cambodia under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea with Brother Secretary (POL Pot) being Chairman who is leading Cambodia towards development and a bright future.

Finally, I have nothing to depend on except the Communist Party of Kampuchea for the remainder of my life. For these reasons, I would like to humbly beg the Communist Party of Kampuchea with the correct line to spare my life so that I could have a chance to see the bright future of motherland Cambodia.

Done on 9 May 1978

*[Signature and thumbprint]*

CHOU Chet alias Sy

Respectfully Submitted to the Respected and Beloved Communist Party of  
Kampuchea

I, CHOU Chet alias Sy, would like to report to the Party about my personal  
history of joining the CIA.

After the war ended in 1954, I left the Joint Committee (Svay Rieng) and joined  
the bases in the districts of Chhouk and Kong Pisei to infiltrate and continue to do the  
Revolution. But when I arrived, it was fully occupied by the enemy and the group of  
contemptible Sieb (សៀម). I was fearful and demoralized by the sound of gunfire at  
all villages.

It was a time when I had to retreat and so returned home. I went to my  
grandfather-in-law to help me go to Phnom Penh, particularly to the house of his son  
named UK Vân (អ៊ុក វ៉ាន់), secretary to the Customs Inspector of Phnom Penh.

Upon arriving at the house, I managed to buy a family record book with the name  
of KEO Lēng (កែវ ឡេង) for ID card registration purposes. Soon after I arrived at the  
ministry in charge of ID registration with the family record book, I was arrested and  
sent to the main prison. UK Vân sought help from his friend named Phai who was  
working as a spy at the ID card registration ministry. Phai went to get me out of the  
prison by offering a bribe of 3,000 riel. Phai told me to stop working any more as an  
Issarak of Viet Minh. After he told me this two to three times, I agreed to stop.

In April 1955, Achar YUT (អាចារ្យ យុត្ត), KEO Meas (កែវ មាស), CHEY Suon  
(ជ័យ សួន), CHI Kim An (ជី គីមអាន) and SIEN An (សៀន អាន) came to prepare a  
house for publishing a newspaper in. I was called by Achar Yut to work for the  
newspaper. I thought that I had told Uncle Phai about my resignation from the  
Revolution. So I went to ask him. He allowed me to go but warned me not to forget to  
honour my promise.

In April 1955, the newspaper publishing house had opened. After working there for a period of time, I came and reported to Phai about the publication of the newspaper.

After the election in 1955, the two newspaper publishing houses were closed. CHI Kim An and PÈN Yut (ប៉ែន យុត) were jailed. Then the workers of the Pracheachon (ប្រជាជាតិ) News and Pracheachon Chăs (ប្រជាជនចាស់) News were unemployed. The newspaper publishing workers at that time were:

1. BUN Thân (ប៊ុន ថន)	News distributor
2. CHAB Phlong (ចាប ផ្លុង)	News distributor
3. Kim (គីម)	News distributor
4. Myself	Editor
5. Vy (វី)	News distributor

The five of us lived on the remaining balance to be paid by the newspaper sellers and we collected that money to buy meals at the market. But when all the remaining balance had been paid off, we ran out of money, and to solve this we returned home to get milled rice to cook for our own meals.

Unlike us, the leading cadres were employed (but at different workplaces).

A-PÈN Yut	Teacher at Kampucha Botr (កម្ពុជាបុត្រ).
CHI Kim An	Employee at the International Committee (Poland, Canada and India.)
SIEN An	Employee at the International Committee



	(Poland, Canada and India.)
CHEY Suon	Living on the salaries of his group and KEO Meas.

Facing such situation, the workers ran for their lives. They looked for any way they could to eat. During that time, I wanted to turn myself into a liberal person by going out for traditional palm beers and prostitution.

For survival, I often made certain contacts with people for money and jobs, including my second cousin Choeun (ជឿន), who was a royal soldier, and spy Mèn, a three-stripe soldier during the French era for money, as he was my father-in-law's close friend during the seven to eight years of the struggle movement.

During 1956–1957, as a newspaper agent, I made many contacts. I got in touch with school teacher THĂCH Thai (ថាច់ ថៃ) alias Siek (ស៊ីក), a Kampuchea Krom Khmer teaching at Chamraen Vichea School. He was a CIA agent of Major THĂCH Thuon (ថាច់ ធ្នូន). I also knew Teacher An (អាន) who was teaching at Chamraen Vichea School as well as VĨN Ắn (វិន អាន់), whom I had known through Ya (យ៉ា) when he was a Soviet Embassy staff member.

When I knew where their houses were, I visited them frequently. During my visits, we discussed about the situation in the country and the world. Siek, An and Ắn said, “Nowadays the socialist world is weaker than the liberal world (America), and it is not easy to beat the latter. American influence in Cambodia is very strong as you can see and it provides all kinds of assistance in the economic, cultural and technical sectors, more than the socialist world does.

I was in agreement with such a statement as I could see it was true. One day, on a Sunday, I went to Ya's house and I was invited to visit VINH Ắn (វិញ អាន់). There we were provided with a meal. During the meal we talked about something very pleasant. VINH Ắn said the newspaper publishing work was difficult, and the living was very

difficult, and we did not know when we would win. Siek shared this view, saying, “Now do some other work and wait for new jobs from me.” Ya smiled softly.

One day, Siek asked me to visit the house of Lieutenant Colonel THĂCH Thuon at Phsar Siloeb (ផ្សារស៊ីល៉ូប). During the visit, THĂCH Thuon greeted Siek and me.

Siek hinted to THĂCH Thuon that I was coming to do something. After a tea and cigarettes, we said goodbye to him and left for Phsar Thmei Market.

Along the way, Siek said I would get a good salary if I worked with THĂCH Thuon, and my life would be good. Having heard this, I started thinking a lot because I was unemployed and broke. Thinking back and forth, I decided to work with him.

At the end of 1958, Ya, THĂCH Thai (Siek) and VINH Ăn took me to THĂCH Thuon’s house again. When arriving at his house, THĂCH Thuon came to greet us and brought us up to his house. After sitting on the corridor outside for a while, we were brought into a room, where a table and four chairs were available.

Then VINH Ăn, who was the nephew-in-law of THĂCH Thuon, said the purpose of our meeting here was to acknowledge a new member. Then Ya briefed the meeting about my background, followed by THĂCH Thuon statement, “Today is a solemn occasion on which the CIA in Cambodia is accepting a new member.” Then I was asked if I was going to serve the CIA for life. I responded positively. THĂCH Thuon went on to declare that the duty of the CIA was to embed ourselves in the Khmer Rouge for the long term. The immediate tasks were to:

1. Grasp authority from the upper to lower levels.
2. Distort the line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and thwart it from moving forward.
3. Build more new forces.

THĂCH Thuon then included me in Ya’s group to control the Pracheachon News. The initial monthly salary was 1,500 riel. Before saying goodbye, we had a party.

About my traitorous activities after becoming an agent of the CIA:

1. About building forces in the newspaper publishing house: During my three months' work there, I managed to recruit two new members, namely:

CHAB Phlong (ចាប ផ្លុង)	Past: Khmer Issarak of the Viet Minh, working as a news distributor at home in Slab Leaeng (ស្លាបលែង), Kong Pisei. In 1972, he was the District Secretary of Koh Thom (Sector 25). Present: Under arrest
KUCH Kim (គុច គីម)	Past: His duty was to continue to infiltrate in Phnom Penh during the evacuation. In 1970, he was evacuated to the countryside and was called back by LONG Sâm Oeu (ឡុង សំអឿ) alias Kun (គុន). Present: Under arrest (at Phnom Penh).

About the plan to bore within and capture power in the Zones:

In 1963, after the event in Stung Treng, the Pracheachon Committee headed by secretary KEO Meas called a meeting with CHEY Suon and Ya with a view to having the 'covert component' agree to:

KEO Meas, Secretary assigned to the Central Office,

SAMRET Hong, assigned to the East,

BUN Thăn (ប៊ុន ថាន់) alias Chên (ចេន), assigned to Takeo,

Phoeun, assigned to Kampong Chhnang,

Chhân (ឆន) (Sy), assigned to Kampot,

Brother Vi, assigned to the Northeast, and

Poch (ប៉ូច) alias Hàng (ហង់), assigned to the Northeast.

I had just been released from jail before Ya called me and told me that I had been assigned to the duty station in Kampot Province. I agreed to accept the post.

In May 1963, I left for Kampot, where I endeavoured and managed to collect former strugglers and organized them as cadres in various communes and districts in a covert manner.

The preparation of the forces took place to the south of National Road 3, that is in the districts of Chhuk (ឈូក), Sarae Chea (ស្រែជ្វា), Kampot (កំពត), Tuk Meas (ទូកមាស) and Angkor Chey (អង្គរជ័យ). All forces were former strugglers, and the forces in Kampong Speu and Takeo were of a similar quantity.

In 1964, I (Sy) had a meeting at the house of Chè Bau (ចៃហ្វូ) who was a goldsmith in Tram Kak, Takeo. There, Chong said Sieng and KEO Meas wanted to say hello. Then Chong asked about the work of recruiting forces. I replied that there was a great possibility of recruiting forces in Takeo and Kampot as they were former struggle bases. Chong suggested that new forces should be educated as well. At that time he was asked to build a school in Sangkum Niyum (សង្កុមនិយម) Village.

Chong praised my capability after finishing reading the annual report of 1973. Chong and I were in agreement with the stance and viewpoint in terms of eating and extravagance.

In 1968-1969, there was a riot and I fled to the forest. In April 1969, I met with Vèn (also known as *Ta Kamsan* តាកំសាន) through Ya's introduction, at Prey Thom (ព្រៃធំ) in Phnum Sruoch (ភ្នំស្រួច). Vèn had never known me before, but I didn't know why he was so happy. He talked about his forces, some of whom had been destroyed while carrying out activities in Wat Kamsan (វត្តកំសាន) Pagoda. I said there

was no problem and that there were still many people remaining. I continued to ask him how many new forces he had recruited. He said that there was plenty of our forces from the city. His old networks included: Phoeun, the wife of Kdat (ក្អាត); Phi (ភី), female, single; and, Sây (ស័យ), a newly recruited one, who liked drinking.

Vên asked the whereabouts of *Achar Kâng* (អាចារ្យកង់), I said he would show up soon.

The new forces with whom I had been in contact with during the course of my work in the forest during 1968–1969 included:

1. Yoem (យ៉ែម) alias Yîn (យ៉ិន)	Past: Ekapheap (ឯកភាព) News Publisher.  Present: Arrested.
2. Kâng (កង់) alias Nhoek (ញ៉ែក)	Past: Anchanh Rung (អណ្ណាញរុង) Commune, Phnum Sruoch District, Kampong Speu, who had left the base for a long time.  Present: Arrested.
3. Nhoel (ញ៉ែល)	Past: Vagrant peasant who lived in Nhoek's commune.  Present: Defected to the enemy.
4. Ta Kamsan alias Vên	Past: Head monk at Wat Kamsan Pagoda.  Present: Arrested.
5. Nut (នុត)	Past: Defected to the enemy in 1969.  Present: Moved to the Central Zone after the liberation.

6. HOU Nim (ហ៊ូ នីម)	Present: Arrested.
7. HUY Yun (ហ៊ុយ យ៉ុង)	Present: Arrested.
8. UCH Vèn (អ៊ុច វ៉ែន)	Present: Deceased.
9. Lim alias Kdat	Present: Arrested.
10. Achar Kâng (អាចារ្យកង់)	Past: Former Kampuchea Krom monk, Vinh Kinh (វិញ គីញ) Residence, Wat Pralom Pagoda. Present: Arrested.
11. SOK San (សុខ សាន)	Past: Chinese expatriate (from Hong Kong). Present: Deceased.

On 18 March 1970, a coup took place. I went down from Phnum Kamchay (ភ្នំកំចាយ) and saw the Viet Cong in villages and communes in the districts of Kampong Tralach and Tuk Meas, and in other districts along the border of Takeo Province.

My stance at that time was that I did not like the fact that the Vietnamese came to organize their spies to seize power. Then every district which was full of the spies, making the Front Committees to withdraw.

Joined with the Vietnamese to attack the enemy.

Received weapons from the Vietnamese to equip the army.

Fought against the Vietnamese desire to defeat the Cambodian army (to what extent?).

#### IV. From 17 April 1975 to 26 March 1978

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After the liberation, I made a three-day visit in Kampong Som, where I met Mut (មុត), the current Secretary of Kampong Som. He said, “*Ta* (Grandfather) has just left this morning; maybe the two of you had gone past each other at Veal Rinh. The meeting participants included Chhum (ឈុំ) alias Sēk (សែក) (who had just left Kampot upon the victory) and Sour (សួរ), Commander of Kampong Seila Army (transferred to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division).

During the visit, I spent one night there and requested two cars from Mut—a Land Rover and a Datsun—as well as some spoils of war including clothing, skirts and medicines. The cars were fully loaded with these materials and we returned via National Road 4. When we reached Srae Klong (ស្រែក្លង់), we met Brother Mok (ម៉ក), who was examining the road. He said, “ ‘Brother’ wants you to meet him without fail because of a requirement. He now is staying at the railway station.”

After distributing the cloth in the district of Choam Sangkae (ជាំសង្កែ), I travelled to Phnom Penh to meet Brother Number One and Brother Number Two. I eventually met Brother Number Two only. He asked for a confirmation about the salt, whether it had all been transported out. I reported to Brother that half of the salt which had produced had been transported out, but we had found tens of thousands of tonnes more in the form of war spoils, east of Kampot and Traeuy Kaoh (ត្រើយកោះ). The two “Brothers” were so happy and instructed me to make great efforts to collect cars/trucks and fuel as quickly as possible before the rainy season came to avoid difficulties.

After the meeting, I went to Pong Tuek and instructed the transport group to transport the salt in the open air as soon as possible before transporting our own stuff.

Following that, I wrote a short letter instructing *Neary* Thoeun (ឆៀន) to find materials in Kampong to be used in the Salt Producing Unit. Upon arriving there, she was allowed to take some, but only a small quantity, one truck-towed trailer load of salt only.

Then I thought of allowing the Salt Producing Unit and paper plantations to find materials freely since the limited amount of salt provided through requests was not enough for us. So trucks of the Unit and the plantations were driven to Phnom Penh for collecting materials from people they had acquaintance with. As a result we got a lot of spoils, such as cloth, clothes, etc..

Given this, male and female youths became overjoyed, using luxurious commodities, clothing, and even perfume.

Following that, I continued to contact TEU Kam (កែ កម្ម) (a Vietnamese of the former liaison committee) in order to be prepared for post-victory contacts. I consulted with Sè that the meeting with the Vietnamese this time was to organize contacts after the victory and other long-term plans.

Therefore, it was requested that and the two of us meet for the purposes of views and standpoints. Comrade Roes (រ៉ូស) agreed and had a messenger to bring a letter of invitation to him. In the afternoon TEU Kam and an interpreter arrived. The discussion then began.

I gave my opinion that, "Today, after the liberation, Kampuchea is liberated and is in the process of rebuilding the country. What is your view and standpoint, both for now and the future?" TEU Kam replied, "Nowadays, I am still taking refuge in Cambodian territory. How can I do that? But I can do that after my country is liberated. As far as my viewpoint and standpoint are concerned, [Vietnam] will still continue to invade, fight to seize, and harass Cambodia forever primarily to fight for and seize its islands and the territorial seas a little at a time. This is the long-term strategy."



Sè said, “I ask you Comrade to speak with certainty; do not say one thing and another. Our Party believes you and has been in close solidarity with you.”

TEU Kam replied, “Please trust me. Cambodian friends can understand my intentions. Regarding communications, even after Vietnam is liberated, we will still have contact.”

I asked TEU Kam to contact Comrade Sè since he was already nearby.

In May 1975, there was the first meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea since the victory. This was held at a quiet place. The meeting disclosed information regarding the situation along the border where conflicts between Vietnam and Cambodia were taking place. It also said the Vietnamese had taken attacked some islands and taken some. We had suffered some losses. The conflicts were still going on. I then thought that the Vietnamese had carried out what they had said.

During the meeting I asked our comrades for their opinions on what to do now. Brother Phim and many other comrades suggested that we should not think about it now and continue to happily collect the spoils of war first.

Brother Phim said that now we should accomodate ourselves to bore deeply inside the Communist Party of Kampuchea by striving to erase our past bad history. I met Brother Nhim and to survey of his opinions and ask him for some tractors for farming purposes. He replied that he would give some.

The meeting decided to give two tractors to the Southwest Zone and four to the West Zone. The areas south of the road belonged to the Southwest Zone. In my capacity as the West Zone Secretary, I had had no idea of development as the West Zone was poor, having poor quality land and less population and it was impossible to be prosperous like other Zones. It could not be compared to Battambang or Kampong Thom. I was so concerned about the country’s reconstruction.

After the meeting ended, we returned to our respective offices and tried hard with Brother Mok for the first time to prepare materials into two shares – both in terms of human resources and equipment.

I then went down to Prey Nob District, a district which was still not well-prepared. Importantly, the people from the cities were still crowded there, and as a consequence, a lack of milled rice and foodstuff was not unusual. Still worse, diarrhoea was rampant. When I went there I saw clearly the lack of milled rice and everything was in chaos. The sector level was asked to solve the problem but they had had no ability to do so. A ten-day ration was still not enough. So there was no place to find more.

I asked NHOEK Pon as to how to solve the problem. He suggested we go to the city to meet Nhèm for loans. I went there and met Krin (គ្រីន) for advice. His reply was the same. Krin said he had done his best to facilitate the milled rice issues as the requirements of the two Sectors had been understood for a long time already. They had collected milled rice and stored this in warehouses. Half of the sacks remained, the other half having been sent to Kampong Seila and Koh Kong. I asked, “Now, is there still a need and is there any solution to this?” Krin replied, “Based on the current situation, the milled rice is not insufficient; there is more coming. The only way is to coordinate with Nhèm, who is the general controller of the State Warehouse.

Comrade Krin asked someone to call Comrade Nhèm to meet me. He came and it was my first time to meet him in person. He sat down, and I asked him if milled rice could be distributed on loan since my area in Prey Nob (ព្រៃនប់) was facing difficulties.

Nhèm confirmed positively that some milled rice would be allowed on loan for the areas facing the most difficulties and equivalent rice should gradually be returned in the future. I was so happy upon hearing this and expressed thanks to Nhèm for helping solve such a problem.

I returned to Prey Nob to cooperate with NHOEK Pon to prepare cooperative groups or squads as quickly as possible. Upon my return, Chhăn (ឆាំង) came to report that he had met with VINH Ắn, agent of the Soviet Embassy in Phnom Penh, Achar SAING Chăn and KIM Saing. These three people had requested Chhăn to report to *Angkar* that they had made requests for reconnection. Then I

made a separate comment to Nhoek, “Destroy them all because these contemptible people have had no internal connection at all.” Doing so would delete any traces concerning myself. I did not know why Nhoek was slow in executing them.

During a short break of a Central Committee meeting about the coordination with the Vietnamese to solve the tension over Wai Island (កោះវ៉ៃ) and the border issues, Brother Number Two came to me and said, “Now they say that TEU Kam has a number of his people in Prey Nob, namely VINH Ān, *Achar* Saing and THĀCH Kim Saing.” I replied to him, “This is true!” “So then, it is requested that they are sent to Comrade Sè, and they would then be sent to TEU Kam,” said Brother Number Two. I agreed and wrote a letter to NHOEK to that effect.

In June 1975, I travelled to Battambang to request tractors from Brother Nhim. When reaching Kampong Chhnang, I examined whether the farmland there could be used for rice cultivation without transplanting. After a thorough examination, I looked at many hectares and saw that the time for cultivation of such crops was not over yet. Knowing this, I sent as many as 30 armed forces to Kampong Chhang to plough the fields with tractors and sent about 10 to Battambang.

When arriving in Battambang, first I stayed in a house on stilts (in a faculty), where I met Brother Kae (កែ). He invited me to make a tour of the school. During the tour, he told me that there was a variety of spoils of war in Battambang and there were much more than in other areas, and asked if I needed any of them. I told him the purpose of my visit was to meet Brother Nhim to request some tractors to plough the fields. He replied that Brother Nhim was living as far away as Thma Koul (ថ្មគោល) District and asked me to wait for him for one night before he asked someone to invite him to come. At that time, combatant/driver Sie and two female messengers were looking for and requesting spoils of war, including electricity generators and commodities – totally a full American truckload. The next morning, at dawn, Brother Nhim arrived. He asked me how many tractors I wanted to take. Upon hearing this, I was so glad and responded, “I request from you 10 to 15 tractors, including their ploughshares.” He said that a few days ago,

he had just given 10 tractors to *Angkar*. I said that I had also seen them along my way here, and they were full of unmilled rice, plus their truck-towed trailers.

He said, “Now you can take as many as 10 – the only special offer I can make after collecting from all corners and from my personal knowledge. Importantly, I think of our long-time acquaintance since 1955. Another reason is that this will be carried out pursuant to the plan to embed deep within the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the long term, and especially because that area is the poorest of all. Without the tractors it is difficult to restore some of the cultivated rice without transplanting.” I was so excited having heard this and resolved before him to endeavour to restore the economy of this place and bring about prosperity. He said goodbye and left hastily.

Then Ranh (រ៉ាញ) arrived. After saying hello and asked about my well-being, he talked about the post-victory situation in Battambang, saying this area had won a great victory and received a great variety of spoils of war. He also told me that if I needed anything I should request from Brother Nhim. I said I was not here to acquire anything but tractors, and other things would be considered later. I said goodbye to him, and the tractors would be ready to follow. I arrived and waited for the tractors in Kampong Chhnang to prepare them for ploughing which took place for nearly a month.

The modern dyke system began from then. The implementation of my plan was to thwart the Party’s plan of raising dykes – to stop it from being achieved on time. My plan was to raise too big and too high dykes to absorb and waste a significant amount of paddy fields. The places of the work were selective as well, that is, to work on any farmland where gravel and stones existed, just for the sake of doing or for people to praise.

For instance, the dykes from Boeng Pô, Tuek L’ak and Pongro to Boribo in Sector 31 were raised carelessly for the sake of goodness, the result of which was unknown. As for the dykes in Angk Snuol and Ou Krang Ambel, they had been done only 50 to 100 metres from the main road, while the rest remained as they were.

Following that, I received a letter from TEU Kam sent via Sè. The content of the letter was:

“To Beloved Comrade Sy and Comrade Sè

We haven’t met in person for two months now. We only communicated through letters. I would like to report to you that in the past months of April and May, the Vietnamese went to attack and destroy, capturing Koh Wai Island of Cambodia, using high-speed war ships and type 111 fighter planes, attacking and sweeping cleanly Koh Wai Island and capturing half of Koh Ses Island as well. At that time Cambodia received heavy destruction, both in terms of human casualties and properties. Now they have withdrawn as a result of Cambodia sending its representatives to Hanoi for negotiations about the border issues.

There were also clashes in some other places, namely Takeo, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng.

That’s the report of the past period. Please believe that Vietnam will help support Cambodia both in terms of political standpoint and combat to build a new party which loves and is close to Vietnam like the one in the period before 1960.

Finally, I would like to request a direct meeting in order to speak about all this. If we don’t meet, things will not be clear. For the meeting place, Kep would be very convenient. But it is requested that a letter be written to the navy to facilitate entry”

At that time I agreed to meet, but I then wrote to Sè to go meet at Koh Po Island instead as it was close to our naval forces and they could return immediately after the meeting. By this way, there would be no chance of being discovered, and we would the pretext that we were going to look at the ocean.

