

Minutes of Meeting of Secretaries and
Deputy Secretaries of Divisions and Regiments

18 October 1976, 1415 hours



Agenda:

- I. The National Defense Plan, especially the defense of Phnom Penh
- II. State of food supplies and rice rations
- III. Time for convening session and the organization of the School Committee
- IV. The issue of farming high water rice and other crops
- V. Various issues

Brother 89's Presentation:

- I. On the general situation and national defense measures
 1. After the treasonous events in the Army and in the base areas, we have had discussions. I wish to present the principles for attachment to measures.
 1. The plan of the CIA is to attack the Kampuchean Revolution with the French and American imperialists, the Japanese, and traitor groups, by attacking and taking our islands along the coast. Our Party has examined this and sees that the embedded traitor networks have fundamentally been smashed by us, including the internal embedded groups and the groups from Thailand as well as those coming from outside the country in legal forms. This issue of attacking us along the coast is an old plan and has fundamentally been smashed and scattered by us. This plan is only a move to raise the morale of traitors inside the country so they will dare to carry out activities. However, we must concentrate on internal purging/screening those among us to be clean and not allow the enemy to bore any holes from within to attack our revolution at all.
 2. The second part is the revisionist group: the Soviet Union and Vietnam plan to hit us even harder, specifically by creating internal traitor forces and using cover forces from the outside. This contradiction is a sharp, profound one: they have been attacking our Party by creating a new party since 1962. Previously when Vietnamese troops entered our

country they carried out successive activities to build traitor forces. Later we attacked the traitor strings in the Southwest, Koh Kong, Kampong Seila, and Sector 33, until we drove the Vietnamese from our territory.

Even though the traitor groups have already been fundamentally smashed, Vietnam still continues to lead the remaining groups to continue their activities. The exposed groups have been evacuated outside by Vietnam. Our Party concludes that the struggle against them will continue, but they must build other forces for use in the long term, handing us the opportunity to strengthen and expand and became stronger. The past victory in eradicating the traitors was one more great marvelous victory after the great victory on 17 April. We were able to seize victory in waging open war with the American imperialists, but we also went on to seize victory against espionage, especially in the quiet war of the revisionists. Why? Because of our correct Party lines do not come from technology. These traitor forces were embedded for a long time, and this has been the history of major treason inside our Party.

The enemy has put in place plans to attack us by embedding deeply for the long term, going deep inside the Army, deep inside the base areas, and even holding important leadership positions too. These are major traitor leaders. This has been a major experience for us. It is imperative to further examine our cadres in terms of their biographies and their implementation of the Party line as well. This is one more lesson that teaches us that they want to attack us from the outside ~~in the fashion used in Angola~~ by creating internal turmoil, and only then attacking from the outside in a form similar to Angola and Czechoslovakia. This teaches us that when our party is detailed in going around doing quiet work, meticulously searching, it is difficult to attack us. But the enemy sees our weak point as being that our forces are not prepared for combat and are busy only with crop production work. If they were to attack immediately, we would find it difficult to assemble forces to counter in a timely fashion. This is if they use traitor forces to attack us immediately -- but this does not mean they will be able to defeat us.

2. Measures:

1. The view and stance of high revolutionary vigilance appears in the flesh in implementation, as a reflex of revolutionary vigilance, having a deep view on class contradiction, on the tense struggle between us

and the enemy. This contradiction is sharp: sharp in the sense that we have the advantage over the enemy.

2. One more measure is that it is imperative to screen/purge the troops by grasping their biographies clearly and monitoring their implementation of the Party Line, seeing if they are in a free state or in a state of distorting the Party Line in all fields.

3. Military measures:

With the entire country, let the Military Staff have discussions with the Zones. Wherever the Center Army is located, we will take measures, especially in the defense of Phnom Penh. One division must prepare one battalion of forces weapons and with ammunition and vehicles to be constantly on standby. This battalion specifically must prepare one company with the objective of defending the radio station, Angkar's location, and the Military Staff location. Select people that are clean in terms of politics, ideology, and organization. Arm them with light weapons: AKs, light machine guns, M-79s, B-40s, B-41s. Deploy this force at the city's important target areas, and maintain constant radio contact with the Military Staff. The location of this deployed company must have fast vehicle traffic, without obstacles, in order to have mastery when attacking rebels carrying out a coup and in order to prevent enemies from the outside from bombing and emplacing their forces.

Tasking of this company:

1. When on duty and guarding a location, maintain constant contact with the Military Staff; be ready for combat; carry out some patrols by using a normal appearance, not allowing anything strange to appear similar to an emergency.
2. Clean up the city near residence sites.
3. It is imperative to organize on site and to make carry baskets for the Salt Fields. Another issue is the livelihood of the brothers and sisters: this company must get a ration of two cans starting on 20 October in order to maintain the health of the troops to be ready to defend the country.

I wish to emphasize the importance of meticulously preparing the personnel, because the personnel are the decisive factor.

The meeting unanimously and completely agreed with the presentation of Brother 89.

Opinion of Brother 89:

- I. The draft proposal to prepare the battle plans. Request the organization of a committee with Comrades Nath, Teanh, Rèn, Saom, and the division secretaries.
- II. The enemy attacks us in the following ways:
 1. The enemy attacks by coup, striking quickly. In this case it is imperative to ready quick mobile conditions to counter within 15 minutes. The targets for the enemy attacking us are Angkar's location, the Ministry of Propaganda, the Military Staff Office, and logistics sites.
 2. It is imperative to prevent the enemy from striking and penetrating into Phnom Penh with overt forces. The objective is to prepare one company of forces inside the city and also in the rice fields to strike quickly. Therefore, it is imperative to prepare vehicles with mastery.
 3. If the enemy attacks us at the border, it is imperative to move troops within two to four hours, mastering personnel, weapons, and food supplies.
 4. In the case the enemy carries out guerilla attacks, it is essential to use the patrolling forces.
- III. Troop deployment principles:
 1. Deploy to defend the perimeter for which they are responsible at all costs and to be able to go out to intervene at the designated targets.
 2. Do not deploy near other units. Must prepare mosquito nets, mats, weapons, and ammunition at all times.
 3. The brothers and sisters must meticulously respect organizational discipline and must constantly have shift relief signals.
 4. Must prepare constant radio and telephone communication.

5. Troop deployment locations must have one division cadre or regimental cadre in order to have the right to contact Upper Echelon.
6. In the rice fields, troops must be deployed with mastery to facilitate rapid assembly to help intervene both inside the city and at the border.
7. In terms of Logistics, propose preparing vehicles for the division and vehicles for themselves, 12 vehicles for the division.

II. Food supplies and rice rations:

Estimation by the numbers for the production side to know: we have 1,608 tons of rice. So then, give the production units a ration of two cans; the offices get 1 ½ cans.

- III. The study session proposed to convene on 20 October. We will meet on 19 October in case divisions from far way do not arrive and the Phnom Penh division is busy preparing forces.
- Prepare quarters and rations when studying mixed together
 - Group leaders responsible for security

IV. Rice and other issues:

1. Late rice already transplanted; propose caring for it well
2. Push mid-season rice. Request statistics on where this can be done with mastery of water.
3. High water rice at Cheung Ek, Boeng Snao, Neal Loeung
4. Corn planting: when the water recedes, 703 and 290
5. Propose planting a lot of vegetables
6. Propose raising animals because we already have the rice bran
7. Rice: Each division it to provide statistics on how much has been obtained, and how much has been milled. Must have Logistics designate this.