After receiving this letter, Sè agreed and took measures as requested.

It is noted that the Zone Office after the liberation was located west of Wat Tang Po (តាំងពោធិ៍) Pagoda, Pram Bei Mom (ប្រាំបីម៉ុំ) Commune, Thpong (ថ្មង) District, Kampong Speu (កំពង់ស្ពឺ), west of Tbaeng Pradab Village. I had collected

many male and female youths to put there in preparation for a location of hospital and sewing, and making a reservoir and raising dykes for farming purposes.

At that time I took Miss Nan, a distant relative of my wife, from the 1st Division to be the Chairwoman of the Sewing Office as she had had that skill already. After being there for a period of time, she suffered from stomach ache very often and the disease could not be cured. I asked her to be hospitalized in the military hospital in Longvek and then in the 17 April Hospital. But her disease still could not be cured. Finally, I asked her to go to be treated at the Office. When she was treated there, I often visited her, and saw her lying on the bed all the time. I could not help but touch her belly to see what was actually happening. Eventually, I had sexual relations with her. After that I sent her to work as my network. I said that given this, we could not follow the path of the Revolution.

In November 1975, I travelled to Koh Kong to see what the city of Khemrak Phoumin looked like. Comrade Rân (រ៉ាន) accompanied me until I reached Koh Kong. There, I met NEOU (នេអូ) and Ki (គី), of the Regiment Army, Koh Kong Sector. Representatives of the army were invited to a meeting. The participants were:

Neou	Past: Network of Sy in 1964. Present: Chairman of the Sector Regiment.
Ki	Past: Network of Sros (ស្រស់) in 1972. Present: Deputy Chairman of the Sector Regiment.

Besides these people, there was another battalion composed of:

Phat (ផាត)	Past: Network of On (អ៊ុន) in 1972. Present: Battalion Commissar.
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Pheap (ភាព)	Past: Network of Nhoek in 1973. Present: Comes from Sector 37.
Soeun (សៀន)	Past: Network of Nhoek in 1972. Present: Comes from Sector 37.
Torng (ទង់)	Past: Network of Nhoek in 1972. Present: Comes from Sector 37.

...since it was seen that if all types of cadres were condoned, the Revolution would never win. I saw that both comrades agreed and assumed that demobilizing armed forces and making them infiltrate among the population was building a stronger political force. If it was done, the victory was visible. Significantly, the people knew the local settings, such as the coastal far-flung areas.

Following that, Comrade Sary (សារី) invited the cadres of the two army units (Men's and Women's Units) to have a meeting. They included:

Sat (សាត)	Battalion Commissar, network of Chhăn (ឆាន់).
Chăm (ចាំ)	Battalion Commander, network of Chhăn.
Neary Kâng (នារីកង់)	Battalion Commissar, network of Chhăn.
Moeung (ម៉ឺង)	Deputy Commissar, network of Nhoek.
Sok (សុខ)	Battalion Commander, network of Chhăn.

Comrade Nhoek, Sary and I also went there to explain the matter more clearly. I said, "Armed forces have the duty to defend the country. A country with peace is a country with a peaceful population. To this effect, we have to control the people directly to avoid waves of rebellion. It is important to control the people and educate them about our policy from top to bottom. They are completely new people. It will be great if we could do so."

Our duties were:

1. Educate them about the contradictions in contemporary Kampuchea.
2. Educate them about the prospect of future happiness resulting from our regime.
3. Encourage sexual relations between men and women, male and female youths.
4. Increase crop production, but hide produce and make fake reports of less crop yield and of lack of food for the purpose of feeding others.
5. Encourage acts of stealing potatoes, corn, vegetables and poultry to cause chaos.
6. Constantly agitate people to flee from one group to another, from one cooperative to another.
7. Destroy agricultural tools ranging from digging hoes, knives, axes, cooking pots and spoons to clothing.

After listening to the presentation, the commanders of the two military units agreed and were happy. In the afternoon of the same day, the commanders asked their soldiers to attend a study session with a focus on this subject. The soldiers totalled more than 500. They clapped their hands with enthusiasm and were happy to go down to lead the people to do crop production and defend the country as planned by their commanders.

The military system was organized from top to bottom; the soldiers were organized by group, platoon and company, both for the male and female combatants. With such a system, the people and the military would become one flesh within a short period of time. Significantly, those soldiers with a soft revolutionary stance would become demobilized and live with the new masses (from 17 April on).



After a while, theft, indulgence and desertion from one group to another appeared to increase far more. Acts of fleeing into the forest to become bandits were on the increase as well.

As for the activities of cadres, some places were strong, while some others were weak in fighting against the Revolution. For the places where anti-revolution sentiment was too strong, we went there to cool them down and ask them to carry activities step-by-step to avoid easy exposure. Importantly, we tried our best to build up our forces and waited for the right time when we were able to rise altogether.

In February 1976, the Fourth Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was held in Phnom Penh. The number of participants was higher than that of the Third Party Congress as more new Party Center members, cadres and assistants had been included. The meeting this time was crucial in organizing the Socialist Revolution in Kampuchea. The main agendas were to pass the new Party statutes and basic principles of the Socialist Revolution.

For my opinion regarding the meeting, the age of the Party was not surprising because Brother Number Two had stated more frequently that we had to run much faster than Vietnam, in terms of politics, economy, name of the Party and its age. In summary, it was to avoid the vestiges of colonisation, the state of being a lackey. I personally was not dismayed by the fact that the birth of the Party was said to have started from 1960 as I had worked as a Zone Secretary and member of the Central. I was very satisfied.

*Neary Lân* (នឿរ ឈន់), a Women's Battalion Commissar, came from Sectors 33 and 35 and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division.

Having heard the presentation by the military, knew that all the soldiers originated from their own bases. Upon hearing the report by the regiment, I thought that the army of the Koh Kong Sector had facilitated and created favourable conditions for their force building and in foreign communications. During that presentation, I shared my view that the future plans of the army were:

1. Endeavour to build up our own forces well, not leaving even one single person behind.

2. Along the border, it was necessary to facilitate good contacts to avoid use of weapons on either side. It was imperative to communicate all the way up to their commanders.
3. Make efforts to carry out activities in the areas north of Dang Tung, starting from Kirivong, in order to clearly survey the geographical features of the forest in order to have mastery at all times.
4. Expand the morality issue: if they are in love, allow their marriage.
5. Anyone who is homesick shall be allowed to visit their home, but in a group or squad, not individually.

After participating in the military meeting of the army of Sector 11, I travelled back to the Office located west of Tang Po Chi.

In early 1976, a great hunger was facing Kampong Seila due to the fact that 80 per cent of crop yield had been destroyed during the process from harvest, threshing and trembling up to storing in the granaries. It would only be solved by means of supplying hundreds of thousands of *thaings* (each unit equivalent to 30 kg) of rice.

Given the situation, I thought of using people of this place as our political force. I then said it was necessary to demobilize the troops here in Kampong Seila and integrate them into the community. Importantly, all the forces present were from Prey Nob District.

I called comrades Rân and Sary for a discussion. During the discussion, Comrade Rân said it was the right choice to demobilize the troops and have them control the new people. I totally supported it. Sary also agreed in order to express a fake feeling that he was satisfied with the Party Congress and was a long-time revolutionary. I had an impression in this regard.

About the implementation of independence and mastery: Past experiences had showed that in order to have independence and mastery, it required great effort and a need to overcome difficulties. Independence did not come for free. For instance, our Party had tempered itself with a self-reliant spirit during the political war, a two-year internal armed struggle and a five-year destructive war by the Americans. In another sense, active participation in all kinds of construction by self-reliance was also significant.

As far as the collective line is concerned, I thought that our victory this time resulted from the collectivity at the bases because it served as a most powerful weapon that the male and female youths had wished for—equality, no oppression, no rank-orientation, no hierarchy, no leader, no follower. If there were leaders and followers, the male and female youths would not go to die for them. I confirmed that even I myself, as a revolutionary, was not someone to die for any individual person but I did it for the nation and the country.

Sihanouk often said Communism could not prevail in Kampuchea, as this country had had private ownership and strong Buddhism. However, today we have achieved victory. It was clearly seen that it resulted from the collectivity which had caused private ownership and religions to collapse.

The Party Congress ended with an election of new Central Committee members. I met Brother Phim and asked him about his view on the current situation of the country. He replied, “It is just like being at a dock in the wind.” The Fourth Party Congress of the Central Committee had shown clearly the orientation of the Communist Party, and our forces would be stronger in the near future.

So it was imperative to consider measures to tackle it gradually. In mid-March 1976, I had received an instruction and coup plan from Brother Phim.

It was instructed that on 14 April 1976, I decided to have Thuch (ឥច) and Ya stage a nationwide coup. This plan had been discussed thoroughly in our organization. (Note that my group’s prominent members included Brother Phim, Ya and Thuch, who had decision-making powers at that time).

As for the coup plan, it had to be done without much bloodshed. Key points were:

1. Assign youths to be ready to shoot and kill Brother Number One and Brother Number Two on the occasion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Anniversary without fail.
2. Assign the cooks to poison Brother Number One and Brother Number Two without fail.
3. As for specific activities, assign military combatants of Oeun (North Zone Division handed over to *Angkar*) as the shooters on the occasion of that meeting. Assign military combatants of Chakrei (the East Zone Division that were hand over to *Angkar*) to throw hand grenades into the Royal Palace on

the occasion of 17 April 1976 to alarm the world (the ambassadors to Cambodia would know.)

4. All forces at the bases and military units must be vigilant and stand ready to receive victory by making siren sounds via radio.

Upon receiving these instructions, I wrote a letter of instruction to some units and groups working with me, including Nhoek in Kampong Seila, and Comrades Soeung and Rân in Kampong Chhnang.

In addition, I also sent people to organize a place for celebration at the Kampong Luong worksite, where I gathered workers from Sector 15, totalling 3,000, to wait and receive the announcement of victory via radio.

As part of the ceremony, I hired an *Ayai* (អាជ្ញា) classical band [The Satum (ស្រីព្រះ)] for entertainment during the day. Most of the attendees were new people. The 14<sup>th</sup> day of April had passed, and it came to 17<sup>th</sup> of April, but there was no sign of a coup in Phnom Penh. I was without hope.

Then there was gossip that in Phnom Penh, on the occasion of the anniversary celebration, a combatant was reported to have been arrested while carrying a AK rifle and a fully-loaded pouch and walking into the celebration place. The combatant was said to belong to the [...] Division of the North Zone handed over to *Angkar*. Upon hearing this, I sensed failure.

To make myself happier in this hopelessness, I tried to travel to Siem Reap and Battambang along with Soeung, my wife, and a number of combatants. We drove a jeep and a Land Rover 1 504 1.

On 18 April 1976, I arrived in Battambang on an urgent trip to see if there was any special situation there. There, I met Vanh, who greeted us so warmly because he thought that we were visiting their place. On that evening, a variety of dishes were prepared for us. Vanh whispered to me about what happened in Phnom Penh. I replied, "There are signs of reasons behind it, and so far there has been no announcement via radio about the reasons for the failure yet."

I continued to comment, “Now, we have to burrow even deeper because staging a coup without the use of force and tactics would not be successful. The only way is to capture power on legitimate grounds. You are now enjoying a prominent position as Chairman of the Zone Commerce section. If everything is processed well, it will be a long-term infiltration. So please do not be too aggressive.”

Then Vanh appeared to be a bit calmer, and I continued to say, “Now, try to recruit and build up stronger forces.”

The next morning, I left for the textile factory in Battambang and went through Thma Koul to meet Brother Nhim. When we first met, we did not talk much about the aborted coup. He said, “What’s the point of staging the coup with failure like this. It just led to exposure and foreseeable fear in return.” He then took Roeun and me to see the endless rice fields in Thma Koul. By that time, Soeng and I had already lost independence and mastery. We told Brother Nhim that upon our return we would not do farming with such a very small sized farmland. Each individual depended on their individual duty.

After looking at the farmland, we returned for lunch. At lunch, Brother Nhim said, “I am not sure about those who led the coup. What did they really want? It’s better and righteous for them to just instruct people to bury deep in the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and we will think of further steps when something goes wrong.”

I said, “The decision to stage a coup was made by three persons only, who manage the whole country’s affairs. It would have been better if they had consulted every sector’s and zone’s cadre. It has been too subjective.” Brother Nhim insisted on meeting with Phim once. Brother Nhim told me that before doing any work one should consult each other continuously, even for a short while, as we were close to each other.

After the lunch, I quickly travelled on. Comrade Vanh also accompanied me. We arrived at Serei Saophoan on the same evening, but Hoeng (ហ៊ឹង) was not around. He was taking a rest. At 10 p.m., Hoeng arrived, and we did not talk until the next morning. He then asked me to go to visit Paoy Paet (ប៉ាយប៉ែត) once to know the border with Thailand. I said it was too far and I would go next time.

Hoeng asked about the coup in Phnom Penh. I said it had failed and everything was finished by the anniversary celebration day. I had actually left home on 18 April, when I did not know anything about it.

I asked him about his view on the failed coup. Hoeng replied, “It would have been good if it was successful because all of the elements are ours. Now the situation is difficult; we do things differently from instructions or trainings. They are always different. As for male and female youths, they are more aware of the Party line that we have disseminated.”

I commented, “Our stance and process should not be as stiff as a poker; that is we need to compromise for long-term survival.” He agreed. Then we were accompanied to Siem Reap. We first did not meet anyone. But in the afternoon, we met Sean (ស៊ាន). After a discussion with Sean, Hoeng returned.

In the evening, we saw Soth (សុទ្ធ) return from Phnom Penh. He looked very tired. He asked me where I was going. I said, “I am on a duty to tour the country, the farmland, from Battambang up to here. Now I am going to visit Angkor and I will return tomorrow.” His facial expression became relaxed and he went to find some food. After the meal, he came again for a chat. This time I asked if he had known if anything was happening in Phnom Penh as he had just returned from there. He paused for a while and said he knew a little. In Phnom Penh, there was a failed coup staged on 14 April 1976. It failed because the combatant assigned to do the assassination was arrested at the gathering.

I was tasked with carrying out Plan B. It also failed. My duty was to broadcast by radio to foreign audiences. I asked what would be next. Soth replied, “It is not known how the story will develop as the combatant assigned for the assassination has just been arrested.”

But based on my personal assumption, many people would have been involved and tracked down since this combatant belonged to the army of Oeun (Châm ឡែង).

This man had also been under the supervision of Thuch and Doeun. I also knew that Soth was one of them. I then said, “It’s clear as you have assumed. So there is a need

to take measures and stand ready now before it is too late.” I asked if there were any forces at hand. He said there was a regiment of soldiers plus authorities of the district and commune levels he had built. I said, “These forces must be prepared now. It is also necessary to be in contact with foreigners (namely the CIA) in Thailand for backup purposes.” Then Soth seemed to be reluctant. The discussion ended when the Angkor visitors came back.

The next morning, I departed. Along the way, I stopped to have lunch at a guest reception house of the Kampong Thom Sector run by *Ta Vèn* (តាវ៉ែន) who offered very warm greetings and a good reception. He asked about the well-being of those he had known in the West and Southwest zones. I told him that they were fine. He also asked about *Achar Kâb* and Yim. I replied that they were doing well.

Then he prepared a place for lunch. I ate lunch and took a break before saying goodbye to him at 2 p.m. I left a verbal message with him that if he had a chance to go to Phnom Penh, he was requested to call on me at Kampong Luong. SUON Keo of Ponhea Lueu District knew my whereabouts.

I returned to the Office on the same day. Now it was time for me to solve the issue with *Neary Năn*. I asked her whether she could now accept a great duty. She asked, “How about the current one?” I said the current one was not great, and that it was just a normal one which anyone could do. She replied it was up to me. I said, “Now I ask you to go back home as I requested previously. But this time a duty is also attached. The main task is to stay at a place of the new movement with networks from top to bottom. The next task is to recruit and build up more forces around you. And it requires constant communication with me.” She said what would happen if she was not well all the time and what she should think. I replied, “Please try Cambodian traditional medicines, and take along some modern medicines as well. Come and meet me every half-month, or when I have chance, I would pay occasional visits.” The next morning, I asked a driver to take her back home.

About a week later, I travelled to meet Comrade Sè and Phân to learn what was happening.

First, I met SAOM Phên (សាម ផែន) because I had never met him for a long time. He was so happy. I asked him some questions about work. He said the work went as well as normal. As for unmilled rice and milled rice, he said Tuk Meas had gained more crops than other areas, but it also ran out sooner.

Then I asked him about the forces in Tuk Meas District, whether it was better or worse. He replied, “The process was moving forward but only slowly. I have not paid attention to the continuation of recruiting new cadres for a while because these days all communes are under my command. There is no problem. They do everything on our order. So there is no reason for recruiting them. However, we also have recruited forces close to us, totalling as many as 15.”

Then Comrade Phên reported about the communications with the Vietnamese, “These days the communications are done by Brother Sè, and I am just a messenger moving up and down and sending letters to the Vietnamese based at Katum (កាតុំ)

Mountain. They have already moved from here. The communications were made along the Vietnam-Cambodia border in the vicinity of Ha Tien.” I asked if he could bring letters straight to me (in Speu). He said it was okay as we had all the means.

I requested a discussion on paths to travel, “If we have only one way to go it will be a risk. For example, in case of exposure, we need to recourse to another alternative. Now please direct another path from Chhuk to Wat Chàk (វត្តចាក់) Pagoda, Srang (ស្រង់) and Thnal Totueng (ថ្នល់ទទឹង). A path on which we can travel on foot is also fine. We should work it out this way: From here to Chhuk, from Chhuk to Damnak Snuol (ដំណាក់ស្នួល), from Damnak Snuol to Slab Leaeng (ស្លាបលែង) and from Slab Leaeng to Thnal Totueng. Short movement is good.” Comrade Phên agreed and I asked him to find people to be placed at the first point, that is, from his place to Damnak Snuol. He introduced a person named Sēng (សែង), a native of Srae Khnong (ស្រែកុង). I told Sēng to contact Neary Năn stationed in Damnak Snuol Village.



Then I went to meet Comrade Sè but could not find him. It was said he was going to Toan Hoan (ត្បូងឃ្មុំ) in Tuk Meas to solve the problem of Vietnamese invasion there. The reason was that the Vietnamese sent too many residents there so there were cases of land grabbing. Comrade Sè had collected ploughs, rakes and tractors to work the fields before rice seedlings were transplanted.

We did not meet him until the afternoon. He gave me a detailed account about the story and I asked what he would think if the Vietnamese took the land there. He said it would be fine to allow them to take it for a while before he met TEU Kam for negotiations.

Then he handed a letter from TEU Kam to me. The content of the letter was as follows:

“To Beloved Comrades Sy and Sè:

Today, my side has continued to invade further along the land and water boundaries as well as on islands, from Ratanak Kiri to the Vietnamese border. The reason is that the negotiations in Hanoi yielded no result due to Cambodia’s rejection of the Indochinese Federation principle, its stance of independence, mastery and no economic, cultural and technical cooperation with Vietnam. Generally speaking, Cambodia rejected the long-existing militant solidarity between the two countries, turning its back to Vietnam in a younger-brother-fight-with-older-brother game, small country versus big country, etc.

Now the Communist Party of Vietnam has decided to continue attacking Democratic Kampuchea until Cambodia surrenders to Vietnam, accepts the principle of the Indochinese Federation, and recognizes Vietnam as the elder brother. Only then will Vietnam stop.

Therefore, your comrades are requested to trust the Vietnamese stance and viewpoint from today onwards.

Wishing you happiness and success.”

After reading this letter, Sè and I discussed whether it was necessary to continue our contacts with the Vietnamese because this kind of thing appeared to be happening more and more.

Comrade Sè said, “The good thing is that the contacts give us some information regarding their future activities. In addition, it is also easy in case we have any issue as we have had our existing networks there. With regard to the invasion activities, we think that if they invade, we also take the opportunity to continue our activities at the same time. If there are no activities from outside, we also find it hard to implement our plan.” I agreed and continued to strengthen our existing contacts.

In May 1976, I went to Hospital Por-17 to have a blood test as part of a general medical check-up. I was hospitalized for half a month. One evening, I happened to meet Soth (from Siem Reap) again. I was wondering why he was there. Only a moment later, he came to shake hands with me. His face changed colour and he did not smile. “What are you here for?” I asked. Soth said he came to pay a courtesy visit to patients. After a while, he told me that he came to ask about the information we had discussed last time. I asked how it was going. He replied, “It has been said that Thuch and Ya have been arrested. Oeun (Châm) has had the same fate. I will be tracked down soon.”

I asked what he thought about that situation. He said, “There is only one way as you had suggested when we met in Siem Reap. That is to gather all our existing forces to rise and defend ourselves with Thailand as a backup in order to restore the defeat suffered by Thuch and Ya last month.” I said it was fine, or he should escape. He then went back.

After spending a fortnight at the hospital, *Angkar* decided to allow me to have medical treatment abroad. I was rather happy, seeing that special attention was being paid to me by *Angkar*.

Then I was discharged from hospital, and returned to my office to delegate my duties to the Zone Committee before inviting Brothers Päl, Sarun and Soeung for a discussion. I delegated all my duties, big and small, to the Committee for the period of my sick leave.

On 26 June 1976, I departed to Beijing with a military medic named Borat (បូរ៉ាត), a son of Comrade Ân (អ៊ែន), Chairman of State Industry. After a complete medical check-up in Beijing, I left for Guangdong (southern China) for treatment.

There, I met Brother Phim who had been in Beijing since May 1976. The gathering on that evening was solely a party without any discussion. We then met and discussed for the whole day until the next morning before we left. During the whole day's discussion, I raised a lot of issues. They included the failed coup on 14 April 1976. I asked why the coup plan had not been put on a discussion table before execution. Brother Phim replied, "I had believed Thuch and Ya, who had said they had grasped all the possible problems, both strength and weaknesses, during the consultation with the Centre. Then I allowed them to execute the plan." I told him that Brother Nhim was very angry. He said we had discussed one thing, but did another thing. I asked for the reasons for the failure. Brother Phim said, "It was because the guards at the meeting arrested the youth tasked with the duty to assassinate, along with both gun and bullets. For this reason, the planned coup failed. Then Oeun, Thuch and Ya were said to have been arrested one after another. And the arrests seem to be gradually widespread. However, I am not hopeless. Wait and see; when I return home, I will organize forces to attack by my own style. We will definitely win and will not take the same risk as Ya and Thuch's group. The forces will include the remaining forces, the forces of Chakrei of the East Zone to be handed to *Angkar*, and the local forces of Chhuk (Prey Veng)." I warned that there should be no more risk like before.

For my impression of the situation in China, I said though I had not even gone far during my visit, I could see China was less strict than our country. It enjoyed development in all sectors – economic, scientific, and technical – and they controlled their population well. Their people actively and enthusiastically cultivated crops everywhere. The way of living of their cadres was not so strict. It was fairly good. Alcohol and other commodities were still on sale in their cooperatives.

*Brother* Phim said, "I would be satisfied if similar things existed in our country. The way we are living and working was too strict; any minor mistakes are considered as contrary to the organization's political line, ideology and morality. No time to drink, even a bit. We are like a gourd surrounded by thorns, unlike China where the rules are much less strict. They can drink alcohol in any quantity as long as they can. We want to make our regime even better than China."

I said, "Do whatever we can to bring happiness." Brother Phim agreed with me.

We said goodbye the next morning. I left for 'hot water treatment' for almost one month. Then I returned to Guangzhou where I had communicated by telephone with Brother Phim from Beijing. He said he would be returning to Kampuchea the day after tomorrow. I asked him if I could return home with him to avoid boredom after staying here for quite a long time, and he agreed.

The night we reached Beijing, we did not have any talk as we were cautious about an earthquake. The next morning we flew back and discussed nothing as well because there was a Chinese lady on board who spoke Khmer. So we just drank wine and beer until we landed in Kampuchea. This was in August 1976. When arriving in Cambodia, I still continued treating my diseases, especially my nervous system, at 17 April Hospital.

At that time Comrades Soeung and Rân came to pay a courtesy visit, asking me about my treatment in China and the current state of my health. I told them as to what was happening. Then the two comrades reported about the difficult situation at the bases. And I asked them to solve those problems gradually.

I would like to comment that in 1976, our important plan was to provoke revolts anywhere, encouraging the people to rise against the current state of Kampuchea. The aim was to cause public disorder in villages, communes and district, especially as to politics.

The contents of the campaign included encouraging the people to want freedom, markets, religions, etc.. It was requested that the campaign was disseminated to the grassroots level as well. Literally speaking, parades would lead to success in political terms.

This comment was forwarded to Comrades Sè, Kâb and Sary in Sector 37.

On 30 March, there was a huge demonstration in Tuol (ទួល) Village, Tuek L'ak (ទឹកល្អក់) Commune, Kampot (កំពត) District. The two communes saw military demonstrations along the way to Kamchay (កំចាយ) Mountain. Some people carried belongings by shoulder poles, some on their heads as they moved up to the mountain's top. It was for political gains. Rebellions also broke out in Prey Nob the

same day. But the forces from Prey Nob did not catch up with those from Kaoh Touch and Tuek L'ak due to the fact that the group of military guards at Kampong Smach (កំពង់ស្ពឺ) had not been aware of the plan in advance. That's why they could not cross to the area and went back as a consequence.

Two days after the riots, Comrade Sè was seen coming by car to Teuk L'ak Commune to examine the situation and solve the problems resulting from the rebellions. He asked the people the reasons why they rebelled. They gave no reasons, but one person said, "First, we saw two village cadres coming with propaganda and saying that only this place had not been told what was happening, while the other places had been told. And the cadres asked us to follow them. And we did, carrying belongings along." Asked where they were now, the people said they all had gone by boats or motor boats to Vietnam.

Comrade Sè knew that a cadre named Lēng, who was under his supervision, was one of them and thus knew it was part of his plan. After getting this information, I asked the woman to stop talking and said goodbye and returned. Comrade Sè went to meet Comrade Sary in Prey Nob and asked what was happening to the forces in Kampong Seila which had led to the delayed march to the designated place. Comrade Sary replied, "Because there were armed forces standing guard on the bank of the creek to prevent our crossing since they had not known the plan in advance, which of course caused such interruption." Sè warned of no more such failure in the future as it had caused difficulties to other groups involved. Then Sè returned.

As far as the situation at Sector 15 was concerned, 50 people of both sexes in Chan Saen (ចាន់សែន) Commune had left their villages along the road to the west of Odongk, and marched to Srae Andoung (ស្រែអណ្តូង) Village in Peam (ព្រៃ) Commune to spread propaganda there. When arriving there, the rebels incited the people in the commune to rise up, but as the villagers were the relatives of the local authorities, they did not do anything. There had three weapons from the people who were living in the forest.

After more than 10 days, we could see what was happening. I then went to solve the problems with the commune and called for the rebels' return.

As for the situation in Kampong Chhnang, people were incited to go back to their birthplaces, and as a result many had left for the districts of Rolea B'ier, Boribour and Tuek Phos to prepare to get gather forces at Anchanh Rong for a demonstration to march to Kampong Chhnang. However the Sector Army was aware at the time and dispersed it. As for morality, sexual relations between male and female youths, and between men and women were also very common.

As for building the baseas both in terms of politics and authority, I paid more attention to Sector 15 since it was near Phnom Penh and the front battlefield. During that time, I met Comrades Hâm (ហាំ), Keo (កែវ) and Prach (ប្រាច់) at the riverside for work discussion and preparation of separate plans for individual sectors.

First of all, I confirmed the current existing forces in Sector 15. Hâm reported on the forces in Angk Snuol for the year of 1976:

1. Hâm	Secretary of Angk Snuol and Sector Secretary.
2. Neou	Past: Network of Hâm in 1970. Present: Arrested.
3. Sim	Past: Network of Krong (ក្រុង). Present: Arrested.
4. Nô	Past: Network of Hâ (ហា) in 1971. Present: Angk Snuol Handicrafts.
5. Neary Hun	Past: Network of Hâ in 1970. Present: Secretary of Snao (ស្នោ) Commune.
6. Neary Nan	Past: Network of Sim. Present: Chairperson of Ph'a (ផ្កា) Hospital.

7. <i>Neary Sāk</i> (នារីសាក់)	Past: Network of Hām in 1971.  Present: Secretary of Damnak Ampil (ដំណាក់អំពិល) Commune.
8. <i>Neary Sokh</i> (នារីសុខ)	Past: Network of Hām in 1972.  Present: Secretary of Samraong Leu (សំរោងលើ) Commune.
9. <i>Neary Sokhom</i> (នារីសុខុម)	Past: Network of Keo in 1971.  Present: Member of Chrey Loas (ច្រើនលាស់) Commune.
10. <i>Neary Put</i> (ពុត)	Past: Network of Keo in 1971.  Present: District member.
11. <i>Loeun</i> (លឿន)	Past: Network of Keo in 1971.  Present: District member (arrested).
12. <i>Lorn</i> (លន)	Past: Network of Keo (Peam Longveak ពាមលង្វែក).
13. <i>Prēn</i> (ប្រេន)	Past: Network of Keo in 1970.  Present: Cooperative of Tumnob Thom (ទំនប់ធំ).
14. <i>Oeun</i> (អឿន)	Past: Network of Keo in 1970.  Present: Machine Repair Office.
15. <i>Eab</i> (អ៊ាប)	Past: Network of Keo in 1970.  Present: Machine Repair Office.

16. Prach (ប្រាជ្ញ)	Past: Network of Keo in 1970. Present: Secretary of Odonk District.
17. Set (សិត)	Past: Network of Krong. Present: District Deputy Secretary.
18. Teab (ទាប)	Past: Network of Keo. Present: District member.
19. Duk (ឌុក)	Past: Network of Keo in 1972. Present: Secretary of Preah Srae (ព្រះស្រែ) Cooperative.
20. Ma (ម៉ា)	Past: Network of Keo in 1972. Present: Secretary of Chăn Sèn Cooperative.
21. San (សាន)	Past: Network of Keo in 1970. Present: Wife of Loeun, Education Office.
22. Neary Khom (ខ្ញុំ)	Past: Network of Keo. Present: Wife of Set, Education Office.
23. Mon (ម៉ុន)	Past: Network of Hâ in 1972. Present: Chairman of Sector Fisheries.
24. Kung (គង់)	Past: Network of Khăn Pèn (ខាន់ ប៉ែន) in 1965. Present: Member of Sector Fisheries.
25. Săk (សាក់)	Past: Network of Hâm in 1973. Present: Member of Sector Fisheries.
26. Soeun (សៀន)	Past: Network of Hâ in 1974.



	Present: Chairman of Sector Economy.
27. Neary Kim (នារីគីម)	Past: Network of Keo in 1973 Present: Member of Sector Economy.
28. Sân (ស័ន)	Past: Network of Hà Krong. Present: Sector Military Unit.
29. Phās (ផាស់)	Past: Network of Hà Krong in 1970. Present: Sector Military Unit.
30. Neary Răt (រ៉ាត់)	Past: Network of Hà Krong in 1970. Present: Sector worksite.
31. Neary Lēng (នារីឡេង)	Past: Wife of Sâ. Present: Sector Commerce.
32. Thi (ធី)	Past: Network of Hâm in 1970. Present: Driver.

After inspecting the list of forces, I said the number of the forces was higher than last month and last year, and there was a need to continue with the work of building forces as Sector 15 had great possibilities to do this.

Hâm said it was true as Sector 15 was close to the city, and therefore the city dwellers often came in and out very frequently, many of whom preferred to entertain rather than to do labour work. For this reason, we were able to build up forces.

I asked how many of our forces were among the local authorities these days and how many more remained to be recruited. He replied there were two-thirds more to go before we could have a complete capacity of our own and he was determined to build all of them up to be our own forces as soon as possible.

I continued to talk about the issues of Sector 15. The important things to be done in the sector were:

1. Endeavour to build up forces as quickly as possible because this sector was a main political base both for now and the future as it was adjacent to the mainland and Phnom Penh, which made it easy for entry and exit, and especially that it was linked to National Road 5.
2. Organize all village and commune authorities to become our own forces and to do this as soon as possible as the situation was developing so quickly.
3. Control all the mobile brigade male and female youths since they were our soldiers in companies and were to be paid special attention to. At the same time, control all the forces belonging to medical, transport and commerce units who were in our hands.
4. Organize small groups of youths, each of which could consist of from three to 12 people, in order to operate secretly when a situation arose across the country or in the sector. These youths could be taken from the regular army or the sector's mobile work brigade.
5. Encourage sexual relations between men and women and male and female youths, as such an issue was a key without which the youths would not have followed us this far.
6. Continue with the active incitement of the people as happened in Chăn Sèn Commune the last time, because doing so would spoil the current Party significantly.
7. Prepare a warehouse at Chatoruos (ចតុរួស) Mountain as soon as possible to store milled rice and unmilled rice – as much as 10,000 *thaings* – and to keep weapons, ammunition, clothing and medicines there as well.

Those were my comments. During that time, our comrades in the meeting also actively participated and discussed matters in the meeting. Comrade Hâm said that there would have been a good advancement if the plan had been set on a practical basis like this. He had never endeavoured to carry out a plan with

such efforts, and we had been so lax in realizing it; that it why there had been no advancement of the work.

Keo said, “So far I have never thought about the work at all. I have only been thinking about acting disobediently and doing things my own way; if everyone goes along with me, we can work together”. Keo was determined to achieve the plan.

### **The plan to burrow into and seize the authority by legitimate means:**

This year (1976), a certain number of cadres had been exposed due to their strong activities or foreign contacts. As a consequence, they had been removed or arrested. New forces had to be organized.

Brother Päl (ប៉ាល់) presided over a meeting of the Zone Standing Committee.

The issues raised included:

1. The reduced number of cadres,
2. Organization of newcadres:

Sector 31: Comrade Sarun reported that in Sector 31, many cadres had been removed, such as: cadres in Rolea Ph’iet District; Yim (យ៉ឹម) from Kampong Leang; Mèn (ម៉ែន) from Baribour (បរិបូរណ៍); Ut (អ៊ុត) from Kampong Tralach Kraom; Vēng (វ៉េង) from Tuek Phos; and, many other cooperative cadres. Also removed was *Ta* Kandol (តាកណ្តុល) at the Office and in the army, soldiers Phên (ផែន), Mei, Sây, etc., had been removed.

In summary, currently Sector 31 was facing a shortage of leading cadres.

Sector 32: Brother Päl reported that in Sector 32, there were many inactive cadres. They included *Ta* Chay (តាចាយ), from Aoral District, who had been removed due to serious moral offences. Thus, the position of the district secretary was vacant

for the time being. Nân (ណន) from Thpong ថ្មង was lax in working and a reason for removing him had not been found. Moeun (ម៉ឺន) from Prey Prayuth (ព្រៃប្រយុទ្ធ) worked slowly, but tricks for removing him had not been found.

Sector 15: In Ponhea Leu District, Keo had been removed to the Office for a period because he had been opposing the current regime too overtly.

Angk Snuol: Comrade Ta (តា) was still okay.

Odongk: Comrade Prach was also still okay.

Sector 37, Srae Ambel District: Tin (ទីន) had been removed from the district due to his strong overt activities against the current regime. He had been placed at the Division Office in Longveack.

Prey Nob: No problem.

Comrade Nhoek had been removed from Kampong Seila to the Zone Office. So a new secretary of Sector 37 had to be installed.

Sector 11, Koh Kong: Three districts which had no problems were: Thma Sa (ថ្មស), Thma Bang Brother (ថ្មបាង) and Trapeang Rung (ត្រពាំងរូង).

With regard to the organization of new forces, Comrade Sarun said there was a shortage of cadres in Sector 31. Now Brother Yim could be considered to be removed from District 12 to Kampong Leaeng. I said to myself that such removal would give a disadvantage to the model district. Then I suggested these moves: Tēng, a cadre I had recruited, to go into Kampong Leaeng District as a district member; Pa (ប៉ា) to go into Kampong Tralach Kraom District as a district member of Baribour for a period; Neary Din (នីន), a relative of Kaury (ក្បួន), to go into Kampong Leaeng to continue with her work; to introduce Snguon (ស្ទួន), a former soldier, into Baribour District; and, Kaury and Brother Din – who had been said to be useless – were to be allowed to

continue with their work as they had had the background of being cadres' children. After I had made such comments, Comrade Sarun kept quiet.

For Sector 32, Brother Pāl talked about the secretary of Aoral and that there was no way to find a position for Run. The meeting had no comment on this. Then I requested the meeting to appoint Comrade Chim, Commissar of the Sector 32 Battalion because he had been a fighter for a long time. I learned that one of Chim's elders had been executed by us, and therefore sooner or later we would be able to entice him.

I pretended to raise the issue of Moeun (of Prey Prayuth District), asking whether there was a need to remove or keep him if he was so slow. (He actually was my network.) Brother Pāl responded, "Keep him for a while. It is all about his attitude."

As for a person by the name of Nân, Brother Pāl requested to keep him. For Sector 37, the question of transferring Comrade Nhoek to become the secretary remained doubtful. He had worked for the upper organization which had decided to merge Sector 37 with Sector 11 and Sector 32 with 15, and make them two sectors.

Therefore, the issue of appointing the Sector Secretary was sorted out, i.e. Comrade Rân was put in charge. The merging of the sectors required the reorganization of the structure: Brother Pāl to become the Secretary, Hâm the Deputy Secretary and Keo Kân the member. The six districts would be merged into five and *Ta Neou*, Secretary of Angk Snuol and Prach, Secretary of Odongk District, should be removed and replaced. So Sector 15 consisted of two districts only: Ponhea Leu and Odongk. Comrade San became the District Secretary of Ponhea Leu, while *Neary Li* (លី) became the District Secretary of Odongk.

I thought that if I appointed my wife as a district secretary I would definitely be able to go down to the commune level, that is to say I could travel to all the areas concerned. This was my first step to capture power on legitimate grounds, by assigning my people in advance before making them in charge at a later stage.

#### **Examination of the forces recruited by the end of 1976:**

The actual forces which existed in the Zone:

1. The First Base—Koh Kong: Koh Kong consisted of four districts, namely: Prey Nob, Srae Ambel, Thma Sa and Thma Bang.

a. Prey Nob District comprised 11 cooperatives. All of their members had been recruited.

b. Srae Ambel District comprised four cooperatives, namely Srae Ambel, Trapeang, Chi Kha (ជីខ) and Dang Peaeng (ដងពែង).

c. Thma Sa comprised five cooperatives, all of them being our pure forces: Chi Phat (ជីផាត), Ta Nuon (តានួន), Ta Ok (តាអុក), Daun Leav (ដួនលាវ) and Thma Sa (ថ្មីស).

d. Thma Bang comprised five cooperatives, namely Chumnoab (ជំនាប់), Ta Tai Leu (តាតៃលើ), Ruessei Chrum (រួស្មីជ្រំ) and Pralay Chamna (ប្រឡាយចំណាវ).

2. The Second Base—Northern Kampong Speu: It comprised five districts: Aoral, Prey Prayuth, Thpong, Odongk and Ponhea Leu.

a. Ponhea Leu comprised five cooperatives: Peam Longveaek, Chrey Loas, Tumnob Thom, Koh Chen and Kampong Aus (កំពង់អូស).

Only the secretaries of the cooperatives had been recruited. The leader was Comrade Long.

b. Prey Prayuth: We managed to recruit forces in the communes of Chambak (ចំបក់), Tang Samraong (តាំងសំរោង), Moha Sang

(មហាសាំង) and Ta Sal (តាសាល) only, with the rest remained to be

done, namely: Haong Samnam (ហោងសំណាំ), Krang Dei Vay

(ក្រាំងដីវ៉ាយ), Ou (អូ) and Tang Sya (តាំងស្យា).

c. Thpong: We managed to recruit forces in the communes of Pneay (ព្រៃយ័), Khtum Krang (ខ្ពំក្រាំង) and Cheung Roas (ជើងរាស់) only, with the rest remained to be done, namely: Prambei Mom (ប្រាំបីមុម), Veal Pon (វាលពន័), Yeay Angk (យាយអង្គ), Krang Chek (ក្រាំងចេក), Samraong Tong (សំរោងទង) and Ou Krang Ambel (អូរក្រាំងអំបិល).

d. Odongk: No single force had been recruited, except for the only old network, Duk from the commune of Preah Srae.

e. Aoral: The District Secretary was newly appointed and he had not become a network yet.

3. The Third Base—Kampong Chhnang: It had been fairly good before the arrests of Kâb, Yim, Mên, Ut, Ta Kandol, Rin, Vēng and Sâ, but after their arrests, all had gone because the lower levels had also been purged to a significant extent.

Therefore it was necessary to rebuild new forces again pursuant to the 1976 plan, in which the above-mentioned cadres had just been replaced.

Clarification: The building of forces was a tug of war between the Revolutionary Group and the Non-revolutionary Group. My group had managed to do so but they were eventually exposed or even arrested with new replacements. So this base lost forces, such as in the commune of Pneay, where Chhorn (ឈ័), a network of Peou, and Peou himself, had now been removed and this base would continue to lose more forces. The building of bases could never be a hundred per cent sure. Generally speaking, only one third of the cooperatives had been done.

**The plan to seize power by legitimate means and to build stronger  
forces at the base of Northern Kampong Speu by 1977:**

Among the forces in the whole Zone, only those in Koh Kong had been built up fairly strongly. Given this, a plan was set up to capture power in Northern Kampong Speu and build up forces in this base to make it become even stronger.

First, it required capture of the power from the district army – the Sector's Mobile Work Brigade – before we prepared anything else.

In a meeting, I talked about Nân, who was the Secretary of Thpong District, "This Nân has a younger brother named Noeun who has already been executed by us. Another person named Sây had also been executed in 1958. So his inactivity was reasonable. I requested that he be removed as secretary of the district and appointed to hold any other position for a period of time. The meeting agreed.

As for a person named Khoem, he had been implicated by two confessions but he could not be considered as being reliable. One thing which should be paid attention to was his work; he was often leftist, hurt our feelings while working and engaged in immorality. The meeting decided to remove him from the army to the offices around the Sector. Khoem operated at the offices for a period of time and upon the Zone's request, he was transferred to work as a cadre in Kampong Leaeng District, i.e. Deputy Secretary, being second in rank to Sarun.

However, following reports by Sarun about his bad activities, it was decided to arrest [illegible].

After his removal, Khoem was replaced by Lĕk (ល៉េក) from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to be responsible for the Sector's Army through an introduction of Soeun. Lĕk was a native of Veal Pon and whose brother-in-law had been sent to the reeducation office.

Bun, Secretary of Amleang in Aoral District, had been removed as well due to his being slow to solve problems, but he was honest. Because



he was unable to sort out food problems, he was removed and replaced by Koeun, former deputy secretary of Aoral District.

The appointment of Comrade Li (female) as Secretary of Odongk District was just a 'cloth to hide the face'; my actual purpose was to be a district secretary myself. But the reason for this failure was my constant ill health. Thus, the plan was interrupted, and not completely done.

But sometimes I went down to some communes or called cooperative cadres to meetings and introduced a few issues relating to the situation and their duties in order to survey their abilities and aims. My main purpose was to influence this district in order to make the cooperative cadres understand and show a sense of mutual attachment. At the same time, I got to know the cadres personally whom I directly educated to become my own forces.

One day, I discussed with Brother Pāl about the removal of Hām to *Angkar*. Hām was very good at winning someone's heart; he always spoke well of Brother Pāl who was very gentle. I thought that Hām was an element of Brother Pāl as well. Brother Pāl commented that Hām seemed to have done nothing wrong except for his irresponsible spirit. I said, "To my understanding, Hām was just the type of KEO Set in terms of attitude—being against the Party and having networks." He once had said if he had known in advance about socialism, he would not have joined in from the beginning. I thought he should be brought to *Angkar* to be appointed as a diplomatic cadre at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brother Pāl eventually agreed, and I introduced Hām to *Angkar* then.

Brother Pāl raised the issue of Nor (នរ) (and Bun (ប័ន)) for discussion and comment in relation to future work assignments. I asked him for his personal opinion. He said he would assign duties to Nor again as there was nothing wrong with him and Achar Kâng's confession against him was also less important.

I said, "Bun has not done anything wrong except for his being slow in solving problems. The reason for his removal from Amleang was just that.

Now the same duties should be reassigned to him. As for Comrade Nor, he should be put on probation for another period, but assign him less serious, rather than important works.” This comment was just to survey the heart of Brother Păl, but I personally did not think of giving any duty to him again because he did not understand people’s attitude and just brought and keep bad people to stay with him.

With regard to assigning people to the Sector Commerce section, I proposed Sân, a former long-time struggler, to be responsible for the Sector’s Commerce following the arrest of Chhorn, the would-be nephew-in-law of Brother Păl. Brother Păl disagreed about Sân’s candidacy, saying, “This guy has committed many wrongdoings, most importantly endless moral offences.” I turned a deaf ear to Păl’s statement, knowing that Sân had been a network of Moeun for a long time.

Eventually, I came up with the idea that it would be better to remove Brother Păl completely from the Sector so that future assignments of individuals into all levels of the Party could be done more easily and more quickly, and everything could be done at my will. Moreover, all of his forces had to be removed from the bases to offices, worksites and sewing units.

In January 1977, my state of illness got worse—occasional gall bladder pain. During that time, I was hospitalized. I reassembled a group of female medics I had known very well for a long time, such as *Neary* You, Khăt and Li, and who had previously worked for the Sector Hospital, and I requested them back successfully. Each time when I encountered gall bladder pain, these women helped massage me for a period of one hour before it returned to normal, especially during cold weather. Such exercise was practiced for a month and I got better. During the manual massage therapy, I had physical contact with these women, especially Khăt, whom I did have sexual relations with.

During the therapy, I asked the medic named You (ឃុំ), “During your study in the school in Speu, in the Faculty of Peace, did you study with

Comrade Ri, and did Ri introduce you into any organization?" I told You not to lie since Ri had already told me about it. After thinking for a while, You responded that she remembered joining an organization, but could not recall its name. When asked about the introducer, she said she was introduced by Ri. I then said, "So, I acknowledge you as an element of mine from now on. Please follow me. I am the representative of *Angkar*."

I assigned her to propagandize and educate Khăt to make her become our own element. In February 1977, I opened a Zone conference in Kampong Chhnang for three consecutive days, and Brother Number One also attended. It was only when the conference was underway that certain numbers of traitors become exposed due to the introduction by *Angkar* about the supper traitors such as Ya, Thuch, Chhouk and others in the sectors and zones. The one who was most exposed was Keo.

After the conference closed, I was admitted to hospital for gall bladder surgical procedure. At that time medic Pèn said, "I don't know what the Chinese doctors have said about your illness, I just treat it based on my own techniques." I was enraged by such a statement and asked to be discharged from the hospital and to stay at the Zone Commerce section, and would return when the illness got worse again. At one point, the illness caused me so much pain that I called K-7 for permission to have Chinese doctors. I received a negative response from 870 that I could not have them but to have the illness treated at home where the only medic, PÈN Sat, was affordable. By that time, I realized that I had already stepped out of the Party's organizational line and activities.

Later I returned to the Office. One time there, I saw Brother Number Two arrive and he asked me about the current status of my illness. I told him that it hurt me so much but medic Pèn had not agreed to treat me, and I requested him to allow me to undergo surgery in a foreign country one more time. Brother Number Two replied that it needed to be discussed.

At a later date, as my illness hurt me too much, I went to the hospital again where medic Pèn appeared to be friendlier. This time he said the illness required surgical procedure before it would become better.

Maintaining the existing state of the illness would not help. Surgery was decided to be carried out on 3 March 1977.

One day, *Neary* Sei, as the hospital chairperson, came for a courtesy visit and asked whether my current diet and blood regime was strong enough for a surgical procedure. I said there was no problem.

I asked her about the original name of Chea (ធី). She asked if that was something to do with her and the reason for my question. I said there was a problem. Sei said that serious or less serious problems were up to my assessment and needed my solutions. I had been aware that Sei was also a network working with Chea. I then stayed calm.

On 3 March 1977, the surgery was performed. My wound healed during the course of a 20-day treatment. During my hospitalization, I had not been able to talk in length with any person due to the doctor's warnings. Later, I went to Chamkar Daung for a post-treatment stay.

One day, Brother Pāl asked the district and sector cadres to work at Chamkar Daung, the same place as I was staying. During their breaks, Comrades Soeung, Rân and Sary often came to talk with me. I said the acts of internal treachery had become more widespread now, both in the countryside here and in the city [Phnom Penh]. Soeung said it was a worrying issue and it was feared that it would affect each and every one of us. Comrade Rân said, "This group of people pretended to have the matter exposed prematurely." Sary said, "For better or worse, please make efforts to carry out the current duties."

During that time, the Upper *Angkar* invited the Zone cadres to attend a three-day training session. Upon return, I received a letter from Brother Phim through Soeung addressed to me. It read, "Dear Beloved Comrade: First may I ask you about your well-being since your return from China?" Then he reported on our internal situation, saying, "It is progressing toward seriousness. After the failed coup in April, a series and increased number of arrests have been carried out both in cities and in the countryside. For my area, Chhouk has also been arrested as a consequence

of the snowball effect of the issue of Chakrei ordering a youth to throw hand grenades at the Royal Palace before his own arrest. So, the issue I told you about in Beijing now proves to be wrong. Now I can see clearly that there is a need to seek a firm backstop because it seems to be dissolving here one and there once. My backstop is the Vietnamese named NGUYEN Duc Thuan (ហ្ស៊ីន ឌុក ធួន), Secretary of the East Zone in 1953–1954. Until lately they kept writing letters, once every month, but I refused to meet them as it was not the right time yet. But now it is time to depend on it because the inner forces have become increasingly scarce. Thuan is currently serving as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam.”

Then I replied with a letter to Brother Phim, agreeing to adopt his comments as stated in the letter. I commented on the future communication with Thuan; that if it works it will be a very strong chief support as Thuan is also a member of the Central Committee. But my communication is not fruitful because TEU Kam and I are at the zone level. So a country-to-country communication is not possible. For these reasons, I propose that you make contact as soon as possible and sign a cooperation memorandum with them to this effect. I am in total agreement.”

Brother Phim asked his messenger to make contact and arrange a meeting immediately. On the evening of the same day, they invited us to meet as far away as Smach (ស្មាច់) (at the border). NGUYEN Duc Thuan came to meet us in person. After the talks, we knew the situation and the purposes of meeting with the Cambodian side. Then NGUYEN Duc Thuan asked Brother Phim if he would be able to leave [Cambodia] for two or three days. Brother Phim replied that this was no problem. So Thuan asked Phim to be well prepared for an upper level meeting.

Three days later, a messenger brought a letter to me asking me to go to Smach where a car would be waiting. Upon my arrival at Smach, I got in the car of Thuan, who was waiting for me there. Thuan took me to Tay

Ninh where I saw HAI Sau (ហៃស៊ូ) and MAI Lam (ម៉ៃលាម) (the Vietnamese who had been in contact with Chhouk) waiting there. After lunch, we were prepared to depart for Hanoi in a special aircraft.

Upon landing at Hanoi airport, I saw VO Nguyen Giap (ហ៊ីង ឡាវីយ៉ាប) and many others (whose names cannot be recalled) waiting there to receive me. At 5 p.m., Giap took Brother Phim to meet LE Duan (ឡេ យ៉ាន់), Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Present at the meeting venue were TRUONG Chinh (ត្រូវ ឡីងចីញ), PHAM Van Dong (ផាំ វ៉ាន់ដុង) and many other friends waiting to greet Phim. LE Duan asked about the well-being of Brother Phim, the people, the army and the cadres of Kampuchea. Brother Phim replied, reflecting the current situation in Kampuchea, "These days the internal is tense. Numerous veteran fighters have been arrested on the accusation of being Vietnamese agents or CIA agents. The total number of arrests neimplementation practice of the line is so strict that small mistakes lead to accusations of serving the enemy, having non-proletarian ideology, committing moral offences, and having non-Party-line alignment. Currently, the internal Party is divided into two or three separate groups belonging to the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Workers' Party and the CIA. On behalf of the Workers' Party, I would like to communicate with the Communist Party of Vietnam in order to revitalize the ties between the Parties, the peoples, and the armies [of the two countries]; most significantly to help each other in times of emergency."

LE Duan organized a banquet to most warmly welcome us. In a speech, LE Duan stated, "Today I am very excited to have received you, a long-time comrade veteran fighter-in-arms, who is visiting our country. On behalf of the Communist Party of Vietnam, we will make our whole-

hearted efforts to support all activities of the Kampuchean comrades until the final day of victory.”

The next morning, a serious discussion was organized. The Vietnamese side included TRUONG Chinh, VO Nguyen Giap, army commander, NGUYEN Tăk Dung (ហ្នឹង តាក់យុង) and Thuan.

As a result, both sides reached an agreement as follows:

“Since independence, Kampuchea has consistently rejected the Indochinese Federation principle, provoking constant conflicts with Vietnam, and breaking the long-standing solidarity between Vietnam and Kampuchea and between the two peoples and the two countries. Firstly, now it is time to absolutely restore and reinforce the policy of one country, one party and one army.

That is one issue. The most important thing is Kampuchea’s internal issues—divisions among the Party, the people and the army—and conflicts between the fast and the slow, the knowledgeable and the unknowledgeable, and between the cadres and the people.

Seizing this opportunity, when Kampuchea is facing a crisis, The Vietnamese Communist Party has resolves to stand shouler to shoulder in solidarity and in mutual support to invade Kampuchea by military force with the purpose of helping Kampuchean comrades now present herehere. Our strategic objective is that Vietnam will take Kampuchea completely as its satellite into the Indochinese Federation by installing a Vietnamese-loving government like that in Laos. But if the plan to capture Kampuchea completely cannot in reality be achieved, Vietnam will capture it from the eastern bank of the Mekong, stretching from Ratanak Kiri to the Vietnamese border.

Finally, it is imperative to get the Parrot’s Beak area of of Svay Rieng. As for the Cambodian Workers’ Party, the Communist Party of Vietnam is

determined to have shoulder-to-shoulder solidarity and to mutually assist at other levels until the ultimate period of success.”

The discussion was conducted in an environment of solidarity and mutual trust. In the afternoon of the same day, Brother [Phim] returned with success.

One day, I received a letter of invitation to meet at Tonle Bet to discuss and make a plan for 1977. After receiving the letter, I prepared a journey to hide the purpose of my visit. In doing so, I borrowed a white car, a “404”, to drive. When I reached Prey Totueng (ព្រៃទទឹង), I met Brother

Pork (ប័ក), Secretary of the old North Zone. He waved his hand at me

from his car, asking where I was going. I stopped the car and walked toward him. When reaching him, I said that after having made foreign trips, I wanted to tour my country, especially to see the current development of the East Zone. He then asked someone to find coconut juice for me to drink, and I continued with my journey. When I reached Kampong Cham, I had lunch. After lunch, I crossed the Tonle Bet river via ferry and met Lin (លីន) by chance. Lin asked a youth to lead my way. I did not know where I was being led. I drove across endless rubber plantations. At one point, the youth indicated we were at Suong now. When we reached Suong, we went even farther before reaching Brother Phim’s residence.

When I arrived there, I saw Brothers Phim, Phuong, Nhim, Vi, Chea and Yi, as well as the East Zone and the Sector cadres, among whom I knew only Comrade Khoem who was in the house having a discussion.

The next morning, the work agenda started.

The work agenda that day included:

- Examination of the past situation, both internal and border issues.
- Report on Brother Phim’s visit to Vietnam.



- Plan to be set for 1977.
- Other business.

First, Brother Phim reported about our failed coup in 1976 which was due to the fact that the coup leaders did not assess the situation thoroughly enough, which led to their subjective manner in dealing with the work before its complete failure. After the coup, there were a series of arrests both in the cities and the countryside.

As for our visit to Hanoi, after contacting Thuan (Yuon) at the Kampuchean border, he took us to meet his leader LE Duan. They greeted and received us warmly without any dissatisfaction. During the visit, we came to understand and knew the Vietnamese heart and stance toward Kampuchea—intimate solidarity with Kampuchea.

About the plan for 1977:

1. The general situation at the present time is very good. Along the border, Kampuchea was at war with Vietnam. Security was not in existence. Everybody knew there were gunshots. Vietnam is planning to invade Kampuchea unilaterally. Therefore, their forces will be of significant assistance to us.
2. Kampuchea's internal affairs: Nowadays, there are conflicts between the cadres and the people, between the knowledgeable and the unknowledgeable, and the issues of grouping partisans have not been solved yet. Importantly, there are conflicts among the people who have not understood or carried out the line wrongly, and some have been arrested, educated and accused of being the enemy before eventual executions. Based on the above-mentioned situation, we would like to raise a practical plan as follows:
  - a. Politics: As for our Party today, in order to win, the only way is to have a close solidarity with Vietnam as our forces are gradually decreasing due partly to the suppression by the government of Kampuchea, by division, by desertion. We clearly uphold the Indochinese Federation stance with Vietnam on the principle of one party, one nation and one country.

- b. Military: In order to liberate Kampuchea, we need to depend on the Vietnamese forces, which are much greater than ours. As for the practical plan of invasion on 17 April 1977, we will launch another assault in the coup fashion as we did last year in order to harass Kampuchea in celebrating such a ceremony. For the Vietnamese troops, anywhere they go, the Kampuchean troops must pave the way for it without any interruptions. The Kampuchean troops have the duty to lead the way and guide them in the right direction—Phnom Penh. The battlefields the Vietnamese troops have to attack are National Road 7, Snuol, Smach, the Svay Rieng area, Prey Veng, Sector 25, Kaoh Andaet and Lork (ក្រវាញ) (Kampong Tralach). Kampuchean troops have a duty to lead the Vietnamese troops or launch attacks side-by-side continually. These are the plans for the above-mentioned targets. Besides, the troops at the rear battlefields must stand up and create turmoil among the people in villages, cooperatives, and especially in the district army. For the 1<sup>st</sup> Division, of the Longvaek target, there is a need to assign a certain number of forces (one battalion/regiment) standing ready for attacks into Phnom Penh. For the troops at the coastal area (Navy), they need to stand ready to attack the Navy of the General Staff to destroy their ships. The Northwest Army must be in contact with the forces of IN Tam or Thai forces in order to assault through Kampong Chhnang without fail. For the Preah Vihear Army, they have to contact outside forces, either Khmer Sa (White Khmer) or Thai forces, to jointly attack through Kampong Thom.

### 3. Economy

- a. Encourage the activities of destruction and assign people individually or in groups to destroy the economy, most importantly the 1976 milled rice and unmilled rice for consumption this year (1977), to the greatest extent; that is start to destroy from the period

of harvest, threshing and trembling rice, up until the transport and storing of rice in the rice barn.

- b. Hinder crop production of all kinds, ranging from dry season rice farming, cassava cultivation to gardening, to stop it progressing.
- c. Destroy equipment and commodities, such as machine parts, bolts, oil, diesel, gasoline, etc. used for trucks and cars.
- d. Destroy clothing, medicines, kitchen utensils and cooking pots or make them useable for a short period.

#### 4. Authority

- a. Use dictatorial rules against the elements who are against us, that is sweep clean the good elements of the authorities by smashing or by removing them from their positions.
- b. Appoint our people as quickly as possible to the available posts so that finally they are totally ours.
- c. Destroy those who have been persuaded by us but who have refused to accept the essence of our education – in order to destroy the evidence against us.
- d. As for those who love the Revolution, we must either educate them to love us instead or make them become soldiers.

5. About foreign contacts: We must continue contacting foreign countries further, especially Vietnam which is our neighbouring country and is our chief support. Their messenger these days is NGUYEN Duc Thuan, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam based in Cambodia. The sector level contacts must be continued as they have their key roles as well.

That was all for the plan raised for 1977. Following that, there were some discussions:

*Brother Vi* said that the contact with Vietnam this time was so serious as there was no independence – not even a bit. Then *Brother Phim* replied,

“Correct: our life now has no independence and future, but living with the Vietnamese will be happy, although there is no future.”

*Brother* Nhim asked, “Since we depend on them, what if they will not help us whole-heartedly?” *Brother* Phim replied, “We must also try our best, in our own way, not to depend totally on them. We do depend on them wherever it is necessary. In summary, we depend on them for the main matters only, while the minor ones will be dealt with by us.”

Finally, *Brother* Phim raised other issues for discussion.

About the organization of the Battlefield Command Committee:

<i>Brother</i> Phim	Chairman.
Nhim	Deputy Chairman.
Sy	Member.
Sè	Member.
Vi	Member.

The reorganization. In the rural areas, organize the current administration

Southwest	Sè, Chea, Sokh.
West	Sy, Soeung, Rân.
Northwest	Nhim, Kae, Kantol.
Northeast	Vi, Lão, Chăn.
Kratie	Yi, Comrade Deputy Secretary of Mondul Kiri (unrecalled name, deceased).
Vihear (Hàng)	To replace <i>Brother</i> Phim.

About the city:

The General Staff consisted of Hou and Nat.

Commerce: Chen, Hong.

Industry: Say.

Energy: Hok.

Kampong Som Port: Kĭn.

These leaders can be contacted through the old network, Comrade Si.

After the meeting ended, I travelled back and passed my area to call on Comrade Sè in Kampot with the purpose of reporting to him on the results of the meeting with the Vietnamese. (Comrade Sè did not go to the meeting due to his ill health.) After reporting, Comrade Sè interjected about Brother Phim being able to go to Hanoi and stressed with enthusiasm that if the contact was successful, it would be very fruitful indeed.

After arriving back at the office, the Hanoi group started to rebel because it had already been two years since the liberation, yet there had not been any changes. In fact, the problems became more and more serious. They started requesting to work at the bases (cooperatives). As soon as I learned about this, I reported to Brother Pāl (ប៉ាល់) and asked for solutions. Brother Pāl called for a standing committee meeting.

After the meeting, we decided to remove all the leaders first and see what the subordinates would do after that.

After the removal of the leaders, A Khon (ខ្មែរ) committed suicide by hanging himself. He knew that those leaders, who had been removed, had not been not to work. In fact, they had all been killed. After A Khon's death, all his partisans at the Trapaing Chăo (ត្រពាំងឆោ) Office became extremely upset. Seeing this situation, I decided to tell the Office Chairman – TEAK Suon (ទាត ស្នួន) – to hold a religious ceremony in commemoration of A Khon's soul in order to calm the situation down for a while. A Khon and his father had both died by hanging, and at exactly the same place, so his mother and siblings believed that his father's soul must have made Khon

commit this suicide. Therefore, this ceremony could be a sort of consolation to his family as well.

However, after the ceremony, the Hanoi group was still not quiet: the Trapaing Chăo Office was in chaos again. We took smashing measures on them all, around 80 people. If we had kept them, they would just continue carrying out their traitorous activities such as stealing and hiding weapons in the mountains, sending their partisans to the forest to work as guerilla troops, and provoking propaganda against us, etc..

During this period, troops in Preaek Phneou (ប្រែកណ្តៅ) (310) were getting so arrogant. They carried out searches from Phnom Penh to Preaek Phneou. The searches became more and more strict. One day, they arrested Comrade Sarun (សារុន), Secretary of Sector 39, and forced him to do a revolutionary life view because there was no correct number, stamp nor signature on his letter of identity. He was detained for one whole day, from dawn to dusk.

Later on, when Comrade Soeung (សៀង) also came, he was also arrested and his car was impounded. When meeting with Brother Number 2 (បងទី២), I informed him about the situation at Preaek Phneou, asking why it was so strict. Then, unintentionally, I said, "Be careful if another member of the Center goes there, because they have already arrested Comrade Sarun and have already made him do a revolutionary life view." Brother Number 2 did not express any idea at that time; he was quiet. Later on we went to the school that was being convened by Brother Pål. He introduced a new duty there which was to place revolutionary understanding as the first priority because it was extremely crucial. After leaving the school, I joked with Brother Number 2, "In praying, we have to pray about the prayer that is set out to pray first." He did not say anything. I then invited him for lunch.

By April 1977, the situation inside the country, Sectors, and Zones seemed quiet. There was no sign whether or not the plan for 1977 succeed or not. At that time, I was feeling bored because I had no idea if the plan would succeed that year. I then

sent a letter to Brother Phim (ផ្កឹម) to ask about the implementation of the plan for 1977. Brother Phim replied by letter saying, “Vietnamese troops are approaching the South, but not all of them have arrived yet. The implementation for 1977 appears to be impossible because it is now April 1977 already and there has not been any implementation as yet.” Brother Phim further added, “Because we rely on their forces and because we have no leader, the decision is theirs. We can only keep quiet and wait patiently.” After receiving this letter from him, it helped me a lot. I also did not know what else they will do this year.

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I would like to respectfully report to the Communist Party of Kampuchea on my incorrect implementation of the Revolutionary Line from 17 April 1975 until now.

First of all, I would like to confirm my stance. I am stupid and a hooligan and free-spirited, and I would especially like to say that I have worked as a CIA agent for another *party* called the Kampuchean Workers’ Party. The line of the Kampuchean Workers’ Party is to disobey and wrongly implement the Communist Party of Kampuchea’s orders. This is one of a hundred things that I have not raised so far. From the outside, we appear to have been working so hard to implement the daily and monthly plans, but in fact our internal plan is to disobey the Party’s line.

- 1) Plan to recovery the economy in 1975: I tried to propagandize and set up educative workshops very often. Yet, in reality, people in Prey Nob (ព្រៃនប់) still did not have enough rice. The situation was impossible to remedy. In fact, the soil and water are good and adequate, but I did not encourage the people to work very hard. I just instructed them to work for the sake of working. What is more, I did not remove Nhoek (ញឹក). I kept him and let him destroy resources.
- 2) Imera of independence, the Party appealed for us to stir up the spirit of independence and mastery as the principle for building up the country. However, I did not strongly stir up that principle. For example, in innovating to produce all kinds of productp, I have heard of few places that they were able to do that. For instance, at the hospital they could produce thisworkshops they could generate power from charcoal in order to operate machines, etc. I never

rushed to care to learn from them and disseminate that; I heard of it, then ignored it.

To sum up, I just did not have the stance of nationality, loving that my nation could produce some small something even though not yet well. To the contrary I did create a power generator to show off to others. Whatever I did always failed. I was very happy when I managed to test the generator. I told others about that. At that time, Brother I (បងទី១) told me, “Soon, this place will have access to electricity.” Hearing this, I gave up my idea. That day, I thought to myself and realized that my work did not comply with the Party’s plan, and that was why most of our Comrades did not follow my instructions. It was because I did not follow the Party line.

3) About the stance of independence and mastery in the building agricultural:: According to the plan, we were supposed to gain mastery over water for on between 20% to 30% of the entire rice field lands. However, I could not reach this objective because I did not implement the plan seriously, and therefore, the subordinates also could not implement anything. I did not know which part of the land we should work on, the lower area or the upper area. At first, I instructed them to work on the upper area and later I told them to work on water construction on the lower area. As a result, three years after the liberation, we still had not yet found locations for modern agricultural bases. For example:

- First, we built dikes along Roads 5 and 4.
- Then, we dug canals to make a water reservoir near the foot of the mountain.
- But now, we moved to work at the lower area instead.

None of the job was done seriously. Until today, we have not complied with the stance of independence and mastery. What percentage of water has been saved? Over how many hectares of land? There were damages to rice production every year. The production still did not reach the Party’s target.

- The construction of water reservoirs, water gates and dams, etc. was never done well. We only did it for the sake of doing it.



One interesting point was that I always implemented the plans wrongly. I always instructed them to finish work quickly by using the slogan “*Angkar* moves forward by leaps and bounds.” The production was very poor, as a result. I only focused on quantity. For example, the target for corn plantation was 3,000 hectares, but I increased it to 6,000 hectares. The subordinates, hence, had to work extremely hard. To sum up, I agitated the revolutionary forces to work day and night, incessantly. For example:

- The water gate at Peam Sa Tha (ព្រែកសាថា) had been repaired many times because it was not carefully constructed at the beginning. I never went to check the work at the construction site; I only checked through what was written in the report. Therefore, many times, a lot of state money was lost in cement and metal.
- As for Ou Krang Ambel (អូរក្រាំងអំបិល) Dam, I increased the water volume up to above the dam’s limit. I also did not manage the water properly. Much water remained outside the reservoir. The left over water damaged the road, as a result.

These were all the actions that did not comply with the Party’s line and were implemented in order to destroy the Party. The designation of forces was the same. I sent more forces to the small battlefields and fewer forces to the bigger ones. The designation was ineffective. There were too many people and there was no place to work, etc..

For example: When doing dry season rice farming at Sector 31, lots of petrol was wasted on transporting people back and forth. The job was not assigned effectively. First, they instructed us to work at Kaoh Bau (កោះប្លូ) (in Sector 31) and later for more profit, we were told to move back to places in our own districts such as Baribou (បរិបូរណ៍) and Rolea B’ier (រលៀងឆ្នើរ). The forces were sent back as instructed.

For example: During the harvesting season, we needed to collect forces to construct the Peam Lvea (ពាមល្វើ) Dam. First we only thought about collecting and sending many forces to construct the dam; we had not thought of the harvest. As a result, some forces had to walk back barefoot. They had to rush back quickly because the rice was already fully ripened.

4) About Perception and Stance of Consciousness: After the liberation, I did not have any perception and stance of consciousness. I did not know what it was meant by a 'Revolutionary Man'. My perception was to be happy – happy for the victory that the Party, the citizens and the troops had achieved -- happy for the spoils of war and the freedom of movement -- happy to have women, position and recognition, etc.

Therefore, my stance of consciousness was to think about where to collect the spoils of war and where to find someone (a woman) to live with – someone who could help to arrange the department and prepare food. The war was over and therefore life should be easier.

Each night, I never thought of the Party's plan. I never thought of how to recover the post-war economy and how to rebuild the country. After receiving orders from above, I just spread the orders to the sector's committee. Or if there was any recommendation, I just forwarded the message. I never cared to check whether or not the job was completed successfully.

- I collected those who could cook, make noodles, make biscuits and desserts, etc. to live with me. Among those, I brought a Chinese named HUN Cheu (ហ៊ុន ជឿ) to work in the department.

- I arranged for a personal cook and lived as conveniently as a guest. For example, I brought Neary Sien (នឿន) who used to live in Phnom Penh, to cook and got her to teach others for a while.

- The most important thing was that I always brought along a cook wherever I went. Actually, after the liberation, I had received lots of advice and training on how to rebuild the country in every sector, but I just did not pay much

attention to that. In short, I was carefree. Unless there was a problem, I would not care.

- I collected good cars and kept them at the department for long-term use. I collected a Mercedes, a Premiere (ប្រីមីញ៉េ) and two K04 (ក័០៤) cars. What is more, I used only good cars. I should have learnt from Brother Păl, but I did not. He was much older than me and was even sick, but he only used the jeep. He also did not have a personal doctor.

To sum up, my post-liberation activities were done in the position of a government official who worked just for the sake of complying with the orders. In fact, I no longer had the nature of a worker and proletarian.

- 4) 5) Post-liberation Moral Lifestyle: After the liberation, I often got extremely overjoyed. From the outside, I behaved as gently as normal. The problems were:
  - a. I got carried away by delicious food and luxury. I would do anything so that life was comfortable.
  - b. I got overjoyed by women. I have always liked women. I was happy to have many women living around me. It did not matter what they did.

That was why after the liberation, I collected women to be my personal nurses, tailors, cooks and doctors. In addition, I got involved with them in daily tasks. When I got sick, there were women to massage and care for me, and they even had sexual affairs with me. Throughout these years, I had sexual affairs with four women. It all started from my closeness through massaging, especially during the times I fell sick. The four women were You (យូ), Khăn (ខាន់), Li (លី) and Sēng (សេង). Most of the staff in my department were women. Only a minority – the messengers – were men.

My moral lifestyle followed the stance of ignorance and feudalism. I only thought about how to enjoy the luxuries. I never thought of the class struggle. My working perception was to fulfill the duty of a government officer, not as a revolutionary man.

I let women use good things such as clothes (and underwear), personal stuff, soap, watches, etc. That made them overjoyed. I perpetually provided

them with those luxurious things. To conclude, women only wore black outside, their underwear was all colorful.

As for the use of personal stuff such watches, cars, radios and other spoils of war, I was not at all ashamed of using those luxuries. I used my illness as an excuse to cover my luxurious lifestyle. I said I needed to use a car because I always had to travel long distance, such as going back and forth over 400 kilometers from Kampong Speu (កំពង់ស្ពឺ) to Prey Nob (ព្រៃនប់).

To sum up, my moral lifestyle was based on the stance of ignorance. I only cared about enjoying myself with the luxury, women and sex. People got immorally involved with one another, just like in the old regime. From the outside, I appeared to be supporting the Revolution, but deep inside, I was a CIA revisionist. I intentionally misused the Party line for my own benefit.

**5) 6) Implementation of the organizational line:**

- a. Building up of leading forces: For a year, from the outside, I opened a workshop for the committee ranging from the district level to the cooperative. However, the expanding of forces was not done in compliance with the Party's Line of Class.
  - i. I only chose people from the cadre, cooperative or chief of department level. Peasants and the lower level people rarely had the chance to join *Angkar*'s core and do revolutionary work.
  - ii. The organizations were set up as CIA organizations, but it was reported to Upper that they had joined the Youth League or had joined the Revolution. There were few, mostly in Koh Kong (កោះកុង). Many bases did not comply with the class line when recruiting And inducted them as leading forces, members of Youth League or as Revolutionaries, such as in Sectors 31 and 32.
- b. About Internal Solidarity: As for life in the Zone/Office Committees, I did not implement the principle of solidarity with comrades and youth at all. I ignored people of equal echelon; I rarely talked. When they made a request, I did not call for a discussion. I just decided based on strategy on whether spies had to be educated or killed. I never heated

with anyone.. When I got angry with anyone, I would not say anything, but kept the anger hidden. After a few times of this, I would add up their mistakes and decide on the punishment. This was what I did to scare subordinates as well as those who were of equal position. When I made any decision, they dared not oppose it.

- *Brother Pāl* rarely talked with me. If there were only two of us, he would just walk away and talk to other people. He only talked with me during discussions over big issues. He did not want to talk much with me.
- As for *Brother Sarun* (Secretary of Sector 31) and me, we talked normally. But if I made any decision, he would quickly put that into action. Besides the collective, he often did other work. He would finish that work first and then make a request later.
- As for *Soeung*, he argued with me many times because I assigned duties which were not proper for his Sector. He protested during the meetings. But normally, when I advised him, he would listen and implement immediately.
- As for *Brother Numbers 1 and 2*:
  - i. For *Brother Number 1*, I had spoken out of place with him many times. In fact, I wanted to joke with him so that we could be close. However, at times my words were quite offensive. One day, soon after the liberation, at around 5 p.m., when he had finished work, *Brother Number 1* dressed in guest's clothes and left in a car. He returned at around 6 pm.. When he got out of the car, *Brother Kae* (កែ), *Kânndol* (ក្អែល) and I were sitting together. He said, “Today, I was busy welcoming a foreign guest.” As he said that, he walked toward us. At that time, I wondered why he had said that. I thought he might have been shy because he was wearing smart clothes (ខោអាវថ្មីៗ). I unintentionally said, “As long as it is a duty, just do it.” Hearing this, he walked to his house and changed his clothes. Thinking back about

that, I was so ashamed of my words. It was as if I had been teaching him. I went to sleep regretting what I had said.

- One day, Brother Number 1 told me that there have been many searches in the city recently. In Odongk (ឧដុង្គ) and Phnhea Leu (ព្រៃរៀ), many citizens were bailed out each day. At Preaek Phneou, they would not be bailed out until the dry season rice farming time arrived.
- Then Brother told me about his story at Hospital 17/4. He said that even at midnight they still carried out a search. Every search was made thoroughly. One day, while searching, they found him sitting in the car, so they stopped the search. I unintentionally said, “If they thought you were a merchant, it would be a problem.” Brother just smiled.
- One day after checking around Kampong Chhnang (កំពង់ឆ្នាំង) in a helicopter, we returned back for lunch. I said, “Kampong Chhnang Market is bigger than Kampot Market.” Brother did not reply. I said this because in the West Zone, none of the towns were convenient to live in, except Kampong Chhnang which was the biggest one. I actually said that in order to taunt Brother.
- ii. For Brother Number 2, I argued with him many times as well. As I remember:
  - After the liberation, I contacted with Brothers 1 & 2 at the train station. At that time, Brother 1 asked me, “Is Phnom Penh a fun city after the liberation?” I replied, “The liberation of Phnom Penh is an absolutely pleasant victory. This is the first time in history that the city is liberated. But I do not live in stone houses. The stone houses are for Brother. I would rather live in the countryside.”
  - During my revolutionary outlook on life period (1976), Brother Number 2 said that there was an anonymous letter that had been sent to higher echelon. The letter mentioned that I had sexual affairs with female cooks every day. I thought that if the letter was anonymous, it means the information was not completely true. So I told him that the

information was not true. In fact, they just recalled my previous story in 1971 at Kampong Seila (កំពង់សីលា). Then I said, “This moral issue gives a bad image to me, and if it is still being talked about, I request the Party to get another comrade to replace my position. Please do not let this issue block the Party’s work.” Brother Number 2 did not say anything.

- One day, Brother went to see me at Phnom Chăktoruos (ភ្នំចក្តុរួស) School and told me about the traitorous networks in the West Zone. He advised me, “Old soldiers should not be kept because they will not give up their old perceptions easily. Therefore, just smash them all.” I replied, “Nowadays, anyone who opposes the Revolution is killed. Only the remaining younger generations are enough.”
- One day, Brother Number 2 informed me about the decision of *Angkar* on the integrating of Sectors and the internal traitor named CHEY Suon (ជ័យ សួន). At that time, he told me to keep the news of CHEY Suon secret. Later on, I spread the decision to the Sector members. I also spread the CHEY Suon news, but only to a small number of members.
- One day, he asked me about the history of Hâm (ហាំ), Deputy Secretary of Sector 32. I told him, “Hâm’s history is unknown. I only know a little about his activities when we were working together. He is a very conservative person. He would never give up his old perceptions. He is against the socialist revolution, and most importantly he is quite in favor of collectivism. He never propagandized about the line of socialism.” Brother Păl replied, “I think Hâm is only a bit irresponsible in his duty. In fact, he is alright.” Then Brother Number 2 said, “Why is the information different? But, it is okay, I will further look into this matter.” At that time, I realized that perhaps my report was either a bit too exaggerated or wrong. I guessed I would be arrested forever.

- In a meeting, I raised the attitude of Brother Number 2. I said, “Brother, you are somewhat cantankerous and hot-tempered. If you could be a little more polite, work would be more fruitful.” These words were sincere. I was not saying that to taunt him. I only said this from what I saw; it was a purely constructive comment. Brother accepted the comment and said he would take that for consideration.
- During the Sector meeting, Brother reminded about the first core duty, which was to raise revolutionary vigilance as the first priority because that was extremely crucial. Then Brother confirmed, “Please do not misunderstand that opposition to the Party during these times is from old out-of-date views and stances. No, this is actually also the enemy’s plan. Therefore, before taking any action, please be very careful because it might be the enemy’s trick. When arriving back at the place where we stayed, I joked with Brother Number 2, “In praying, we have to pray what we are advised to do first. Previously, they have been constructing dikes in order to get water. They have not thought much about the enemy. What do you think about this?”
- One day, I reported to Brother Number 2 that, “The search at Preaek Phneou is getting tougher and tougher now. One day, Comrade Sarun was arrested for the whole day and forced to study about the Revolutionary outlook on life only because his identity letter was not numbered. However, the letter was properly stamped, signed and dated.” I further said that there might be a problem at that place.

As for the other Brothers , I did not comment about or have anymajor conflicts with them. I only used to use impolite words with them at times. To sum up, I still lack respect in my words toward these leaders. I was always very straightforward. I just said what was on my mind. This showed the nature of my rudeness as well as my anti-party politics. This did lead to the breakdown of solidarity and internal unity.

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The 17 April 1977 celebration arrived. The situation in the whole country was in a complete calm. There was no sign of any anti-party activities. This year's celebration was twice as big than last year's. I went to join the Celebration of Independence with soldiers in Longveak (លង្វែក). The soldiers had trained for several days before the celebration day. Therefore, they were so confident and brave in arranging the meeting. There were also art performances at night.

A month later, I went to Tonle Bet (ទន្លេប៉ែត) to meet Brother Phim. I wanted to ask about the situation in that area. I met her and we got to discuss about the implementation of the plan for 1977. Brother Phim expressed her ideas, "We cannot get full control of the situation because we ourselves are not self-reliant. I told you to ask Thuan (ផ្លាន) to update about the progress of the implementation." I told her that Thuan reported that Vietnamese soldiers had prepared to attack some places. They had spread their troops in several areas. Most importantly, they spread their troops in Rattanakiri and Mondulkiri in order to make us believe that Vietnam is going to attack from those parts. Then when Cambodian soldiers moved to those provinces, they would attack and completely take over the lower parts.

About 10 days later, there was an invitation letter, calling us for a meeting with the Military Commander Committee. It was an urgent meeting between the Committee of *Angkar*, and the Military and Front-Line Battlefield. At that time, Brother Phim told a young man to take a car and pick up Brother Nheum (ញឹម) for the meeting.

On 30 June 1977, the Military Commander Committee Meeting was held in Tay Ninh (ត្បូងឃ្មុំ). Attendees were VO Nguyen Giab (ហ្វឺន ហ្វាប), NGUYEN Tân Dung (ហ្វឺន តាន់យុង), all the Military Commanders, and Thuan. For the Cambodian side, there were Brother Phim and Brother Nhim.

Actual Plan to Attack Cambodia in 1977-78 (Decided on 30 June 1977)

1. Strategic Military Targets: To completely take over Phnom Penh and designate a government which was closely allied with Vietnam.
2. Strategic Plans: In case we could not take over Phnom Penh completely, we had to take over:

All land on the East side of Mekong River from Stung Treng (ស្ទឹងត្រែង) up to the Vietnam border.

In case, we could not take over the east side of Mekong River, we must take over the Parrot's Beak (ជំពុះទាវ) area that runs across Kampong Châk (កំពង់ចក) to the south in Svay Rieng (ស្វាយរៀង) Province.

3) Target Battlefields:

- a. To liberate Chhloung (ឆ្នៀង) and Peus (ប៉េស) and make the areas our supporting bases.
- b. To attack along National Road 7, targeting Suong (ស្ទឹង), Kampong Cham (កំពង់ចាម) and then to Phnom Penh.
- c. To liberate Steung (ស្ទឹង) Village and make it a supporting base.
- d. To confront with troops of the Military Staff in the Parrot's Beak, Kampong Chak, Chantrea (ចាន់ត្រា), Ta Ei (តាអឺ) and Thlork (ធ្លក) in order to clear the way to Phnom Penh.
- e. To fight in the battlefield of Sector 25 (Kaoh Thum = កោះធំ), targeting Phnom Penh.
- f. To attack Kaoh Andaet (កោះអណ្តែត) and Kampong Chrey (កំពង់ច្រៃ), targeting Takeo (តាកែវ). Takeo must be liberated.

- g. To attack through Lork (លក់) and Kampong Trach (កំពង់ត្រាច) Market, targeting Kampong Trach Market.
- 4) Use of military forces:
  - i. National Road 7: use one division of soldiers to attack until Phnom Penh.
  - ii. Stung: one division.
  - iii. Chhloung and Peus: one division.
  - iv. Chum Puh Tea Sector: five regiments (one division and a half).
  - v. Sector 25: four regiments.
  - vi. Kaoh Andaet: one division of soldiers.
  - vii. Lork: only one regiment of soldiers.
- 5) Military Weapons for the Attacks:
  - Weapons needed for these attacks were Soviet heavy tanks, cannons and many heavy hand-guns.
  - Use aircraft as the escort.
- 6) For a Successful Attack, we needed to organize:
  - Recon forces along the border..
  - Use a number of Cambodian soldiers to guide troops to reach the targets.
  - Use the border security units to carry out small attacks first in order to clear the way for the big attacks.
  - Prepare boats, small motor-driven boats and big ships at Tonle Bet in order to travel to Phnom Penh, and also prepare cars along the National Roads.
  - Prepare cars to Svay Rieng and boats, small motor-driven boats and ships in Sector 25.
  - VO Nguyen Giap as the Battlefield Chairman.
  - Brother Phim as the Deputy Chairman.
  - NGUYEN Tăk Dung as a member.
  - Thuan as a member and the Chairman of all divisions.

The date to start the battle would be informed later because troops have not yet reached the battlefields.

After the meeting, both Brother returned. Then I asked them, “How was it?” Brother Nhoem said, “The plan was very detailed, but I’m just afraid they rely too much on cannons and tanks.”

Brother Phim said, “Now, just let them do what they want. This is also a good chance for us to expand our forces.” After that, we discussed briefly over what needed to be done upon our return. Brother Phim shared these ideas:

1. To the Northwest: Make preparations from the north to the northwest; most importantly, set up a Battlefield Command Committee to lead the attacks.
2. To the West: Make preparations from the west to the north. Comrade Sè (សែ) and Sok (សុខ) were already removed. Now there were only Phn (ផ្អែ), Yoeung (យ៉ែង) and Chea (ជា).
3. Phim (ផឹម) would be responsible for Kratie (ក្រាតឺ), Rattanakiri, PreA Vihear (ព្រះវិហារ) and the east.

At the end of this, Brother Phim reminded us that if we were not sure of anything, we must ask one another immediately.

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Upon return, I went straight to see Comrade Phn and Yoeung (Kampot) in order to examine the situation in the area after the removal of Comrade Sè. At that time, I designated Comrade Phn to take over Comrade Sè’s duty, which included:

- To keep good contact with Vietnam (Teu Kam ទឹកាម).
- To lead forces in Sector 35 (our forces).

I asked him, “Did Comrade Sè say anything before he left?” He said that Sè did not say anything. He only talked about the Vietnamese Teu Kam. I further asked him, “The person in charge is Comrade Chea. Do you know him?” Phn said, “I know him. We used to study together many times.”

After that I returned to my department. There was a letter from Comrade Sè, telling about his moving to the North. He also told me that he had already assigned Comrade Phên to be in charge of connecting with Teu Kam. He told me to contact Comrade Phên in case I had any questions.

After that I wrote a letter to Chea. I said, “Brother Phim asked me to tell Comrade to work hard in order to receive new plan. Vietnamese soldiers are coming through Road 25: please help welcome them. Please make boats, small motor-driven boats and ships ready for transporting the soldiers to Phnom Penh as soon as possible. Please call Comrade Phên and Yoeung for a designation meeting because Comrade Sè has already been transferred.

Since June 1977, there had been reports of fighting along the border areas including Rattanakiri, Mondulkiri, National Road 7 (Snuol, Kratie), Kaoh Andet and Kirivong (គីរីវង្ស). Such reports were made just once in a while. Most importantly, the border security forces first came to reconnoiter and then started fighting right away.

At that time, I sent a letter to Brother Phim to ask for an update on the situation. In his reply, he wrote, “They have already carried out attacks, but just small ones. For now, they only use the security forces along the border. However, we have also set up a plan in order to prepare our forces for the upcoming confrontation. I have full control of the forces. There is no problem regarding our connection with Vietnam. We can easily contact them through radio. Their plan might start at the end of December 1977 or in January 1978 because they cannot prepare forces on time.”

In July 1977, there was a three-day training course in Kampong Speu (កំពង់ស្ពឺ). Brother Number 1 also attended the course. At that time, I implemented the plan of making poison from resin. I put the poison in *num korm* (នំគុម) (a type of cake made of rice-flour with coconut and sugar) that were prepared for the afternoon snack at 2 p.m. They were supposed to eat these cakes before going to school. Unfortunately, that day they overslept and by the time they got up, it was already too late. Brother said, “It is already late. Let’s eat at night.” Then they left in a car. Fearing that the plan might have been discovered, I decided to throw away all the cakes into the water in front of the house. Then I went to school.

After the training course was over, the Sector opened other training courses. I spoke at one. In front of the masses, I misinterpreted many contents. For instance, there were many spies secretly hiding and reconnoitering internal issues, but I said, “We can’t find these enemies. They are holding power in some collectives and some districts. Therefore, brothers, sisters and friends, please make sure before you point out someone as the enemy.”

Regarding state power, I interpreted that, “In fact, the Party is working hard for the benefit of peasants and the lower level. However, since the peasants and the lower level are not capable enough, the Party has to assign those jobs to the middle-class peasants and the higher level. When all of you are capable, the Party will assign those jobs to you.”

During the training at Kampong Speu which Brother Number 1 attended, I requested a plan to reorganize the Sector, especially to find a new person be in charge. My strategic target was to remove Brother Pāl from the Sector, so that it would be easier to arrange forces in Sector 32. However, I requested, “In order to strengthen leadership of the Sector, we should practice collective leadership. As you can see, we are all sick. None of us is very well. Therefore, we need to unite our forces and lead together.”

I requested to withdraw Brother Pāl from the Sector and take Comrade Rân to Sector 32. I also requested to designate Comrade Soeung to Sector 37 because he was currently by the sea and also in the Revolutionary Base. Brother approved of the idea and said, “This change is strategic because Brother is already old. It is time to let the younger work.” After that, Comrade Rân moved from Sector 37 to Sector 32, but he did not get any job then because Brother Pāl had not transferred the duties. Therefore, Comrade Rân worked as the Secretary of Thpong (ថ្មង) District.

On 12 August 1977, an event broke out at Sector 32, in Detention Office M-99 (ម័ន្ទីរ), Ta Sal District, District 27 (FoPrey Prayuth), northern Kampong Speu. The event was caused by the Chief of the Office guard named ..... He rebelled and shot a cadre in the Office and freed prisoners. A cadre – Kul (គុល) – and four

soldiers were killed. Another person – Nâm (ណាំ) – was injured. Around 200 prisoners escaped and 16 weapons were lost.

The view and stance of Brother Păl toward these events, a responsible person in charge of the Zone and the Sector, was that he evaluated this event lightly. I asked him, “Who caused this problem? I think it must have been Nâm.” Brother Păl said, “I don’t think Nâm could have gone to that level. It must have been the guard leader having a really strong conflict over his being transferred to upper echelon.”

Brother Păl did not chase after the prisoners right away; he let them escape until they had almost reached the Thailand. As for Nâm, after being injured, he was sent to 17 April Hospital (ពេទ្យ១៧មេសា). On 30 August, CHAB Nâm (ចាប ណាំ) left the

hospital and returned to the hospital in Angk Serei (អង្គសិរី). At that time, he wanted to escape again but was seen and caught immediately by the young men and women who were staying at the hospital dormitory. Brother Păl was not informed about this.

At that time, I started to suspect why Brother Păl always protected those people. As for Nâm’s case, I had asked him four times already. As the person in charge of Sector 32, he had said:

– First time: “CHAB Nâm was already taken to the South by Lim (លីម) alias

Kdat (ក្ដាត).”

– Second time: “Nâm was already arrested in District 28.”

– Third time: “Nâm might appear to be disagreeable. But if you know him long enough, you will know that he is a good person.”

– Fourth time (when the event of 12 July happened): “I don’t think Nâm could have done this.”

After that, I made a very long report about Brother Păl and sent it to *Angkar*. I requested *Angkar* to have Brother Păl take a holiday for a while in order to cure his illness. He could come back to work when he had fully recovered. Also, I requested *Angkar* to have him make a revolutionary life view too. However, *Angkar* did not clearly respond to that.

One day, I suddenly saw Brother Hèm came to see me at (Chamkar Daung) to confirm about Brother Pāl's case. As soon as he arrived, he inquired about the current situation at the West. So I reported to him according to what had actually happened. I mentioned especially the case of CHAB Nâm's rebellion at northern Kampong Speu. I told him that Brother Pāl had protected Nâm from beginning to end. I said, “

- He let the rebellious group escape until they had almost reached the Thai border. He did not take any measures to block their way. He should have at least sent a telegraph to Kaoh Kong and asked people there to catch the rebels.
- He instructed Khoem (ខ្មែរ) to lead soldiers to catch the rebels, but it was just like chasing them to make them run away even faster.”

I further said, “Please, Brother, inform the Standing Committee about this. My report and evaluation of the situation might be wrong or a bit exaggerated because I am sick. But, that is what I really think.”

Several days later, Brother Number 2 came to the Zone Office. He came right at the time when we had gathered for a meeting. At that time, he asked “What is the situation like at the moment; is it less tense now? Do troops want to rebel in 32?” Comrade Rân replied to Brother, “No, there isn't. The situation is calm now.”

In August 1977, Office 870 invited me to work there once. At that time, I met many people from the East Zone, Southwest Zone, West Zone, Central Zone, North Zone, Northwest Zone and from Kampong Som. We had a discussion about the visit of CHHEN Yung Kuy (ឆិន យុងគុយ) alias *Ta Chay* (តាចាយ) to Kampuchea. The discussion was made in order until the West Zone's turn (each zone took turns to share ideas). At that time, Brother mentioned clearly that the West referred to Kampong Chhnang. Since *Ta Chay* was coming to Kampuchea, I indeed wanted to work in order to get some credit; however, I was not well.

In November 1977, *Ta Chay* arrived. I really wanted to be credited and recognized at that time. When walking in honor with the guest, I always walked in front, even in front of Brother Number I, and Brothers Văn and Vorn. My attitude seemed to show that I was very knowledgeable. When *Ta Chay* got out of the car to



view Klong Porpork (ខ្សែពពក) Rice Field, I immediately asked him, “Please give some recommendation on how to improve modern agriculture.” At that time, *Ta Chay* exclaimed in surprise and Brother Number 1 laughed. I knew immediately that my words had been incorrect.

While we were visiting the red mat weaving place, I was extremely dissatisfied. I wanted the weaver to give a mat to the guest as a souvenir, but none of them cared to think about that. Unable to bear it, I picked up a mat and gifted it to *Ta Chay*. He received it. However, no picture was taken. Later on, I realized what I had just done was completely wrong – extremely displeasing to other people’s sight. There was no appropriate protocol used. I just did it according to my own wish. After this (*Ta Chay*’s visit), I fell ill again. This time, I got poisoning. I always felt dizzy; I could not walk straight. There was blood when I defecated and I also had high blood pressure.

In December 1977, fighting at the border broke out. Vietnam started to invade Kampuchea and the situation turned extremely critical. At some places, Vietnam invaded about 30 kilometers. Fighting went from The Dragon’s Tail, Kontuy Neak (កន្ទុយនាគ), to Ha Tien (ហាទៀន). This war lasted for only 15 days at its longest and the Yuon troops broke and retreated.

At that time, I sent a letter to Brother Phim and inquired, “How did they attack? Did we manage to seize any opportunities? During those several days (of attack), did they inform us that they were going to attack? How did we arrange our troops? How was our attack? Or weren’t we allowed to fight? Were we told to just manage? What is the next plan?”

Brother Phim replied, “On the first day of the attack, they did inform us in advance. So I prepared two battalions of soldiers and instructed them to fight on the frontline. I did not know what happened, but the two battalions of soldiers just returned on that day. When I asked, they said that Vietnam had already retreated. However this time, they destroyed a lot of rice and cattle, burned many houses and destroyed many jars, pots and rice pots of the cooperative.

The attack did not comply with the plan. There was no organization of military forces. Chhloung and Peus were not attacked. Instead, they gathered and attacked from National Road 7. The plan to send one division of soldiers to the support base at Stueng Sector was also not implemented. Therefore, I had no idea why they carried out this attack.

At the end of December 1977, there was a meeting of Angkar to examine the current situation of battlefields at the border. How did the Yuon attack us?

At the meeting I got to listen to reports from comrades from different battlefields including Rattankiri, Mondulkiri, National Road 7, Stueng Sector, Kampong Châk, *Ta Ei*, Chantrea, Thlok, Prey Veng, the Southwest Zone (Kaoh Thom, Kaoh Andaet), Lork, Kampong Trach Market, the sea, etc.. We could see that the Yuon had attacked on every battlefield; they had even invaded deeply to places where we were such as Sector 21 in the East Zone. Reports suggested however, at Stueng and other places where there we were not present, these were not easily invaded. For instance, at Kampong Châk, Chantrea, *Ta Ei* and Thlok, fighting was extremely heavy. The fighting in Prey Veng was also very heavy. Besides, the fighting at Kaoh Andaet was also heavy. At Lork (Ha Tien), fighting was the heaviest, etc.. After listening to these reports, I thought that it was impossible to implement general and military plans in Kampuchea because the Yuon attacks looked to be very soft. Their troops were unable to counter Kampuchean troops who, actually, were not even fully prepared for these sudden attacks and who carried out counterattacks only to defend the country.

During the break, I asked Brother Phim, "How do you see it?" Brother Phim said, "I don't know because I have been hospitalized for almost a month now. My report was actually made at the hospital. But I did advise Comrade Sat (សាត) the Zone Commissar to just carry out a defensive attack, not a heavy counterattack, and to patiently watch the situation, just to see how it would turn out."

I shared my opinion: "Now I think we'll surely be defeated because troops could not go ahead. After half a month of fighting, they retreated. For this matter, we have to go to the battlefield and check the real situation if we are to succeed in the second attack." Brother Phim also regretted that we actually had forces yet we could not use

them. Then I suggested him, “Please request to *Angkar* to allow us to go to the battlefield for a short while. Now the hospitalization is another story.” In the evening, Brother Nhoem arrived. That night, we rested watching movies. Three of us sat together on a stone bench and discussed the situation.

Brother Nheum said, “How is the situation at the border? It seems to be failing. It does not progress.”

Brother Phim said, “I don’t know. I’ve been in the hospital for almost a month. I don’t know how the situation has changed.”

Brother Nheum asked Brother Phim, “Now what to do next?” Brother Phim said, “Let’s wait and see what the reason is.”

On the next morning of the meeting, other issues were raised. *Angkar* suggested, “Brother Phim must leave the hospital and go the battlefield immediately because troops seemed to be ineffectively prepared. The attacks were so weak. Upon returning, you can go back to the hospital for injections.”

After leaving the meeting, I said, “I want to go to the battlefield in order to learn clearly about the situation.” Brother Phim replied, “You won’t be alone at that place. Comrade Vorn and Pork are also going. You better not go with me. I will send the news as soon as possible.”

Several days after I arrived there (hospital), a letter was sent from Brother Phim. He wrote, “As I’ve been here and experienced it, I can say that causes of their defeat were:

- The defense of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and the Communist Party of Kampuchea is very strong. Vietnamese troops cannot advance.
- Unable to defend from the militiamen’s attack.
- When tanks and cannons ran out of ammunition, their infantry have to pause, and sometimes their infantry were shot dead or even fled..
- There was no one to guide the way and there was not enough food and gunpowder.
- Most importantly, there is shortage of food. In fact, there was an instruction from the Revolution to husk rice and store it for troops. But

even though they knew that the rice was to be kept for Vietnam, they just did not follow the instruction. In one commune, there are only about two people who love Vietnam. The rest have run away into the forest.”

At the end, Brother Phim wrote, “Perhaps I will go back to the hospital in the next three days to get injections and pills. I hope to see you at the hospital. It’s the appointment time, so I’ll just go to stay in the hospital for one night in order to get my blood tested in case there is any illness.”

After three days, Brother Phim arrived. I was also staying in the hospital. At night we talked for one hour to share our experiences regarding the failure of war at the border.

Brother Phim said, “The most important cause is a lack of involvement from us. They know nothing about roads, battlefields, rice warehouses and gunpowder. They have no idea about the strength and weakness of Kampuchea.”

I asked, “What are they doing next? Are they going to recover from the failure in the January 1978 attack? If they can recover, that is good. But if they cannot, then it’s all over. What do forces at other Zones think about this?” “They were instructed not to do anything but wait for an opportunity,” replied Brother Phim. I continued, “I mentioned about this because according to the country’s general plan and propaganda plan, the backup forces also have a duty. At the Northwest Zone, they implemented this. Besides they also designated Village Battlefield Command Committees and assigned young forces to continue embedding. Brothers Nhoem, Kae (កែ) and

Kândol (កង់ដុល) contacted ǺN Tam’s (អ៊ុន តាំ) forces. ǺN Tam’s force agreed, but because they could not do it secretly, *Angkar* finally learnt about this and arrested some of them including the cadre of the Northwest Division, the Liaison Committee, and the cadre of the base.” Brother Phim was quiet. I learnt about this from Brother Nheum while I was working inside.

Next morning, after getting my blood tested, I returned home.

In January 1978, the Kampuchean Battlefield Command Committee, with VO Nguyen Giap as the Chairman, held a meeting under the presidency of Brother PHIM and in Tay Ninh. to draw experience regarding the causes of the failure at the first

attack in 1977. The meeting agreed that the main cause of the failure was the lack of direct involvement of Kampuchea, at every target.

Future targets identified at the meeting:

- From January 1978, Brother Phim to be the Battlefield Chairman and directly command and arrange all the attack strategies.
- To solve all problems which were not solved, including shortage of rice, guides, gunpowder and food, etc..

At that time, every Zone received instruction to prepare attack forces from January 1978 onward.

Fighting started again from January. This time, the attack was mainly made through long distance artillery. Only a small numbers of infantry came to Cambodia. There were also fewer tanks. By mid-January 1978, fighting was over.

In this Vietnamese second war of invasion, Brother Phim set up clear strategies and tactics. In addition, he also used additional supporting tactics including poisoning Brother Number 1 who was in charge of the East Battlefield because he went to Brother's house more often than to Brother Chăn's.

- Connect with and get the cook to put poison in meals and desserts served to Brother Number 1.
- Poison through occasionally available fruits such as bananas and sapodilla, etc..
- When the war breaks out, Brother must be involved, inevitably.

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War at the border ended. The situation recovered gradually until it was completely calm. The historical attack was on 6 January 1978. I was extremely disappointed that we had to rely on Vietnamese troops in order to take over the State power.

In February 1978, a Zone meeting was held in Longveack to celebrate the zone plan. Brother Number 1 also attended this meeting. I then asked him about the recent broadcast on our radio regarding the Yuon plan to invade our territory by designating their people to come to Kampuchea and cause damage. The broadcast seemed to be

very short and unclear. I also asked if broadcasting about *Achar Kâng* (កង់), CHEY Suon, etc. would be a benefit or a loss. Brother said we could not do that because it would reveal our internal issues. I agreed with his idea. It would be a loss.

Then I continued, “Vietnam can invade our territory because we are careless. And that’s why we lost some rice and cattle. As Brother Mon said, all weapons were kept in the warehouses. When the Vietnamese arrived at Kampong Chrey, we just jumped up (in surprise).”

Brother responded, “No! In fact, before they arrived in our land, we had already entered theirs, at times almost reaching Tay Ninh, and at times almost reaching Kontum (កុងតូម).”

The meeting was over and Brother continued to Battambang. I went to Prey Nob to check how much rice was produced in 1977. Then I continued to Kampong Som and I met Comrade Krin (គ្រីន) who was staying there. Comrade Krin took me to a house on the mountain where there were not many people coming in and out. We talked about the port development in the last few years.

Eventually, we talked about the current post-liberation situation. Many people were arrested, including Phăn (ផាន់), Sok (សុខ), Chhăn (ឆាន់) and Nèt (ណែត), etc..

Comrade Krin said, “Witnessing these arrests, I’m also frightened.” Then I asked what we should do. He said, “I just want to be safe now. I am not doing anything apart from my daily duty.” Then I asked why he joined with A LONG Botta (ឡុងបុត្តា). He said, “I just wanted to be safe and sound. There was no other reason.” I

further asked why he was so active at Âm Leang (អមលាំង). He said, “The environment seemed to favor that side at that time, so I just joined.” I asked, “How about now?” “Now the main goal is building up the country. So I only think about building up the country. I think of nothing else,” he replied.

In fact, I knew Krin's personality since the beginning. I only wanted to confirm. Then I asked him what other comrades – Mean (ម៉ាន), Saut (ស្ទូត), Bân (ប៉ាន) – thought about this. He said they thought just the same as him.

I took his leave and returned to Prey Nob. One day later, while looking at land in Veal Renh (វាលរេង), I met Comrade Hok (ហុក) who was coming from Kampong Som in a jeep. He saw me and stopped the car to say hello. I took Comrade Hok to Comrade Sari's (សារី) place, north of Veal Renh. Having Hok sit for a while, I started asking about progress of the establishment of the petroleum factory. Comrade Hok replied, "I don't know when it will be completed. Due to lack of equipment, they only work two days per month. As for eating, they always ask for delicious food. In one month, they ask for 54 pigs. They eat two pigs per day, one in the morning and another one in the evening. They cook by themselves and always finished every single piece of the pig."

Then I asked about living conditions in Phnom Penh when the country was in such a situation. Comrade Hok said, "It is also frightening. That this person goes missing and then that goes missing. There is a reason behind every person who goes missing, but still it is frightening." Then I asked if he knew anything about Comrade Krin. Comrade Hok said, "I have known Comrade Krin since long ago. He is a type of person who only cares about his own happiness and safety. Now his life is even happier. He only thinks about working and working."

I then asked about his contacts in Phnom Penh. He said, "I could only connect with the ministries which are involved in my petroleum work such as:

- The Ministry of Commerce: connecting with Comrade Rît (រ៉ិត) and

CHEN Hong (ចិន ហុង).

- Ministry of Agriculture.
- Ministry of Railways.

- Ministry of Defense: perpetually connecting with Teanh (ទាញ) in the Office of Equipment.”

I asked, “What is Hou (ហ៊ូ) doing nowadays?” Comrade Hok said, “I don’t see him doing anything else besides taking care of guests.” I continued, “How about other comrades? Are they doing just as well as Comrade Say (សាយ), CHEN Hong, Nat and Hou?” Comrade Hok said, “Only CHEN Hong sometimes recalled the old stories and YIN Chong (យ៉ិន ចុង) sometimes also recalled the happy times, etc. The rest have not said anything.”

Then I said, “Now, I assign Comrade Hok to be the chairman in charge of contacting with people in the city, because it is difficult for me to go in and out. Is this okay?” Comrade Hok agreed, and said, “The people that we contact are Comrade Hou, Nat, CHEN Hong and Say. Where is Sēk alias Chhum (ស៊ី) nowadays? I saw him at the Ministry of Industry, but I don’t know what he does. He used to come to see me quite often.”

I told him to try contacting these people and strengthening the connections. But whatever he did, it must be done in complete confidentiality. I also asked him to make a list of all forces and send it to me because I had not connected with them for ages. I told him, “The connection could be done regularly at the zone department. Reports could be sent directly through my messenger.”

On 20 February 1978, I received a parcel weighed four kilograms from CHEN Hong. It was full of poison. They looked like the antibiotic Tifomisin (ទីហ្វូមីស៊ីន).

There were two kinds of poisons. One kind was big and yellow in color; its poisonous effect is a bit light. Another kind was small and dark yellow in color; its poisonous effect is strong. I sent those poisons to the Zone Commerce to distribute them to bases, as mentioned on the list provided. I also gave some poisons to CHEN Hong and he later gave those poisons to a woman who worked at the Ministry of Social Affairs. The woman was responsible for poisoning Brothers 1 and 2.



I also kept 1,000 poison tablets, but I had no idea where Doctor Oeun (ឧក្រិដ្ឋ) hid them. On that same day, I received a letter from Brother Phim, telling me to arrange a place for discussion at the Ministry of Commerce, the West Zone, in Phnom Penh. On 1 March 1978, Brother Phim arrived and worked for one night. The time came and I waited for Brother Phim over there. At 8 o'clock, Brother Phim arrived. He entered from the west and went to the place where I was standing. Then he drove ahead to wait at the east entrance. He entered the house and a soldier (Chey) (ជ័យ) guarded outside.

At that time, he announced, "The 1977 Plan and the Military Plan (30 June) failed and could not be recovered because Vietnam said they were out of ideas and could not enter. Now we can only implement our final plan,. I would like to introduce our final plan:

1. About the General Situation: Overall, the current situation is good because it coincides with the Kampuchea-Vietnam war at the border. Therefore, there won't be any argument if we implement the plan.
2. Internal Situation of Kampuchea: Currently, there is a big contradiction on the strict implementation at the countryside and the city. People who don't understand or are slow to understand cannot escape the situation. So then, they are accused of being enemies, arrested, and taken away and killed. There is a conflict between the cadres and ordinary people, conflict over the expenditure of many forces without getting much result.
3. About the final attack strategy: Smash all the leadership apparatus (Government of Democratic Kampuchea) and organize a new government.
4. Forces Needed for this Attack:
  - Friendly military forces to help with fighting: to enter through National Road 7, Svay Rieng and Sector 25. Use only three divisions of forces but use automatic light-weight weapons. Attack quickly and withdraw quickly. Avoid using too many forces as before.
  - Our forces in both Zones amount to five divisions. We must assign these forces carefully. These forces are now guarding along the border.

- We must assign one battalion to Longveaek to attack from behind, attacking via National Road 5. Most importantly, use Special Forces to attack quickly and withdraw quickly.
5. The Attack Targets:
- National Road 7: Enter through Tonle Bet and then take ships to Phnom Penh.
  - Svay Rieng Zone: One unit will counterattack the Military Staff units and another unit will take the opportunity to move forward to Neak Loeung (អ្នកលៀង) and then to Phnom Penh.
  - Another unit enters through Sector 25 and moves on to Phnom Penh.
6. Movement of Forces to Phnom Penh: On 14 April 1978, as the celebration day approaches, all our forces can withdraw to visit homes, etc.. Therefore, we will send forces by trucks. As for friendly forces, it is the same because it is close to the celebration day.
7. About additional Attack Strategies: In this last attack, we do not use only military forces. We must also use additional strategies. If we can succeed with the additional strategies first, it would be great.
- Using poison: We have already set up measures by asking CHEN Hong to buy poisons from abroad. The poisons are available now and they have already been distributed to all places. CHEN Hong has given some poison to a woman (about 30 years of age) at the Ministry of Social Affairs. The woman will take care of poisoning Brother 1 and 2. She has already mixed the poisons. There are two types of poisons. One type is big and yellow, similar to Tifomisin (ទីហ្វូមីស៊ីន). It slowly shows its poisonous effect. The other type is small and yellow, also similar to Tifomisin (ទីហ្វូមីស៊ីន). It spreads the effects quicker than the first type.
  - Designate a special unit to carry out damaging strikes and bombings when leaders are sleeping, walking, entertaining or having meetings, etc.. This squad is being taken from the Special Force in Longveaek. They are now being sent here.

- Forces to lead the way for the special unit are the forces hidden in all state ministries. Therefore, Comrade Hok (Industry), Nat and Hou (Military Staff), Say (Industry), CHEN Hong or his forces (Commerce), Department 870 – including Comrade Soeung (សៀង) alias Pàng (ប៉ង) – will be the indirect attackers.
  - The Special Unit will be implemented from now on. They will come to study the geography and hide themselves at houses, saying they are related to the house owners.
- 8. Strength and Weakness of Kampuchea:** As examined, the weakness and strength of Kampuchea is that there is no military base in the city. The important forces are workers at the factories who do not have weapons in hand. Soldiers are all far away from the city. Therefore, we can enter the city easily. There are also no troops at the ministries. Most importantly, we have to be careful when getting close to Phnom Penh, in case there are any squads coming to protect the city.
- 9. In Case of Victory or Failure:**
- The strategy is to liberate Phnom Penh in order to conquer the capital and designate a new government in Phnom Penh. This is the strategic recommendation.
  - In case we cannot take over Phnom Penh, we must take over the east of the Mekong River, from Kontuy Neak up to the Vietnamese border.
  - If we lose forces and cannot take over the east of the Mekong River, we must lead forces to escape into the eastern forest. Then we can carry out sudden counterattacks against the government, by using Vietnam as back-up forces. It will take years to win this war.
- 10. In Case of Victory:**
- Designate a government under the name: “Democratic Republic of Kampuchea”.
  - The government will be a member of the Indochinese Federation.
  - The government will be a subordinate to Vietnam.
  - Allow Vietnam to set up bases on Cambodian territory.
- 11. About Weaponry Warehouses to Use During the War:**

- A warehouse must be prepared in Chheu Kăch (ឈើកាច់) in order to serve the battlefield in Phnom Penh and ensure that there are adequate weapons in the warehouse in Longveack to serve its battlefield.

**12. About Preparation of Rice Warehouses:**

The East Zone is heavily responsible for solving the shortage of supplies because the zone is rich in rice. Therefore, we must prepare warehouses along National Road 1 and National Road 7, and the Mekong River.

The West Zone does not have to think about a rice crisis because the zone does not produce much rice. However, rice must be continually milled and prepared for there.

Confirmation: In the additional attack strategies, we still have to use the revolutionary forces, which are taken from two districts: Ponhea Leu District and Udongk District, to gather with troops and go to Phnom Penh.

- Forces from Udongk District will enter through National Road 4.
- Forces from Ponhea Leu District will enter through National Road 5.

**13. Date to Implement this Plan:**

17 April 1978, near the celebration day.

The announcement of this last plan finished at 12 p.m. At that time, Brother Phim told us that he would spread this announcement to the Northwest Zone, the North Zone, the Northeast Zone and to Kratie too.

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After receiving this plan, I further spread it to every place such as the Southwest and the West zones. At that time, I went to Kien Svay (គីនស្វាយ) because I wanted to see Neary Bau (ប្អូន) to spread the plan, but I could not see her. Then I returned. I went on spreading this plan until 26 March 1978 when I was arrested.

Name list of traitorous forces who collaborated to conduct traitorous activities with  
CHOU Chet (ជួរ ជេត) alias Sy (ស៊ី), From 1975 to 1978

1. In Office 401 (the West Zone)

Office 71		
1	Oeun (អឿន)	Vi's network in 1974. Currently, he is a chief of Agriculture Unit in Stoeng Thom.
2	Neary Phalla (នារី ផល្លា)	Vi's network in 1975. Currently, she is is a chief of Agriculture Unit in Stoeng Thom.
3	Văn (វ៉ាន់)	Yuon's network. Currently, he is under arrest and put in a detention center.
4	Lam (ឡាំ)	Sim (ស៊ីម)'s network in 1975. Currently, he is in ... Unit.
5	Sim (ស៊ីម)	Vi's network in 1974. Currently, he is moved to wood sawing warehouse.
Office 72		
6	Nēng (ណេង)	Vân (Koh Kong)'s network in 1972. Currently, he is under arrest and put in an education center.
7	Youth Koem (ខ្មែរ)	Khăn's network in 1973. Currently, he is under arrest and put in an education center.
8	Nang (ណាង)	Khăn's network in 1973. Currently, he is under arrest and put in an education center.
9	Neary La (នារី ឡា)	Khăn's network in 1973. Currently, she is a tailor in Office 72, Agriculture Trapeaeng Nov (under arrest)

	ឡា)	
10	Kèt (ខែត្រ) alias Khăn (ខាន់)	<i>Yuon's</i> network. Chief of Office 72 Unit (under arrest)
11	Thēng (ថេង)	Khăn's network in 1975. Currently, he is a tailor in Office 72, Agriculture Trapeaeng Nov (under arrest).
12	Neary Răn (នារី រ៉ាន់)	Khăn's network in 1976. Currently, she is a tailor in Office 72, Agriculture Trapeaeng Nov (under arrest).
13	Neou (នេវ៉ា)	Khăn's network in 1972. Currently, he is farming at the working site.
14	Tēng (តេង)	Khăn's network in 1971. Currently, he is farming at the working site.
15	Kân (កិន)	Khēng (Hanoi)'s network. Currently, he is farming at the working site.
16	Sao (សៅ)	Khēng (Hanoi)'s network. Currently, he is farming at the working site.
17	Chorn (ជិន)	Sun (Hanoi)'s network. Currently, he is farming at the working site.
Office 73		
18	Touch (តូច) Disabled combatant	Vi's network in 1973. Currently, he is under arrest and education.

19	Chroeun (ច្រឿន)	Disabled combatant. Vi's network in 1974. Currently, he is under arrest and education.
20	Huot (ហ្វុត)	Disabled combatant. <i>Yuon</i> (Lam Seung (ឡាំស៊ីង))'s network. Currently, he is under arrest and education.
21	<i>Yeay</i> Rim (យាយ រីម)	<i>Yuon</i> 's network. Currently, she is under arrest and education.
22	Kèm (ខែម) Female	<i>Kaun Kinh</i> (កួន គីញ)'s network. Currently, she is at zonal cotton orchard.
23	Cheat (ជោតិ) Female	<i>Kaun Kinh</i> 's network. Currently, she is at zonal cotton orchard.
24	Sèm (សែម) Youth	Vi's network. Currently, he is at zonal cotton orchard.
25	Ri (រី) Vi's wife	Vi's network in 1973. Currently, she is in charge of general work in an orange orchard.
26	Vi (វី) Chief of Agriculture	Sy's network in 1972. Currently, he is a zonal chief of agriculture.
Office 75		
27	Chôt (ជោតិ)	Yim's network in 1971. Currently, he is under arrest and education.
28	Hēng (ហេង)	Chôt's network in 1975. Currently, he is under arrest and education. Mixed Chinese.

29	Huot (ហ្គុត)	Chôt's network in 1976. Currently, he is under arrest and education.Chinese.
30	Neou (នេវ៉ា)	Li's network in 1976. Currently, he is at Mechanics Hall of Office 75.
Office 76		
31	Cheoun (ចឿន)	His wife's name is NÂN Sari (ណាន សារី). Vi's network in 1975. Currently, he is in Economics section in Office 76.
32	NÂN Sari (ណាន សារី)	Bân's network in 1972. Currently, he is in Office 76, Kampong Luong agricultural site.
33	Thēng (ថេង)	Choeun's network in 1972. Currently, he is in Office 76, Kampong Luong agricultural site.
34	Meas (មាស)	Vi's network in 1972. Currently, he is in Office 76, Kampong Luong agricultural site.
35	Neary Sokh (នារី សុខ)	Sy's network in 1973. Currently, she is at Office 76, Agriculture.
36	Mr. Soth (ប្រស សុទ្ធ)	Sy's network in 1971. Currently, he is in charge of managing tractors in zonal agriculture.
37	Youth Chey (ជ័យ)	Sy's network in 1973. Currently, he is farming in a zonal office.
38	Youth Tong	Sy's network in 1974. Currently, he is farming in a zonal



	(តុង)	office.
39	Uy (អ៊ុយ) (Chinese)	Choeng's network in 1970. Currently, he is under arrest and put at education center (Sâ).
40	Choeng (ចឺង) (Chinese)	Hong (Chinese)'s network. Currently, he is under arrest and put at education center (Sâ).
41	Bun (ប៊ុន)	Choeng's network. Currently, he is under arrest and put at education center (Sâ).
42	Kong (កុង)	Kèv's network. Currently, he is being sent to S-21.
Commerce		
43	Suon (ស្នួន)	Chairman of Zone Commerce. Sy's network in 1970. Currently, he is being sent to S-21.
44	Im (អ៊ឹម)	Suon's network in 1973. Currently, he is Chairman of Commerce in the Northwest Zone.
45	Chhim (ឈឹម)	Suon's network in 1975. Currently, he is in charge of managing a zonal commerce warehouse.
46	Hao (ហៃ)	Suon's network in 1976. Currently, he is a carpenter in a garage.
47	Khăt (ខាត់) alias Khon (ខុន)	Nuon's network. Currently, he is a manager of an education center in a zonal office.
48	Neary Thēng	Khon's wife.

	(នារី ថេង) Khon's wife	
49	Yèm (យ៉ែម) alias Neang Lan (នាងឡាន)	Sây's network in 1970. Currently, he is at the education center.
Hospital		
50	Neary Pheap (នារី ភាព)	So (ស៊ី)'s network in 1977. Currently, she is the head of female group in a hospital.
51	Phan (ផាន)	Midwife. Neou's network in 1976. Currently, she is at a hospital.
52	Nao (នោ)	Neou's network in 1975. Currently, he is at a hospital.
53	Neou (នោ)	Hâm's network in 1970. Currently, he is under arrest – 1976.
54	Sie (សៀ)	Yvon's network in 1970. Currently, he is under arrest – 1976.
55	Ben (ប៊ិន)	Technical Medic of CIA. Currently, he is under arrest – 1976.
Mechanic Workshop		
56	Chèm (ចែម)	Chief of Mechanics in the hall. Sy's network. Currently, he is in the mechanic hall.
57	Neou (នោ)	Carpenter. Chèm's network. Currently, he is in the mechanic hall.

58	Tong (តុង)	Carpenter. Chèm's network. Currently, he is in the mechanic hall.
Office 401		
59	Neary You (យ៉ូ)	Personal Doctor. Ti (Battambang)'s network. Currently, she is at an Office.
60	Neary Khăn (ខាន់)	Personal Doctor. You's network. Currently, she is under arrest.
61	Neary Li (លី)	Personal Doctor. You's network. Currently, she is under arrest.
62	Neary Sēng (សេង)	Office 401. You's network. Currently, she is at the Office.
63	Nan (ណាន)	Sy's network in 1976. Currently, he is at home in Damnak Snuol Village, Srae Knong Commune, Chhouk District, Kampot Province.
64		
65	Oeun (អឿន)	Personal Doctor. Sy's network. Currently, he is at the Office.
66	Lam (ឡាំ)	Sokh (Kampong Som)'s network. Currently, he is a peasant.
67	HUN Cheu (ហុនជី)	Chinese noodle maker. Hong (Chinese)'s network. Currently, he is at Office 401.
68	Sokun (សុគុន)	KONG Cheu (កុង ជី)'s son. Hong (Chinese)'s network.

		Currently, he is at a zonal commerce Office
69	Hân (ហ៊ាន)	Direct Secretary of Office. Sy's network. Currently, he is at a zonal office.
70	Neary Noeun (នឿន)	Sy's network. Currently, she is in a Cooperative in Peam, District 12, Sector 31.
71	Youth Sie (ស៊ី)	Motorbike Mechanic. Sy's network. Currently, he is being sent to S-12
72	Neary Soeun (សឿន)	A rice cook. Mean's network. Currently, she is under arrest.
	Neary On (អុន)	Office medic. Yuon's network. Currently, she is under arrest.
<u>2. Brigade/Division 1</u>		
73	Voeun (វឿន)	Under-secretary of Brigade. Sy's network in 1968. Currently, he is in charge of Samun (សមុន្ន) troops.
74	Run (រុន)	Commissar of Regiment 116. Soeung's network. Currently, he is under arrest and education.
75	Sai (សៃ)	Commissar of Regiment 15. Soeung's network. Currently, he is under arrest and education.
76	Kân (កាន)	Commander of Battalion. Currently, he is working in the unit.
77	Reaksmei (រឿន)	Secretary of Regiment. Voeun's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
78	Neary Khon	Secretary of Battalion. Sokhân's network. Currently, she is

	(នារី ខុន)	under arrest.
79	Sokhân (សុខន)	Secretary of Battalion. Chong's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
80	Oeung (អឿង)	Military Logistics. <i>Hanoi</i> 's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
81	Vang (វ៉ាង)	Military Logistics. Oeung's network. Currently, he is not under arrest.
82	Noeun (នឿន)	Medic of Regiment 115. Run's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
83	Neou (នេវ)	Commissar of Battalion. Run's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
84	Sour (ស្វ័រ)	Commissar of Battalion. Voeun's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
85	Kèv (កែវ)	Commissar of Battalion. Voeun's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
86	Lam (ឡាំ)	Chief of Agriculture Unit. Voeun's network. Currently, he is put in an education center.
87	Khoeun (ខឿន)	Run's wife. Run's network. Currently, he is put in an education center.
3. Bases		
Sector 37		
88	Sat (សាត)	Member of Prey Nob District. Chhăn's network. Currently, he is put in an education center.
Prey Nob District		

89	Yim (យីម)	Sat's network. Currently, he is put in an education center.
90	Phluong (ភ្លួង)	District Secretary. Chhiv's network. Currently, he is sent to S-21.
91	Nat (ណាត) Female	District Doctor. Kâng's network. Currently, she is the district hospital.
92	Savân (សាវ៉ាន)	District Doctor. Nhoek (ញ៉ែក)'s network in 1969. Currently, he is in the district hospital.
93	Phân (ផាន)	District Doctor. Nhoek's network in 1973. Currently, he is put in an education center.
94	Nhoung (ញួង)	Secretary of Cooperative 10. Nhoek's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Cooperative.
95	Vung (វង់)	Secretary of Prey Nob Cooperative. Nhoek's network. Currently, he is dead.
96	Savat (សាវ៉ាត)	Member of Prey Nob. Nhoek's network. Currently, he is in the district.
97	Mão (ម៉ៅ)	Secretary of Cooperative 7. Nhoek's network. Currently, he is in a Cooperative.
98	Neary Mân (ម៉ែន)	Secretary of Cooperative 2. Chhăn's network. Currently, she is put in an education center.
99	Yon (យ៉ុន)	Secretary of Cooperative 4. Chhăn's network. Currently, he is in a Cooperative.
Srae Ambel District		

100	Tin (ទីន)	Member of Sector – District Secretary. Nheok’s network. Currently, he is being sent to S-21.
101	Neary Ma (នារី ម៉ា)	Secretary of Tra Peang’s Cooperative. Tin’s network. Currently, she is in a Cooperative.
102	Neary Kim (នារី គីម)	Cooperative member. Tin’s network. Currently, she is in a Cooperative.
103	Răn (រ៉ាន់)	Cooperative Guard. Tin’s network. Currently, he is in a Cooperative.
104	Saroeun (សារឿន)	Cooperative Guard. Tin’s network. Currently, he is in a Cooperative.
105	Chham (ឆាំ)	Srae Ambel Militiaman. Tin’s network. Currently, he is in a Cooperative.
106	Neou (នេវ៉ា)	District courier. Tin’s network in 1971. Currently, he is in the unit.
107	Ki (គី)	District courier. Tin’s network in 1970. Currently, he is in the unit.
108	Vun (វ៉ុន)	House Builder. Tin’s network in 1970. Currently, he is unknown.
109	Neary Tha (នារី ថា)	Tailor. Tin’s network in 1972. Currently, she is unknown.
110	Srun (ស្រុន)	Assistant in District Office. Tin’s network in 1972.

		Currently, he is put in an education center.
111	THAING Huot (ថាំង ហ្គុត)	District Handicraft. Tin's network in 1973. Currently, he is at a tile kiln.
112	Li (លី)	Chhai's wife. Chhai's network in 1974. Currently, he is at a tile kiln.
113	Pheap (ភាព)	Chăn's wife. Chăn's network in 1970. Currently, he is at a tile kiln.
114	Neary Kâng (នារី កង់)	Female cadre. Chhăn's network in 1970. Currently, she is under arrest and put in an education center.
115	Neary Moeung (នារី មឿង)	Female cadre. Chhăn's network in 1970. Currently, she is at a sectoral tile kiln.
116	Neary Sokh (នារី សុខ)	Female cadre. Chhăn's network in 1970. Currently, she is working in a district hospital.
117	VĂN Tha (វ៉ាន់ ថា)	Chăn's network. Currently, he is a cadre in commerce.
118	SAOM Chăn (សោម ចន្ទ)	Chief of Commerce. Sy's network in 1966. Currently, he is under arrest.
119	Thi (ធី)	District Secretary. Soeung's network. Currently, he is a Secretary of Srae Ambel District.
Thma Sar		



120	Sokh (សុខ)	District Under-secretary. Roeung's network in 1970. Currently, he is in the unit.
121	Neary Sou (នារី ស៊ូ)	Vorn's network in 1973. Currently, she is a member of Chiphat Cooperative.
122	Neary Sèm (នារី សែម)	Vorn's network in 1974. Currently, she is a Secretary of Doun Leav Cooperative.
123	Om Hoeung (អុំ ហឿង)	Siv's network in 1975. Currently, he is a Secretary of Thma Sar (ថ្មីស័រ) Cooperative.
124	Phân (ផាន)	Siv's network in 1974. Currently, he is a Secretary of Ta Ok (តា អុក) Cooperative.
Thma Bang (ថ្មីបាំង)		
125	Rin (រិន)	Secretary of Dâm Nab (ដំនាប់). Roeung's network in 1970. Currently, he is under arrest and put in a district education center.
126	Neary Nhánh (នារី ញ៉ាញ់)	Roeung's network in 1970. Currently, she is in Dâm Nab Cooperative.
127	Phom (ហុំ)	Reoung's network in 1971. Currently, he is in Dâm Nab Cooperative.

128	Soeun (សៀន)	Reoung's network in 1970. Currently, he is a district commander.
129	Văn (វ៉ាន់)	Reoung's network in 1970. Currently, he is in district office.
130	Khom (ខ្ញុំ)	Reoung's network in 1972. Currently, he is in Pra Lay (ប្រឡាយ) Cooperative.
131	Sai (សៃ)	Reoung's network in 1974. Currently, he is a cadre in Dâm Nab Cooperative.
132	Neary Mom (នារី ម៉ុ)	Reoung's network in 1975. Currently, she is a cadre in Dâm Nab Cooperative.
133	Văn (វ៉ាន់) Female	Reoung's network in 1975. Currently, she is a cadre in Ta Tei Leu (តាតឺ លើ) Cooperative.
Sector Offices		
134	Neary Lân (នារី ឡាន)	Neou's network in 1974. Currently, she is in sectoral mobile unit.
135	Pheap (ភាព)	Nhoek's network in 1970. He was a battalion commissar. Currently, he is under arrest.
136	Torng (ទង់)	Nhoek's network in 1971. He was a battalion commissar. Currently, he is under arrest.
137	Soeun (សៀន)	Nhoek's network in 1972. Currently, he is in an education center.

138	Chhom (ឡុំ)	Lân's husband. Kaet's network in 1973. Currently, he is in an education center.
139	Soeung (សៀង)	Sy's network in 1958. He was a Sectoral Secretary, Brigade Secretary and Member of Zonal Assignment Unit.
140	Rân (រ៉ន)	Soeung's network. Currently, he is a member of Prey Nob.
141	Chhai (ឆៃ)	Soeung's network. Currently, he is a member of Prey Nob.
142	Soeng (សឹង)	Neou's network. He was a sectoral Chief of medical staff. Currently, he is under arrest.
143	Siv (ស៊ីវ)	Prachea (ប្រាជ្ញា)'s network in 1973. Currently, he is under arrest and sent to S-12.
144	Vorn (វ៉ន)	Prachea's network in 1973. Currently, he is under arrest and sent to a Sector.
145	Ki (គី)	Sràs (ស្រស់)'s network in 1972. Currently, he is under arrest and sent to S-21.
3. North Kampong Speu (32)  District 28		
146	Rân (រ៉ន)	Sy's network in 1958. Currently, he is a Sectoral Secretary and a Zonal Member.
147	Neary Han (នារី ហាន)	Sy's network in 1975. Currently, she is a Member of Thporng (ថ្កង) District.

148	Săk (សាក់)	Sy's network in 1972. Currently, he is under arrest and educated in Cheung Roas (ជើងរាស់) Commune.
149	Chieb (ជៀប)	Rân's network in 1976. Currently, he is in Au Tra Tum Ambel (អូត្រាទំ អំបិល) Unit.
150	Peou (ពៅ)	Pros's network in 1970. Currently, he is under education.
151	Chhorn (ឈ័ន)	Peou's network in 1973. Currently, he is at a working site in Sector 32 (Baset (បាសិត))
152	On (អុន) Female	Oeung's network in 1973. Currently, she is resting in Tram Ka Chek (ត្រាំកកចេក) Cooperative.
153	Oeung (អឿង)	Run's network in 1970. Currently, he is in Tram Ka Chek Cooperative.
154	Sang (សាង)	Peou's network in 1971. Currently, he is in Say Angk (សាយអង្គ) Cooperative.
155	Hên (ហែន)	Peou's network in 1972. Currently, he is a district member.
Prey Brayuth (ប្រៃយុទ្ធ) (27)		
156	Moeun (មឿន)	Chong's network in 1964. Currently, he is a District Secretary and Sectoral Member.
157	Chheang (ឈាង)	Nâm's network in 1970. He was a Secretary in Cham Bak (ចំបក់). Currently, he is under arrest.

158	Sokh (សុខ)	Moeun's network in 1972. Currently, he is in <i>Ta Sal</i> (តាសាល) Cooperative.
159	Neou (នេវ៉ា)	Moeun's network in 1973. Currently, he is Moha [illegible] Cooperative.
160	Khēm (ខេម)	Moeun's network in 1973. Currently, he is Moha [illegible] Cooperative.
161	Thong (ថុង)	Moeun's network in 1973. Currently, he is in a Production Unit in Stueng Khleach (ស្ទឹងឃ្លាច).
162	Sin (ស៊ីន)	Moeun's network in 1974. Currently, he is in Taing Kroch (តាំងក្រូច) Cooperative.
163	Vèn (វ៉ែន)	Moeun's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Secretary of <i>Ta Sal</i> Commune.
29 (Ao Ral (ខ្ចីរ៉ាល់))		
164	<i>Ta Chay</i> (តាចាយ)	Kèv's network in 1975. Currently, he is in a Sector work site.
165	<i>Neary Khăn</i> (នារី ខាន់)	Chay's network in 1975. Currently, she is in a Sectoral working site.
166	<i>Neary Thai</i> (នារី ថៃ)	Chay's network in 1975. Currently, she is in a Sectoral working site.
167	Sat (សាត)	Sun's network in 1970. Currently, he is under education.

		(Secretary of Sangkae Sa Tor (សង្កែសាទ)).
168	Neary Văn (នារី វ៉ាន)	Sun's network in 1970. Currently, she is under education due to her immoral act.
169	Phoeun (ហ្វឺន)	Nâm's network in 1971. Currently, he is a soldier in Po Boeng (ពោធិ៍បឹង)(under education).
170	Chun (ជុន)	Nâm's network in 1972. Currently, he is in Trapeaeng Nov (ត្រពាំងនូវ) (under education).
171	Măt (ម៉ាត់)	Nâm's network in 1973. Currently, he is in an education center of the sectoral working site.
172	Săn (សាន់)	Nâm's network in 1974. Currently, he is in an education center of the sectoral working site.
173	YI Phôk (យី ហ៊ុក)	Khăn's network. Currently, he is in a Zonal education center.
174	Va (វ៉ា)	Khăn's network. Currently, he is in a Zonal education center.
Udongk (26)		
175	Prach (ប្រាជ្ញ)	Kèv's network in 1970. Currently, he is in an education center.
176	Set (សិត)	District Under-secretary. Krong (ក្រុង)'s network. Currently, he is under arrest.

177	Neary Li (នារី លី)	District Secretary. Sy's network in 1963. Currently, she is in the district.
178	Teab (ទាប)	Member. Kèv's network in 1972. Currently, he is in the district.
179	Neary Hun (នារី ហ៊ុន)	Hâm's network in 1972. Currently, she is in an education center.
180	Sāk (សាក់)	Secretary of Rumleak Ampil (រំពាក់អំពិល) Cooperative. Kèv's network. Currently, he is in an education center.
181	Duk (ឌុក)	Kèv's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Secretary of Preah Srae (ព្រះស្រី) Cooperative.
182	Ma (ម៉ា)	Hâm's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Secretary of Chan Saen (ចាន់សែន) Cooperative.
183	Sokh (សុខ)	Hâ's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Secretary of Samraong Leu (សំរោងលើ) Cooperative.
184	Nô (នោ)	Sek's network. Currently, he is at Handicraft section in Udongk.
185	Neary Khom (នារី ខុម)	[illegible]'s network in 1970. Currently, she is in a Zonal education center.
186	Neary Sim (នារី ស៊ីម)	Kèv's network in 1970. Currently, she is in Veal Pong

	ស៊ីម)	(វាលពង័) Cooperative.
Ponhea Leu District (25)		
187	Lâng (ឡង)	Kèv's network in 1971. Currently, he is a District Member.
188	Put (ពុត)	Kèv's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Member of Tum Nub Thom (ទំនប់ធំ) Cooperative.
189	Neary Sokhom (នារី សុខុំ)	Sy's network in 1970. Currently, she is a Member of Chrey Loas (ជ្រៃលាស់) Cooperative.
190	Hēng (ហេង)	Sy's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Member of Chrey Loas (ជ្រៃលាស់) Cooperative.
191	Khoeun (ខឿន)	Kèv's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Member of Chrey Loas Cooperative.
192	Leav (លាវ)	Kèv's network in 1971. Currently, he is Kaoh Chen (កោះចិន) Cooperative.
193	Heang (ហ៊ាង) Female	Sy's network in 1976. Currently, she is a District Member.
Sector Office		
194	Nor (នរ)	Kâng's network in 1973. Currently, he is in a work site in Sector 32.
195	Mon (ម៉ុន)	Hâm's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Chief of Fishery and is arrested to be educated.



196	Kung (គង់)	KHĀT Pèn (ខាត់ ប៉ែន)'s network. Currently, he is under arrest and put in an education center.
197	Sāk (សាក់)	Hâ's network in 1973. Currently, he is in the unit.
198	Phâl (ផល់)	Hâ's network in 1972. Currently, he is in a lathing factory.
199	Neary La (នារី ឡា)	On (33)'s network in 1973. Currently, she is at a working site in Sector 32.
200	Moeun (ម៉ឺន)	Hâ's network in 1970. Currently, he is in the sectoral fishery section.
201	Suos (ស្លូស)	Hâ's network in 1970. Currently, he is in the sectoral fishery section.
202	Van (វ៉ាន)	Hâ's network in 1972. Currently, he is a medic in Sector 32.
203	Mēt (ម៉ែត)	Hâ's network in 1971. Currently, he is a medic in Sector 32.
204	Neary Răt (នារី រ៉ាត់)	Hâ's network in 1970. Currently, she is at a sectoral working site.
205	Lēng (ឡេង) Female	Hâ's network in 1974. Currently, she is in a zonal education center.

206	Khoem (ខឹម) <sup>1</sup>	Former Secretary of Regiment, Sector 32. Old network. Currently, he is under arrest and put in an education center.
207	Hâm (ហាំ)	Krong's network. Currently, he is sent to Unit 870.
208	Kèv (កែវ)	Krong's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
4. <u>Kampong Chhnang</u> Kampong Tralach Leu District (12)		
209	Teacher Neou (គ្រូ នៅ)	Tēng's network in 1975. Currently, he is a medical staff in Traing Sra Mar (ត្រាំងស្រមរ) Cooperative.
210	Hoeung (ហឿង)	Tēng's network in 1976. Currently, he is a medical staff in Thlork Vien (ធ្លកវៀន) Cooperative.
211	Văn (វ៉ាន់)	Tēng's network in 1977. Currently, he is a medical staff in Tbaeng Khpuos (ត្បែងខ្ពស់) Cooperative.
212	Sokh (សុខ)	Tēng's network in 1976. Currently, he is a medical staff in Kraing Lvea (ក្រាំងល្វា) Cooperative.
213	Thau (ថ្លៃ)	Tēng's network in 1976. Currently, he is a medical staff in Svay (ស្វាយ) Cooperative.
Toek Pos District		
214	Kèm (កែម)	Sy's network in 1975. Currently, he is a Secretary in Tuek

<sup>1</sup> I contacted and used him from 1970 after the coup. I accepted him as force in this Kampong Speu Province.

		Pos (ទឹកផ្អែម) District and member of reserved Sector in Kampong Chhnang.
215	Neary Phea (នារី ភា)	Vēng's network in 1974. Currently, she is an Under-Secretary of Tuek Pos District.
216	Soeung (សៀង)	Vēng's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Secretary of Kbal Tuek (ក្បាលទឹក) Cooperative.
217	Vēng (វ៉េង)	Kâb's network in 1970. Currently, he is under arrest and put in an education center.
218	Sân (សាន់)	Kâb's network in 1970. Currently, he is under arrest and put in an education center.
Kampong Leaeng District (16)		
219	Yim (យីម)	Vèn's network. Currently, he is a Secretary of Kampong Leaeng (កំពង់លេង) District (under arrest).
220	Tēng (តេង)	Sy's network in 1974. Currently, he is a Secretary of Kampong Leaeng District.
221	Dĩn (ឌិន)	Yim's network in 1975. Currently, he is an Under-secretary of Kampong Leng District.
Kampong Tra Lach Kraom (18)		
222	Ut (អ៊ុត)	Kâb's network in 1970. Currently, he is an Under-secretary of District 18 (under arrest).
223	Kauy (ក្បាយ)	Achar Kâb's network in 1973. Currently, he is the Secretary of Kampong Tralach Kraom District.

224	Pa (ប៉ា)	Sy's network in 1975. Currently, he is an Under-secretary of Kampong Tralach Kraom District.
225	Soeun (សៀន) Female	Soeung (Brigade)'s network. Currently, she is a Member of Kampong Tralach Kraom District.
226	Mèn (ម៉ែន)	Yim's network.
Baribour District (10)		
227	Snguon (ស្នួន)	Sy's network. Currently, he is a member of Kampong Tralach Kraom District.
Rolea B'ier District (20)		
228	SAING Thuon (សាំង ធ្នួន)	Kâb's network in 1973. Currently, he is in Kraing Leav (ក្រាំងលាវ) Commune (Under arrest and education).
229	Neou (នេវ៉ា)	Kâb's network in 1973. Currently, he is in Kraing Sdar (ក្រាំងស្កាវ) Cooperative.
230	Tum (ទុំ)	Personal secretary (of Kâb). Kâb's network in 1973. Currently, he is a soldier but his squad is unknown.
231	Heu (ហ្គើ)	Kâb's network in 1970. Currently, he is an Under-secretary of District 10 - Baribour.
Sectoral Offices		
232	Ta Kândol (តាកណ្តុល)	Kâb's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Chief of Sectoral Commerce (Under arrest).

233	Mei (មី)	Kâb's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Commissar of Sectoral Regiment (Under arrest).
234	Sây (សាយ)	Kâb's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Commander of Sectoral Regiment (Under arrest).
235	Phân (ផាន)	Mei's network. Currently, he is a Commissar of Sectoral Regiment (Under arrest).
236	Thau (ថ្ងៃ) Female	Kâb's network. Currently, he is a Medical Staff in Sector 31 (Under arrest).
237	Heang (ហ៊ែង)	Kâb's network. Currently, he is a Medical Staff in a Zonal Hospital, Sector 31 (Under arrest).
5. Zone and other Sectors		
A. Southwest (Sector 35)		
238	SAOM Chorn (សោម ជន)	Secretary of Touk Meas District. Sy's network in 1964. Currently, he is a Secretary of Chhouk District.
239	Yoeung (យ៉ឿង)	Sy's network in 1964. Currently, he is at a working site in Sector 35.
240	Trâk (ត្រាក់) alias Roeun (រឿន)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is unknown. He was a former Commissar of Regiment in Kampot Sector from 1973 to 1975.
241	Neary Yut (នារី)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, she is moved to the Central Zone, Sector 41.

	យុត្តិ)	
242	<i>Youth Văn</i> (វ៉ាន់)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is moved to the Central Zone, Sector 41.
243	<i>Neary Mēng</i> (នារី ម៉េង)	Sy's network in 1966. Currently, it is said that she is a Member of Trapeang Mnoas (ត្រពាំងម្លាស់) Cooperative.
244	Rin (រិន)	Sy's network in 1958. Currently, he is moved to the Northwest Zone and is a Secretary of Sector 5.
245	Kok (កុក)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Member of North Chhouk District.
246	Chēm (ចែម)	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Secretary of Kampong Trach District.
247	Nut (នុត)	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Member of North Chhouk District.
248	Hoeun (ហៀន)	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Secretary of Kaoh Sda (កោះស្ដា) District.
249	<i>Ta Nēm</i> (តា ណែម)	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Mechanic in Phnom L'ang (ភ្នំល្បាង) Unit.
250	<i>Yeay Nây</i> (យាយ ណយ)	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, she is a Cadre in a cooperative in Chhouk District.
251	<i>Yeay Mom</i>	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, she is a Chief of Handcraft in Kampot Market.

	(ហាយ ម៉ុ)	
252	Ti (ទី)	Sè's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Secretary of South Chhouk District.
253	Vuy (វ៉ុយ)	Sè's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Cadre in South Chhouk District.
254	Neary Sokh (នារី សុខ)	Sè's network in 1973. Currently, she is a Cadre in Touk Meas (ទ្វីបាស) District.
255	Neary Phân (នារី ផន)	Sè's network in 1972. Currently, she is a Cadre in Touk Meas District.
256	Sien (សៀន)	Yoeung's network in 1968. Currently, he is moved to Sector 25. His duty is unknown.
257	Sēn (សែន)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, his duty is unknown.
258	SAOM Văn (សោម វ៉ាន់)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Commerce Cadre in Sector 35.
259	Kung (កង់)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Commissar of Sectoral Battalion.
260	Vèn (វ៉ែន)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Commissar of Sectoral Battalion.
261	Sēng (សេង)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Commander of Sectoral Battalion.
262	Chrun (ជ្រុន)	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Commander of Sectoral Battalion.

263	Saom (សោម)	Sè's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Soldier.
264	Tep (តេប)	Sè's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Soldier.
265	Nun (នុន)	Sè's network in 1978. Currently, he is a Sectoral Carpenter.
266	Neang (នាង)	Sè's network. Currently, he is a Sectoral Carpenter.
267	Neary Lân (នារី ឡាន)	Sè's network in 1975. Currently, she is a Cadre in the Sectoral Production Unit.
268	CHEA Chim (ជា ជឹម)	Sè's network in 1956. Currently, he is a Mobile Cadre searching for this and that.
269	You (យូ)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Sectoral Courier.
270	Văn (វ៉ាន់)	Sè's network in 1971. Currently, he is a Sectoral Courier.
Sector 33		
271	Ta Săk (តា សាក់)	Sokh's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Secretary of Samraong Torng (សំរោងទង) District.
272	Ta Sokh (តា សុខ) Blind	Sokh's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Secretary of Choam Sangkae (ជាំសង្កែ) District.



273	Lēng (ឡេង)	Suon's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Cadre in Choam Sangkae District.
274	Khim (ឃឹម)	On's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Secretary of Korng Pisey (គងពិសី) District.
275	Sokh (សុខ)	Sy's network in 1968. Currently, he is moved to the North Zone. He was a former Secretary of Sector 33, South Kampong Speu)
276	Neary Sây (នារី សាយ)	Krong's network in 1970. Currently, she is unknown.
277	Mr. Nuon (បុរស នួន)	Krong's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Medical Staff in Sector 33.
278	Neary Chim (នារី ជឹម)	Krong's network. Currently, she is a Chief of Female Group in Bati District Sector.
279	Mon (ម៉ុន) Chim's husband	Krong's network. Currently, he is a Sectoral Commerce Chief.
280	Nim (នឹម)	On's network. Currently, he is a Commissar of Battalion, 1972.
281	Khuon (ហ្នៀន)	On's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Commissar of Company 110.
282	Khum (ហ្នំ)	On's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Commander of Battalion 210.

283	Yin (យ៉ិន)	On's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Commander of Battalion 320.
284	Nēn (ណេន)	On's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Cadre in Choam Sangkae Cooperative.
285	Neary Sau (នារីស្នំ) Widow	Duch's network. Currently, she is a Cadre in Choam Sangkae Cooperative.
286	Sēm (សេម)	Sokh's network. Currently, he is a Cadre in Chaom Sangkae Cooperative.
287	Soeung (សៀង)	Sokh's network. Currently, he is a District Solider (where he is moved to is unknown).
288	Kâng (កង)	Suon's network. Currently, he is a Cadre in Prey Kmeng (ព្រៃក្នុង) Cooperative.
289	NEOU Chea (នេវ៉ា ជា)	Duch's network. Currently, he is a Cadre in Chek Char (ចេកចារ) Cooperative.
290	Thân (ថន)	On's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Militiaman in Korng Pisey District.
291	Vung (វង់)	On's network. Currently, he is a Militiaman in Korng Pisey District.
292	Sèt (សេត)	On's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Secretary of Moha Ruessei (មហាប្រសើរ) Commune.
293	Mão (ម៉ៅ)	Pheap's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Cadre in Po

		Angkrang (ពោធិ៍សាត់) Cooperative.
294	San (សាន)	Cham's network in 1974. Currently, he is a Cadre in Phong (ផ្អែង) Commune Cooperative.
295	Rat (រ៉ាត)	Cham's network in 1974. Currently, he is a Cadre in Phong Commune Cooperative.
296	Răt (រ៉ាត់)	Cham's network in 1973. Currently, he is a Cadre in Phong Commune Cooperative.
297	Tít (ទិត)	Pheap's network in 1974. Currently, he is a Cadre in Nitean (នីតាន) Cooperative.
298	Neary Han (នារី ហាន)	Khim's network in 1970. Currently, she is a Cadre in Nitean Cooperative.
299	Prăk (ប្រាក់)	On's network in 1972. Currently, he is a Cadre in Sector 33 (Secretary of Sector 33).
<p>Please note that: Prăk contacted me (Sy) to be his network. But at that time, we did not declare it officially. We only talked unofficially. When On was killed, Duch was moved to Preah Vihear and Sokh became a Secretary and Prăk became a cadre in the Sector. Prăk said that he was one of On's networks for a while, so I accepted him since then. But that story was known by only three people. It was later that I told SOKH Noeung about that. Please be reminded that:</p> <p>When Prăk left the City, there was another person with him. That person was Mēng (ម៉េង). Mēng, who was responsible for managing soldiers in one battalion, also betrayed him (Prăk) to become On's network.</p> <p>[Illegible sentence]</p>		

Takeo Sector (13)		
300	<i>Ta Kiev</i> (តា កៀវ)	Member of Tram Kak (ត្រាំកក់) District. San's network in 1969. His current duty is unknown.
301	Chen (ចិន)	Secretary of Trapeaeng Thom (ត្រពាំងធំ). Kiev's network in 1970. His current duty is unknown.
302	<i>Neary Kea</i> (នារី គា)	<i>Ta Kiev's</i> daughter. <i>Ta Kiev's</i> network. Her current whereabouts is unknown.
303	Moeun (ម៉ឺន)	<i>Neary Bau's</i> younger brother. Bau's network. Currently, he is working in Cheang Torng (ជាងទង) Commune Office.
304	Phân (ផែន)	Moeun's husband. Bau's network. His current duty is unknown. Currently, he is in Kbal Au (ក្បាលអូ) Village, Cheang Torng Commune, Tram Kak District, Takeo.
305	Sari (សារី)	Sarăn's husband. BUN Chăn's network. Currently, he is in Kbal Au (ក្បាលអូ) Village, Cheang Torng Commune, Tram Kak District, Takeo.
306	Phèn (ផែន)	Under-secretary of Sector 13. Sy's network in 1970. Currently, he is moved to Kampot and his duty is unknown.
307	Saom (សោម)	Secretary of Sector 13. Siv's network. Currently, he is still a Secretary of Sector 13 (on leave).
Remark: Saom contacted me in 1973 while the situation was difficult due to the bombing [by the USA], and, especially, as the Cooperatives were being		

established. He put in place tough policies towards the Revolution. I got to know him when we were carrying out the Cooperative Allocation Plan. Seeing that, I asked for [the assistance of] a network operative. He said he had two brothers-in-law in the North (Koh Kong) Zone, [Illegible] Khoem (ខ្មែរ), with whom he had been in contact since in 1966. He and I have cooperated with one another since then. I would like to provide a further account that [I thought] the Cooperative Allocation, at that time, in 13, entailed the utmost suppression. It led to the seizure of all properties and collective dining. Everyone was surprised with the Revolution. When I saw that situation, I told him it seemed to be too oppressive. He said it would cause the people to join the Revolution's enemies and hate the Cooperatives.

All kinds of information were secretly sent to Koh Kong (Chong). Chong often talked about this in Takeo. I was also concerned, but I could not find any leaks (in the network) at the time.

In short, it was [not entirely] the theories and visions of the Left which were implemented to destroy [the Revolution], but, actually, the real situation was the ideas of the Right trying to select the highest level (most honest) people.

308	Neary Khoeun (នារី ខ្មែរ)	Ta Sat's network. Currently, she is in an Office in Takeo Sector.
309	Nam (ណាំ)	Khoeun's husband. Khoeun's network. Currently, he is in an Office in Takeo Sector.
Sector 25		
310	Chea (ផា)	Phim's network. Currently, he a Secretary of Sector 25. (Under arrest)
311	Neary Bau	Chong (Koh Kong)'s network. Currently, she is a Secretary

	(នារី បូ)	of Kien Svay District.
B. The Northwest		
312	Bang RUOS Nhim (បង រស់ ញឹម)	KÈV Meas (កែវ មាស)'s network in 1956. Currently, he is a Secretary in the Northwest Zone.
313	Kae (កែ)	ÎN Tam's network in 1967. Currently, he is an Under-secretary of the Northwest Zone.
314	Kandol (កន្ទល់)	ÎN Tam's network in 1967. Currently, he is a Member of the Northwest Zone.
315	Hoeng (ហ៊ឹង)	Nhim's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
316	Vanh (វ៉ាញ)	Nhim's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
317	Dâl (ដល)	Sy's network in 1968. Currently, he is a Chief of a new Brigade in the Northwest zone.
318	Neou (នេវ)	Sy's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Commissar of Battalion.
319	Sokh (សុខ)	Phâl's network in 1974. Currently, he is a Commander of Battalion.
320	Noeun (នឿន)	Run's network in 1975. Currently, he is a Chief of Special Squad.
321	Sè (សែ)	Phâl's network in 1975. Currently, he is a Commissar of Battalion.

322	Săn (សាន់)	Soeung's network in 1974. Currently, he is a Commander of Battalion.
C. The North Zone		
323	Sè (សែ)	THÁCH Thuon's network in 1957. Currently, he is a Secretary of the North Zone.
324	Sokh (សុខ)	Sy's network in 1968. Currently, he is in the North Zone.
325	Leang (លោង)	Sè's network in 1970. Currently, he is a Chief of Office in the North Zone.
326	Hàng (ហង់)	Sy's network in 1958. Currently, he is under arrest.
327	Soth (សុទ្ធ)	Former Secretary of Siem Reap Sector. Thuch's network. Currently, he is under arrest.
328	Sean (ស៊ាន)	Sectoral Under-secretary. Châmraen [illegible]'s network. Currently, he is under arrest.
The Northeast and Kratie		
329	Vi (វី)	KÈV Meas's network. Currently, he is a Secretary of the Northeast Zone.
330	Lăo (ឡៅ)	Ya's network. Currently, he is a Sectoral Under-secretary (Deceased).
331	Chăn	Sy's network. Currently, he is a Sectoral Member.
332	Soeun (ស៊ឺន)	Chăn's network. Currently, he is a Chief of Sectoral Economics.
333	Yi (យី)	Thuch's network. Currently, he is a Secretary of Kratie Sector.

E. The Central Zone		
334	<i>Ta Vèn</i> (តា វ៉ែន)	Thuch's network. Currently, he is a Chief of Protocol Office. (Under arrest)
335	<i>Chân</i> (ចាន់)	Thuch's network. Currently, he is Secretary of Sector 43. (Under arrest)
	<i>Neary Yut</i> (នារី យុត្តិ)	Sè's network. Currently, she is an Under-secretary of Sector 41.
	<i>Youth Vãn</i> (យុវជន វ៉ាន់)	Sè's network. Currently, he is a Chief of Office in Sector 41.
F. The East Zone		
336	<i>Bang Phim</i> (បង ភឹម)	Sè's network. Currently, he is a Secretary of the East Zone.
337	<i>Phuong</i> (ផ្លុង)	Sè's network. Currently, he is a Chief of State Rubber Plantation Committee.
338	<i>Lin</i> (លីន)	Phim's network. Currently, he is a Chief of Zonal Office.
339	<i>Khoem</i> (ខឹម)	Phim's network. Currently, he is a Secretary of Sector 21.
340	<i>Chhouk</i> (ឈ្មួក)	KÈV Meas's network. Currently, he is under arrest.



341	Sat (សាត់)	Phim's network. Currently, he is a Commissar of Regiment in the East Zone.
G. Phnom Penh City		
342	Nat (ណាត់)	NEOU Phân's network. Currently, he is in the Zonal Military Staff Section.
342	Hou (ហ៊ូ)	Hok's network. Currently, he is in the Zonal Military Staff Section.
343	CHEN Hong (ចិន ហុង)	KOK Minh (កុកមីញ៉ូ)'s network. Currently, he is in the Ministry of Commerce (Under arrest).
344	Say (សាយ)	THÁCH Thuon's network. Currently, he is in the Ministry of Industry (Under arrest).
345	SĒK Khum (សេក ហ្គុំ)	Sy 's network. Currently, he is in the Ministry of Industry (Under arrest).
346	Hok (ហុក)	NEOU Chorn (នេវ៉ា ជិន)'s network. Currently, he is in the Engery Section.
347	Huor (ហ្គួរ)	CHEN Hong's network. Currently, he is in Military Logistics Section.
348	Mēng (ម៉េង)	CHEN Hong's network. Currently, he is in overland transportation section.
349	Seila (សីលា)	CHEN Hong's network. Currently, he is in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
350	HAI San (ហៃ សាន់)	CHEN Hong's network. Currently, he is a Translator in the Military Staff Section.

	សាន)	
351	Lai (ឡៃ)	CHEN Hong's network. Currently, he is unknown.
352	Soeung (ស៊ីង) alias Pàng (ប៉ង)	KÈV Meas's network. Currently, he is in Office 870.
Kampong Som Port		
353	Comrade Krin (មិត្ត គ្រិន)	LONG Bok <i>Ta</i> (ឡុង បុក <i>តា</i> )'s network. Currently, he is a Chief of the Port.
354	Hân (ហាន)	Kren's network. Currently, he is a Cadre in the Port.
355	Sautr (ស្ទូត្រ)	Kren's network. Currently, he is a Cadre in the Port.
356	Bân (ប៉ាន)	Sean's network. Currently, he is a Cadre in the Port.
357	Pon (ប៉ុន)	Sy's network in 1968. Currently, he is a Chief of Salt Farm (Under arrest).
358	Neary Mean (នារី ម៉ាន)	LONG Bok <i>ta</i> 's network. Currently, she is a Cadre in the Salt Farm (Under arrest).
359	Chun (ជុន)	Mean's husband. Yen's network. His current duty is unknown.

Please note that the forces on this list are only the superiors. I do not know those in the other Zones and Sectors because nobody had reported to me. Also, I am not well aware of even the other forces [on the list] such as Pàng, who was Soeung's agent.

2. This report is only the additional understandings added to the first report, which was signed on 9 May 1978. The first report was regarded as the basic one because its contents were described chronologically and systematically.

This report addresses:

- The plan to seize authority in the Zone and the North Kampong Speu Sector.
- My wrong-doings concerning the Party's policies, especially my behavior towards the Brothers *Bang*, the leaders of the Party.
- My special reflections after I had seen my mistakes towards the Party.

To my respectful and beloved Revolutionary Party:

Today, after having finished writing my report, I have clearly understood my serious mistakes and wrong-doings towards the People's Party. After re-examining my understanding under the guidance of the Party, I have realized that:

- My existence, from the time I was born until I turned 52 years old, has been of no use to the Party, the People or the Nation.
- The time I spent at the pagoda as a monk, some 20 years, was useless because I had only considered religious ideas.
- I was supposed to serve the Revolution from 1950 to this year (1978), but, in reality, I served only foreign imperialists (as a CIA agent and a Yuon slave) in undermining our own sovereignty and serving the capitalists and etc.
- Therefore, for about 50 years of the 52 years, my life has been of no use for the Nation, the People or the Country. On the contrary, I have made a multitude of mistakes with respect to the Nation, the People and the Country.

\* \* \*

The reason I have committed such wrong-doings derives from elements of my class origin, vagrancy, ruthlessness, drunkenness, sexual harassment and etc.

In the meantime, radical ideas such as those of Buddhism, Imperialism and Colonialism, (the Yuon) had enticed me to commit those wrong-doings.

My respectful and beloved Communist Party of Kampuchea!

Today, I see the mistakes I have committed in my life. As a Cambodian Citizen, I desperately regret what I have done. Taking the severity of the mistakes into consideration, I should be seriously punished in front of the Party and the People.

However, at this time, I would like to deeply beg for my life from the Communist Party of Kampuchea, so that I will be able to see the bright and prosperous future of the Nation under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. I would like to beg [the Communist Party] to give me any duty, even a small duty, so that I can loyally serve the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

My special requests are: After having seen my mistakes, I really want to rehabilitate myself to become a good person for the rest of my life and to serve the Party and the Nation, so that I am worthy of being a Cambodian.

From now, I would like to make some commitments towards the Communist Party of Kampuchea:

- I am committed to abandoning and betraying the Workers' Party of Kampuchea, led by Brother Phim. I will no longer recognize and accept his leadership.
- I am committed to betraying the CIA groups that have continuously recruited new operatives.
- I am committed to separate from all those subversive forces with whom I worked to oppose to the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
- I am committed to be loyal to the Communist Party of Kampuchea by reporting all these subversive forces. I will search for more subversive forces [to report to the Party] in case I have forgotten some names.

This is my confession to the Communist Party of Kampuchea. I would like to beg the Communist Party of Kampuchea to forgive me and give me a chance as per my requests.

From now, I would like to share my impressions regarding the pure politics of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in the present and for the future.

After identifying my subversive activities towards the Nation, I clearly see the good deeds of the Communist Party of Kampuchea inside the territory of Democratic Kampuchea under the leadership of Brother POL Pot.

This Party is robust. Even though the forces of the intruding *Yuon* and the internal subversive forces such as mine within the party have wanted to destroy the Party, they will never succeed. I notice that, under brilliant leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, led by Brother POL Pot, our country has been well protected within its own territory by its self-sufficiency and independence stance.

Under the brilliant leadership of the Party, the present [situation] in Kampuchea is forming a strong foundation for the people, both male and female, and the Army with its stance of independence and self-sufficiency. In particular, by adopting these stances, after the 3 years of independence, Kampuchea has improved in all sectors.

I clearly see that the Revolution, our female and male combatants, the Units and Offices in the rural areas are [constantly] re-establishing and reforming these independent and self-sufficient policies under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and its leaders, with Brother POL Pot as its Head, to maintain Kampuchea to stand for tens of thousands of centuries on the world map. This has excited me, and I [now], obviously, see that the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea has been absolutely correct.

For the above mentioned reasons, for me, from now on, I would like to join with the millions of our People and our male and female combatants in all the Units and Offices to follow the Communist Party of Kampuchea's policies to reform the country to become independent and self-sufficient.

- Bravo! The Prosperous Communist Party of Kampuchea!
- Bravo! The Rightful and Brilliant Communist Party of Kampuchea!
- Bravo! The Powerful and Wonderful Cambodian People!
- Bravo! The Brave and Robust Revolutionary Forces!

- Reject the Labor Party of Kampuchea and the *Yuon* slaves [trying] to invade Cambodia!
- Reject the CIA, the slaves of Imperial America!
- Be committed to learning and rehabilitating ourselves following only the one line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea!

If there have been any inconveniences caused [by me], please, the  
Party, forgive me.

Done on 20 May 1978

Signature

CHOU Chet, alias Sy

*[Signature]*

[ERN: 00013966]

The despicable CHOU Chet, alias Sy

The Secretary of the West